Monte Cassino Question

Very good post Sheldrake!

Mark Clark was probably the least effective army commander the US had in the later war period. Not hideously bad perhaps but definitely not on the same page strategically with US war goals. Probably should never gone beyond a Corps command.

 

The thing is buck starts at George Marshall and Harold Alexander and goes all the way down in unimaginative way Italian Campaign handled. It wasn't a loss. It helped general Allied strategy quite a lot. BUT a lot more could have been accomplished there and casaulties could have been lower.

Mediterranean Theater of Operations and Strategy was Churchill's project since 1940 (or maybe all the way back to Great War echoes of Gallipoli ) to open up another front to damage the Axis by fighting weakest of its members -Italy- , to reach Balkans get airbases in region , to distribute Wehrmachts strength and bomb Romenian oilfields , take out wheat and fodder supply to Germany from that area. After all British Army lost its equipment in Dunkirk and thrown away from Continent for a seems like a considerable time. Western Europe German Armed Forces appeared victorious and strongest. Due to weakness of their land army (population base was never huge in UK) British strategy always assumed an indirect approach to deal with continental enemy on Europe with massive army and resources (remember the Napoleonic Wars ) unless a strong ally with equal resources could be gained on continent. So along with blockade , strategic air campaign , creating and supplying resistance organizations , pulling Wehrmacht forces from main theater of operations and engaging them on periphery on Europe with attrition along with their allies seemed best option for Churchill and Imperial Chiefs of Staff.

Between 1940-42 British had mixed sucess in Mediterranean Theater (after mid 1942 along with US assistance they did good though ) unfortunetely General George Marshall US Army Chief of Staff and main advisor to President Roosevelt did not agree with this peripherial strategy. According to Marshall since Germany was enemy number 1 best way to deal with it was to land Western Europe prefferably France defeat German Army , reach Germany and get its industrial base. Other strategies like air bombing or Mediterranean Theater were waste of time and resources. But after US entering the war US strategists followed British strategy in Mediterranean since it was their turf , they were more experienced engaging with Germans and Italians fighting longer than Americans , providing necessary manpower. Up until mid 1943. Then things began to change toward US strategic way of "engaging enemy directly head on" That meant opening up a Second Front with massive forces on Western Europe. USA began to provide majority of resources , material , credits , US Army was taking shape though still lacking experience (Mediterranean Campaign was very valuable on that regard although Marshall did not wish to accept this , saying Operation Torch was a just a much required public entertainment ! ) Along with Soviet pressure about handling the major weight of German war Second Front became a priority and got a date in Washington and then Quebec Conferances in 1943. After that Italian Front was destined to became secondary in resources although it was not even opened up yet !

As for direction of campaign Allies also had to deal with predictabilty of their strategy. After capturing Sicily and evacuation of remaining German forces from island in August 1943 , Feld-Marshall Albert Kesselring CiC of Mediterranean Theater correctly predicted next steps of Allied military moves concerning Italy (which was about to leave Axis and war , a fact Kesselring was also aware of ) Combined Allied HQ led by Eisenhower and Harold Alexander was reluctant to operate outside of Allied air cover. Their operations was always took that on regard ( a wise consideration since Allied land forces were still green and not as well motivated , experienced or drilled as Germans and usually defeated their enemies on battlefield only with air and naval support. Unfortunetely it also made Allied strategy transparent ) That left Salerno bay south of Naples obvious place to land since that was the maximum range of Allied air cover based on Sicily. Operation Avalanche was already comprimised on that regard. After that and Allied advance from Salerno and Taranto toward north Germans retreated but fought skillfully traded ground for time , resisted always in multiple defence lines including most formidabble of them Gustav Line south of Rome which contained Cassino.

Gustav Line was hardest nut to crack. Between Thyreneian and Adriatic Sea and based on Apeninnes it hold all approaches to Rome. Allied head on assaults to that defense was bound to fail because it was designed that way. Only was to overcame it was either concentrate most of Allied forces on one flank of line and overwhelm it (that was what Operation Diadem , fourth battle of Cassino was all about ) or seaborne landing behind its back. Allies tried latter in Anzio in January 1944 but of course it failed because Allied naval transport resources just spared enough landing craft to land one corps to set up a bridgehead and defend it not more to enlarge it or overflank enemy behind. That is due to fixation to Operation Overlord landing on France and diversion of most of Allied amphibious landing resources to England. Marshall's fixing it killed Operation Shingle.

During Diedam and Operation Buffolo Clark gave very controversial orders. He was a careerist plain and simple , focusing on his image before anything else. It was probably one of the reasons Eisenhower left him in Mediterranean , his ego and hard to control nature would be damaging (two egoists like Monty and Patton would be enough for SHAEF anyway ) to Overlord. His order to focus on Rome after Anzio breakout saved 14th German Army. Alexander couldn't control him because Alex despite all of his gifts as an Army Group Commander (I think he was the main architect of Tunis Victory along with Monty ) was not good in holding and gripping his subordinates , he let them to fight their own battles. Even worse he couldn't make his own authority feel over them (During Sicily Campaign Montgomery advised Patton to ignore whatever Alex commands since that was what he did all the time !) Besides in that stage of war complaints of a British Theater Commander about one of his American subordinates wouldn't sound good in Washington where Allied unity was paramount. American resources and strategy was decisive not British. So Clark was confident that he had Marshall and War Department's backing and did whatever he wanted.

Weird thing both Clark and Alexander promoted after that. When Alexander took over CiC of Eastern Mediterranean in November 1944 Clark took his job and became commander of 15th Army Group in Italy. Good thing is professional soldiers not careerists or egoists took over army commands after that. Sir Richard McCreery one of the best British generals of entire war (and least heard of because he disliked publicity ) after Slim and Montgomery was appointed to the head of 8th Army and Lucien Truscott , one of the most experienced and hard working US generals of war took over 5th US Army. Combined with Clark did what Alex did to do their work and let them free , gradual German weakness in Northern Italy as war ending and new Allied equipment and gained experience in mountain warfare made last Allied assault over Gothic Line in Northern Italy over Apenines a huge victory in April 1945.

I always wondered why men like McCreery or Truscott were not given a chance before for commanding armies in Italy. McCreery involved planing of Second Battle of Alamein and he commanded 10th Corps excellently in Salerno , led 10th Corps with distinction in Italy. Truscott involved Combined Operations since Dieppe , he was in Operation Torch , commanded 3rd US Infantry Division and made it best drilled outfit in US Army , participated Sicilian Campaign. He then took over beleguarded Anzio beachhead , led 6th Corps etc. Those guys were movers , decisive proffesional soldiers unlike Clark.

Italian Campaign accomplished its main purpose from US strategic perspective , pulled scant German reserves to Italy but so much more could have been accomplished there.

 

On balance, a good assessment of the Italian theater.

But you might think I had gone soft if I didn't nit-pic it to some degree.

I believe you are being too harsh on both Marshall and Alexander. Marshall was a product of the American way of war, which promoted the idea that victory can only be gained when you move directly against an enemy. A sideways approach, while it could hurt an enemy, was almost never fatal to them, and simply prolonged the war, thereby insuring more casualties and continued dislocation of your economy.

During the Indian Wars, capture, destruction or the forced movement of the village/capitol usually ended the war, where as skirmishing with the braves often led to inconclusive results. The Mexican-American, despite major US battlefield victories, did not end until Mexico City was captured. In the early stages of the American Civil War the Union employed the "Anaconda Plan", very similar to classic British strategy, that hurt the Confederacy but failed to provide the fatal blow. Only when Union Armies carved deep into the south was the Confederacy forced to accept defeat.

It must be remembered that while influenced by Marshall, the direct approach was the wish of FDR as well, who had a major Pacific War that had to won after the European war was concluded. In his mind he had given Churchill and the British a major bone by deciding that the European war was to get priority over the Pacific. We take this as a given now, but in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, most Americans expected us to concentrate on Japan since they "stabbed us in the back while talking peace".

Had FDR ordered Marshall to invade Europe from Italy or Greece with the bulk of American forces he would have said yes sir and done his level best to make it happen, No he would not like it, but he would never go behind the Presidents back once a strategic decision had been made.

The diplomatic planning dance that characterized both the Italian and NW European campaigns was a matter of perception to both parties. The British got a commitment to hold off Overlord for limited American support for the Italian campaign, America agreed to limited support for an Italian campaign for a firm date for a cross-channel invasion. While they sound the same, each perceived it differently and could by compared to the amorous youth, who convincing his date to shed her blouse is confident that convincing her to drop her skirt will soon follow.

The Americans kept their knickers on and it was the British who had to comply.

As for Alexander, his position was more than an Army Group commander but that of a Theater commander, or in effect a smaller version of what Eisenhower was. Ike too had trouble keeping all his generals on a tight leash and had to suborn his personal preferences to maintain unity among a multi-nation military alliance. In many ways a thankless job since you can never make everyone happy and one that even if you win, as both did, there will still be complaints from all sides that you showed favoritism to one side at the expense of the other.

Lastly I do not think we can blame the Allies for insisting that invasions be undertaken only within the range of air cover. One, because all such except for a handful of minor ones did so (including German, executed and planned), and due to the extreme complexity and risk that such maneuvers presented.

The failure to try and trap the German 10th Army was a grave blunder, and Clark's fault, but over all without compromising the timing Overlord by committing more assets I can't a much better outcome for the Italian campaign. Even If you did what have you got if you are in the Po valley in say the spring of 1944?

Rather crappy options I think. Turn left and fight through the French-Italian Alps, Go north through the German-Italian Alps or Right into the Hungarian plain. Only one is a direct path to the heart of Germany and that through about the worst route (Brenner Pass) imaginable for a Mechanized/Motorized Army like the Anglo-American.

 

Don't get me wrong. Marshall along with Imperial Chief of Staff Alan Brooke were chief masterminds who devised a workable strategy to bring down Axis as soon as and as minimal as casaulties possible Although they couldn't always get along together during war time conferances (like their protegees Ike and Monty) both had immense value to shape main strategy and advised their leaders (Roosevelt , Churchill ) best of their abilities. Marshall is the man who created and organized material effort to bring down Axis. He created US Army from a peace time corps to a massive global army , armed it , trained it , created the organizational structure to support it overseas. As for strategy although he was ultimately right about getting Continent with a massive land army equal to Wehrmacht and defeat it , getting to Germany and defeat it utterly he was wrong about timing (Both Marshal and Eisenhower intended to invade France and create a bridgehead in 1942 in a proposed Operation Sledgehammer That operation would be without air cover , logistical support base and only with two US divisions based in Britain supporting which would be a predominantly British affair , a suicidal one also a grand self sacrifice scheme to show Russians like a larger Dieppe. Thank God Churchill and Alan Brooke had guts to say no to this plan ) In 1942-43 period only logical theater where Allies could engage and weaken Axis war effort could be in Mediterranean. They had resources , logistical bases , ports in the region , an existing logistical infrastructure and geography made easier to strike a number of strategical targets catching Axis off balance. (Torch was complate shock for Hitler and Mussolini , Husky was so well wrapped up with a deception plan Hitler refused to send any reinforcement to Sicily after landings )

The thing is even after success of Mediterrenean Campaigns Marshall continued to undervalue and dismiss this theater as a distraction , a waste of time and worse a neferious British imperial scheme to sucker American resources. US Army was not ready to invade France in 1942-43 it needed experience , overwhelming superiorty in logistics , support and numerical superiorty (US Army does not defeat it enemies it overwhelms them is an exegeration but also has a ring of truth ) and safe sea trasport lanes between UK - US plus air superiorty over Europe. None of them were complately achieved until 1944. During amphibious stages of Operation Torch invasion of French Northwest Africa and Husky invasion of Sicily so many things went wrong , so many mistakes made during initial landings with so much chaos and confusion a much more determined enemy resistance in these operations would probably throw them back to sea. Allies perfected mass amphibious landing operations in Mediterranean from Gallipoli ameteurishness to Overlord professionalism. It would be much more logical for Marshall to step away from grand strategy for a moment and gave more amphibious support to Italian Campaign (like Anzio ) at the expense of other theaters like South West Pacific (MacArthur could complain all he wanted who really cared if he returned Phillippines six months later than intended ) or Central Pacific (King could use a few humblings)

Until then best Marshall could hope was to erode enemy in Italy with further operations since Germany was declared enemy number 1....Instead when Operation Sledgehammer was rejected in 1942 both Marshall and Admiral Ernest King were so incensed they proposed to cancel Germany First policy and concentrate entire US war effort on Pacific. That was purely a blackmail effort to force British strategists to accept Sledgehammer. I respect Marshall immensely but this was as low as he could get. Again Thank God Roosevelt made the correct choice and supported Churchill and Alan Brooke on that. Focusing Japan at the expense of Germany and Europe would solve nothing except giving Germany more time to strengthen its defenses on Europe and its war effort , give occupied European states more motivation to collaborate , give more reason to Russians to distruss Western Allies and make their share of power much larger in post war Europe. After rejection of Sledgehammer Marshall only focused Second Front in Europe and Allied war effort in Mediterrnean Theater suffered. 5th US Army became a dumping ground for mediocre commanders like Clark , Dawley or Lucas. War effort in Italy could have been sustained much better without interfaring preperations of Bolero ( transportation of US Army to British Isles ) or Overlord. Admitted Marshall was also dealing with general war production , organization plus demands of General Hap Arnold and US Air Force and their strategy for winning the war by constant strategic bombing or King and MacArthur's constant demands for more resources in Pacific. Still he could make better priorties taking war on Germany whatever means first and getting Pacific in second.

 

belasar you also mentioned Anaconda Plan from American Civil War. My info about that particular conflict is not extensive but I seem to remember Anaconda Plan implemented by Union , isolated rebel states from Mississippi and from Atlantic Ocean by blockade and cutting sea trade did more than hurt the Confederancy. It destroyed the economy of South ,wiped out whatever trade (either cotton or textiles) or industrial base by cutting Confederacy from outside world and made recognition of Confederacy impossible by other European powers. It made South's ability to continue the war and willing to sustain the fight impossible in long term and sapped both material power and morale of Confederate armies. Confederacy recognized by Europe and had a stable economy by cotton trade with overseas would be stronger and much more harder if not impossible to invade by Union which already spent quite a bit effort and lives to accomplish that. South would be in a much better position to deflect Union blows and resist.

Same thing with World War I. British naval blockade of German ports and cutting German overseas trade destroyed German economy , created hunger in population and at the end created necessary political conditions for German Revolution in 1918 fall which caused Germany to seek armistice. German Navy tried same thing with submarine warfare They failed. British succeeded

Another one. British Royal Navy also used blockade weapon against Revolutionary-Napoleonic France too between (1793-1814) which caused almost collapse of French economy and made Napoleon take irrational decisions like invading Iberian Peninsula and Russia. They caused his downfall. Indirect approach like these especially in Total Industrial Warfare can be very useful for undermining enemy strength considerably before min killing blow no matter how powerful it is. Marshall should have looked these historical examples more closely.

 

I definetely agree about that Italian-Austrian Alps in Brenner Pass is a terrible place to fight. During WWI Austrians stopped much larger Italian forces on these mountains with fewer resources. Getting Reich from south was out of question and a pipe dream of Churchill. Still capturing Po Valley (a major food resource for Reich ) , Northern Italy industrial base and complate or partial destruction of German Army Group C would be worth the effort and divert much more significant German resources to defend Austria and Central Europe. Adolf couldn't create army groups out of thin air. 15th Army Group once reached Po Valley could turn right enter Yugoslavia and unite with Tito's Partizans plus endengaring entire fuel suply of Germany in Romenian oilfields by constructing closer airbases in Northern Italy.

 

I suspect we are more in agreement here than not.

We sometimes forget that as democracy's America and Britain had to base some of their strategic decisions on how they were perceived domestically. That being said, they made much better choices than their Totalitarian enemies who could safely ignore such considerations.

Churchill not only had to win the war, he could not lose the Empire doing so, a very real possibility. Roosevelt had to balance two major wars at the same time (yes Britain had a commitment to fight Japan, but it was a true sideshow compared to its European commitment, indeed they might have sent nearly as much material aid to Russia as they sent to India)

Many years ago I read a book about FDR and his back channel efforts to divest Britain of her Empire. Certainly he wanted Britain and her commonwealth to survive, but felt the European Colonial empires were greatly responsible for both world wars and tremendous human suffering for the benefit of a few in Europe. Reports from OSS teams in Indochina would indicate that the natives hated the new Japanese overlords only slightly more than their French predecessors.

I was surprised by how much effort went into trying to balance war aims while doing as little as possible aid Britain (and France) in keeping or recovering their lost imperial possessions. Winning came first, but if it could be done without reinforcing the imperial position, that option was pushed. Yes Marshall and other American political and military leaders were hyper sensitive to anything that looked like it was intended to promote Britain's Empire at the expense of a speedy defeat of the Axis.

It must be understood that it was a somewhat common perception my many Americans of all strata that she had gotten 'suckered' into the First World War that was all about the expansion of colonial empires, and this perception was a main catalyst for American isolationism between the wars. Certainly it was not the number of war dead as they were much lower than her allies, but they still seemed a needless waste as imperial possessions were traded back and forth after the Great War.

Forgive the digression, but I felt some perspective on the American outlook was needed and I will try to get us back on track.

Marshall's pushing for a 1942 cross-channel attack was one of his few mistakes of the war and the British were correct to stall the operation, but I have viewed the "we're gonna take our Sherman's and go fight in the Pacific" as something of a political ploy on Roosevelt's part. Yes King truly believed this, but Marshall supported a Europe first strategy, and By coming down on Britain's side he (FDR) looked like the great peacemaker and someone that Churchill had to court with concessions of his own.

I suspect that from Marshall's perspective drawing off a German Army Group, supporting air assets, knocking out Italy from the war and making a minimal effort at a "Second Front" that pacified (to some degree) Stalin's demand for such, The Italian Theater had done all it was needed of it. Further the more sea-lift, air and ground assets sent there would only delay the buildup for Overlord. In theory assets could have been denied the Pacific, but realistically it could not for three reasons.

One there was much finger pointing in both the New Guinea and Guadalcanal offensives as they were fought on shoestrings and Washington could not afford to repeat this. Secondly a momentum had been achieved by these hard fought victories and to surrender this to allow Japan to further bolster their defences would have been decried post war as an even greater mistake compared to the Italian campaign (the Japanese penchant to actually fight to the last bullet as Hitler demanded, but rarely got from his Aryan supermen would have been particularly galling). Lastly FDR could not ignore public opinion at home who expected the Pacific war to won in a expeditious manner and not seen as sacrificed to keep Britain happy, i.e. we are not gonna get suckered again. Fair or not it was an American perception and as the primary engine for the Western Powers, Britain would have to accept the back seat.

I further suspect that Marshall saw Italy as the proverbial diversionary attack that allowed success to the main attack. In such you employ only enough force to sell the diversion while preserving the balance to ensure victory. It's never easy to ask men to die when they will have only a tangential part in the defeat the enemy, but it is a tactic or strategy that has been used since the beginning of organized warfare.

 

It is true that Churchill wished to preserve the Empire but I think there is a difference between criticizing or unwilling to participate an imperialist aggresive move and look for a Perfious Albinion scheme under every stone. Because British strategists were reluctant to accept US Strategy in 1942 did not mean that they did not wish to win the war or they have other interior motives , interests. Besides only Victorian romantics like Churchill could fail to see that British Empire was collapsing no matter who did what.....All I am saying Marshall as a strategist should have seen that. Besides he was a soldier. Post war policy making and geo political stragegy was not his job it was Roosevelt's. Marshall was tasked to win and end the war in most quick and effective way. A man as talented as him couldn't really believe that a green , unexperienced , badly equiped , untested and understregth US Army could take German veterans in 1942 or as soon as a landing succeeded Germans as a whole would throw their hands up and surrender en masse. He should have also considered alternatives.

By the way Britain's commitment to fight against Japan was as vital as US maybe more. They may have spared less resources but British stand in China-India-Burma Theater not only saved India from Japanese invasion and hold three Japanese field armies mobilized in Burma for both defense and offense , after Burma Road was cut in 1942 Northern Indian airfields around Assam were only link as supply and logistical support base left for Chank-Hai-Cheng's Nationalist Chinese Armies over Himalayas (airbases for HUMP Airbridge). Without that air bridge for supplies Chinese Nationalists would throw towel long ago under pressure of Japanese Imperial Armies (two thirds of Japanese Imperial Army was deployed in China btw. Chinese were holding Japanese armies main weight not USA or Britain) British Commonwelth stand in India-Burma frontier kept China at war.

I wonder if Roosevelt could be more merciful against Britain which bankrupted and sacrificed eveything in economy and manpower and USA got immensely richer and much more powerful a global superpower in its own right. If Marshall and US Military circles were less suspectful about British intentions with Roosevelt's motivation a more efficient strategy could have been developed. That's all I am saying. Still considering Roosevelt's deep (and mostly rightful after WWI Peace Treaties mess) dislike of colonialism and his public opinion/image considerations about 1944 election campaign (Pacific Theaters were vital about that regard as you mentioned) it was most unlikely.

That's all I will say on that regard. Sorry to extend this thread so long

 

On the contrary, I have found this most stimulating.

 

Almost all Allied war leaders thought their troops would preform much better than they did in their initial contact with the enemy. The collapse of the Anglo-French position in 1940 was a terribly rude shock to both governments, and this after Germany carved up Poland, Denmark and Norway (under the nose of the RN no less). Churchill was again stymied by the performance of his army in North Africa (and Greece) until 1st El Alamein. The fall of Singapore was perhaps the greatest shock of all to Churchill a year and a half into the war.

Marshall over estimated what his troops could do in 1942, scant months after entering the war, a very common failing among Allied leaders, but then Churchill was still making that mistake after a year and a half.


As for Britain's commitment to the Pacific war I think you are laboring under several, quite understandable, misconceptions. First let me say I would never question the sacrifice of any servicemen who fought, where ever that may be, and concede that the British 14th Army has never gotten its due, but I still stand by the argument that the British Commonwealth commitment in this area was at the lowest priority for the war and did not change until Allied forces were at Germany's Frontier.

The first misconception was the threat to India. The Japanese drive ended in early 1942 with the conquest of Burma which achieved its primary goal of cutting the Burma Road Route to supply China. From this time until early 1944 Japan was content to hold this position and was effectively on the defensive, posing no imminent threat To India. For the balance of 1942 and 1943 it was the British who were trying to get into Burma and roll back the Japanese. For the most part these efforts were seen as less than spectacular in their execution and results.

Several factors led the Japanese to re-evaluate its defensive posture in Burma, the Chind-it and Merrill's Marauder raids, the reorganization of the British Eastern Army into the 14th Army under Gen. Slim who corrected many of the previous mistakes made by British forces and the effective supply by Air and construction of the Ledo road. That latter which negated the effectiveness of holding Burma.

In the late spring of 1944 Japan executed its Operation U-Go, the last grand offensive launched by the Japanese Army and the only serious attempt to invade India. By Japanese standards a major undertaking in a ground offensive, but by western standards rather small (on D-Day we would land more Divisions in a single 24 hour period). The entire force consisted of some 5 Infantry divisions and one Tank Regiment who by this stage of the war were at a severe disadvantage in firepower, technology and logistics compared to a Western force of similar size, even one at the very bottom of the priority list as 14th Army was (many of their tanks were M3 Grant's).

This brings us to a second common misconception, the force structure of the Imperial Japanese Army. Japan did not employ a Corps unit as in the Western armies. Their "Army" was in fact a Corps sized unit consisting of 2 to 4 Divisional sized units and attachments. The three army's you cite were most likely the 15th, 28th and 33rd, but again these would better called Corps in actual size and ability.

Nor can we compare Britain's deployments to America's in the Pacific-CBI region. While the 14th Army was fighting in Burma and a equivalent force of Anzac's under McArthur, the US had the 6th and 8th US Army's and the USMC (6 plus Divisions itself) and the greatest war fleet ever assembled operating in the Pacific. A far greater percentage of America's military was committed to this region than by the entire British Commonwealth, but then again we had it to spare and was deeply motivated to win.

Lastly I do agree America and Britain could have done a better job of coordinating their efforts and a mutual suspicion of each parties motives prevented that, but on balance it is a minor point in my opinion and I can not cite a better united effort between two powers who did have different outlooks, agendas and capabilities.

 

The view of Monte Cassino has been coloured by the counter factual debate about whether Italy should have been invaded at all.

This determination of the US Army to try to open a second front in Europe ASAP may have been influenced by several factors. 1) Europe was the only place that the huge 100 division US Army could be deployed. 2) If the Army did not put up a convincing argument that it would use the resources in a sensible time frame, the priorities would be switched to the US Navy or USAAF. It was politically unacceptable to argue "Germany first" while doing nothing for two to three years. 3) This was a coalition and the Red army, in 1941-43 looked as if it needed urgent help to defeat the Germans. The US Army expected setbacks and to take losses and were prepared for initial failures. Their historic tradition and models were based on the US Civil War and "Bull Run" "Fredericksburg " and Chancellorsville were part of a learning experience that led to Appomattox via Gettysburg and the Wilderness. The US had not been a major participant in WW1 and military planning could be quite callous by Western European standards.

Lets return to the C word. The US were part of a coalition, with the British as partners. The British were horrified at the risks the Americans proposed to run in 1942 and 43. (Brooke, who liked and admired Marshall, wrote of interrogating Marshal about what he wanted to do with a ten division landing in Northern France in 1942. What direction did he want to exploit? etc.) Brooke did not appear to grasp the scale and simplicity of the US plan: Mobilise and deploy 100 divisions to France where they can fight the Germans - France because that's the only space big enough in Western Europe. If the first ten divisions were defeated there was another 90 and the resources of America mobilised for a crusade. This wasn't an approach the British could afford to take. The British had already been kicked out of Europe on three occasions (France Norway and Greece), and were at the limits of their resources. To the British; the American plans all seemed to ask the British to deploy their last army in Europe on a series of risky ventures where the initial casualties would be disproportionaly British.

Coalitions need to find plans which satisfy their partners or they fall apart. The compromise achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of two democratic governments was remarkably effective. The solution adopted worked out far better than the US planners might have expected. There was simply no prospect of a successful D day until the U Boats had been driven from the Atlantic, which was not until May 1943. It is hard to see a 1942 D Day as anything other than a bigger version of Dieppe, which is also the likely fate of a 1943 battle for Normandy mounted with the troops available in Europe in July 1943 and Italy still in the war.

The historic development of the war worked out far better. The North African campaign allowed the US Army to be blooded where the geography and resourced favoured the allies. The setback at Kasserine pass was not fatal. The US could deploy and test a First IX (Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Truscott, etc) with manageable numbers of troops. The rest of the Tunisian campaign allowed the US Army the time to learn and apply lessons. A similar set back on the French coastline might have ended up with the entire army in the bag. The invasion of Sicily allowed the allies to try out the techniques they would need for Overlord, against a modest, outnumbered enemy. Op Husky was a huge strategic success. It was cited by Hitler as his reason for abandoning his 1943 offensive in Russia (Op Ziterdelle) at a point where some commentators have argued that his forces were on the brink of victory.

The invasion of Italy took Italy out of the War and opened a second front which absorbed a German Army Group of 20+ divisions and forced the Germans to deploy a further 20+ divisions in SE Europe to to take on the occupation activities undertaken by the Italian army. The Italian campaign was fought in a geographically remote peninsular, which enabled the Allies to deploy a single Army Group of 20 Divisions into Europe without the Germans being able to mass the resources to throw the allies into the sea.

The troops involved in the Italian "side show" disproportionately damaged the Germans more than the Allies. The key battle for Operation Overlord was to secure a lodgment area where the remainder of the US Army could be deployed direct from the USA - the Normandy campaign. The balance of forces available in the Normandy campaign was the result of a race to build up forces between the Allies, using sea and air; and the Germans, by road and rail. The Allies had a lot more troops , but only limited shipping. The Germans had fewer troops in total, but it was easier for them to be concentrated by road and rail. The allies won the battle for the build up. After an attritional battle lasting seven weeks the Germans ran out of troops to plug gaps and the Allies broke out. The 20+ divisions German troops in Italy and the casualties incurred throughout the campaign were not available on D Day in France to fight the crucial battle. Even if the troops of the 15 AG not been deployed in Italy, they could not have been used at the lodgement phase of Op overlord, because the number of troops was limited by shipping capacity. Even at the end of the Normandy campaign there were many US Divisions forces still waiting to be deployed. (E.g. (99th 100th & 106th ID 9th, 10th & 11th AD). If there had been no Italian campaign there would just be more US troops waiting to be shipped.

There is a parallel with the US Civil War. Arguably the war was won in the West, with the Confederate states split and dismembered by larger Union forces. The Eastern campaign, (and various incursions along the coast) however inconclusive, tied down CSA troops that might otherwise have made a difference on the West. Given that the Union had the preponderance of forces, it made sense to deploy on as many fronts as the CSA could be forced to deploy their smaller resources.

Instead of looking at the Italian campaign as a side show, it might be more constructive to consider it as a successful diversion, which succeeded in tying down Germans which might have made a difference elsewhere. it did not matter to the allies for this purpose exactly where they were fighting the Germans in Italy. Sure the air force wanted bases near Foggia, but whether the battle was North or South of Rome only really mattered to Mark Clark - and the Italians themselves. Whatever faults there might have been in the execution of allied operations around Monte Cassino, the overall aim was achieved. On D Day there were hundreds of thousands of German combat troops in Italy and even some en route from France. The battles around Monte Cassino played their part in defeating the Nazis and liberate Europe.

I think this might be a better way to remember the remember the sacrifices of the soldiers who fought and died in the Italian Campaign.

 

I know I am treading on a well worn path, but.....The Allied troops had a hell of a time trying to get up that hill with The Abby on top of it...because of all the German firepower coming down on them. This went on for days, or weeks maybe.?
But the Germans were not actually INSIDE The Abby...they were just all around it...taking advantage of the high ground.
Is that kind of what was happening.?
Thanks

 

denny
Thanks for reviving what is, IMHO the best and most powerful thread on this forum. The one who, above all else, sets the standard by which all else must follow.

Yes. The German command, (Commanding Officers: Colonel General Heinrich, Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff of the German 10th Army) on more than one occasion, communicated with the allied forces that no troops were in the Abbey.
That groups of troops were permitted to attend Church services on a regular and ongoing basis.
If you go back and read this thread thoroughly, and trust me, it is worth every moment of your time... you will find the details that back this up.

See also other equally good threads on this forum. Examples: http://www.ww2f.com/topic/41985-abbey-at-monte-casino/?view=findpost&p=469552&hl=%2Bmonte+%2Bcassino
plus http://www.ww2f.com/topic/42078-strategical-maps-of-monte-cassino/?hl=%2Bmonte+%2Bcassino
plus http://www.ww2f.com/topic/15630-question-about-monte-cassino/?view=findpost&p=287048&hl=%2Bmonte+%2Bcassino
plus, plus plus!!!

Be sure to also search through our sister forum which has literally hundreds of threads dedicated to this topic: http://ww2talk.com/forums/index.php

Note also that there are many extraordinary Italian websites dedicated to Monte Cassino.
And for heavens sake, don't miss checking out their toppo English Language Forum: http://www.comandosupremo.com/

Enjoy!

 

I will gives those a look. Thank You
My confusion, I guess, is that there was something declared "out of bounds" ...but there were troops all around it.
It is also kind of odd-ironic-hypocrytical...the way "we" pick and choose what is significant.
We wiped out the whole gorgeous city of Dresden...with much more architecture and art...not to mention tens of thousands of sleeping babies, children, elderly and refugees.....
War is Hell I guess.
Thanks again for all the links and suggestions.

 

Denny

You might find these links of help:

INDEX OF STORIES on BBC People's War Archives relating to the 49th LAA Rgt at Cassino.
IMAGE ATTACHED TO ARTICLE

Two Weeks in Dock in Naples and Not a Wound to Show for it!
Cover of Ron’s Army Album
Monte Cassino, March to May 1944
Lew Fox & Cover of Cassino Passover Service leaflet
Return to Cassino
[SIZE=12pt]Ron at Cassino British Cemetery[/SIZE]



Ron

 

So those are Your writing's.?
Will give these a read as well.
Thanks Again

 

Denny

If they are not, I'm in trouble.

Ron