Operation Barbarossa - the UK is neutral and Japan attacks Siberia

I'm not entirely convinced of US involvement in an Axis war vs the Soviets given the premise of a neutral UK without Churchill. Even to the extent of US Lend-lease to the Soviets.

It took Churchill a great deal of time and effort to persuade the US. To expect that kind of aide to be given automatically to the Soviets without the prior need of the British is a bit questionable, IMO. In fact, there is an argument to be had for saying that the collapse of the British will encourages those forces wishing to focus US efforts at rearmament on the US, and not on other nations.

Arctic convoys can no longer assemble in England or Scotland, as yet another difficulty. RN wouldn't be providing escorts either.

Not sending a fleet halfway across the Pacfic to bomb Pearl Harbour has to save some oil for the Japanese....

Just how much oil did Japan manage to squeeze out of the captured territories for use in China / Korea / Japan?

 

More than traditionally is assumed

 

Really? What do you think is "traditionally assumed"?
Certainly Japan extracted quite a bit of oil in the DEI but not all that much of it actually reached Japan. There are some intersting numbers here:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm
and here:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Oil.htm

 

Other numbers can be found here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=65&t=87104
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/i/Oil.htm
https://ia802704.us.archive.org/18/items/effectsofstrateg53unit/effectsofstrateg53unit.pdf

However, until LJAd elaborates on what amount "traditionally is assumed", this is not worth pursuing.

 

The traditional claims were that Japan had no oil and was for its imports for 90 % depending on the US.
The following sources give an other picture

1)The AHF

Imports (in barrels a day)

1940:102000

1941:23000

1942:29000

1943:40000

1944: 13300

Home production (synthetics included)

1940:9600
1941: 10500

1942:12000
1943: 10500

1944; 10000
1945: 9300

2) A Japanese source (desperate war of Japan in the Pacific)

Domestic consumed heavy oil (including the civilians) in kbbl a day

1940:6727

1941:7569

1942:12156

1943:11874

1944;9078

1945: 2194

3)There is also the fact that the US oil exports to Japan (in millions of $) although decreasing in 1941 compared to 1940,were still higher than in 1935

1936:28.4
1937:43
1938:51
1939:45
1940:51
1942:28

Source = Japanese -US trade and rethinking the point of no return toward the Pearl Harbour

4) An other source gives for 1940 the following production figures (in millions of barrels)

Japan : 2.7
Manchuria : 1
Formosa : 1
Import from the SU : 1

A total of 4.7 million (650000 tons) for an import of 37 million (5.3 million tons)

Thus the Japanese domestic production was not that insignifiant as still is claimed

5) from source 2: production AND import from oil in the southin kbbl a day)

1942roduction :25940/import :10520
1943roduction : 49630/import :14500
1944roduction : 36930/import:4980
1945roduction :6550/import : 5410

 

They had...Between 1925 and 1927, each of the Big 3 US automobile manufactures had established an assembly plant in Japan. However, the demand for just was not there. Between 1925-1936, the Big 3 had assembled in Japan, almost 209,000 vehicles, while Japanese domestic automobile makers produced some 12,100 vehicles. If you think that is a lot of cars, just look at US vehicle production in 1925:
Ford - 1,669,847
Chevrolet - 306,479
Hudson/Essex - 269,474
Willys/Overland - 215,000
Dodge - 201,000
Buick - 192,100
Studebaker - 133,104
Chrysler/Maxwell - 132,343

However, in 1936, the Japanese enacted the Automobile Manufacturing Industries Law. Which was designed to protect and expand Japanese automakers and put foreign competition out of business. This measure was successful, and by 1939, all US auto makers had ceased assembling cars in Japan.

We must also remember the 1934 Petroleum Industry Law which was enacted to do essentially the same thing concerning foreign oil companies.

Thus, Japan was making it harder and harder for foreign companies to gain a foothold in Japanese markets, however, it did, at the same time, serve to expand Japanese industries.

 

Our mistake for asking LJAd to clarify...

Example

Are you kidding me?

In 1940, the Japanese were consuming 6,727,000 barrels a day? That is 2,455,355,000 barrels a year in consumption!

Both you and your source a full of bull.

Let's see...Japanese production and Soviet imports represent only 11% of Japan's petroleum needs...She imports the other 89%.

Japanese oil production is pretty insignificant when compared to her needs.

Can you clarify this. According to your "source", Japan is producing 9,468,100,000 barrels of oil a day in 1942. These are some very unbelievable numbers.

 

Those appeare to be starwmen rather than traditions. Even looking at wiki we find:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan%E2%80%93United_States_relations

So much for "no oil" and "90% deneding oh the US"
Here's another source for 1940 at least:
http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/japan-oil.htm
During part of the 30's the numbers did vary with ~15% coming from the USSR at one point. See:
http://japanfocus.org/-richard_j_-smethurst/3825/article.html

 

Wrong :imports are not the same as needs .

 

I never said they were...

You read and comprehend posts about as well as you read and comprehend your sources.



So...no clarification on the outrageous data in your sources is forthcoming then?

 

Given Japan's desire to build up an oil reserve in the late 30's and early 40's it can be argued with considerable merit that her imports did not meet her needs.

 

Even to this day, Is west coast of the Sea of Japan still underdeveloped on average to cities on the Japanese Archipalego ?

I think from a long term perspective, Japan shall act like Franco's Spain: friendly with Germany, send help for fighting with German allies, such as Finland. Finland fought against the USSR in lesser scales in 1920s and 1930s than that in the Winter War. Swedish and Japanese armoury would get a Finnish testing ground and because of this coincidence, Swedish and Japanese companies could cooperate in armoury research. Swedish artillery were well known for quality and thus could compensate Japan's weak firepower in armored vehicle. Maybe Bofors 75 mm Model 1929 would have arrived in Japan in the 1930s and be mounted on Type 97 Chi-Ha. Domestically, developing Japan's newly conquered lands such as Southern Sakhalin, Taiwan, would also be a priority.

Let me write off-topic a bit. If clock was to be turned back, the US shall let Japan take the whole Sakhalin. Japan developed the island more zealously than the Russian or Soviet. Not to mention if Japan held onto the whole island after ww2, it would not be isolated from overseas. Offshore oil and gas exploitation on the island have been paying for decade for the investing Japanese, American and Russian companies. Imagine all these revenues are Japanese.

 

The Japanese fought against the Bolsheviks during the Siberian Intervention and stayed in Russia until October, 1922. And all of their actions in China provided plenty of testing for their tanks.

Unfortunately, Swedish-Japanese tank design would not have produced much...All the Swedes had were light tanks that were little better than what the Japanese Army fielded at the time.

The Japanese had their own good AA guns(Type 11 & Type 88, both 75mm) all ready in production, and they could have been put into tanks had Japan so decided. Further, Japan also had the good Type 90 75mm field artillery piece that also could have gone into such tanks. However, neither the Swedes nor Japanese produced any pre-war tank that was capable of mounting such guns.

 

You compared production to needs,which is something that you should not do,unless you can first define needs,and define the correlation between needs/production/imports/consumption .

 

This is making the same mistake as Takao:before the war(1940) Japan imported 100000 barrels a day, in 1942 29000:was it so that the needs were much higher in 1940 than in 1942.

 

Probably a fault of the translator the( Japanese-English )translation is primitive .

Whatever, there is a contradiction between the AHF (using a Anglo-Saxon source) and the Japanese source:

The AHF gives for 1942 a daily oil production in barrels for the DEI of 65000,which is almost 3 million ton for the whole year .

The Japanese source gives a daily production (in barrels) of 26000 ton for the DEI,which is 1.35 million ton for the whole year .

 

If you would have bothered to read my sources, you would have seen all of that.

 

Read your "Japanese" "source" again...

Production is given in kbbl...That is thousands of barrels. So, it's not 26,000...But 26,000,000.

 

No mistake at all that I can see. Perhaps you should go into more detail so we can point out exactly where your hypothesis (if I can difnifie it as such) is wrong.

Oh I should mention another rather classic straw man embeded in the quote above.

 

In the bigger picture, Japan cooperation with Axis allies in weaponry development would have help Japan battlefield performance, which in turn would convince the decision maker whether to attack the USSR in Barbarossa. Soviet T-34 incorporates many features of previous Soviet tanks. If Japanese developers were very keen on taking new ideas, the developments of Czech vz38, Polish 7TP could all be ideas for a Japanese tank destroyer/assault gun like Stug3 which its battlefield performance contribute much of its usefulness, just as you mentioned AA guns could have been mounted on tanks if so decided. Why must a Japanese tank but not a TD/AG be mass produced to go against Soviet tanks ? With an AG like Stug3, could an AT gun with a larger calibre would be mounted ? In other words, other reasons shall decide why a Japanese tank like Chi-Ha be developed earlier. Would her isolation contribute to her slower development of tanks ?

In weaponry deployment, if Japanese infantry were fanatical in fighting, could weaponry development be directed towards amplifying their anti-tank performances without armor vehicles ? Like Bazooka, a turretless low silhouette Ha-Go with radio communication and diesel engine like stug3 would have appeared in 1930s. In my imagination, could stug3, panzerfaust, and bazooka armed Japanese infantry hold the coasts of the Sea of Japan againt swamp of Soviet weaponry ? Let me go off topic, Their performance could be tested in, say the Siberian Intervention as you mentioned, Spainish Civil War, or even Japanese participation in pushing the Dutch out of Sulawesi and New Guinea in 1920s.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Territorial_Evolution_of_the_Dutch_East_Indies.png

My point was to ask why Japanese weaponry development and deployment had not gone enough into amplifying infantry performance against tanks and fortification with firepowers. Had the nation's involvement since the Siberain Intervention, war in China contributed to its isolation from the West ? Why must Japan go into war to solve her problems ? Note that Japanese navy would be in control of the Sea of Japan and Soviet Navy was not that great. Imagine Japan in control of the whole Sakhalin and part of Outer Manchuria along the Amur estuary after the Siberian Intervention and before taking Inner Manchuria in 1930s. Her army held the Red Army in the mountain ranges with Navy and aircraft carrier support from the sea of Japan.