Operation Barbarossa - the UK is neutral and Japan attacks Siberia

In a nutshell, given all the troubles, Japan would better act like Franco' Spain with territorial control in Outer Manchuria and Sakhalin, plus wherever she control before the open conflict in 1937. Was the relation of the west coast of the Sea of Japan to Japan like that of Morocco to Spain ? No Soviet power in Morocco, shall I believe ?

 

Japan's government had evolved into a very strange and IMO rather warped one. The conflict with China wasn't due to a decision at the top of the government but by IJA officers on the scene. If Japan had been willing to withdraw from parts of China they had taken that likely would have solved her problems but they didn't feel they could do so. The problems with China is what drove the conflict with the West and it was one Japan couldn't win but didn't have the will to stop.

 

That depends...Germany and Japan were not exactly that close prior to 1938. Despite being at war with Japan, Germany was still supplying the Nationalist Chinese Army with arms and training.

The Japanese had plenty of experience with Russian BT tanks in 1938-39, which resulted in them upgrading their Type 97 Chi-Ha tank.

The Japanese did not need Czech or Polish tank hulls to create SPGs with...Their own tanks worked well enough(as was seen later in the war). Problem was that they lacked the production capacity to make lots of new tanks or SPGs. The most numerous tanks were the Type 95 Ha-Go Type 97 Chi-Ha. Both tanks, despite having production runs of several years, including wartime production, only amounted to about 2,400 of the Type 95, and 2,200 of the Type 97.

Had the need for an SPG arisen, Japan certainly could have produced one. For example, the Type 1 "Ho-Ni I" mounted the Type 90 75mm artillery piece, and the Type I "Ho Ni II" mounted the Type 91 105mm artillery piece. However, even though production was begun in 1941, only 138 Ho-Ni I & II were built throughout the war. They were also mostly retained for home island defense, and did not see their first combat until late 1944 in the Philippines.

Japanese tanks & SPGs need to be mass produced because you are getting into a pissing contest with the two biggest boys on the block. And the Japanese had already seen what massed Soviet BT tanks can do when handled properly.

As to Japanese tank development and better tanks. The need was not there in the 1930's, when their main enemy was China, which had, essentially, no tanks. Further, the logistical supply train was not there to support the use of large armored formations. Finally, the Japanese Army had become enamored with air power, and they were diverting most of their spare cash into building up their Air Force. So, no, Japan's perceived "isolation" (they were hardly isolated, and made good use of their military attaches) did not hurt Japan's tank development...Even the Germans were unaware of the T-34, and they had a very close developmental relationship with the Soviets before the war.

For the most part, infantry AT weapons were neglected by all countries, because there were very few pre-war tanks that required that kind of firepower to be destroyed, and it was not really foreseen that tank development would grow so quickly. Further, since all pre-war armies were working with mostly limited budgets, they were limited in what the could develop...If the need for such weaponry was not their, it would be very unlikely that such weaponry would be developed. Even the Allies did not come out with the Bazooka and PIAT until 1942, even though much of the groundwork for such weapons had already been done.

The Diesel engine myth was supposed to have been laid to rest...The Stug had a gasoline engine, and was not diesel.

The Germans did not do that well in holding off the Soviet juggernaut in 1944-45, I don't see the Japanese doing better with less.

No other nations had any real AT weapons outside of AT rifles and small caliber AT guns...So why would Japan suddenly have the desire to do so? Especially, when the vast majority of tanks did not require that level of killing.

Japan did not go to war to solve her problems, the Japanese Army went to war in China and created them.

Capturing all of Sakhalin Island, will not get Japan all that much, IIRC, Japan is already purchasing much of the oil produced there. So, it is not what you would call a "prize" worth fighting over.

I have grave doubts about a great Siberian victory over the Soviets in the 1930's. Japan could not defeat China, in the same timeframe, and China was far less well off, militarily, than the Soviet Union.

 

IMO that's a really impressive one sentence summary.

 

Well verse, Takao.

So if Japan had forseen her problem, why would she still go into war with Nationalist and Communist China openly in 1937 ? Analogously, would fighting the Soviet create more problems, not to mention at least some "booties" like coal were available in China ? I agree all that land around the Sea of Japan would not give much in term of resources to Japan but its geographical location blocked the Red Army intrusion if Japan had good enough military power. That was why I suggested Japan would have acted like Franco's Spain which guarded the west passage to the Mediterranean. Was Japan stronger than Spain ? Soviet navy was not the great in the East; without a major engagement with the US in the Pacific War, I believe the Japanese navy could handle by themselves guarding the Sea of Japan. With this naval support, the army would have an easier time on the west coast.

I agree that Japan lacked good enough mass production capacity for lots of new tanks and SPGs. I am not sure where to recall but building one fighter aircraft cost about several tanks. One way to get around - not cut corners - was to take as much battlefield experiences overseas as possible, even Japan engaged herself in it. Hostility between the East European nations and the newly born USSR would be good; Japan's main geopolitical entanglement on land had been the Russian/Soviet. Why not sent some experts to Eastern Europe and the Balkans to see how the Soviet engaged the other end ? If those battlefield experiences would have brought back to Japan, why not developed an assault gun to support the infantry and the tank gun based on Swedish Bofos design would be upgraded to engage tanks as well? One tank/AG model would accomplish all these tasks ecomonically, like the stug3 ?

In a nutshell, I do not see why Japan MUST get into war in Barbarossa against the USSR; however this non-engagement would not rule out support. Say infantry firearm and armored vehicle support for the Finns. (c.f. the Spanish engagement in the Eastern front). Spain had done it, why not Japan ?

 

The Soviet Far East is far less populous, and there was only one line of communication back to Moscow. Any serious, extended foray would look at severing / interrupting that path of communication.Such was not possible in China.

 

The Japanese had experts In Germany, looking at tanks. They even purchased a few and sold them back after examining.

 

I agree. Given the population in Japan, could the Russian Far East (not Siberia !), west coast of the Sea of Japan to be more precise, be an area of immigration ? Severing/ interrupting that path was indeed an aim.

From English wikipedia,

The Achilles heel was if Japan could hold it. In late 1930s to early 1940s, Japan would need to do that amidst Soviet and US pressure. Given that and the slow decline of population in those cities after the dissolution of the SU, could and shall Japan hold on to them from 1920s until today ?

 

Škoda Works was a prime example of Austria-Hungarian industrial might. In other words, the area of Bohemia (I do not want to use Bohemia because I do not mean the historical country) provided industrial might. For hydropower, Russian, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish companies could help develop local hydropower. In other words, synthetic and mined oil products would provide nation-wide use and hydropower for local use.

May I know your source for Japan exploiting shale oil in Manchuria from 1920s to the end of ww2. The Daqing Oilfields were discovered in 1959 under the PRC... If Japan had discovered the Oilfields, would the geological theory for predicting location of oilfield be changed ahead of time? Given that Japan followed Western European and German lines of theory, why not taking some East European -- Russian included -- theories ? Note that Tesla worked for Edison and resigned so besides Western European lines of theory did have merits, their human resources managements were also crucial to their success. Zaibatsu had already spotted opportunities in later 1910s to early 1920s; so prospecting Japan having Edison's and Ford's is better than not.

About synthetic oil, I agree with your assessment that Japan would have stop military intervention in China after taking Manchuria. Using resources and revenues from Manchuria, Taiwan and Japanese home islands to fund development in other areas. If no intervention since 1937, its 1930s technological development with help from European nations would much improved its oil syntheses and refinement. Solving the oil problem was the prime one among other resource issues. Even no shale oil, Manchuria solved many agricultural productions for Japan.

Tin, Nickel, Rubber and more Rice would be sought elsewhere -- the Dutch East Indies would be a target. Therefore, given newly administrated islands in West Pacific after ww1, amphibious landing onto Sulawesi and West New Guinea would be a start but would the Netherlands be left to its fortune ? In the timescale of 1920s to 1930s, the US had just led a diplomatic cause to push Japan evacuating lower estuary of the Amur and north part of Sakhalin. Why would Japan expect the US not intervening if Japan would launch anything against the Dutch ?

So far I have not even begun to discuss primarily any diplomatic and political. So this Japan joining the OB What-if topic holds if other what-ifs had fallen into right places.

 

From 1936 to 1940 Japan produced 18 million barrels of oil and imported 190 million of barrels .The military consumed 72 million barrels, the civilian sector 93 million .

 

knightdepaix, have you done any research into Japanese industrialization or are you just guessing as to what you think is important?

That may be, but it was rivaled, if not surpassed by, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

What did Skoda have that Mitsubishi needed? What parts of Skoda's production facilities was better or more inventive than Misubishi's? In what areas did Skoda excel that Mitsubishi didn't?

It is questions like these that you need to answer before just tossing out your thoughts on Eastern European partnerships.

Why would Japan need Russian, Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish companies to develop local Hydropower?

Japan was well versed in developing hydropower. In case you did not know, hydro was, on the average, providing Japan with 80% of her yearly power needs. In 1936, hydropower provided 19.5 billion kilowatt hours vs steam's 4.643 billion kilowatt hours. Japan was third in the world in hydro electricity production - with the US & Canada being #1 & #2. Further, Japan was increasing both her hydroelectric generating capacity and her steam generating capacity. Finally, Japan was also greatly expanding her steam power plants, because during the of 39-40, hydro was unable to fully meet the national base load for power.

Why would Japan waste "synthetic and mined oil products" to meet her national power needs when coal was in overabundance?
Your not making any sense with this.

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/presentations/AIChE%202003%20Spring%20National%20Meeting/Paper%2080d%20Stranges%20Japan.pdf

The Soviets did not find the oil in Daqing when China was a client state. So, why would Soviet "help" find it in the 1920's-1930's?

Tesla was many things, but he was not a geologist.

Ford was in Japan...Since 1925, but his theories and practices did not catch on in Japan as they did in the United States. Likely, because the demand was just not there. Thus there was no need for large mass production facilities at the time. Ford's Japanese production, till 1936, was some 10,000 Model As - a pittance of Ford's yearly production in the States.

 

Let me reply in reverse order.

Mentioning Edison and Tesla, Zaibatsu showed a comparison Japanese companies would have more management capability than new
research results. As you have mentioned, Ford -- a foreign management -- was in Japan. -- viewpoint A

Given that the probability of management than research and Daqing oilfield discovered in 1959 after ww2, Japan would be much less likely to find resource in Outer Manchuria to justify military approach there, except to counteract Soviet presence there. -- point B

Combining A and B, Japan could take in East European technology or technologists to help development: a what-if point C. Management issue in Japan would still be resolved itself. Why Takao must want Soviet technology was beyond my points.

As point C is a what-if, different and opposite views would be possible; however, this what-if C did not support Japan would attack Siberia, not just West Coast or the Sea of Japan or Outer Manchuria.

About hydropower, maritime, airborne, road and railway transport could not be supported by hydropower at those time but only hydrocarbons -- point D
Japan including Manchuria had coal production -- point E
Japan had tried synthetic oil production but failed -- point F
Japan had acquired mined oil production but did not have enough for national annual use -- point G

By combining points D to G, Japan needed hydrocarbons from synthetic and mined oil production to support various transports; using national hydropower production could not tell the whole story unless this production could be transform to something of local use -- transport for example. Given the technology at those time, such transformation was impossible. Therefore, Japan would still need to rely on synthetic and mined oil production. However, hydropower could still support industrial and home use for example.

So far I have been using common sense to explain my points. Use of sources to provide idea shall be understandable in reasons, would you not agree ?
Therefore, before going to source, why not sorting out what information would be needed?

Back to the topic of Takao's discussion of hydropower, if Takao would like to make an argument with hydropower, let all viewers discuss how the hydropower was produced or transformed to another form of energy -- how synthetic oil was produced from coal, distributed to users and used.

For the sake of discussing this thread and given my points above, a viewer could not rule out Japan imminent and surged need of synthetic from coal and mined oil production -- regardless of hydropower supply. As my point B showed, Japan was unlikely to find oil resources in Outer Manchuria, let alone Siberia. So my point C still stands: this what-if topic of Japan attacking Siberia during Barbarossa would not be a sensible idea.

 

Except Tesla had zero managment capability, so you are comparing research ability not business management capability.

Why mention the finding of the Daqing oil field in 1959? The Japanese already controlled that territory - It was part of their puppet state, Manchukuo. Further, there were plenty of other resources for them to get in outer Mongolia. Finally, Oil did not become the decisive issue until mid-1941.

Unfortunately for you, wanting Soviet technicians & technology was expressly one of your points

Or where you talking about another Russia that I am unaware of?

I an not sure what you are trying to say here, could you rephrase and clarify the "bold" statement...It does not make any sense.


Well, work beckons, I'll return to finish this sometime this afternoon.

 

The idea that Tesla having no management ability is one thing. How Zaibatsu and Ford's presence in Japan meant
comparing research ability not business management capability is beyond my past post. Mentioning Japan has not or not enough
business management capability was your point.

May I know what other resources Japan would get in Outer Manchuria besides coal, timber and tin? Oil, as mentioned,
would not be available until 1960, unless Japan suddenly used a ground breaking geological theory that specialist during ww2
would have very much low probability to derive.

My point was why could or would not to include East European, Russian included -- foreign to Japan -- technologies.
I do not see why it means Russian technology must be included. Do the words "could" and "would" mean a must ? Also,
if the reasoning from Tesla and Edison follows thru, the idea meant could include East European and Russian, and not a must.

This what-if for Japan attacking Siberia during the OB was not sensible.

 

Perhaps because it wasn't technological understanding that the Japanese were short of (in comparison to the Western states) in those first three decades of the 20th centuary. Japan's limits lay elsewhere.

For example, in the mid-1930s, the Japanese nominal wage rates were a tenth of those in the United States (based on mid-1930s exchange rates), while the price level is estimated to have been about 44% that of the US.

As indicated by the above, private sector consumerism was very weak, to say the least. You are talking about a country that literally had lept from a fuedal, medieval society to one capable of building the largest Battleship ever built, in the space of 50-60 years. It was definitely not an inability to seek out and exploit new knowledge or technology. They were well aware and staying abreast of scientific and technological advances.

 

Well, my point was more towards introducing to Japan the ability for mass production. Which would probably fall somewhere between business management and technological/developmental. While Japan was a growing industrial nation, she had not yet fully grasped the benefits of mass production that she would direly need in the coming war.

While Ford did have a presence in Japan...For the most part, the plant was an assembly plant, where vehicles arrived "knocked down" and were reassembled - The parts were manufactured in the United States.

Firstly, as I have already mentioned Japan already controlled the area where oil was found in 1959-60. So, that is a moot point, and I cannot fathom why you continue to bring it up as some kind of decisive point.

Secondly, the "Strike North" faction did not limit itself to Outer Manchuria, but Mongolia and Siberia as well. Wiki has a nice list of mostly available, period-wise, Siberian resources here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberian_natural_resources

Thirdly, it was not just simply a quest for resources and land. Those proponents of the "Strike North" faction also hoped to sever most of the ties that were bringing Soviet supplies to China. By severing those ties, it was seen as breaking the stalemate that had arisen between Japanese and Chinese forces. Without Soviet supplies, Chiang Kai Shek forces would be forced to yield to Japanese forces. Further, it was seen that by cutting the Trans-Siberian railroad the Soviet controlled regions of Outer Manchuria would collapse once they were cutoff from their main supply route.

Fourthly, the "Strike North" faction consisted of the most militant anti-communists in the Imperial Japanese Army, and by taking Mongolia, Outer Manchuria, and Siberia, they would create a rather large buffer zone between the Communists and Japanese territory.

Fifthly, with the "draw" at Lake Khasan in 1938, and their defeat at Khalkin Gol in 1939, the "Strike North" faction had suffered a severe blow to their "honor" and were wanting a "rematch" with the Soviets with which they could regain their lost honor.

So, while there were many natural resources to be had. They were not the only, nor do I think, most important of the "Strike North" faction's reasons for invading the Soviet Union.

First off, the few technologies you mentioned were not "foreign" to Japan, nor were the Eastern European, Russian...whatever, superior to Japan in these technologies, and in one, hydropower, inferior.

Skoda Works, your "a prime example of Austria-Hungarian industrial might." was at most equal to Mitsubishi Heavy industries, and at worst inferior to it.

Then, you brought up hydropower...Not knowing that Japan was the third leading nation in hydro-electric power generation.

You have yet to present some technology where the Eastern Europeans were superior.

From a Western point of view, attacking Siberia was not sensible.

But, then again, from a Western point of view, attacking South was also not sensible...Nor was choosing to go to war with the United States.

Yet, we see where that got us.

 

One of your previous points was pointing out I had singled out Russian technology while I incuded it as an example of East European source of tech. In your point of view, borrowing East European tech meant some tech there would be better than Japanese. Applying sloped armor on tanks would be an example. Well if your point was more towards introducing to Japan the ability for mass production and thus would probably fall somewhere between business management and technological/developmental, explain or state that viewpoint expressingly. You have demonstrated the ability to single out an understanding which you thought was an expressing viewpoint.

About resources, I was narrowing my post to that so post contents would be focused. Your understanding of my post shows me that you may have read the usage or repetitiveness of ideas or words as emphases of them.

So controlling the area that have oil in at decades after 1930s would not help bringing in more LOCAL resources to solve the problems from Japan's dwindling resources. I first suggested that oil was discovered in late 1950s and after a few posts my viewpoint become yours. You put that in my mouth as I have made it as a decisive point which was originally a suggestion. Thus, to an experienced posters like yourself, carefulness to reply to you would be prudent.

So let me just look at your remaining 4 points:

Not limiting to just Outer Manchuria for Japanese military would mean more than resources to be used. You pointed out that resources themselves were a factor but not a decisive one. You need to explain to readers to explain that how Japan military could solve other criteria.

The border between Nationalist China and Soviet Union was very long. How Japan by occupying Outer Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia could severe completely the land links is hard to fathom, not to mention more criteria are needed.

Buffer zone would be meaningful if transportation links were present. You mentioned the Trans-Siberian railroad would be one a major railway; could Japan just concentrate the effort of severing that rail-link ? By common sense, occupying a buffer zone needed more effort than severing a link. By your reasoning, should Japan take Chukchi and Kamchatka Peninsulas as buffer zones against Alaska ?

About regaining the honor, may the readers actually understand how a drive for regaining the honor was a decisive point for striking north ?

See ya, I return to real life.

 

Sloped Armor was a "East European Tech"?

You mean the sloped armor of these Japanese tanks?

Type 95 Light Tank "Ha-Go"


Type 97 Tankette "Te-Ke"


Type 97 Medium Tank "Chi-Ha"


Sloped armor that the Japanese were already using? That sloped armor?

I believe the viewpoint you first suggested was that if Japan had brought in enough foreign technicians to Daqing, the Japanese would have found oil. My viewpoint was that the oil was located in an area, that given the geological norms of the period, where it was not expected to be found. Thus, the foreign technicians would never have been looking there for oil there in the first place.

Further, the Japanese took over the territory, even though they were not expecting to find oil there. So, something other than the prospect of finding oil drove them to capture the territory.

So, your viewpoint has never become mine.

As to explaining how the Japanese military could solve other criteria...What other criteria do you want explained?

To sever the land link with the Soviet Union, the Japanese would have to take Sergiopol in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

http://tothosewhoserved.org/aus/army/ausarm04/chapter02.html

Which, as you can see, is quite a distance from Japanese positions in Manchukuo.


I don't think that anyone other than those of the "Strike North" faction would reasonably think that such a task could be accomplished. However, severing the Lake Baikal link might be an achievable goal. But, severing that link would have little effect on the overall war in China.

If the Japanese had went to war with the Soviets, they likely would have concentrated their effort to sever the rail link, and let the Soviet soldiers and citizens starve, before finally mopping up the rest.

It is not "my" reasoning, it is that of the "Strike North" faction. If the Japanese were so inclined, the Chukchi and Kamchatka Peninsulas would be taken because they were communist controlled territory, and not to serve as a buffer zone against Alaska.

 

Good to know Japanese tanks had their own sloped armor. If it is developed natively, then sloped armor would not be ONLY an East European tech; given that foreigner had performed in Japan -- Henry Ford was once in Japan, searching for answer would be an enormous task for this what-if topic.

Based on that map, 4 rail links --
1) Sergiopol in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic,
2) Lake Baikal that cut thru Mongolia
3) Nomahan link near the border between (Inner) Manchuria and Mongolia: Khalkhin Gol
4) the link near Vladivostok, which is practically Changkufeng Incident or Battle of Lake Khasan

Back to this what-if topic
Just before Barbarossa, the strike north group have already known the last 2 links cannot be severed because they have tried and been defeated.

To achieve cutting #1 and #2 links, it means using diplomatic means to contact Japan friendly local powers in today Xinjiang or a kind of strategic bombing. Russian and Soviet influence had been strong there; Nationalist China had struggled for influence there so why a third party like Japan be able to achieve some kinds of co-belligerence -- this what-if is too far stretched.

What the Strike-North group could strive for after the defeats fo Khalkhin Gol and Lake Khasan was to concentrate navy, army and kwantung efforts on the west coast of the sea of Japan. American Navy victory on Midway was about a year after this time; given that Russian navy is not as strong as the American, IJ navy could divert some effort to help amphibious landing near Vladivostok and take the city. Maybe launching a Pearl Harbor on Vladivostok. This effort would be easier than the historical Pearl Harbor. Vladivostok is a major port of the Pacific route of Lend-Lense.
I believe severing the Vladivostok maritime link was discussed elsewhere on this site.

Once Vladivostok was taken, then army troops -- and Kwantong troops would be ferried from Korean peninsula in today North Korea -- from the city would push northward along Ussuri estuary to Khabarovsk. This effort required great determination from many parts of IJ military. Given the strike-north group was not a major influential sect, how can they achieve such determination ? The west coast of sea of Japan -- Primorsky Krai of today -- held some mineral, tin, coal and timber resources. In terms of getting resources, that coast would be quite like Karelia.

If Japan could take Primorsky Krai and guard mountain passes with airpower help -- building some Henderson airstrips in valleys in Outer Manchuria to support the garrisons, Japan helped by cutting the Pacific route of Lend-Lense. Would the ports or airfields in Chukchi and Kamchatka Peninsulas be upgraded with great effort to reignite the Pacific route ?

In one sentence, IMO Japan attacked the SU and cut the Pacific route of Lend-Lense. That was about it.

On equipment, that is about tank. Given the above, visual proof of sloped armor on Japanese tanks, success of stug's in the Battle of France, and their weak tanks against the Soviet, Japan could develop their own version of assault gun tank destroyer hybrid like the stug from Ha-Go and Chi-Ha. Type 1 Ho-Ni I, Type 2 Ho-I, Type 3 Ho-Ni III, Type 5 Na-To, Type 5 Ho-Ru prototype were Japanese effort to create tank destroyers. Ho-Ru prototype was compared to the German Hetzer. In other words, if Japan ordnance industry pushed ahead of schedule in developing tank destroyers, could Hetzer, Marder I, II, II, Panzerjäger I, Pz.Sfl. II and in a long stretch but only in small numbers StuG III help Japan against waves of Soviet tanks ? Also putting a radio on these would-be Japan tank destroyer to coordinate combat with aircraft and artillery can help defense. In other words, in stead of Japan tanks to accompany the infantry in Manchuria and Mongolia against the Soviet, tank destroyers would take that role. Soviet military divert some effort to push Japan military back to the Sea. I believe the Soviet could still soundly defeat the Japanese but such effort would achieve exactly what Germany wanted.
In more practical terms, Soviet effort to fending off Japan intrusion needed troops capable of fighting in harsh cold weather and thus diverted some men from the Finland-Soviet conflict East of Lake Ladoga. So Finland might actually be a beneficiary in military might and cutting the Lend Lense, more than Germany which this what-if topic is about.

Type 3 Chi-Nu was developed in 1944 and compared to Panzer IV. So the stretch of comparing German tank destroyers to probable Japanese counterparts shall be limited to destroyers weaker than but not including StuG IV.

 

Just in case, a fifth rail link near Khabarovsk is on that map but Japanese troops going towards that direction would face Soviet defense of both flanks, instead of just one of their flank or no Soviet flanking. If Khalkhin Gol -- a Mongolian flank which required the Soviet to coordinate foreign effort -- and Lake Khasan -- Soviet defense would be flanked by Japanese airpower from sea-- meant defeat, direct attack towards Khabarovsk shall mean defeat as well.