Operation Herkules

I get the feeling that you think that the Brits & Maltese would be comfortably in bed when the Invasion hit.

Ground forces were far inexcess of 1 British Brigade, there was a number (depending on the date) of Maltese Brigades, maybe not Brigade of Guards quality but very capable of defending their island.

As the Airfields were the key to the survival of Malta, they would have been well protected by at least 40mm, and despite stories of "down to ...mins ammo", always managed to find enough to defend against the next raid.

Malta's terrain was bocage, but with stone walls rather than hedges. The fields were very small and perfect for defense, the most open areas were probably the landing fields(Tarmac, maybe rolled dirt!!) (I think that 2 of the fields had been joined so as to handle larger aircraft.) A small number(about a squadron?, of Matilda II's were on the island, the fallschirm. had little to stop them (look at the success of a few Mk VI Lt Tks on Crete).

It has been mentioned that Intelligence would have picked up the plans(Enigma?) but the very effective RAF PR Unit would surely have spotted any concentration of landing craft, maybe the RAF could not intervene but the RN would have fought for the Island, to misquote ABC, It takes a year to build a ship, but 500 years to build a
Reputation.

You assume that Special Ops units would ease the landings, after being under threat of attack for 2 years, maybe this would have failed under the close scrutiny which is very easy on such a small and insular community on an island as Malta. (I work with some Maltese, they're all related)

What other effects would the attack have, concentrating Luftwaffe Units for Malta may have seen Rommel's task harder, leaving RAF support in Cyrenaicca rather than under pressure defending against Rommel.

I dont think the attack on Malta would have succeeded, but if it did, I would have left it alone, maybe Rommel would have lasted longer but still have lost the build up battle, the Allies would still have landed in NW Africa and may have diverted through Sardinia, Northern Ital and been on the Southern Borders of Austria by 1944!!

 

This if from July 1943, so maybe the forces could be a bit smaller.

231 INFANTRY BDE (1 MALTA) 2 Devons 1 Dorsetshire 2 KOMR 3 KOMR 1 Hampshire
232 INFANTRY BDE (2 MALTA)8 Manchester 2 Royal Irish Fusiliers 1 KOMR 8 Kings Own
233 INFANTRY BDE (3 MALTA)11 Lancs Fusiliers 2 Royal West Kents 10 KOMR
234 INFANTRY BDE (4 MALTA)4 Buffs 1 Durham Lt Inf 1 Cheshire MG

(KOMR = Kings Own Malta Rgt)

 

I do not think that a land battle for Malta would have been as you describe it. The situation was awful:

In March, April 1942 the situation in Malta was a desperate one. Let me quote the commander in chief of the RAF in Malta, air vice marshal Sir Hugh Pughe-Lloyd: ‘Live conditions are extremely precarious... Every time you asked for a physical effort you could notice the lack of proper feeding... Water and electric energy were strictly rationed, as everything else... Coal and oil reserves could last for a few weeks but it was nothing else than a dream to have 20 fighters in April. We used to begin the day with 12 planes and finished it with just one or two by night... Then we couldn't fight until we had fixed the rest’.

Defences had being mostly destroyed. There was lack of food, water, weapons and ammunition, the planes didn't have spare-parts to be repaired, the pilots were exhausted, the fleet had been withdrawn from the ports and the submarines had to spend the day submerged. Anti-aircraft artillery ammunition was severely rationed in Malta. The gunners had orders not to shoot except to dive-bombers and only if they were under 1.000 metres high. The radar network in Malta had been neutralised by German interference devices and the vital supplies for 300.000 Maltese were running out...

In other words:

In March 1942 (when marshal Kesselring wanted to launch the attack) Malta couldn't deploy more than 12 Spitfires a-day, they didn’t have almost any ammunition and nearly any ship could make it to the island. A solid defense for a prolonged period was impossible. However, it wouldn't have been a picnic for the Italo-German forces. There would have been many casualties (mainly due to German mistakes when dropping the men, not to British defences) but still, the island would have been captured. Maybe the end of German paratroopers, but the strategic situation of the Germans in the whole Mediterranean would have been improved.

No more RAF nor RN in the central Mediterranean and a completely secure supply line for the DAK (which means that Rommel would have got 95% or so of his supplies, not 40% as he actually had). Remember that British U-boats (mostly based in Malta) sunk more than 1.000.000 tons of Axis shipping; including 4 cruisers, 17 destroyers and 21 submarines. HMS Upholder alone sunk more than 133.940 tons!

 

Friedrich,

I suppose for every picture painting a bad story, you can see a brighter side as well.

If in May 1942, 12 Spitfires is more than Crete could put in the air, and this means there were more than 12 on the Island, they just couldnt get them servicable each day.
Rationed AA fire, any place under Siege has to cover for the worst, when the Aussies were in Tobruk,they had rationed its AA & Artillery but was under no threat.
You believe the Luftwaffe would have placed the troops in the right place, Malta is a very small island, and the Luftwaffe failed over The Nederlands and Crete, why would they get precise here.
The Defending Ground troops would have consisted of.
Fortress troops
1 Indep Sqn RTR (Matilda II), 12 Fd Rgt, 4 & 1RMA Coastal Defense Rgts, 4, 7, 10, 2RMA, 11RMA Hvy AA Rgts, 4 Searchlight Rgt, 26 Defense Rgt, 32, 65, 74 & 3RMS Lt AA Rgts, 1 Cheshires (MG) Rgt.
South Brigade(Later 1 Malta then 231 Infantry Bde)
2 Devons, 1 Hampshire, 1 Dorsets,3 KOMR, 8 Kings Own(to 12 May)
North Brigade (Later 2 Malta then 232 Infantry Bde)
8 Manchester, 1 KOMR, 4 Buffs(To 12 May)2 Royal Irish Fusiliers, 2 KOMR.
Central Brigade (Later 3 Malta then 233 Infantry Bde)
11 Lancs Fusiliers, 2 Royal West Kent, 10 KOMR(from 4 May)1 Durham Lt Inf(to 12 May)
West Brigade (Later 4 Malta then 234 Infantry Bde)
4 Buffs(from 13 May) 1 Durham Lt Inf(from 14 May) 8 Kings Own(from 13 May)

Are there any reports of shortages of .303 for their rifles and machine guns etc.

With nowhere to go, and little hope of evacuation, the British could have made this impossible for the Fallschirm & Folgore, they equally had little support expected by Sea, and a mnimal chance of evacuation.

 

Hercules was not needed considering the Italians and Germans could have just bombed it into submission, rather than risking another "Crete" with the possibility of losing transports and more importantly men, which the Reich needed more than anything towards the end. Now a land battle would clearly be out of the question. A large loss of troops would have resulted from an amphibious landing. Bombing with what bombers Germany and Italy had would have done a sufficient job with the situation in Malta. Bombing is more efficient considering Germany needed more of the transport planes and men for the East, which was far more important, rather than a small island.

 

I do not:

See, ali?

Bombing it into submission was exactly what marshal Kesselring tried to do, and failed. He knew that the island had to be taken, not neutralised, because even if complete air supperiority was achieved, some destroyer, U-boat or plane always managed to sneak out during the night, causing problems all over. Germany couldn't afford such constant attention on the island. Having so many planes bombing the island all day long consumed too much fuel, men and matériel (all badly needed for tactical support of Rommel's forces).

Two days without bombing allowed the British to fly three Hurricanes or Spitfires into the island, which would be shooting down German airraft the next day. What about the effort recquired to prevent the British convoys to reach the island (for the British, as long as their flag flew on the island, were going to send supplies in).

See what happened in summer 1942, when, instead of continuing bombing the island, the Luftwaffe started supporting Rommel's trusth into Egypt. By November 1942, the 12 Spitfires of May had become 400. And those 400 planes took care of Rommel's supply lines…

 

What makes you think Hitler could of done a better job with a paratroop drop into Malta. It wasn't worth it, the forces were needed more in the East, not some tiny island which had greater chances of failure, and little strategic advantage.

 

Are you serious?! Look on a map. Which spot dominates the entire central Mediterranean? What is between Sicily and North Africa, in the middle of the Axis supply line?

On what was based British power in the Mediterranean? On 3 naval bases: Alexandria, Gibraltar and Malta.

The most important for the Axis was the last one, because without it, it couldn't take any of the other two.

Do I need to say this again?

What a coincidence is that of exactly when Malta was under the hardest siege, Rommel made his greatest advances in the desert. Why? Because that was when supplies and reinforcements could be brought in.

Is also a coincidence that at El Alamein he had no fuel because 90% of his petrol supplies was either in the bottom of the Mediterranean or in the motorway between Tripoli and Egypt?

I wonder how so many Axis ships went down, along with thousands of tons of supplies, as well as from where did all those aeroplanes, submarines and ships come from?

Malta was the very key to the Mediterranean campaign: if the Germans take it, whatever the cost, they clear up Rommel's supply lines, meaning that 100% of the supplies sent to him from Sicily can actually reach North Africa. From Malta, the Luftwaffe can use air bases closer to Africa and cover the entire central Mediterranean, thus cutting British air and sea communications between Gibraltar and Alexandria.

 

Well said Freddy...

Plus I dont think 1 FJ Div and 2 Italian Airborne Divs would have made much difference in the East...

Certainly no strategic airborne role for them so taking Malta may have been the one thing the Germans SHOULD have done...

 

Maybe using them as infantry and then withdrawing them both after 80% casulaties rate after one month… like the élite Mountain divisions in the Caucasus…

 

Lets examine this, first of all there 2 Italian AB divs, c'mon the Italians couldn't fight a war let alone capture one of the most heavily guarded fortresses in the British Armed Forces. Then that leaves one Fallschirmjager div, well what happens when they need to be resupplied, than the Germans run into a lot more trouble from the British AA guns. Eventually it turns into a disaster which could have been prevented by sending the troops to far more needed areas.

 

No, let's examine this, which, I think, isn't clear yet:

In 1942 there were two options:

1) The eastern front, where airborne operation are not suitable and where their use as infantry would have no effect at all in the course of a battle and it also would have been a stupid waste of élite unreplaceable troops.

2) The Mediterranean, where an airborne division can be used in a costly but most needed battle, which could only be fought through an airborne invasion. Again, using that division as infantry (supporting Rommel's troops, for example, as in Cassino later onwards) was again, a waste and irrelevant to the general outcome.

This forces were the very best of the Italian armed forces, truly élite units. There's no way of believing they wouldn't have made a difference.

This proves my point: the Axis has naval inferiority because the RN has its main base in the heart of the Axis theatre.

Re-supply could have only been done by air, which means that great air supperiority had to be achieved (the exact condition accomplished on May 1942 by marshal Kesselring's aircraft).

Many plane casualties for sure, but not due to AA guns, which were very short of ammunition.

Again. There was not far more needed areas at that time than Malta. That miserable little island was going to decide which side was going to dominate the entire central Mediterranean.

Without Malta on German hands, Rommel can't reach Alexandria and Suez. With Malta on British hands, Rommel can't get but a fraction of his supplies, and therefore would be unable to win any battle.

Trying to capture North Africa with Malta still active is like trying to invade Great Britain with British presence in Belgium…

 

Wait wait wait, the troops could of easily fought on the ground just as well in the East, rather risk another paratroop jump which they couldn't even accomplish. Once again you my friend are missing my point and that the Eastern Front was far more important than anything in North Africa or in the Mediterranean.

 

Eastern Front may have been more important but wouldnt knocking the British out of the Med have been useful?

I also fail to see what great difference one FJ div would have made when deployed in a ground role on the Meat Grinder of the East...

Actually the operation to take Malta may have suceeded. Training had commenced in earnest with both the aircrews and the paratroopers conducting exercises against fortifications they would likely encounter. They were also JU-52s available at this time despite the losses during Norway, Holland and Crete and other aircraft would also have been utilised for the dropping of paras. The Germans also at this time were placing more emphasis on the glider and the GO-242 would have been available for the operation. It also seems highly likely that the Germans could have attained local air supremacy and the ground attack aircraft had the expertise to work closely with the Fallschirmjager.

The Germans knew full well that airborne ops inncur large numbers of casualties. Student expected heavy losses during Merkur. An attack on Malta would have suffered losses in both aircraft and men. Hence the decision to employ the Italian airborne formations, which despite the rather unfounded comments were actually of a very high quality. The Folgore Division was a very well trained and respected force. The nucleus of which had been founded before the German Airborne forces and indeed from where the Germans developed the RZ series parachute.

Regardless of losses, which would have been expected to be high as in any airborne operation, the attack on Malta would have been an operation that MAY have had a definte strategic gain rather than squandering highly trained troops in a ground role.

Incidently Crete did not mark the end of German airborne drops. Several more were carried out, but these took the form of tactical rather than strategic drops.

 

As to the earlier remarks of inaccuracy during Holland and Crete, the German FJ were often dropped with surprising accuracy. They had to be as their reliance on drop canisters meant that as low a level of dispersal was required and their chutes allowed for a low drop height to decrease dispersal as much as possible. The side effect was to make the transports liable to come under fire from the ground. Dropping troops accurately was often difficult with ground fire and having to change course due to unforseen circumstance but on the whole the transport units did a reasonable job. Look at the Allied drops in Sicily for how accurate the Allies were in their first large scale drops...

An example of the accuracy that could be attained by the FJ becomes apparent when you look at the glider landings at Eben Emael...

 

I don´t think the British, for example, counted the possible losses for keeping Malta. They knew it was vital and thus did everything to keep it no matter how big losses.

As well it is weird to think that the Crete losses made Hitler think that paratroops should not be used again. The losses in Russia 1941-42 however did not make him think of peace but then again you know one death is sad ...a thousand is just statistics...

 

Great posts, Kai and Red.

No one has ever denied that the eastern front was more important. WWII in Europe was decided there. But there's no absolute way that 12.000 highly trained infantry soldiers can affect the outcome of anything there. After one month fighting in the eastern front, the division may have been withdrawn after losing 80% of its force in a static battle, like the mountain divisions in the Caucasus or Finalnd.

However, those same 12.000 men coould turn the tide in the Mediterranean on the Axis' favour.

 

There is a broad assumption that the occupation of Malta equals the fall of Egypt.

This is not a given result, All the Commonwealth needed was a strong leader, plus the inevitable break caused by the Invasion of Malta, its fall and the re-routing of Convoys to Benghazi & Tobruk. No one would imagine Hitler releasing a Panzer/Mechanized Korps from Russia and sending it to the Mid-East. Also the British subs, based out of Alexandria, would still have been effective, especially against the longer Tobruk/Bengazi routes. Also the Tripoli run was safe against Aerial attack from Cyrenaicca/Egypt, the Bengazhi run would be less so & the Tobruk run very dangerous.

Of course the RAF(Wellington/Halifax's/Maruders) & USAAF(B24 & B25's) would have started to pound these ports into Dust, plus maybe Bomber Command would have been made to release a few more Halifax squadrons to the Mid East.

While I doubt the fall of Malta, it was a possibility. But I do not doubt the ability of the 8th Army to recover and hold of the Axis forces.

 

Interesting point from Keitel´s memoirs

In Spring 1941 of the two possible Mediterranean objects Keitel and Jodl voted for Malta. The Final choice was left to the Air Force and Göring chose Crete. Hitler agreed to this.

 

Could it be said that an invasion of Malta might have been prefferable to the invasion of Crete? leaving Crete in British hands certrainly might endanger German activities in the Balkans in the long run, but with greater control of the Med and North Africa their presence there might be prove academic.

The Blue Max