Pearl Harbor Conspiracy?

On the torpedo and bombing method the Japanese view:

" It was not before the fall that aerial torpedoing in shallow waters of only 10-odd meters was made possible with the great help of the technicians concerned, and it was also only in last August and September that the technique of horizontal bombing had been improved so that one hit might be expected from nine attacking bombers. "

From Isoroku Yamamoto´s letter to Admiral Takahashi 19 Dec 1941

From Pearl Harbor papers by Goldstein and Dillon

 

Larry, trying to inject rationality in some minds can be a mistake. Don't ask us how we know

 

"Never ascribe to malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence."
--Napoleon

'Always ascribe everything to malice.'
--All Conspiricists, always

 

he totally tore Stinnet a "new one", he was there, he was in the branch mentioned, and he had all the "right stuff".

Stinnet was just selling a book to make a buck, Jacobsen had all the data which showed that Day of Deceit, itself was a self serving deceit.

Philip H. Jacobsen

Day of Deceit in Wars in History Channel

BOOK REVIEW - Day of Deceit

You guys may not like that old "The History Channel" link, but until (username) "pjacbosen" passed away he was a totally reliable source of information and data.

 

Yes he was. And I appreciated his info and input. I was sad to see him go. BTW I wish this thread would die and stay dead LOL. Belongs in the "What If?" forum if anywhere.

 

As far as Washington-the code breakers and people they dealt with-pure incompetence, compounded by bureaucracy.

Short and Kimmel. Short was a jingoistic old horse cav soldier who didn't embrace technology (the Japanese have always embraced technology). Kimmel understood the politics of his position. His predecessor was kicked downstairs for griping about the shortcomings of Pearl Harbor.

Finally, I'll put forth a theory no one else has discussed, till now.

The military has a significant percentage of 18-22 year olds. Most of the others are 23-38-all in all, young men. How much do young men love popular music?

The night before the concert there was a battle of the (battleship) bands. This event was very much akin to a monster rock concert. As another poster wrote here, the forces woke up December 7th very much hungover. That is why the radar report from Joe Elliott was ignored, and the sub report taken lightly.

Conspiracy? No. Vast incompetence and a giant hangover.

 

What have you got to support that theory?

 

There's no evidence to support this statement. In fact, there is no evidence that any message was ever intercepted in any code that was then being read by US code-breakers, which would have reasonably indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. The "target-grid" message has often been cited, but it was ambiguous and only appeared significant in hind-sight.

Maybe, but how much technology does one have to embrace to understand a war warning? Short was misled by the bias in Washington which leaned to exaggeration of "fifth-column" activities; even Marshall admitted this.

Chapter VII: The Pearl Harbor Attack

As for the Japanese, they have always embraced technology? Like radar and electronic communications? Like modern infantry weapons? Like advanced industrial methods?

No Kidding? The fact that Oahu's radar warning system was incomplete and the personnel still being trained had nothing to do with it? The fact that the non-existent air defense center was inoperative and there was no responsible officer there at the time wasn't a factor? Do you have any data which indicates that the people responsible for Oahu's air defense even attended the Navy Band Concert?

You might want to read the testimony of Lieutenant Commander William Taylor, USNR regarding the state of "readiness" of Oahu's radar on December 7, 1941. Taylor had served in the USN, the RN, and the RAF, as a fighter pilot, and studied British radar air warning and intercept systems. He probably knew more about radar at that point than any other American officer, and was at Oahu on December 7. He emphatically stated that even though the air warning radar picked up and tracked the incoming raid, there was no system in place to disseminate or utilize the information for air defense, even if Lieutenant Tyler had guessed correctly as to the identity of the radar contact.

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION: Taylor

Page 366

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD: Taylor

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/taylor_4.html

 

In fact, there is no evidence that any message was ever intercepted in any code that was then being read by US code-breakers, which would have reasonably indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. The "target-grid" message has often been cited, but it was ambiguous and only appeared significant in hind-sight.

Granted, no intercepted message ever read "Attack Pearl Harbor", but I refer to the fourteen part message. A phone call could've been made, but the fact that it was Sunday morning, and big cats don't work on weekends delayed a message to Hawaii warning of war.

Maybe, but how much technology does one have to embrace to understand a war warning? Short was misled by the bias in Washington which leaned to exaggeration of "fifth-column" activities; even Marshall admitted this.

I was in a choir where the choir director was fired with the justification of "She was like a AAA coach trying to lead a five A team." Something was stirring in the Pacific, of that there was no doubt. Short had hundreds of planes under his command. Prudence would require having some kind of Combat Air Patrol up, but every last one of the planes were on the ground that morning, every last one of them.

As for the Japanese, they have always embraced technology? Like radar and electronic communications? Like modern infantry weapons? Like advanced industrial methods?

At the onset of the war, the Japanese were ahead of the U.S., but the U.S. quickly caught up and surpassed them. The Japanese are actually like the "Borg" of Star Trek fame-they are great at assimilating technology, and improving upon it, whereas fleet investigates and experiments-therefore gaining that way.

The night before the concert there was a battle of the (battleship) bands. This event was very much akin to a monster rock concert. As another poster wrote here, the forces woke up December 7th very much hungover. That is why the radar report from Joe Elliott was ignored, and the sub report taken lightly.
No Kidding? The fact that Oahu's radar warning system was incomplete and the personnel still being trained had nothing to do with it? The fact that the non-existent air defense center was inoperative and there was no responsible officer there at the time wasn't a factor? Do you have any data which indicates that the people responsible for Oahu's air defense even attended the Navy Band Concert?

I don't know if you served in the military, but I served 11 years. I noticed, more than once, that efficiency was way down the morning after a big event. Some of it was due to alcohol, the rest was a "hangover" of good feelings from the night before. As far as particular personnel being at the concert-the drop in efficiency I noted was a collective mood.

 

The "fourteen part message"? That would have totally mystified anyone in the military hierarchy. It wasn't a declaration of war, it wasn't a statement of intention to initiate hostilities, it didn't point to any specific action the Japanese intended to take, or any specific geographic location, it didn't even specifically break off negotiations. It meant absolutely nothing and would have had no meaning to anyone in Hawaii.

In fact, Washington was already aware that Japanese troops convoys were at sea and moving toward Malaya, so it was obvious that war was imminent. MacArthur, in the Philippines, the most obvious American target, had already been notified. It's just plain wrong to say that "big cats don't work on weekends" so a message to Hawaii was delayed; There was nothing that could be said to Hawaii that hadn't already been said multiple times.

Sure, in hindsight there should have been a combat air patrol over Oahu that morning. Hell, the fleet should should have been at sea with hatches buttoned up, turrets manned, and guns loaded. But that wasn't apparent to anyone, least of all Kimmel and Short. The country wasn't at war and Kimmel and Short would have been criticized for wasting fuel if they had done those things and nothing happened. Short reported to his superior that he had taken "anti-sabotage" measures which meant lining his aircraft up on the taxi-ways where they could be easily guarded; nobody in Washington said a word or suggested that it might be better to have some of them in the air.

I'm not defending Kimmel or Short: I think they were to blame for not inculcating more diligence, and a sense of war-time urgency in their commands, but to accuse them of incompetence when no one else thought it likely that Hawaii would be attacked is nonsense. Where they were inadequate was in not insisting on things like pushing the development of an air warning and intercept radar system as quickly as possible. It was up to them to make everyone realize a war was going to happen, and soon. That was where they failed. But US intelligence also failed and that wasn't the fault of either Kimmel or Short.

Rubbish! I'm not into sci-fi, so I have no idea what you are talking about when you reference "Borgs". At the beginning of WW II, the Japanese were technologically inferior to the US in almost every way. Even the vaunted Zero aircraft design was the result of technological inferiority in aircraft engine design and production. (Eric Bergerud, "Fire In The Sky"). Do some research into Japanese industry before you make such ignorant statements. Check out the Japanese electronics industry; REPORTS OF THE U.S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN
The series "E" reports are particularly enlightening. Japanese electronics were at least a generation behind the US at the start of WW II, as were many other Japanese technologies. This had an important impact on the course of the war.

Well, you're certainly entitled to your opinion, but I don't share it (and yes, I did serve in the military). My opinion is that "efficiency" in the discharge of duties is attuned to the attitude and expectations set by the commanding officer. If the CO tolerates slack performance, that's what will prevail. In my humble opinion, that was Kimmel's and Short's major failure, not failing to anticipate a Japanese attack. If you ask me, neither Kimmel nor Short pushed hard enough to get their commands ready to fight the coming war. If they had, the radar contact on the morning of December 7 would have been received by a fully manned and prepared central Air Intercept system which would have alerted the AAA defenses and gotten fighters into the air and properly positioned to intercept the incoming raid. Pearl Harbor would have still taken some damage, but the Japanese attack would have been so costly as to be considered a defeat.

 

There was nothing that could be said to Hawaii that hadn't already been said multiple times.

Short and Kimmel were hand picked as non trouble makers when some high ranking Officers warned of the costs of complacency (i.e. Kimmel's predecessor).

Sure, in hindsight there should have been a combat air patrol over Oahu that morning.

Not just hindsight. Government has always seemed to be obsessed with $$$. I don't know the total cost of the destroyed planes, but not enough was done to protect property. Even lacking a known war footing, there should have been at least two planes circling the island-even in peacetime. Failure to do so was proof of a General Officer clearly lacking the faculties of the responsibility of his command.

Even the vaunted Zero aircraft design was the result of technological inferiority in aircraft engine design and production.

After the Zero spanked the P-40 in China, the U.S. Aeronautical companies rushed to meet the new threat. After Pearl Harbor, the P-40 was virtually retired from active duty. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the P-40 was the best deployed fighter the US had, and it was inferior to the Zero. Had it not been inferior, the P-40's would've chased the Japanese out of China.

The series "E" reports are particularly enlightening. Japanese electronics were at least a generation behind the US at the start of WW II, as were many other Japanese technologies. This had an important impact on the course of the war.

For a technologically inferior military, they sure took the fight to us pretty well (1941-42), the best illustration of this is the long running Battle of Iron Bottom sound where the Japanese were clearly superior to the US in night fleet warfare.

the Japanese attack would have been so costly as to be considered a defeat.

Actually, Pearl Harbor was a victory for Japan only in the sense of media coverage. Militarily, it was a gigantic defeat for Japan.

 

Huh? I beg to disagree with this. Militarily, it was a victory for Japan. The Japanese attacked, crippled the US Pacific Fleet at their main Pacific base, almost obliterated the US Army Air Corps planes there and withdrew without suffering a significant loss in men, planes or ships. How can that feat be a "gigantic defeat" for Japan? Would you care to elaborate?

 

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I have to agree with Lias_Co_Pilot on this one; Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor really changed nothing as far as US plans in the Pacific were concerned. The US pacific Fleet was not crippled by the loss of a handful of old, slow battleships which could never, by themselves, have taken the fight to the Japanese anyway. The loss of the aircraft was a temporary setback, quickly remedied, and certainly never justified the huge risk taken by the IJN at Pearl Harbor.

Japan's whole strategy for the Pacific war was to limit the conflict and win by negotiating an acceptable peace treaty which left her with substantial gains in territory and natural resources; the very nature of the Pearl Harbor attack destroyed any hope Japan ever had of achieving that goal.

It's not easy to start, and lose, a war all in one morning, but the morons at the Japanese IGHQ and on the Combined Fleet staff managed to do exactly that.

 

Virtually "retired" from active duty after Pearl Harbor? Production stopped in 1944. After Pearl it served in The Med,The Pacific and China. The majority of the over 13,000 P-40s were built AFTER Pearl Harbor. It served up to the end of the war.

 

hey there guys, let's not forget that the P-40 never fought the AM6 in China, and it had a super kill to loss ratio in that theater when the AVG group started to fly post Pearl. And the P-40 (as mentioned) remained in production until near the end of the war, and it continued to be improved in both speed and firepower. It's ruggedness is another "plus" where the Japanese planes were fragile to say the least.