Well - this all seems a bit mixed up. Have you read "the Crucible of War - Wavell's Command" by Barrie Pitt. I think it would be a good point to start if you want a meaningful dialogue on the campaign in North Africa. You really can't blame Hitler for the initial fiasco. Mussolini wanted to do his own thing in North Africa (and East Africa) and specifically excluded the Germans. It was only after the Commonwealth Army under O'Connor had defeated an Italian Army five times its size, capturing 130,000 troops and all its arms and transport (in initial attack that was only planned to last 5 days - but when the door was kicked in the Italian Army collapsed - and as the Italian Commander was lead away he was still complaining he had been beaten by a much superior force). With the British at the Tripolitanian border but unknown to the Italians down to 47 tanks (including captured Italian ones), precious little fuel, most of their infantry about to depart for Greece - Mussolini relented and Hitler sent a holding force to prevent the collapse of his Ally in North Africa. Rommel disobey his orders (not for the first or last time) and attacked instead of holding the line at El Agheila - he was in luck because Wavell did even have enough troops to defend the blocking position. Wavell was faced with demands to send troops to Greece, to East Africa (which was more serious and higher up the to do list than North Africa), war against Vichy Syria and a revolt in Iraq by Rashid Ali. Rommel did not know that Barbarossa was in preparation but Halder and the high command made clear to him that he was not going to get more supplies or troops. "Selection and maintenance of aim - Clausewitz" - Barbarossa had to have first claim on everything once it had been agreed.