Rommel vs Montgomery

I've never understood why Monty is so criticized, even today. One can understand that at the time his ego and abrasive personality made him unpopular with other commanders but his tactics and strategy were sound, if not spectacular.

 

My impression is that it is for the most part a reaction to those who bought his line about his skills.

 

If you must decide who is the better commander, then you would need to put each of them in the others shoes and then decide, would a different outcome have occurred.

I am not all together sure Mongomery could have defended at El Alemien any better, but considering Rommel's aggressive nature I do think there is a slightly better chance that Axis forces commanded by Montgomery would have been cut off from their retreat short of Tunisia.

Just an opinion.

 

The situation in 1941 was not the same as in 1942 and things changed further in 1943. Allied air, artillery and armor increased, while Axis logistics couldn't keep up. Monty held cards that his predecessors didn't, and he played them in an orderly and systematic manner to produce victory. He didn't squander his advantages. That's good leadership in my view.

Rommel had been lionized by the press on both sides into something he wasn't. Rommel was certainly a competent general, but by 1943 the balance of power in North Africa had shifted. As long as his opponent played a good game, he was going to lose. Monty played a good game.

 

I think Montgomery was a better general no I am not a Monty defender. I realize his faults and shortcomings. But at the end he was suitable for a prolonged campaign that involve multiple corps , nationalities , complex logistics , attritional warfare , long term strategy and proper application of air power

Rommel was not. He was a brilliant tactician but he failed even in a short term campaign that aimed to capture Egypt between May-July 1942 becuse he couldn't see bigger picture under dazzling light of his sucess.

 

Sorry...I know logistics matter and lots of other things...Air power being the one in my book...But the German generals ALL of them....were losers...We can think of reasons why and defend their losses till the cows come home...But the facts remain...they lost..They were losers...Rommel and all...Allied generals may have lost battles but the eventual winning outcome puts them..those that stayed in role and were not dismissed...as the only generals that can be considered as the best general..be they Russian Chinese...American, Brazilian, French, British, British commonwealth etc...

Simplistic it may be...but if we are discussing best generals....the outcome surely is the proof positive...If they are the best then they won we lost.

 

Agreed. Montgomery actually fought Rommel four times in seperate battles. Alam El-Halfa , Second Battle of Alamein , Battle of Medenine and Normandy. Except the last one (where Rommel stopped Allied breakthrough but failed to drive them to sea before wounded on 17th July. So it can be considered a draw ) Rommel lost all of them. I can hear excuses. "But Montgomery had more strength , troops , tanks , planes etc plus he had ULTRA. !" So what ? Neill Ritchie or Alan Cunningham had all these advantages when they commanded 8th Army and they lost. Lloyd Frendenhall had a very good defensive terrain in Kasserine Pass. He was routed. Arthur Percival had twice strength in Malaya Command compared Japanese general Yamashita. Percival surrendered Singapore. Rudolfo Graziani had much more troops than British when Italians invaded Egypt. He was defeated in Sizi Barani during Operation Compass. List goes like that

Important thing is not having advantages but applying them properly before and during the battle.

 

Was Alamein actually the only time Monty had to change tactics during the offensive to beat his enemy?

 

What about the assault on the Mareth Line.? I believe he sent more armour(1st armd div),on the same left hook as Freyberg's New Zealand Div,along with Jorrocks.The frontal assault was being stalled at Mareth(I think),so a shifting of forces was another example of Monty's ability to change his battle plan where he had to.Hope this makes sense,cheers anyway.! 4th.

 

I think that's it in a nutshell. War isn't Poker where risk is often rewarded. It's more like Bridge where the systematic and scientific application of strength wins over the long term. I admire Monty for his patience and risk aversion.

 

Risk aversion though is sometimes seen by some as a weakness...It certainly paid of for Monty...the only times he really ignored his own ethos on risk aversion was in the political sense...which constantly nearly cost him his career many many times.

 

One of the things that make it difficult for me to compare them is I think Monty knew that unless the allies screwed up badly they would win. Thus the most impoftant thing for him to do was avoid screwing up badly. Market Garden is arguably one of the few times he tried something risky and it ended in a bit of a tactical disaster. Rommel on the other hand may well have known that the Germans needed some spectacular successes to win (although when is a good question) in any case in North Africa it was likely clear that if he didn't do something eventually the British and later the allies would build up enough force to kick him out. So he tried for a win.

If I had to rate them I think I would give Romel the nod in terms of tactics but Monty in terms of Strategy and probably operations as well.

 

I don't think MG was Montgomery's operation, though. As AGC he only approved it, along with his superior Eisenhower. I don't think he was involved in initiating or planning it.

 

No, it was Monty's plan. It's the one time he took a chance, and it blew up in his face.

 

We have consider several factors here. It was 1944 fall. UK was almost out of manpower and to keep going 21st Army Group began disbanding existing divisions. They seemed that desperate (though they were actually not. RAF and existing supply / Home Guard units in Britain took a lot of non necessary man power too ) Brits needed a quick end to war like another November 1918. Best way to accomplish that seemed a one single thrust into Rhine and Ruhr. Of course from a hindsight we know Monty was wrong on that assesment. Still from his perspective it is understandable why he did that misjudgement. V-2 assault started on London started in September. So British goverment was anxious and pressured Montgomery to overrun launch sites in Netherlands as soon as possible. Another factor is idleness of 1st Allied Airborne Army. Eisenhower was also constantly bothered by Marshall and CCS in Washington to use this force in a bold stroke.

 

The more I think about the more I tend to thing of Monty as a good general just not as good as he thought or at least publicized that he was. Certainly there were far worse generals in everyones army of the time.

 

Every so called successful general , commanding officer did that , use public and media to inflate their own image and invicibilty myth since Napoleon (he had two personal newspapers published both among his troops and in Paris to gather public/political support for his campaigns and to create invicibilty myth for morale reasons among his troops. And that was when he was just a general in Italy ) MacArthur , Patton , Mark Clark constantly had an army of journalists , reporters and public affairs officers from theatrics nd drama. Montgomery played the same game. Though he never aspired political power like MacArthur after the war and his operations were much more important (Mediterranean and NW Europe Theaters ) than secondary South West Pacific. I consider Monty best suited for reviving and reforming British Commonwealth Armies after two years of battlefield debacles due to bad leadership. In British military leadership only William Slim had a much better record than him. Unfortunetely Slim was never a showman so he was stuck in Burma-India Theater. Montgomery had faults. Yes of course. He was not a team player , had too much self confidence to his own abilities and saw what he wanted to see when it suited his general idea. I also have no doubt that he was vain , arrogant , pompous and unlikable towards his peers. He had defeats and failed operations also. (worst of them are inabilty of closing Scheldt and initiating Market Garden with so many faults in plan ) But nothing like screw up of Neill Ritchie in Gazala-Tobruk battles , Auckinleck's failed attacks in First Battle of Alamein , Lloyd Fredenhall's terrible performance in Kasserine Pass or Maurice Gamelin's ruinous strategy in Fall of France.

Alam el Halfa , Second Battle of Alamein , Medenine , Mareth Line , Normandy might not be romantic dashing cavalry like raid glories like Rommel's ( who still thought like a divisional commander when he was commanding an entire army ) which made good editorial propaganda hits also but they were sure and decisive victories. During Battle of Bulge Montgomery also assumed command of entire 12th US Army Group in Northern Sector also , straigtened the front ( saved the entire 7th US Armored Division and what remained of 28th and 106th Infantry Divisions in dangerously exposed St. Vith bulge by pulling them out) and stopped German advance short of Meuse. Of course then he added another stain to his reputation in his later ruinous press conferance. In final advance to Germany again British / Canadian troops he commanded had some of the worst fighting in Operation Veritable then he crossed an entire army group across Rhine in a very complex maneuver Operation Plunder / Varsity. Not bad for someone whom Patton called "a little old fart"

 

Only if that's how youd define "successful". As you mention Slim was very successful, Stillwell was as well, I don't recall Bradley or Abrams doing much grandstanding either. Mac on the other hand was probably the worst of any of the western allied commanders.

I think that's being rather harsh and unfare to both the British army and to their leadership. That period did include for instance the conquest of Ethopia and some rather impressive gains in North Africa. Some of the failures also were more due to doctrine and equipment than they were to the competency of the British leadership and in North Africa the Axis breaking the US diplomatic code was a very important factor and one completely beyond control of the British.

I wouldn't go that far. Indeed somewhere on this forum perhaps even this thread some of his Battle of the Bulge quotes are detailed and they seem very much team oriented. Certainly he didn't play down his own part but neither did he play it up excessively.

That looks very much like Patton's personal opinion of him and l doubt conveys much info at all on his ability as a general. Indeed Patton's push to beat him to Messina would indicate that Patton considered him at least a somewhat worthy competitor.

 

Slim was very humble not a showman by his nature so it is undersatandable he did not have much PR. Besides China-Burma-India Theater was far away from main actions which was much more important strategicly (Europe , Mediterranean , Pacific ) Besides 14th Army he commanded created its own myth status around him as calling Slim "Uncle Bill" and itself "Forgotten Army" Fighting in that forgotten theater with its unique conditions created its own morale raiser. Stilwell was also stuck in same theater and in China Nationalist Chinise forces were constantly beaten until 1945. (absolutely no fault of his own though ) Abrams was just a Lt Colonel during the war. I always wondered how Slim would perform if A-Bombs were not dropped and he got confirmation for re conquering Malaya and Singapore.

Not every sucessful commander had a good Public Relations but PR can be a very effective tool in modern warfare for motivation , strategic/political back up and getting enemy's spirit down not to mention reshaping other side's strategic thinking.

I think that's being rather harsh and unfare to both the British army and to their leadership. That period did include for instance the conquest of Ethopia and some rather impressive gains in North Africa. Some of the failures also were more due to doctrine and equipment than they were to the competency of the British leadership and in North Africa the Axis breaking the US diplomatic code was a very important factor and one completely beyond control of the British.




That's right. Equipment problems were a huge factor in bad performance of British arms against Germans. (Initial British victories under Wavell and O'Conner's great leadership is another matter. Italian command performance in mid level was terrible , Commando Supremo was complately out of touch and their equipment was complately out of date / unsuitable for modern warfare , their conscripts were not drilled well ) Even more serious problem for British was doctrine. But a good commander realizes these factors and makes his operational plans properly by taking these into account. Neither Gott nor Cunningham , Ritchie , Auckinleck or any other corps commanders in initial years of North African campaign realized that armor/infantry relations were bad and getting worse , British armor had a "Waterloo/Balaclava cavalry" mentality attacking without coordination and out of protection of infantry or artillery only to be ambushed by highly effective German Anti Tank screens , cooperation with RAF Desert Air Force was non existent , German battle group performance was a lot better than British "Jock Columns" so formation revision was necessary. They did not take into account that Cruiser tanks were lighly armored and prone to mechanical problems , Stuart tanks had again thin armour etc. As for intelligence leaks hell 8th Army wireless security was so bad Afrikakorps wireless intel units could track even battalion HQs and pinpointing their locations. ( After destruction of German Wireless Intel Unit 621 in First Battle of Alamein situation reversed of couse. Australians who captured wireless intel HQ passed all decrypted British messages to 8th Army intelligence and codes were changed along with Bonnar Fellers' diplomatic code in US Embassy. ) Results were routs like Gazala in May-June 1942 or fiascos like Auckinleck's attacks during First Battle of Alamein in July. One such attack made by elite New Zealand assault troopers at night and complately defeated , Kiwis suffering 1.000 casaulties. NZ brigade commander Harold Kippenberger commented : "If a regiment size NZ night attack can be broken two battalions of third grade Italian infantry then there is something VERY wrong command and doctrine." In July-August 1942 period 8th Army self confidence was seriously shaken. Auckinleck stopped the enemy yes but every offensive operation against German-Italian Army ended with defeat and heavy casaulties. And Rommel's image raised to a demigod status among Commonwealth troops.

Is it then surprising that Montgomery coming to Egypt as soon as possible tried to create his own invicibilty myth with heavy PR , visiting and cajoling troops and raising his own image as much as possible giving press releases etc. Rommel created such a Aryan superhuman image (which he was not. He was overpromoted and an awful strategist/logistician ) any Allied general bested him would be raised to superstar status instantly by press anyway. He did that. If I dunno MacArthur or Patton accomplished that they would probably go to a signing tour across States.

 

That's a creation of the Monty propaganda campaign, not much different than the Patton or 101st Airborne propaganda campaigns who also claim credit. The main thrust was stopped before Monty even assumed control. The 6th Panzer Army was the main thrust and it was stopped along the Ambleve by the 19th. In fact, the lead elements were cut off and trapped by the 18th of December when Stavelot was retaken by the 30th ID. Montgomery didn't even come into the picture until the 20th.

The 5th Panzer Army to the south did continue to advance for a few more days, but all hope for a strategic victory of any importance was lost when the northern thrust was stopped - it was the northern wing that was supposed to run into Antwerp and cut the allies in half.