Should the Axis have tried harder to take Malta?

Actually in 1942 it's rather the opposite, the RN doesn't even "stick to port" as it has pulled back all surface forces from Malta. On the oter hand the axis convoys to NA continued uninterrupted to the very end and most were not opposed by any surface forces.

Never said Cunningham cannot attempt a night action with force H, or just it's "light" elements if he chooses to, he can attempt one with either fleet though coordinating them is not going to be as easy as it was in 1940 as they cannopt linger within axis air range, especially the carrier-less Alex force. My meaning was that a day action by the Alex based fleet was nonsense, you don't go against battleships by day with light cruisers and short of fuel derstroyers and that's all that was available at Alex. To achieve anything they have to close in, hiding behind smokescreen like at second Sirte or Pantelleria is not going to do them any good. BTW at Malta smokescreens are going to be rather ineffective, with the sort of air superiority the axis has the Ro 43 spotters are not going to be shot down so the British radar advantage is mostly negated by day.

AFAIK by the time the DAF got it's Spitfires the airfield and engineering support had much improved, up to late 1942 relied on Hurricanes and P40 that had a much wider tracked landing gear. And landing a a glider, that has a very low stall speed and all you have to do is not get the crew/cargo too badly beaten up and doing the same with a high wing loading fighter that has to take off again are very different propositions. Just diving trucks over the strips is not going to cut it, the Germans crash land a Me 321 with a Sdkfz 7 or a Pz IV on board and it will clear a strip in hours.

And resupply doesn't depend on taking an airfield, only landing the non jump capable troops does, if the axis establishes a perimeter anywhere they can drop cannisters or even land gliders there at will provided they have a functioning radio to guide the planes to the right spot. They used that sort of resupply tactics often on the Easern front.

 

AFAIK Faith, Hope and Charity was propaganda, there were actually a lot more planes than 3 Gladiators in 1940. The thing is Mussolini expected the war to last a few monts at most so a risky operation like an invasion of Malta was out. It would need to be an air asault as June 1940 was the worst possible moment for the Regia Marina, it only had Cesare and Cavour operational against a much larger combined French and British total all of which were on paper at least the equal to the small Italian ships. The Italian airborne was still at a very experimental stage at the time so despite the lack of defences success was iffy.

Von Borries is usually rather good in his research, his later Kasserine game was a favourite of mine and lots of fun. I've been on and off been looking for a copy of Air Assault on Crete for years after reading about it in the General (the pubblisher's house magazine) this may finally decide me to get serious about it though my current gaming group looks like it will play nothing with less than 1000 counters and 25 pages of rules.

 

Now you are letting your enthusiasm run away. The FJ (and other paras) are a romantic fighting spirited lot with much to be admired but lets put our feet on the ground, they can only accomplish so much with their light arms.

At Primosole Bridge the drop by the British Paras was a disaster in terms of landing on the target - spread over 30 miles with only a fraction anywhere near the bridge - all done in day light with minimal AA from the Italo\german side. This performance from the German FJ would land most of them in the sea.

The British Para elite were equal to the German and held the bridge until 88mms were brought up. The German FJ to prove my point did not fight as paras but fought as infantry that day- arriving by foot (not air). Heavy weapons defeated the British Paras

Concealed in vinefields they successfully repelled head on attacks by British Infantry desperate to quickly break into the Plain of Catania. Nothing wrong with the incredible ferocity or bravery of the British troops, just that they were attacking a dug in enemy well concealed. It took heavy weapons and tanks to defeat the FJ who were cleared out by tanks and machine guns, leaving 300 German dead and 600 British.

Apply all this to the Malta situation. German FJ and Flogore taking the place of the British Paras dropping all over the place including the sea - facing stiff AA which called for really bravery on the part of the German and Italian tug pilots.
The prepared positions in British and heavy weapons hands.

So no, I am not being nationalistically blind.

We keep hearing the assertion that the Luftwaffe would wipe out all the British 25 ponders and AA ect - how many times do we see at DDay and others a 1000 heavy (not German medium) allied bombers plus a massive naval bombardment (something the Italian Navy could not do) lacerate the coastline with every Allied soldier wondering how the German opposition (which was poor quality) could possible survive. Then up pops a lone German MG and decimates allied troops on the beaches.

The Luftwaffe had done its max for over four weeks in April and May and in their own words had no targets left but still the British Force survived - was not it always the case until we had precision laser guided bombs!

I am pleased that you accept that there was quality amongst the British Forces. The feeling I get from the reading the war diary is that these troops were fed up of being on the receiving end and desperately wanted to hand out some punishment of their own - an anger which the German and Italian force might regret - not worn out in boring static peaceful garrison duty as your von Borries seems to assume but troops daily experiencing the danger of combat and the most practiced AA gunners in the World.

 

Scip....

Malta would have been a problematic and tough fight for both sides. Thats why it makes such a terrifyingly good game. The pressure is on both sides. the Axis have time constraints. they must hold Valetta and other objectives for four days, so in the game, they must get a move on.

historically, this was exactly as it should be. It's a tough fight, but if you get your sequencing right, and with a bit of battlefield luck to boot, you can push the Malta garrison into surrender. The Allies, too, can make the cost prohibitive and win like that, or they can move from one carefully prepared position to another and delay, delay, delay, until the time constraints close in. Either way, it's a nail bighting finish, but, my money is STILL on the attackers for the simple reason that they are attacking a force with nowhere to go. Any large scale mistake sees objectives fall that cannot be recaptured, except against incompetent play. So, my guess is that the Axis could make more errors and still come out with all their operational and strategic objectives, so it must be rated 55/45 to start with, with the odds changing as the battlefield situation becomes clear.

All in all, a great design and a terrifc learning tool from designer Vance von Borries. A walkover would not have made such agreat game, but it's not a walkover, just that the Allies have nowhere to go, so can make fewer errors and still win!

 

To me the two critical factors are, will enough troops land in the right place. Two can the Italian navy actually land troops, considering their admirals lack of willingness to fight. I do know that the average soldier was capable, but considering that most had poor leadership, equipment and supply its no wonder their performance suffered. But as happened at Arnhem, unless heavy equipment arrives then the Paras are at a severe disadvantage. Even ifthey land can they get to where they are needed?

 

Would they? Can you find a historical precidence for this? Indeed if we look at the Pacfic aircraft didn't do all that well against dug in artillery. Nor did they at D-day as others have mentioned.

Did they? Exactly what was "this style of air attack"? Notice that in an earlier post it was pointed out that the Axis had abandoned dive bombing as too costly.

I'd debate that. Indeed I'd much rather have one of the Italian armored divisions if I were on the offensive.

Welll there was also the field and coastal artillery not to mention some tanks. And it's far from clear that all the AA weapons would be taken out or out of ammo especially as the British were holding a significant reserve just to counter an invasion.

Ok I'll underline sections that point to the opposite conclusion:

This essentially says that once the invasion is succesful it's successful. Getting artillery in action and secruing supplies are quite problematic.

Note that this is well before the July date we are discussing.

This certainly doesn't make it sound like a walk voer.

So for "The sake of the game" it's assumed that minesweepers clear a mine field covered by coastal artillery. Sounds a lot like the Sandhurst Sea Lion game where for "the sake of the game" they assumed the RN wouldn't intervene for the first few days. I.e. The game is designed to be balanced and not to necessarily replicate history.

Or not. For instance he doesn't mention the problems of the German paratroopers not jumping with their weapons or that water was in critical supply. It's also not clear what weights should be given to some of these factors. Certainly an interesting overview but clearly balance and playability were huge considerations where some of the important details are ignored or glossed over.

 

Spotter aircraft for naval engagements proved rather a disapointment in WW2. Indeed the most significant impact that they had on a battle that I can think of was the River Platte where the spotter plane from one of the British cruisers mistook the shot from another cruiser and "corrected" its own ships fall of shot with erroneous info.

If the vehicle is operable and in a place where it can get to the strip and the crew is not killed, disabled, or captured before they can man the vehicle, and the vehicle isn't taken out before it can get to work.

Actually to a large extent it does. Indeed establishing a "perimeter anywhere" is far from a prerequisite to getting adequate supply from the air. For one thing it has to be big enough that a substantial amount of the supply lands inside. It also requires a fair amount of transport to be available over the entire period it's needed. Then there is the possiblity of decoying the drops as Phylo has mentioned.

 

IIRC Overlord didn't fail or was a Pirric victory.

Those transport planes are still there, misdirection if the troops have functioning radios is not going to change much, air resuply, given a secure perimeter, is as close to a sure thing as you can get in wartime.

I think we were discuissing a scenario where the paras get some control of the "unusable" strip, provided you are willing to sacrifice the gliders there are enough of them one of two vehicles landing in working conditinon is close to a sure thing and that's all it takes if vehicle wrecks are all that's blocking the airstrip. They are not likely to send in the 321 in the first wave. AFAIK the crews were in the gliders if not actually in the tank like the allies did for the Hamilcar and is more likely to survive a crash than the vehicle.

There were a number of occasions spotter planes did a good job, including the already mentioned allied landings.

 

No but disablieng the majority of the AA guns wasn't on the critical path either. Furthermore the allied airforces and naval fire support was considerably more massive and well directed than what appears to be in the axis plan.

Some of them will probablyl still be there but it's not clear how many. Flying low and slow over that much AA isn't healthy. Doing it repeatedly even less so. Misdirecting worked at Crete I see no reason it wouldn't work on Malta. Especially sense the pilots are likely to be more than a little bit distracted. And again if the perimeter is small you still don't have a very good chance of getting most of the supplies inside it.

If all they have is "some control" of the strip they are still in trouble. If they haven't moved British observes out of sight of the strip or guns which can fire on it.

Survival probability depends on a number of factors. If the glider hits a wall/terrace or another vehicle or a stone block for that matter you could be better off in the vehicle than outside the vehicle but in the glider.

I said naval combat. Find me a single surface engagement where spotter planes made a significant positive contribution.

 

Who said anything about "just" vehicles blocking the runways and flightline??? The British have dozens of aircraft on Malta...dozens U/S or under maintenance at any given time...they can simply pull into place and let the tires down; they can cover Hal Far wingtip-to-wingtip At Luqa they can do what they did at Ti'Qali in 1940...simply take the cut stone blocks from the Luqa quarries they piled up to build the fighter pens and manhandle them onto the flightline....they're conveniently stacked in nice rows alongside the runway after all!

Plus AS as Maleme, Sola, and Holland...Luftwaffe wrecks will help to clog up the airfields pretty sharpish.

P.S. I'm a bit concerned by the last page of posts - what has the historical success of the RM's light forces got to do with its heavier units attempting to stop Cunningham or turning tail??? Cunningham isn't going to let air attack stop him; historically it didn't turn back any major fleet action in the Med...which is exactly what he's hoping for. It did cause damage, but it's up to the commander on the spot decide if it's enough damage to make him change his plans I.E. Cunningham will set out to attempt to reach Malta.

P.P.S. 1300 aircraft available to support HERKULES? Where exactly were 1300 aircraft to be based in Sicily??? Are they going to be moved there from somewhere else ALL in one night? Or is the RAF flying photo recce from Malta (as they did) spot the buildup and attempt to bomb airfields in Sicily (which they did)...?

 

Thats a lot of speculation in the situation of blocking this and that ( OK, in other thoughts too). Fact is did they the blockings as they were so superb informed by Ultra? And if they got a call " Ooops the Axis is coming, block all free spaces we have!" were they able to do it in a very short time? I´m not sure that the could handle this situation. Maybe they could have done some but not much. You won´t send out your troops for blocking some fields as soon as you know the enemy will arrive soon.

 

How long does it take to haul a few dozen aircraft onto the runways at Luqa and Hal Far using every tractor they have? "All" it can be as little as an hour's intense activity (if relying on radar warning alone) doing what they normally did in a working day I.E. move aircraft around ...BUT if all signs the RAF sees by aeriel recce confirm the ULTRA intelligence on the invasion preparation timetable, then they can reckon on a whole night's "last minute preparations" on Malta...so as not to give anything away to the LW's photo recce

First thing the NEXT morning...all those glider pilots are going to get a shock on their final approach...

Also, there is no problem at all with mining the runways and flightline ahead of schedule; there was actually quite a history of the RAF doing this! Chains of mines/demolition charges were laid across English airfields in the south and south-east of England in 1940 in preparation for any attempt to grab an airfield by coup de main; the airfields remained in service...with the explosives snoozing fitfully beneath the flightline! By 1943, for instance, sappers at Lympne airfield were having problems trying to find out information about where mines were laid in 1940, how they were fused etc.. They knew where the arming switches were...just nothing else!

There's all sorts that can be done quickly; wire cables can be strung on poles between the walls of Luqa's fighter pits across the flightline, for example. They'd be what, six feet above ground? Gliders don't like those. Remember - every damaged or crashed LW aircraft or glider is ANOTHER obstacle to any more arriving.

Ti'Qali is even simpler to incapacitate...simply plough up the lovely soft grass flightline! Every RAF airfield during the BoB had a plough ready for this purpose if the balloon went up...

 

Phylo, you can do many things if you´re smart enough to see that it has to be done! And is it really that smart o use your Aircrafts for blocking duties than for fighting? Not so sure about it. But no matter if using aircrafts or trucks or whatever, that won´t prevent a landing at all. It will add some more casualities and makes it a bit harder but if anybody want to capture your island, than he will do it.

 

They were smart enough in 1940 to see the need...are they suddenly going to forget that now??? Remember - airfield(s) on Malta had ALREADY been blocked against airborne invasion...in 1940

I did note that...given Malta's quite large air complement - bombers, recce aircraft, transports, Fleet Air Arm aircraft as well as fighters...there will be aircraft on the ground Unserviceable or under maintenance at any given point. Also - and of course - transports, bombers etc. will be useless in the event of an incoming airborne invasion - THEY are available for "alternative duties"!

If a runway/flightline is covered in obstacles - you CAN prevent a landing....there. And force the airfield to be taken from the "outside", in the face of an active defence of course. After all - given the terrain - where else are gliders/Ju52s going to land in Malta?

This by the way DID happen historically; Holland's airfields proved useless for the planned assault on the morning of May 10th...and the LW diverted to attempted landings ALL over Holland instead; on motorways, roads, bulb fields...even the beach at Sandvoort...and suffered the loss of hundreds of Ju52s in the process.

Remember - every aircraft that doesn't come back to Sicily isn't available for the second or third wave...or for flying resupply missions. And every damaged aircraft that reaches Sicily runs the risk of blocking a runway THERE instead! This too happened in 1941, the scratch airfields in the Pireaus soon became as clogged with damaged Ju52s as Maleme...

 

As a P.S....

Remember that Keith Park had been the AOC Eleven Group during the Battle of Britain; if anyone brought knowledge of preparing airfields for defence against glider and airlanded troops to Malta, HE did...



P.P.S. regarding Fliegerkorps X magically eradicating all the British artillery on the island...AFTER eradicating all the AA...stukas etc. weren't exactly magical; on the eve of the war, LW pilots were reckoning on managing to get one of their three assorted bombs inside a ten-metre circle...but most of the hits fell within a 20-30 meter radius, and I've seen claims as low as only 25% inside a 30m circle. For example - when 80 Stukas hit the Polish Mlawa Line on 2nd September 1939 in two waves of forty - NONE of their bombs hit the anti-tank bunkers in the Line!

At best, it's going to take a long time to suppress BOTH the island's "box barrage" AND the army's artillery support...from the air. As it happens - the defenders are going to be afforded considerable respites, as aircraft return to their airfields to refuel and re-arm. This is what happened on Crete before the invasion, and the first couple of days of German air support; a couple of days' monitoring and a bit of arithmetic gave the defenders a very good idea of when the LW could be expected after dawn...and were able to get back under cover around the expected landing zones Then the "morning hate" would arrive...and afterwards, depart again for a couple of hours...and return predictably as regular as clockwork.

It meant the defenders could do their best to minimise the affect of air attack on their positions etc., something they'll ALSO be able to do on Malta - this time more effectively and precisely because they have the added assistance of radar...

And the longer it takes the LW to suppress both these elements of the defence....the longer the FJ go without close air support in the meantime Even aircraft...and especially their ordnance!...can't be in two places at once.

 

... if this so-called invasion takes place in the early summer of 1942, Park was just newly arrived, if at all, and would have to make do with what he inherited. Regardless, the man he replaced was Sir Hugh Lloyd, a VERY capable officer. If Malta survived (and it would), it would be due to his preparations.

I haven't spent much time on this thread, but from what I've seen of the last bits I have to point out a few errors. Malta's air resources were much reduced, at times there was no assigned offensive air strength on the Island, the aircraft maintenance services were dedicated to fighters, the bombers i.e. Wellingtons etc. had to be flown out for maintenance, as it was required. But the available aircraft numbers are skewed, not just bombers.

There was no Enigma decrypt based ULTRA Intel. on Herkules. Most of the Axis communications with anything to do with it went by land lines, between Rome, Berlin etc. Herkules by name only appeared once in a Bletchley intercept, they didn't know what it was referring to, but correctly assessed the troop movements. That said, the forces on Malta knew about the air preps for Herkules through standard military Intel.

There was no ABC, i.e. Sir Andrew Cunningham was gone to Washington, his replacement as CiC RN Med. Fleet was Sir Henry Harwood, a Churchillian creation, true to form, like other such creatures he was in a big job he couldn't fill.

There was no Sir James Somerville OR Force H either; Somerville had taken over the post Z Eastern Fleet, the rump of Force H was gone to Madagascar under Edward Syfret for Operation Ironclad. It would return for Pedesta (August)l, again under Syfret, another very capable officer, and would sorta remain for Torch. That said, the CiC North Atlantic, Gibraltar had his own forces available.

 

I was aware Sommerville had gone to the pacific, but I agree "Gibraltar squadron" is more correct than "force H", was rather surprised to find out the main escort of Pedestal was called force Z so the "forces" designations were reassigned rather frequently.

The airfield blocking sub-thread is looking more and more unrealistic, one thing the paras didn't lack was initiative, thinking they can be stopped by wrecks that can be manhandled for any significant amount of time is hard to believe.

Historically no RN heavy ships came near to Malta during the critical 1942 convoys, the heavy escort from Gibraltar turned back when the convoy sailed past Sardinia because of the air threat, not a sure thing they would attempt it in case of an invasion, the problem is the fleet cannot linger there by day without risking heavy losses to air attacks and if the Italians pull back giving the troops a few hours of release from shore bombardment is all they are going to achieve, the Italian fleet has a few knots advantage so can refuse combat at will.
At night I expect lots of e-boats (Schnellboote, MS and even MAS if the weather is good) will be patrolling the gaps in the minefields, not a good proposition either.

AFAIK a lot of axis planes are not Sicily based but at Crete, Sardinia or in the Foggia area, airfield overcrowding is not likely to be a big issue, this is not Crete where the LW was mostly based at improvised fields, they have been operating from them for months and (except for Crete) they are in friendly territory, lots of airfields available to the axis including some very good ones.

Aircraft spotters now off the top of my head Narvik, Java Sea, Second Sirte (as long as the fuel lasted), Capo Teulada and Pantelleria (until driven off by FAA/RAF fighters) .... do I have to look further?, in the absence of opposing fighters a spotter can report enemy fleets disposition eliminating the fear that if you attempt to cross a smokescreen (or enter a fjord) you will find yourself at point blank torpedo range. AFAIK the 1942 era radar sets were good for detection but not fire control.

Still convinced the allies are in an impossible situaton give the available forces and geography, nearly nothing to do with troop quality, though the FJ are elite and the British half starved. Fortunately the invasion never happened as it could nbe bloodbath, the "revenge spirit" of the troops had better never come up, the FJ weren't SS but when an enemy refuses to surrender in impossible conditions he is is often not given a second chance.

 

My assertion concerning Regia Marina light units was in response to scipio posting that the RM would "run away".

This was pure propaganda, and it needed to be corrected. The Regia Marina light units fought well, and with sometimes exceptional gallantry in the Med War. It's an insult to their surviving members to be accussed of anything else.

The figures clearly demonstrate that the Italians did all they could to get Rommel what he wanted. What was done with those troops was not their faalt or concern. Rommel was the man that blamed them, not just once, but CONSISTENTLY over the period of his command. Considering the true picture, is it any wonder the Italians had a few ruffled feathers with Rommel, a man who consistenly broke the laws of supply regarding desert warfare, outrunning his logistical train on too many occassions to be considered 'safe'.

I take back the statement about Folgore. They were actually number two behind a unit called the SAN MARCO. San Marco weere, easily the best unit in Italy, and they were slated to land on Malta's beaches. So, in terms of quality, the Italians certainly had units earmarked for Herkules that were nothing to be sneezed at.

Ariete and Littorio divisions were strong by virtue of the fact that they were not only operating directly with well tested German troops, but were lavishly suplied by the standards of other Italian divisions. As for Ariete appearing at Malta, just try and prise them from Rommel's dead hands. Funny how Rommel could bag the Italians and blame them for all of his woes, and then admit that he actually depended on their units to 'flesh out' the Afrika Korps. Without the Italians, German committment levels were not conducive to a functioning offensive, or anything else. Rommel threw away many good men fruitlessly trying to storm Tobruk before he actually achieved it, and then only because it's well maintained defenses by the Australian garrison had been run down, and replaced with South Africans, so Tobruk no longer had the very 'active defense' of the "Rats of Tobruk".

Incidently, my maternal grandfather was a sniper for this division at Tobruk.

Malta in 1942 was run down in the same fashion that Tobruk was. Much of her coastal artillery was of dubious value, and Flak positions were hamstrung by lack of ammunition. Once the ballon went up, these position would not have stood up to combined air AND ground troops.

The whole island was in a terrible state. Bomb damage lat unrepaired, installations that had not been moved underground were non-existent. Troops in rags, fresh water problems, it sounds very much like another Singapore to me, with the fate of the civilian population paramount in the minds of British commanders.

If you want to debate, debate. Don't just rubbish Axis chances on the assumption that the Italians would run away. This is old wartime propaganda, and many a British Captain found themselves amazed by the performance of the Italian lighter vessels, who did their job with great gallantry and sacrifice for all concerned.

BTW, for Tired Old Soldier, you are after a copy of 'Air Assault On Crete/Malta'. I have two suggestions. Firstly, you live in Rome. This is also the residence of one Thomas N. Shaw, ex executive Vice President of Avalon Hill Game Co. If you can track him down in the eternal city, he should be able to steer you to people who do have a copy of Vance's design. alternatively, I could photocopy the game boards, rules and counters, plus any relevant "General' articles, if you wanted. A colour photocopier does quite good work these days, and you could cover the sheets I sent you in clear plastic laminate and have a copy of the game for yourself!

 

One thing I agree wholeheartedly with from you all....thank Christ this operation never occurred. It would ahve been a true bloodbath, with much of the suffering transferred to the Maltese people by virtue of the tiny space available to conduct operations.

A Stalingrad? No, it would not have lasted that long or been on the same time/space/troop level scale. But a terrible battle for all concerned it would have been.

 

Oh just one more thing. Assumptions of Mr Borries on the possibilities of minefield clearence by the Italians don't sound farfetched to me at all. considering just how these units actually performed, it would have been a success for them. Malta's minefeilds were by no means extensive, and mine clearence is not exactly the most difficult of operations to get right at all. Mr. Borries assumes as such merely because it was more than likely to be a success; when designing a game you have to concentrate on your design parameters. Trying to include eveything turns a game into a die rolling contest, rather than an exercise in skillful manuever or tactical finesse. A game can't be everything, so the naval aspect was abstracted to let the ground war play center stage, and to keep the number of rules down to a minimum needed to play the game, rather than trying to cover every conceivable situation.

I mean, try it for yourself. Game design has a theory, and many 'best practice', including something called 'blind playtesting', where you send games to volunteers who have never seen it before, and get them to play it several dozen times, making notes on what they think is right and wrong with it.