Should the Axis have tried harder to take Malta?

I just noticed on a BBC WW2 blog that one aircraft man was operating Radar fbased on Malta from 1941 - first I heard of this - anyone got any more info?

 

I think one of the links I posted talks to radar instelations on Malta. It's either one of the short ones or near one end of one of the long ones.

PS I sent you a PM.

 

US carrier Warspite ??? IIRC the Wasp's load were destroyed within days but I think she made two missions. There should be some Blemheims, Beauforts and other coastal stuff as they were used against convoys in early 1942 and likely Malta based.
3 liters a day is a better estimate for the Med in summer so 100t is 33.000 man days, one MZ per day would be enough, and there are lots of MZ. The MZ are actually a better option until the axis captures enough cisterns to unload the water to. I don't see that much wastage, moving water from drums to military water bottles is very similar to bottling wine from casks, and I can tell you from experience there is very little wastage there. IIRC the SM 82 could carry 28 paras, so 200 of them is 5.600 troops without the more numerous Ju 52s, on the other hand 200 operational SM 82 looks a bit high, only 606 were built, some were used as bombers, 100 went to the LW, and losses in the air bridge to NA was around 100 (though most of those would be in the Tunisia phase) most likely some were less capable Fiat G 12 or other types.

 

Sorry typo - should be Wasp, two missions:

Operation Calendar - delivered 46 Spitfires of which only 6 were left after 4 days fighting.

Later that month Operation Bowery with Eagle - landed 62 Spitfires (another source says 60 with 2 crashing). Within minutes a few had been refueled and all within 35 minutes according to one source and successfully fought off nine attacks.

 

Scipio, we´re going on with the fun, as you´ve said! The AA-guns which defended Malta are impressive in their abilities and numbers. Without any doubt the blood toll on the Axis side would have been a great one. The huge number of tanks have been a work of ten minutes nothing more as the Vickers was scrap and the Matilda´s.....
I had the most concernes with fighting against the well trained Infantry and the terrain. Their Commander as it´ve been Sir William Dobbie wasn´t a huge strategyst. I don´t think that he had the agility and imaginativines that this battle would have needed. For me a "Can be done" but i have to admit not a cheap an easy victory.

 

Comparing a Malta jump to allied jumps. In Sicily and Normandy, the troops were scattered about and suffered losses that in Sicily rendered the jump ineffective. Look what happened to a second jump at Arnhem when the Germans were ready. How many aircraft did the axis have and could they have quickly reinforced any success considering the probable losses of planes? Could the Axis have reinforced the landing only by air or would they need a sea landing. I dont care how poor the tanks were, against lightly armoured Para's any tank would be deadly.

 

Matildas made little impression at Crete, they are rather unreliable beasts, but I love the Malta camo.



The comparison with allied jumps is makes little sense, most were night jumps in support of other land forces, to sieze choke points or create rear area disruption not to take the final objective by themselves. Leros is a better comparison and the Germans won there despite committing a scratch assault force. Malta would have seen the first team in action.

 

Lets see what Vance von Borries has to say on the state of the garrison and people of Malta. Vance is, to date, the only person that has designed a game of the proposed invasion of Malta, and his extensive research into this topic produced not only a VERY accurate and exciting game of Crete, but a 'mini game' about Malta that was intrigueing for the design concepts built into it. The following is from his designers notes for the Malta portion of the game......

"Fortress Malta was tough but it faced many problems too. First, in consideration of the civilian population, Lord Gort, (in command from 7 May 1942), would have to consider capitulation when food and water supplies ran low as Percival did earlier at Singapore, (15 Feb, 1942). The equivalent of four reinforced brigades defended the island, but during the Spring and Summer of 1942 they had become weary, were hungry and malnourished, lost their infantry training edge, and were even split up to provide labour details to remove bomb damage. In some photographs, even their uniforms were in tatters. Another problem was that at times, the AA guns fell silent as sufficient stocks of ammunition had to be available in the event of invasion. Malta was also besieged psychologically. Every soldier and civilian watched the convoys, and after 22 months of this behaviour a debilitating siege mentality had taken hold. Many were anxious for the Axis to invade just to get the agony over with. On the other hand, the siege united the Maltese people with the result that there were no saboteurs or collaborators."

This most certainly does NOT indicate that Malta was in much of a shape to seriously contest the well equipped and trained force that was to drop on them. These tough professionals would, most likely, have carried the day. Vance von Borries sums up the task at hand in a few words...

"In sum, the invasion would depend upon the success of the airborne battalions in capturing the few key points necessary to enable the main invasion force to land successfully."

Given the state of the garrison, and the air superiority that the Axis would have enjoyed, these airborne soldiers would have been well motivated to carry the day, just as they did at Maleme, in spite of the heavy casualties expected. But, the high command had no faith in the Italians, as Kurt Student speaks of, on page 243 of Liddel Hart's "The Other Side of the Hill"....

""I hoped to carry out the plan, (HERCULES) not later than August- it depended on suitable weather, and I spent some months preparing it. In June I was summoned to Hitler's headquarters for the final conference on the operation. Unfortunately, the day before I got there, Hitler had seen General Cruwell, who was just back from North Africa, and had given a very unfavourable account of the state of the Italian armed forces and their morale. Hitler at once took alarm. He felt that if the British fleet appeared on the scene all the Italian ships would bolt for their home ports- and leave the German airborne forces stranded. He decided to abandon the plan of attacking Malta."


As I stated before, blame ROMMEL. Rommel requested air support to break out of the Gazala position at the very time Axis aircraft were achieving their objectives for Malta. He was supposed to have these aircraft for only a few weeks, (15 days to be exact), but, his blood was up after defeating the British at Gazala, and bouncing on to take Tobruk. The promotion to Field Marshal went to his head, and he suddenly began to make demands for the continuance of that aircupport. Over the protests of the Italians, (including Mussolini), AND Kesselring and Student, Rommel got his way, and the moment passed to take Malta; The airborne troops slated for the invasion turned up as reinforcements for the AK at El Alemain! Rommel had nobody to blame but himself for this, and all his accusations against the Italians came to the fore.

Cruwell's arrival at Hitler's headquarters was the straw that broke the camel's back for Hercules. Rommel knew very well that without the aircraft to support his operations, he had little chance. Grabbing the Luftwaffe was the first step, and priming Cruwell with anti-Italian reports wass the other side of the coin.Cruwell could only have formed this impression of the Italians from Rommel himself. Rommel knew very well what would occur once he opened his mouth. And he bagged the Italians with just the cancellation of 'Hercules' in mind, for this would have made the question of air support and just where it would be deployed a moot point, and then resolved in Rommel's favor. This was not only pig-headed of Rommel, but arrogant as well. Rommel was a great tactician, but as a strategist he left a LOT to be desired, and over the cancellation of 'Hercules', he certainly had a LOT to answer for.

 

Just a quick thought, if the Italian military in Africa was in such a bad state, as Rommel reported to Cruwell, how on earth did Rommel expect to make it all the way to Egypt and the Suez Canal with such a poor force?

It doesn't make a whole lot of sense, and is only explained by the fact that it was either "Hercules" or the push into Egypt. There were not the air assets for anything else, and Rommel probably made the same assumption that another poster has here, namely, if you take Egypt ans Suez, you don't need Malta, or it falls from lack of supply to a much smaller operation.

Either way, it was ROMMEL that put all this in motion, over the protests of those that knew better. And he stuffed it up for good, because failure at Alemain spelt RETREAT from then on, regardless of anything else.

Once again....blame Rommel....not the Italians...not the Regia Marina, (who had provided sterling support to get the far greater majority of troops and supplies to Rommel)....don't blame Mussolini...don't blame Hitler even....it was ROMMEL who made the bed, and it was he who was forced to sleep in it...

 

I might add also that both the German and Italian advisors for 'Hercules' ALL expected the island to fall...QUICKLY.

They had everything in place, they had air superiority, they had sufficient naval resources to complete the task, and it was the type of invasion that would not have required a great logistical train of cargo ships as 'Overlord' did, (as pointed out above by another poster).

With all this in mind, why should it fail?

Note well Hitler's idea of what the Regia Marina was likely to do. He could only have formed this opinion , once again from Rommel.

The figures show that Hitler was having the wool firmly pulled over his eyes..(1,210 convoys were sent to Libya during the course of the fighting in the Western Desert. These comprised 2,249 cargo ships of 500 tons or more and 1,913 escorts. Thus the average convoy contained 1.7 cargo vessels carrying 170.5 men and 1,855.7 tons of supplies)....

"Some 2,345,381 tons of cargo were loaded into Italian ships for shipment to Libya during the war. Of this total, and in spite of often heavy losses in escorts, only 14% or 315,426 tons were actually lost. Some 206,402 men were embarked in Italian vessels, often warships, for transport to Africa. of whom 17,204 or 8.5% failed to arrive at their point of destination., (though a large proportion of these men were, in fact, rescued, and eventually reached the front anyway.) It is, of course, important to note that these figures do NOT include men and material transported in German controlled vessels, nor does it reflect the limited but useful German airlift capacity."...(Alfred A. Nofi..."The Sea War- Campaign Analysis, Part 4", Strategy & Tactics Magazine, 1971).

considering this effort, this means that the catstrophic losses of escort vessels, and the not inconsiderable losses of cargo vessels of the Italian Merchant Marine had LITTLE or NO EFFECT on Rommel's supply situation. It makes every protest that Rommel made to Hitler sheer nonsense, and reveals the true position of Rommel and his Italian allies.

The Italians were SCAPEGOATS for Rommel's own failures. In an earlier paragraph, Nofi describes it thus....

"German non-cooperation in this matter (lack of fuel for the Regia Marina) is probably more than a little the fault of the obsession the German High Command had with the Eastern Front and also with Rommel's continuous attacks on the Regia Marina for it's "inefficiency" in escorting convoys to Africa. Though an ally protecting a common interest, the Regia Marina had to sweat for every ounce of fuel received from Germany! A truly remarkable situation."

Rommel even pinched their transport vehicles after El Alemain to beat a retreat for his Germans, leaving the faithful Italians high and dry!

Arrogance from Rommel, his use of the Italians as a scapegoat and his failings as a strategist cost the Axis the Campaign in North Africa.

 

Just one last thing...

Many posters here put a lot of faith in Malta's fortifications to make the difference for an allied win. Well, scratch that theory. this is what Von Borries has to say...

"Finally faced was a problem that is probably uniquely Maltese; could all those stone forts on Malta really withstand a modern assault? Central to the design of MALTA was the analysis of the effectiveness of the Maltese fortifications combined with field, coast and anti-aircraft artilery. Research showed that the fortifications system, while extensive, was too old and too small to withstand modern artillery. Yet, when the game was tested without them, British resistence broke after the first day...."

Posters feeling that Malta's forts would make the difference are to be disappointed.

Folks, I own this game. Ive played both sides many times. The pressure is on both players to both perform and not be predictable. Tough fight it is, but the Axis paratroopers are too tough in the open, and if the garrison beats a retreat into the forts, the rest of the Axis forces land quite quickly and secure the island quicksmart. Its a fight to the finish 'on the beaches', just as it would have been. Once the Axis gain a lodgement and bring in the reinforcements by sea, it's game over for the gallant Maltese.

You ought to remember this when speculating the possible results. I have, at least, simulated them in competative play, and have a fair idea of exactly what both sides are capable of. In many ways, it's much better than reading many books on the subject. It gives you a commanders eye view, rather than an historian's point of view.

 

Really? What are the German or Italian paratroopers jumping with that can take out even a Vickers much less a Maltilda? Especially when the latter enjoy infantry support and a significant edge in artillery?

Indeed they did make little impression at Crete but that was because they were held back to allow them to counter attack a seaborne invasion that never occured. Weren't the Matildas on Crete allso recent evacuees of the mainland as well?

Let's see split up to provide labour to repair bomb damage. Where was this likely to be? In at least some cases I would suspect the airfields. Just where the Germans don't want them to be. Note also that the AA guns "fell silent as sufficient stocks of ammunition had to be available in the even of invasion". I.e. those stocks are now available so ammo isn't likely to be a short term problem.

Or not. The British garrison was also tough professionals. I don't think anyone ever tried landing an airborne invasion in the face of that much AA either. Then there's the impact of Ultra. That gets a bit difficult to predict in particular we need to differentiate between an Italian led invasion and a German led one. The Germans thought that a good part of their problems in the med were due to leaks in the Italian military which likely would have resulted in them disclosing even more via Ultra than they did in other operations and in keeping the Italians in the dark as much as possible (not good for inspring confidence or cooperation). Conversly if it's almost totally an Italian effort the British will get very little electronic intel.

Indeed and that capability is in question. At least up through Crete the Germans didn't even jump with weapons heavier than sub machine guns. I don't know if this was corrected yet but there was little prospect of them getting support weapons down until after they took an airfield and that becomes problematic when one considers their equipment, their opposition, and tactical situation.

Indeed they would have been motivated, but that doesn't help much when a heavy caliber AA round bursts in your transport plane or medium and light caliber rounds shred it before you even drop or shred you while your still in the air or when you face infantry, machineguns, artillery, and tanks armed with a machine pistol and hand grenades.
Let's remember this quote for a bit

I wonder who these advisors were? How many of them also expected the USSR to collapse quickly?

Did they? I don't think so. For one thing they barely had enough oil in place for the Italian navy to sortie their ships once.

Because the paratroopers would most likely have been heavily overmatched and the seaborne forces would have found themselves stranded on beaches that requried naval fire support to get them off. Fire support that couldn't be provided even if the RN didn't show up because the Italians didn't have enough fuel. If they did have enough fuel moving it would likely have telegraphed the attack weeks if not months in advance allowing the British to reinforce as well.

Your quote above suggest otherwise. Of course given the fuel they had on hand the Italians could only afford to contest one RN operation and then they would have to head for home.

I think we are in substantial agreement with the above.

I wouldn't go this far. I don't think the axis had much of a chance in North Africa long term anyway. The allies could simply afford to put and maintain more resources there.

Actually this hasn't been brought up all that much.

Certainy at Normandy old stone forts proved quite resistant to modern artillery. There's also little evidence I've seen that the Axis airpower did much damage to any of the artillery on Malta. Artillery that would prove a problem to every phase of the invasion.

This suggest a flaw in the game. German paratroopers in particular were quite vulnerable to immediate counter attacks particularly supported by armor. It also suggest that the dangers of dropping on Malta have not been fully accounted for or the advantages to defenders.

 

To the equipment of the Fallschirm Infantry belongs a Flammenwerfer 41 mit Strahlpatrone/Flamethrower weight 18 Kilograms. This nice little tool is very effective against tanks and for the rest you won´t need a artillery support.

 

I would point out that stone cities and forts when blown up make even better strong points, ask the Germans about Stalingrad and the Americans about Monte Casino. Also did the Italians really have the ability to land heavy equipment on a beach? How quickly could the Germans get reinforcements and supplies to their troops. My point about comparing landings is that in Normandy and Sicily the troops did not land in their assigned areas in large numbers. Of course in Normandy it helped, but due to the size of Malta missing the mark could easily mean landing in the Med as happened in Sicily. To me the main issue in Malta is that enough troops have to land in the right areas and enough reinforcements have to arrive quickly enough. As in MG the more things an attacker needs to go right the more likely the friction of war will cause a failure somewhere in that chain that could easily cause a failure in the plan.

 

They don't jump with that though do they? Is it even in an equipment container? Your weight seems a little low from what I could find.
Flammenwerfer
states 22 kg and it's predecessor
Flammenwerfer 35 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
weight is given as almost 36 kg.
German Infantry Weapons
Does list a variant with a mass of 18kg. However
Flammenwerfer 41
notes that the original model of the 41 wasn't in service until September of 41 and the previous source mentioned that the lighter one was developed due to problems with the original on the eastern front which brings to question just how many the paratroopers would have had in July of 42.
Furthermore it's max range of only 30 m makes it very problematic to use vs tanks. It's firing signature also means it will draw a lot of attention when used. As for not needing artillery support, that's one of the more absurd things I've heard particularly when one side has a lot of it.

 

On armour ... the Germans planned to land a few captured KV and T34, they would be the classic 500lb gorilla until they eventually broke down as AFAIK there were no 6lb AT guns at Malta, the bigger AA guns could deal with them but they had no AP ammo and were not emplaced with ground fire in mind. The Italians would also land a number of M 13, not invulnerable but a problem for infantry without A/Ts. The 28mm A/T and recoilless 75mm were issued to the FJ and airdroppable and they could probably deal with the few tanks the garrison had nwithout the FJ having to go hand to hand with the vehicles, BTW the Folgore proved pretty apt at doing exactly that at El Alamein.
The fuel situation of the Regia Marina is not so bad that they couldn't do one all out effort, on the other hand possibly barring the San Marco regiment, that was RM, direct fire support from ships for the tropps is unlikely, I found no indication of naval artillery observers being deployed with re RE units. The naval guns could be used to bombard installations with no axis troops close by or for counterbattery fire but the RN was short of fleet destroyers by then and is unlikely to detach anything larger for close in work.
The Germans and Italians had plenty of pilots familiar with the area, even with a night drop they are unlikely to miss. Sicily was quite different for the rather inexperienced C47 pilots and of course the invasion fleet opening up on them didn't help.
BIG stone buildings once rubbled make good defensive positions, not that many of them at Malta outside La Valletta, it's mostly one or two story houses, also with the sort of temperatures normal in the Med summer not having a roof on top of you not a good thing.
At Cassino and Stalingrad the attackers never managed to isolate the defenders, at Malta they would start isolated, a huge difference when dealing with what is basically a siege.
IMO water is a bigger problem for the defenders than for the attackers, isolated posts will have to give up fast as their water runs out, the cisterns are unaccessible under fire as the access well is usually outside the building (the cistern itself was not dug under the house but outside it, those houses have little in terms of foundations and a having a big hole beneath them is a big no no.

 

Hmm, i never said that artillery support isn´t needed, i said that you don´t need artillery support on the tanks! Thats a difference! I know that throwing stones against fortified positions isn´t very helpful.

The Flammenwerfer34 had a weight of 36 Kilograms and was a monster to carry. The next step was the Flammenwerfer40 klein, with a weight of 21.8Kilograms.
Than came the Flammenwerfer41 with 22Kg`s and the mentioned Flammenwerfer41 mit Strahlpatrone with 18Kg`s. Sure is the signature of a Flamethrower easy to see and itself has the effect of a magnet to enemies fire. But they were used against the fortifications and against tanks and they are a effective way to deal with tanks if no AT guns or hollow charges are on hand. Please do not forget the LG´s which were in use with the Paratroops at Crete. They had not the same effect as a "normal" artillery piece but they were helpful.

Sorry, TOS post came a bit earlier so i haven´t seen that he mentioned the recoilless guns!

 

Except they would have had to get off the invasion beaches which were from what I've heard funnels. I would expect them to have AT mines on the most likely routes as well given any sort of preinvasion warning.

That's if the FJ can get to them and they were in adequate numbers. Not at all a certain thing. Going "hand to hand" with tanks worked during that period if you could seperate them from thier infantry support. I'm not at all sure that would happen here though.

Indeed they calcualted they could do just one. What then happens if at D-day -5 say the RN makes a major supply run. Do they give it a pass or do they burn the fuel? Of if on the invasion day RN forces approach Malta? Do they wait until they get close or try to intecept at range so that leakers aren't a problem. If the latter what happens if the RN turns around then comes back the next day. Even at D-day + 2 or 3 an RN battleship or even a cruiser showing up off the invasion beach would be a disaster.

Do they have to? They have a fair amount of artillery on the island and I would think the invasion beaches would already be registered.

I think you are overly optomistic. Night drops would be a disaster. With little or no way of telling what the surface winds are like or if one is over the drop point the forces would almost assuredly be scattered and likely some would land at sea. Furthermore the fields on Malata were (are?) seperated by stone fences. These are dangerous enough to paratroopers trying to land during daylight hours at night they would be a lot worse.

The attackers would be even more isolated than the defenders and the staying power of paratroopers isn't very good. They simply don't carry enough supplies.

Why should they be defending in the houses. The stone fences would seem to make better lines and allow them access to the water. The attackers on the other hand would have to carry theirs with them. Of course the paratraoopers might be living off the cisterns but then they would be in worse shape than the defenders as they could only rely on a few loosly connected ones and they wouldn't have motor vehicles to move additonal quantites and even if the house faced the British the latter could call down artillery on them and in all likelyhood they would face attacks from a broad range of angles.

 

That may of been what you meant to say but it wasn't what you said. Furthemore artillery could be quite helpful vs tanks as it helped seperate the tanks from any accompanying infantry. But my point was more that the FJ were going to be facing a lot of artillery which would be a problem for them especially as they would have had little or none of their own.

There are a number of things you can use against tanks in desperation. However especially if they are supported by infantry and artillery they can represent a severe problem to troops as lightly equiipped as the FJ. Now I don't know if they had made substantial changes since Crete but at that time they jumped with only very light weapons and their was a seperate weapons container, I think with each squad, that held their heavier weapons (to include rifles I believe). Thus they were very vulnerable to immediate counter attacks. For heavier weapons I'm not sure how they were dropped but I suspect their own conatiners or in some cases perhaps even gliders or air landed. In an area like Malta this could lead to substantial portions being captured before they could be put to use. And even if the FJ are the first to get to them for the special weapons you have to get them to the right people as well.

 

Thats a fact and their vulnerability while in air and for the first minutes on ground are this the mayor problems they had to face. But lets think that the most of them were able to get their equipment, they had the chance to use the terrain for their purposes to. I´m sure that they knew how to seperate the tanks from their Infantry andeliminate them. And you shouldn´t forget that the defenders had to deal with lots of places where the enmiy landed at the same time. This will have brought a little chaos in their defending.