Spruance or Halsey?

As I understand it, Admiral Halsey was dupped into believing that the Japanese force was headed north in a retreat, not realizing that it was a ruse, so that; I Think that Kurita's force could sneak in and create havoc for the landings on the beachhead. His force being a Battle Force, (no Carriers). Thanks to the DD's and DE's, along with the Jeep Carriers, which by the way suffered heavy losses, Kurita was dupped into reatreating, thinking he had run into a much larger force. I also think it was this battle that Admiral Nimitz radioed the famous message " The world wonders" Where is the Third Fleet??

 

As a Fleet Commander, Adm. Spruance was the better choice. I believe that Adm. Spruance receives unwarranted criticism for the Battle of the Phillipine Sea. Mainly that he failed to offensively position his fleet, prior to the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. As a result, there was the "stern chase" allowing Japanese carriers to slip away. However, he did what the planning designated and required of him. Namely, Cover The Invasion Force. It is similar to what he did on the evening of June 6, 1942. He didn't charge after a lure, risk a night time naval action and leave uncovered his primary goal.
In October 1944 Adm. Halsey was provided with the opportunity to achieve the destruction of Japanese carriers, the last great Battle Line action and Cover The Invasion. He was given the authority to do all of these things. It was the June 1942 scenario, which Adm. Halsey missed, all over again. However, he charged after the lure, left uncovered the San Bernardino Strait, and missed the chance for the last great surface action of the Pacific War.
In retrospect, the black shoes (Fletcher and Spruance) and tennis shoes (Nimitz) understood the nature of the Pacific Naval War, better than the brown shoes (Halsey and King)? The black shoes seemed to have understood that naval war changed at Pearl Harbor. Great Fleet Commanders adapt as changes in tactics, armaments and material come about.

 

Halsey was a fighter. Spruance was a chess player. Each has his place in war. I prefer Spruance's studied, unemotional style; it takes into consideration potential enemy actions more thoroughly, in my opinion.

I wonder if Halsey sending his carriers north against the lure, under a subordinate, and keeping TF34 under his own command to pursue and destroy Center Force might not have been a better solution. Granted there's a heavy pinch of hindsight in that recipe, and I'm not sure Halsey would consider it an option, given his temperament.

 

Slightly on-topic. So why was Fletcher eased into back-office and eventual retirement whereas Spruance went on to command more than 1,000 carrier-based warplanes later in the war? Burn-out for the former?

 

King didn't like Fletcher -- this is according to Lundstrom and Symonds both. King thought Fletcher used the need for fueling his destroyers as an excuse to get out of the relief mission to Wake in Dec 41, and never forgot or forgave that after becoming Cominch. Add into that losing two carriers and having a third torpedoed, Fletcher was sent to DC after desperately-needed leave, where he was shuffled off afterward to Seattle to take charge of the Naval District there.

It boils down to personal animus from King.

 

On 21 November 1942, Fletcher became commander of Northwestern Sea Frontier and did double duty as Commandant Thirteenth Naval District. He passed the Com13 duty on to RADM Sherwoode A Taffinder on 12 October 1943, retaining ComNWSF. On 15 April 1944, in a CinCPOA reorganization, the NWSF was redesignated as Alaskan Sea Frontier. Fletcher was ComASF and simultaneously Commander North Pacific Force and North Pacific Ocean Area, positions he retained through the end of the war and with the Japanese surrender deployed his forces to Hokkaido. He was relieved in December 1945 and was assigned to the General Board in Washington DC. He retired from the Navy in May 1947 after 41 years of active service and upon retirement was promoted to Admiral on the retired list.

So, not quite the way you describe it.

As noted in the post above, King decided he was not satisfied with Fletcher’s performance as a carrier task force commander and refused to return him to such duty although Nimitz wanted his return. Once anyone got on King’s bad side, they stayed there. King retired from active duty in December 1945, though as a Fleet Admiral he remained on the active list.

 

Well, thanks for those corrections. He was promoted. But to a reader like me, I'll of course question the move to take him out of the SOPAC theater where carrier battles kept raging, with the US finally getting the upper hand in terms of numbers and weaponry, and considering the popular view that he was the most successful carrier admiral todate.

 

Shouldn't we also consider that six Japanese carriers were sunk in Fletcher's battles?

 

Tell that to King. I'm of the opinion that Nimitz was right: Fletcher should've been retained. I'm not offering my opinion above, though; I'm only reporting the facts as I've read them.