Stalin's Aggressive Plan in 1941

Rezun was a spy of the highest sort who switched sides. In order for him to have gotten asylum in GB he had to reveal the where abouts of other spies. Care to take a guess as to what happened to the men and woman he revealed?

A traitor is exactly what he is. The fact that he was a high ranking spy only helps him pass his stories as fact...

 

If the sources he revealed were British, they were tried and if found guilty, they were imprisoned. If they were professional Soviet Intelligence, most likely after being asked to leave England, then they were promoted and given a Dacha with a driver to take them there on weekends.
As far as I know nobody has been executed in the West for espionage in a long time. On other hand when CIA or MI6 agents sell out Russian sources, we all know that a bullet in the back of the head is the end for most of them.
Rezun betrayed a system which in my opinion was enslaving and totalitarian. I guess we can look down upon and call people who tried to kill Hitler traitors as well.

 

I dont usually do this but... In the Good Sheppard, there is an excellent portrayal of what happened to spies when caught by the other side during the Cold War. There is a difference between a registered intelligence officers and a spy. The individuals he revealed were not deported.

As for the Hitler analogy, im not sure I agree. Had these same men instead of trying to kill him fled to England to try to start a coupe, well then they would have been considered traitors by the Nazi's and later hailed by the Germans post war.

 

Whatever Stalin's ultimate intentions, it seems unlikely he was planning an offensive in 1941. They were in the process of completely reorganizing their armored forces, the key element of an offensive. Most of the 20-30 mechanized corps in existence in June 1941 had only been established in March-May. T-34 and KV tanks were just being introduced. In the air, the vast majority of fighters were obsolescent, but a new generation of aircraft comparable to the Me109 etc. were coming into service - Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3. The Sturmovik ground attack plane was also being introduced. The Soviets might have been ready to start a war in 1942 or later, but not 1941.

 

I don't know about 'Icebreaker' but I remember browsing through a book caled something like - 'Who Really Started WW2?' - which referred to Russian dispositions, tank design - more suitable for European roads than cross country, officers who had been sent to the Gulags - who now (1941) had a chance to redeem themselves - in the front line, and pieces of information which by themselves maybe didn't mean much, but added together gave me food for thought.

 

Only pair of quotes.

1. Pilot Baidukov, the hero of the Russian youth.
Newspaper «Pravda»,August 18, 1940 quoted him as saying:
"What happiness and joy will express the eyes of those here in the Kremlin to take the last republic in the brotherhood of nations around the world! I clearly present: the bombers, destroying factories, railway junctions, bridges, depots and enemy positions, attack planes, attack the fire rain columns of troops, artillery positions, landing craft, planted his divisions deep in enemy lines. The mighty and formidable fleet of the Soviet Union, together with the infantry, gunners, tank crews religiously fulfilled their duty and help the oppressed peoples to get rid of the executioners. "

2. Memorandum from the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, Deputy Chairman of the SNK SSSR Voznesensky
№ 1146, dated June 4, 1941.
«I present in this statement needs Commissariat of the Navy for mine-torpedo weapons in wartime from 01/07/1941 to 01/01/1943. I ask your guidance to increase the allocated amounts of mine-torpedo weapons, given that the need for them at the 2 half of 1941 are 50% of the total requirements for the period up to 01/01/1943/.»
And you do not belive that Stalin had agressive plan yet?

 

There were no plans for an invasion of Germany in 1941. The Soviet army was in shambles, over half their tanks were out of service, officers had no clue as to how to perform their duties and training was just beginning for many troops. David Glantz has been in the archives and has not seen one single document about an attack. Rezin would be unable to produce one document to show what units were assigned what objectives, what was their time tables and other such basic requirements of planning an attack.

 

Some claim even fewer tank numbers. Nagorski writes 30% were "combat ready".

 

It seems to me that the question "Did Stalin have aggressive plans in 1941" has no answer. Some people have said that the plan was. The other part believes that such a plan was not. So it's one of those eternal questions such as: "Who won the battle for Moscow, General Frost or Red Army?" or "Why did Hitler stopped the tanks in front of Dunkirk?" or "Why Hess flew to Britain?" I mean, now that it is impossible to bring some fact, which will change the opinion of one or another group of people.
I became interested in military history recently. This is not my profession, it is my hobby. But I read a lot of archival documents, I was long enough in the Soviet Army as a military service and I was a member of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1990. Therefore, I have some thoughts on the matter.
It has already been much talk about this theme, but if it interested, we can continue the discussion.
So, the Red Army was not going to attack, because it was not ready. It was understaffed by tanks and other equipment, the commanders were not trained, some weapons were outdated and so on.
Colleagues, on this occasion I can say the following. No army of the world, never ready for war as 100%. At any time in any army there is a new and obsolete weapons (once), there is a shortage of equipment and personnel, has experienced commanders and a "green horns". This is the normal state of the army. Who served in the Army will understand me.
Yes, in June 1941 the Red Army was not the most combat-ready. But since 1939, it not only preparing for, but also constantly involved in local conflicts (China, Romania, Spain, Finland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia).
Only one fact, the most common. The number of Red Army over the years:
On January 1, 1937 - 1,518,090 people.
On January 1, 1938 - 1,582,057 people
On February 21, 1939 - 1,910,477 people.
On September 20, 1939 - 5,289,400 people. (Invasion of Poland)
On December 1, 1939 - 3,273,400 people.
On January 1, 1940 - 3,851,700 people.
On February 1, 1940 - 4,229,954 people.
On April 1, 1940 - 4,416,600 people.
On May 1, 1940 - 3,990,993 people.
On June 1, 1940 - 4,055,479 people.
On September 1, 1940 - 3,423,499 people.
On October 1, 1940 - 3,446,309 people.
By January 1941 - 4,200,000 people.
On June 22, 1941 - 5,080,977 people.
One can observe different figures on the growth of production of tanks, planes and ammunition. One can see the organizational changes that took place in USSR.
But the conclusion is - the Soviet Union was preparing for a major war.
Specifically, in June 1941 - not the best time for the Red Army. At this point, it was all in motion (moving). In it, as it were simultaneously operated two different processes. These processes were not uniform. On the contrary, they often contradicted each other. Just one example, judge for yourself.
12 Mechanized Corps. was in the Baltic. According on the directive of the District Staff, June 18, it was put on alert to plan combat anxiety (with full ammo and full readiness for the start of hostilities) and began to advance to the assembly areas. And Mechanized Corps. - this is a 31 000 people, 750 tanks!
At the same time the Commander of next Military District gave orders to withdraw weapons from aircraft!
I have read many military memoirs. I got the impression that in June 1941, all military units or move a permanent place of deployment in new, often field conditions (that is, increase their alertness), or, conversely, released the officers on leave, dismantled and serviced equipment. That is, lowered its alert.
By the way 12 Mechanized Corps dispersed in the forests of 70-100 km from the border. The gap between the divisions was up to 60 kilometers. It was not as preparing for the defense.
So, June 1941 - this is not the best time for the Red Army to the outbreak of hostilities. It all was in motion. And it was not to be prepared for offensive. But this does not mean that Stalin had no aggressive plans.
I can say another words: In July 1941 the Red Army would be better for offensive then June and more better in 1942 then 1941.

The Red Army was not going to attack, because no one has seen the aggressive plan.
Hitler had a concrete plan "Barbarossa" and everyone can see a copy of this plan on the Internet or a script in the archives. This is a fundamental difference between Stalin and Hitler. I very much doubt that somewhere in the archives lies (or lay, or once existed) a piece of paper on which was written: "The plan of aggression against Germany (Romania, Poland, Europe, etc. ). "
The reason is the following.
In those period of time USSR was ruled not by the government (as in democratic countries). There was the Communist Party. The Communist Party was born and grew up in the underground, illegal. The tsarist secret police brutally persecuted RSDLP (future Communist Party) and the Communists taught to keep secrets. (This is very well described in the book, by Radzinsky "Stalin." I think it was published in English.) On the one hand, the Communists are fond of accounting and order. On the other hand, many important decisions that are contrary to the order for worldwide will never appear on paper. There is no document on the basis of which the troops were introduced in Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Afghanistan. I can give you another example. Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Tulong prison. Thousands of photos and files of dead people. Accounting and order. But there is no document signed by Pol Pot, where he gives the order to destroy its people.
Another reason is too obvious. In the 20th century, after each division of the world have no country would recognize himself as the aggressor. If someone somewhere had invaded (as Mussolini to Ethiopia or Hitler in the Sudetenland), so it's only because "the local people asked about it." Inside the country the Soviet Union was a symbol of the most peace-loving nation. Therefore, such a document, even theoretically, could not exist.
Now, that relates directly to military documents. Those, that determine: where and who is stationed, where to move, etc.
In the early 1990s in Russia have been declassified and published two important set of documents.
1. Description of command - staff games (where Zhukov reportedly played for the Germans and defeated the Red Army)
2. Document of the General Staff, which called "Considerations for the strategic deployment ..." It reflects the conclusions of the war games and proposed deployment of troops for offensive action against Germany and Romania.
Russian historians have debated around this two sets of documents for almost 20 years. Had Stalin aggressive plans or had not? Documents examined thoroughly. There are planned deployment of troops. (In fact, most of the place in 1941 coincides with the plan.) Described plans for the offensive deep into the German and Romanian territory. Who, where and what date should reach the milestone ("strategic objective to have a mastery of the former territory of Poland and East Prussia," etc.)
But this document does not contain one important detail - how (to what, when) to begin those actions. And besides, these documents do not have the signature of Stalin. Therefore, many believe that Stalin did not see them. And this is nothing more than a plan of the General Staff, which (as mentioned above) can have any army of any state.
Therefore, disputes and ongoing. Everyone decides for himself - had Stalin aggressive plans or not. In such circumstances, I can only give another examples, and other indirect evidence that Stalin was preparing for war.

 

Iru yes the Soviets were preparing, but the Soviets were completely uprepared in june. Look at badly they performed in defence. The biggest indicator was that the BT series of tanks were being fazed out, but the T34 were just starting. As stated about 65% of BT tanks were inoperational. As far as planning dont you think that units that were scheduled to attack would know what their objectives were. This is the kind of planning that is missing. Even in in Finland there were planning as bad as it was. Stalins was probably thinking about 1942 as a possible invasion date.

 

I'm totaly agred that Stalin can thought to start the aggression in 1942. But he had to take into account external circumstances. And I think he realized that Hitler could not give him a chance to hold out until 1942. In other words, world situation changed very quickly. And nobody could build such long-term plans. We all know that even a highly organized and punctual Wehrmacht repeatedly postpones the start of the war against Russia.
And let me say my opinion about BT and T - 34.
I think, they are different tanks, they were designed for different purposes. I think that there was no purpose to replace the BT to T - 34.
Tanks a series of BT (BT-2 BT - 5, BT - 7) - it's light, wheel - tracked, gasoline tanks. They had high speed, but a weak cross on the dirt (narrow track, high unit pressure on the soil). Such a result is not accidental. The engineers were asked to make a tank with these characteristics. And they did it. In Russia, where there are few good roads, it can be used only in summer. But it could well be used either in the Mongolian steppe, or in Europe. In Russia at that time appeared a good diesel engine. But BT continued to make gasoline. The reason is - German and European tanks were all gasoline. It was believed that the transition to diesel engine fuel supply make it difficult on the occupied territories. But we could use captured fuel.
By the way T - 34 is also, initially wanted to make gasoline.
T - 34 - it is an medium, tracked, diesel tank. How did it come from? Given the growing power of anti-tank defense engineers were tasked to design another model of wheel - tracked tank. It must to be not light, but the medium (better protection, thicker armor, more powerful weapons). At the same time it was able to move on tracks and on wheels. It was a Model A - 20. But with such a weight control wheel was very cumbersome and unreliable. The designers at your own risk have prepared a prototype only to track powered (model A - 32). In 1938, two options were presented to the commission. And Stalin chose A - 32. Then there were disputes about the gasoline or diesel engine. Because this type of tank had aims only to break defense (to develop the offensive was planned to use the BT light tanks), then eventually to A - 32 decided to put a diesel engine. So there was a tank T - 34.
As for the BT tanks, they successfully fought in 1945 against the Japanese army. Because there was steppe and no powerful anti-tank guns. And on the Eastern Front BT could resist the German Pz - I, Pz - II and Pz - 35 (t)

 

THe BT series were being discontinued, there were few spare parts and a lack of men to repair them. As far as the east front there may have been T70's but there were no factories producing BT's after 1941 and the Japanese tanks were a joke worthy of 1920 to 1925 but not 1940. Stalin was despertly trying to avoid a fight in 1941, there is no reason he would want one. But in 1942 then the Soviet army would be more ready.

 

Glantz was only shown what Russians wanted him to see. To say his research is correct and everybody with opposing view is wrong, is not right.

Being not 100% ready for military action never stopped Stalin.



Tanks have different ratings for combat readiness. Some are in need of a tune up, some need a paint job, some need complete overhaul and some are ready for scrap metal. Many historians put all Russian combat vehicles in need of minor maintenance as not ready for action.

 

Also, in my opinion is: very important not the number of tanks, as well as they are (focused, posted).
The distribution tank units and tanks of the Red Army on June 22, 1941 on the fronts:
(total number / only T-34 and KV)

North-Western Front

12 Mechanized Corps 730 / 0
3 Mechanized Corps 672/128
1 Mechanized Corps 666/10
21 Mechanized Corps 120 / 0
Total 2188 tanks

Western Front

11 Mechanized Corps 414/27
6 Mechanized Corps 1131/452
13 Mechanized Corps 282 / 0
14 Mechanized Corps 518 / 0
7 Mechanized Corps 959/103
5 Mechanized Corps 861/17
57 Separate Armored Division 200 / 0
Total 4365 tanks

South-Western Front

22 Mechanized Corps 707/31
15 Mechanized Corps 749/136
4 Mechanized Corps 892/414
8 Mechanized Corps 858 / 171
9 Mechanized Corps 300 / 0
16 Mechanized Corps 680 / 0
19 Mechanized Corps 450 / 7
24 Mechanized Corps 222 / 0
109 Motorized Rifle Division (it belonged to the 5th Mechanized Corps) 113 / 0
Total 4971 tank

Southern Front

2 Mechanized Corps 527/60
18 Mechanized Corps 282 / 0
Total 809 tanks

So, the largest number of tanks (including KV and T-34) included in the parts that would be used to strike at the enemy (according to "Considerations for the strategic deployment ...")
It could not wait for 1942...

P.S. I myself do not fully convinced that Stalin would have started the war first. So, I continue with some more arguments "yes" of this idea. Then - arguments "no."

 

THe problem is that Icebreaker claims that the Soviets were days away from attacking when there is no evidence. If Stalin was so ready to attack how come he refused to allow his units permission to attack when it was apparant the Germans were coming. When a deserter reported the attack was happening at 3am, he was ordered shot. Why not send the airplanes in, why not start attacking. Units were divided up, some up to a hundred miles. AA units were denied permisssion to fire on attacking bombers. A train load of raw materials crossed the border 5 minutes before the attack started. Considering how badly the Soviet army performed at the start how any one can say they were ready for fighting is absurd. Finally your numbers do not indicate how many tanks were actually usable.

 

Steve,

I am afraid you are waisting your time with this Icebreaker issue. Facts dont mean anything to the Suvoruv bunch. If you notice, they also have something unique about them; the only threads they ever post on are the ones such as these. They never contribute anything uselfull or interesting in other threads, and once they realize that no one here is taking them seriously (rightfully so) they simply disappear....



Cheers.

 

OK,
Maybe that would end this topic, it makes sense to bring the same "aggressive plan of Stalin" here. So, I have tried to translate military document I referred above. (Sorry for the mistakes in this text, I used computer program for translating. It is not perfect). The General Staff of Red Army began to prepare this Document in 1939. There were several versions of this document. They differed slightly from each other. For translation, I took the latest version, May 1941. Red color are places in the document are appended to another hand (presumably Zhukov).
So,
Considerations on the strategic deployment plan forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies

The Commissar of Defense
May 1941
Only the person.
Only one copy.
To Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Comrade Stalin

I report for your consideration concerns according to plan for strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of war with Germany and its allies.
I. Currently, Germany, according to the Red Army's Intelligence Directorate, has deployed about 230 infantry, 22 tanks, 20 motorized, 8 air and 4 cavalry divisions, a total of about 284 divisions. Of those on the borders of the Soviet Union, as of 4/15/41 was to be concentrated up to 86 infantry divisions, 13 tank, 12 motorized divisions and one cavalry, a total of 112 divisions.
It is assumed that the political situation in Germany today, in the event of an attack on the USSR, they could put up against us - to 137 infantry, 19 tanks, 15 motorized, 4 cavalry, and 5 airborne divisions, totaly 180 divisions. The remaining 104 divisions are likely to be at the center of the country in reserve: 22 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 tank division, 1 airborne division, total 25 divisions;
in Denmark, Belgium, Holland and France - 40 infantry divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 2 airborne divisions, a total of 45 divisions;
Yugoslavia - 7 infantry divisions, a total of 7 divisions;
Greece - 7 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, a total of 8 divisions;
Bulgaria - 3 infantry divisions, a total of 3 divisions;
Africa - 5 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 1 tank division, a total of 7 divisions;
Norway - 9 infantry divisions, a total of 9 divisions.
The total of 93 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 3 tank divisions, 3 airborne divisions.
Total, 104 divisions in the center of the country's western borders, in Norway, Africa, Greece, and Italy.
Most likely the main forces of the German army of 76 infantry, 11 tanks, 8 motorized, 2 cavalry and 5 air, total of 100 divisions will be deployed to the south of the Brest - Deblin to strike in the direction of Kovel, Rovno, Kiev.
At the same time we must expect attacks in the north of East Prussia in Vilnius and Riga, as well as short, concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest in Volkovysk Baranovichi.
In the south, we should expect attacks simultaneously with the German army - an offensive in the general direction Zhmerinka - Romanian Army, supported by German divisions. It is also possible secondary attack of the Germans from the Sun-river in the direction of Lvov:
II. in the direction of Zhmerinka - Romanian Army, supported by the German divisions;
III. in the direction of Munkácsy, Lviv;
IV. Sanok, Lviv.
Likely allies of Germany could put against the Soviet Union: Finland up to 20 infantry divisions, Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, Romania - 25 infantry divisions.
Total Germany and its allies could deploy against the Soviet Union up to 240 divisions. Given that Germany is currently holding its army mobilized, with Army deployed rear, it can alert us to deploy and deliver an unexpected blow. To prevent this, and defeat the German army, I consider it necessary in any case not to give the initiative of action the German Command, to forestall the enemy to deploy and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage and did not have time yet to arrange the front and the interaction of arms .
V. The first strategic objective of action by the Red Army put - the defeat of the main forces of the German Army, deployed to the south line of Brest - Deblin and output to 30 day operation on the front Ostroleka, p. Narev, Lovich, Lodz, Kreytsburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. Follow a strategic goal: the onset of Katowice district in the north or north-westerly direction defeat a large force of the Centre and the North wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.
The immediate objective - destroy the German Army east of the r. Wisla Krakow and in the direction to go in rivas Nars, Wisla and capture the area of ​​Katowice. For what:
a. main strike of forces of the Southwestern Front made in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from its southern allies;
b. secondary attack the left wing of the Western Front put towards Siedlce, Deblin, to the Warsaw group of gangs and promoting South-Western Front in defeating the enemy of Lublin;
c. conduct an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary and Romania, and be ready to strike against Romania in a supportive environment. Thus the Red Army begins offensive operations from the front Chizhov, Lyutovisko by 152 against 100 German divisions. In other areas of the state border provides an active defense.
VI. Based on this concept of strategic deployment, provides the following grouping of the Soviet armed forces:
1. Ground forces in the Red Army - 198 infantry divisions, 61 tank divisions, 31motorized-infantry divisions, 13 cavalry divisions (a total of 303 divisions and 74 artillery regiments of Command Reserve), distributed as follows:
a. The main force in the 163 infantry divisions, 58 tank divisions, 30 motorized-infantry divisions and 7 cavalry divisions (a total of 258 divisions), and 53 artillery regiments of Command Reserve - in the West, have of them in the Northern, Northwestern, Western and South-West Fronts - 136 infantry divisions, 44 tank divisions, 23 motorized-infantry divisions, 7 cavalry divisions (a total of 210 divisions), and 53 artillery regiments of Command Reserve, as part of the reserve of the High Command of the Southwestern and Western Fronts - 27 infantry divisions, 14 tank divisions, 7 motorized-infantry divisions (total 48 divisions);
b. The remaining force of 35 infantry divisions,3 tank divisions, 1 motorized-infantry divisions, 6 cavalry divisions (a total of 45 divisions) and 21 artillery regiments of Command Reserve, assigned to the defense of the Far East, southern and northern borders of the USSR, among them: in the Far East and in ZabVO - 22 infantry divisions, 3 tank divisions, 1 motorized-infantry division, 1 cavalry division (total 27 divisions) and 14 artillery regiments of Command Reserve, Central Asia - 2 mountain- infantry and 3 cavalry divisions (a total of 5 divisions) in Transcaucasia - 8 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions (total 10 divisions) and 2 artillery regiments of Command Reserve, the defense of the Black Sea coast of the North Caucasus and the Crimea - 2 infantry divisions, on the White Sea coast - 1 infantry division. Detailed alignment of forces is shown on the attached map.
Air Force Red Army in the available and capable to date 97 air-fighter regiments, 75 regiments of the near bombing, 11 Attack Aviation Regiment, 29 regiments of long-range bomber, and 6 heavy bomber regiments (a total of 218 regiments), distributed as follows: The main force, composed of 66 air-fighter regiments, 64 regiments of the near-bombing, 5 Attack Aviation Regiment, 25 long-range bomber regiments and 5 heavy bomber regiments - only 165 Regiment, deployed in the West, among them: in the Northern, Northwestern, Western and South- Western Front - 63 air-fighter regiments, 64 regiment near bombing, 5 attack aviation regiments, 11 long-range bomber regiments and 1 heavy bomber regiment - total 144 Aviation Regiments, a reserve in the General Command of the South - and Western fronts - 14 long-range bomber regiments and 4 heavy bomber regiments, a total of 21 Regiment, remaining forces in the 51 Fighter Regiments, 11 short-range bomber regiments, 6 attack aviation regiment, 4 long-range bomber regiments and 1 heavy bomber regiment - total 53 regiments left for the defense of the Far East, southern and northern borders and point defense Moscow of them in the Far East and ZabVO - 14 attack aviation regiments, 9 short-range bomber regiments, 5 attack aviation regiments, 4 long-range bomber regiments and 1 heavy bomber regiment, of 33 regiments, in SaVO - 1 fighter aviation regiment and 1 attack aviation regiment, of 2 regiments, in ZakVO - 9 fighter air regiments, 2 short-range bomber regiments, a total of 11 regiments, in ArhVO - 1 fighter aviation regiment.
2. For defend the city of Moscow - 6 fighter regiments.
Detailed alignment of forces is shown on the attached map.
In addition to these Air Force, to date there is in its formative stages and still completely not battle-worthy 52 fighter aviation regiments, 30 short-range bomber regiments, 4 attack aviation regiments, 7 long-range bomber regiments and 22 DSB, a total of 115 regiments, to full readiness which can be expected to 01/01/42.
These regiments when they are ready to distribute scheduled as follows:
to the West to designate 41 fighter aviation regiments, 30 short-range bomber regiments, 4 attack aviation regiments, 5 DSB, 14 long-range bomber regiments, a total of 94 Regiment, of which - in front of the 41 fighter aviation regiments, 33 short-range bomber regiments, 6 attack aviation regiments, 7 long-range bomber regiments, total 87 regiments; - in the pool High Command - 4 fighter aviation regiments, 3 long-range bomber regiments, total 7 regiments; leave for DVO ZabVO 10 and ZakVO 6 regiments; in the defense of Moscow - 5 fighter aviation regiments. Approximate time of entry into service of these regiments - according to the table on the map.

The composition and tasks deployed in the West Front (Map 1: 1000000):
VII.
- North Front (LVO) - 3 Armies, inсlude: 15 infantry, 4 tank and 2 motorized divisions, a total of 21 divisions, 18 regiments of the aircraft and the Northern Navy, with the basic tasks - the defense of Leningrad, Murmansk port, Kirov railway and with the Baltic naval fleet to ensure our total dominance in the waters of the Gulf of Finland. With the same purpose are to be transferred from PribOVO to the Northern Front defence the north and north-west coast of Estonia.
The boundary of the front left - Ostashkov Island, Võru, Viljandi, Hall. Matsalu, islands Saaremaa and Hiiumaa Island only.
GHQ - Pargolovo.
- North-Western Front (PribOVO) - 3 Armies, include: 17 infantry divisions, 4 tank, 2 motorized divisions, total 23 divisions and 13 regiments of the aircraft, with the objectives: to cover up a stubborn defense firm Riga and Vilna areas, not allowing the invasion of the enemy from East Prussia, the defense of western coast and islands Saaremaa and Hiiumaa Island to prevent the landing of amphibious landing forces. The boundary of the front left - Polotsk, Oshmyany, Druskininkai, Marggrabova, Summer.
GHQ - Ponevezh.
- Western Front (Western Special Military District) - 4 Armies, include: 31 infantry divisions, 8 tank, 4 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions, a total of 45 divisions and 21 regiments of the aircraft. Objectives: stubborn defense in front of Druskininkai, Ostroleka cover tightly and Lida Bialystok direction; the transition of the South-Western Front in advance, the left wing hit the front in the general direction of Warsaw and Siedlce, Rod, split Warsaw grouping and capturing Warsaw, to promote, in cooperation with South-Western Front to break Lublin-Radom enemy group, go to the r . Vistula and movable parts, master of Radom and ensure the operation of the Warsaw and East Prussia.
The boundary of the front left - r. Pripyat, Pinsk, Wlodawa, Deblin, Radom.
GHQ - Baranovichi.
- South-West Front - 8 Armies, include: 74 infantry, 28 tank, 15 motorized and 5 cavalry divisions, a total of 122 divisions and 91 regiments of the aircraft, with immediate objectives:
- concentric attack the armies of the right flank to surround and destroy the enemy's main grouping east r. Vistula River in the vicinity of Lublin;
- simultaneously blow from the front Senyava, Przemysl, Lyutoviska smash the enemy forces on Krakov and Sandomierz directions, Kielce and directions to master the area of ​​Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, referring to further attack from the area in the north or north-westerly direction to defeat the forces of large northern flank of the enemy and the capture of the former territory of Poland and East Prussia;
- firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania, and be ready to deliver a concentric attacks against Romania. Areas of Czernowitz and Chisinau in order to destroy the nearest sitting. Romanian military wing and reach the line r. Moldova, Iasi.
To ensure compliance with the above plan, you need to advance the following activities, which are essential to apply a surprise attack on the enemy from the air and on land:
0. carry concealed mobilization of troops under the guise of training sessions stock; under the guise of access to the camp to make the hidden concentration of troops near the western border, in the first place to concentrate all Army Reserve Command, hidden to focus on aviation airfields in remote districts, and now we start to deploy air rear and gradually under the guise of training sessions and exercises to deploy the rear and rear base hospital. V. Grouping provisions of the High Command. The reserve of the High Command to have 5 Armies and to concentrate them, the 2 Armies, consisting of 9 infantry, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, total 15 divisions in the Vyazma, Sychovka, Yelnya, Bryansk, Sukhinichi, 1 Army, include 4 infantry, 2 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, total 8 divisions in the area Vileika, Novogrudok, Minsk, 1 Army consisting of 6 infantry, 4 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, total 12 divisions in the area Shepetovka, Proskurov, Berdichev and 1 Army in consisting of 8 infantry, 2 tank and 2 mechanized divisions, total 12 divisions in the White Church, Zvenigorodka, Cherkassy.
VIII. Cover the concentration and deployment.
In order to provide for themselves against a possible surprise attack of the enemy, to cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and their preparation for the offensive, you should:
0. To organize a strong defense and protection of the state border, using all the forces of the frontier districts and almost all aircraft assigned to the deployment in the west;
1. Develop a detailed plan for defense of the country and lead to full readiness air defense systems. For these questions, I have given orders and plans of the state border defense and defense fully completed by 06/01/41, the
The composition and the grouping of the covering forces - according to the attached map.
At the same time to speed up construction should be fully armed and fortified areas, to begin construction of fortified on the rear boundary of Ostashkov, Pechep and provide for the construction of new fortified in 1942 on the border with Hungary, as well as continue to build a fortified line of the old state border.
IX. Tasks Navy delivered - according to previously approved by you of my reports.
X. The deployment of troops and fighting existing stocks provided by: Ammunition: small-caliber projectile for three weeks; medium caliber - for a month; heavy caliber - for a month, mine - for a fortnight, by anti-aircraft shots: 37 mm - 5 days, 76 mm - and a half months, 85 mm - 11 days for airbomb: high-explosive bombs - for a month; armor - for 10 days, concrete-- for 10 days; fragmentation - for a month, incendiary - a fortnight, on fuel oil and lubricants: gasoline B-78 - for 10 days, B-74 - a month, B-70 - 2 months, gasoline - 1, diesel fuel - for a month;
Fuel supplies intended for the western counties, echeloned in large numbers (due to lack of capacity in their territory) in the interior districts.
XI. Please:
0. To approve the submitted plan for strategic deployment of Soviet armed forces and a plan of proposed military operations in the event of war with Germany;
1. In a timely manner to allow consistent application of hidden covert mobilization and concentration in the first place all the armies of the High Command Reserve and Air Force;
2. Demand from the People's Commissariat for full and timely implementation of railway construction under the plan in '41 and especially in the Lviv area;
3. To require the industry to carry out the release schedule of an equipment of tanks and aircraft, as well as production and supply of ammunition and fuel strictly on schedule;
4. To approve the proposal to build a new fortified.
Applications:
1. How to implement on a map 1: 1,000,000, 1 copy.;
2. deployment scheme to cover for 3 maps;
3. scheme the balance of forces in a copy.;
4. three of the Air Force bases in the west.

The People's Commissar of Defence of USSR
Marshal S. Timoshenko

Chief of General Staff of the Red Army General Zhukov

 

This proves only that the USSR was being and doing its due diligence for its own defense. All nations of the interwar period had such "plans" worked out within their own military. In America the first ones were the "color" plans, which analysed all the possible combinations of nations which could or might attack the US. We had plans on how we would react if attacked by Canada and Mexico for goodness sake. When a nation isn't really at war, you have to keep your military planers doing something besides sitting around watching the paint dry in their offices.

And the plans of America between the wars were every bit as detailed as those you have posted here.

 

We must remember that soviet high command recognized Germany as the main threat to Russia in 1941. Its only natural that any country would prepare herself. Zhukov predicted where Germany would strike (prippet marshes, as the main thrust) Stalin did not like this idea and ordered a renewed version where Germany would attack from the south (Ukraine). The new plan was written up.