The Battle Of Berlin...The Most Interesting Battle of All?

I didn't make the theory. A magazine called Illustrated Science did.

Also remember that the "one little Island" were densely populated, and had an army at the size of the Americans.

 

Japans fate was sealed whether the bombs were used or not. I believe it was established here in other thread, that Japan would have surrendered anyway, anywhere from 2 months to maybe a year later but surely not 7.

 

How could you know? The Japanese were all fanatical fighters, at the level of the German Waffen-SS divisions.

Not a single Japanese division had surrendered during the four year long pacific campaign.

Even the leaders of the country were strongly against surrender.

 

+1

 

Berlin Flak Tower

 

Do you mean the Tehran conference?


In D'Este's book on Eisenhower [also in ''Patton a Genius for War''] he says Eisenhower revealed privately to Patton that he was soon to halt the First and Ninth Armies at the Elbe River to await the arrival of the Red Army. Third Army would be given a new mission to drive southeast toward Czechoslovakia. "From a tactical point of view, it is highly
inadvisable for the American Army to take Berlin and I hope political influence won't cause me to take the city," he said. "It has no tactical or strategic value and would place upon the American forces the burden of caring for thousands and thousands of Germans, displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war."


Patton's reaction was incredulity, [as was Simpson & other commanders, including Montgomery] "Ike, I don't see how you figure that out. We had better take Berlin, and quick"
Later on, in the presence of his chief of staff, Patton reiterated the need to drive on to Berlin, arguing that it could certainly be done in forty-eight hours by Ninth Army. Eisenhower, wondered aloud, "Well, who would want it?" Patton said, "I think history will answer that question for you."

As for why Eisenhower chose to wait....

Even at that early stage there was already significant tension between the Americans and the Russians and it seems possible, maybe even likely, that had Eisenhower simply given the go ahead he'd have taken Berlin and provoked a firestorm, possibly a literal one, with the Soviet Union.
Plus as Bradley said it could cost 100,000 casualties & no matter what nation captured it, Berlin would become a four nation occupation zone anyway, so what was the necessity in taking those casualties if there was no tactical advantage.

And Eisenhower was worried about Allied intelligence reports and Nazi propaganda indicated that several Waffen SS divisions were planning a national redoubt in the mountains of Austria. [The latter proving to be unfounded.]

But 'if' in Eisenhower's mind Berlin did have a tactical or strategic value, in all probability he would have given the go ahead to take the city.

As he says to Montgomery, [Eisenhower personal file.]

As regards Berlin I am quite ready to admit that it has political and psychological significance, but of far greater importance will be the location of the remaining German forces in relation to Berlin. It is on them that I am going to concentrate my attention.
Naturally, if I can get a chance to take Berlin cheaply, I shall take it.

 

If Japan refused to surrender after two atomic bombs, then Operation DOWNFALL would be in effect. Bushido or no bushido, I doubt seven simultaneous nuclear bombs used as tactical weapons followed by an initial invasion force of nine infantry divisions in Kyushu and a Soviet amphibious assault on Hokkaido would fail to take Japan out.

I think he was speaking of the Yalta Conference. Roosevelt and Stalin agreed a post war partition of Berlin but the honor of taking that city would be the Red Army's.

There is no way Eisenhower would disobey an order by the Commander-in-Chief to stay away from Berlin. Not only this disobedience would be criminal according the US military code of law but also completely contradictory to everything we know about Eisenhower's character.

 

Well the theory calculates the campaign to last to 1952, WITHOUT nuclear bombs. If you use nine bombs Japan would be pretty much destroyed.

 

That is still a very doubtful outcome, buy that time, that Allies could just simply starve Japan into surrendering, the they would control the waters around Japan, the mainland, and because of the last two reasons, would control most of the skies over Japan, giving the Allies the freedom to attack where and when they want. Look what air superiority did for the allies over Normandy, however vital that was to the allies and how terrible it was for the Germans. The same would apply here, the Japanese would surrender there is no doubt about that, probably into the following year, depending on how much time and preparation the allies wanted to do for the invasion.

 

IMO the battle for Berlin isn't interesting, just tragic.

BoB, France 1940, France 44 are more interesting because the result was not given prior to the initiation.

On the east front I feel most battles were decided before they started. (this is closely linked with Soviet doctrine)

Op. Bagration and Berlin were big battles, but never a close run thing won by leadership and guts at a specific place or time during the battle. It was hands down victories by everyone participating.

 

Mabe not to the Americans, but around 700,000 surrendered to the Red Army in Manchuria in a matter of 3 weeks. How many divisions is that?

Triple C beat me to it. The final decision rested on Roosevelt not Eisenhower. Did Patton even know of the deal which was struck between Stalin and Roosevelt regarding Berlin? Im guessing no, but since im rusty on the matter perhaps others in here could assist me. It might have very well made more sense for Eisenhower to simply tell Patton that Berlin was no worth it instead of letting him know that it wasnt his to take? From my knowledge the Red Army was closer anyway. The Allies caught up only when the Red Army paused to make the final preparations for the battle? Being fully aware that the ultimate prize was theirs for the taking, their was no hurry of getting there before the Allies.

 

Here are some of the problems with concluding that the armed forces left on the Asian mainland were anything but "second rate". By March of 1945 the Imperial Japanese Headquarters had withdrawn most trained formations (including all armor and elite infantry), from the Kwangtung army reducing it to a mere shadow of its former self, and even then the Red Army had beaten them twice before 1941. In early summer 1945, the Kwangtung Army was forced to mobilized non-Japanese reservists and civilian police units coupled with new recruits to form new divisions and brigades to maintain at least the appearance of a formidable fighting force.

By July 1945, they had expanded from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions. Unfortunately for the Japanese this was mostly "numbers" not quality troops. The Soviets really faced an inexperienced army totaling little more than 710,000 men. The Japanese themselves ranked eight of their infantry divisions as only 15% combat effective while all nine independent mixed brigades were rated at less than 15% combat effectiveness. Over a quarter of its entire barely trained combat force was mobilized only ten days prior to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9 brigades).

Since the Red Army had a ratio of about 2 to 1 in manpower alone (not counting their superior tanks, air power, and supply logistics), it only took the Red Army a little over a week, until August 17th , to walk through those troops remaining in 1945, so I really have to sort of wonder about the Imperial Japanese Army morale, supply, weapons, leadership, and tactics since the bulk of the troops were non-Japanese with no loyalty to the Emperor in reality.

To take nothing away from the Red Army, by the Summer of 1945, the Kwangtung army had no artillery larger than the 75 mm, little munitions for their artillery, few if any puny little tanks, no fuel, no rockets, nor any modern anti-tank weapons. Ammunition and weapons were in such short supply the Japanese resorted to arming some of their soldiers with bamboo spears. Of the 24 divisions in the mainland facing the Soviets and Chinese, the Japanese themselves rated only seven, but maybe possibly eight to be "nearly combat effective". The newly formed 149th Infantry Division did not have one single piece of artillery in its possession when war commenced on August 9th!

They were not only a paper "force" of less than 750,000, they had had their armor, air power, helmets, uniforms, munitions, and experienced troops stripped off and removed to the home islands, which made for only a few divisions which were anywhere near "battle ready". The rest were Chinese, Manchurian and Korean conscripts with the added complications of not wanting to fight to defend their "masters", no traning, and little equipment. It was like a pro football team (soccer or NFL) beating up on the convent of the "little sisters of the poor".

The best of the remainder actually didn't surrender, but fled into the mountains and fought both the Chinese and the Red Army for about three years. They couldn't really figure out whom to surrender to!

I looked it up, and about 20,000 of the more fanatical IJA men of pure Japanese heritage refused to surrender even when ordered to do so by the Emperor over the radio (they were sure it was a ruse) and retreated into the Chinese mountains with their equipment and didn't surrender until either 1948 or so.

As a result of the Soviet's planning, preparation and implementation of their offensive plan (which was dang good BTW), they rolled over this rag-tag "army", and took 594,000 prisoners (over 200,000 of which immediately switched sides and joined the Red Army to fight their former masters). Those captives included 143 non-Japanese generals and 20,000 walking wounded. The Kwangtung Army did suffer over 80,000 men and officers killed in combat which lasted less than two weeks.

Some of this is from:

The Soviet Army Offensive: Manchuria, 1945

 

Werner von Braun himself admitted that Dr. Obarthe (sp?), he and his staff were using Robert Goddard's patents to construct the V-2, and post war he teamed with Mrs. Goddard to sue the US government for patent infringement since they (NACA/NASA) were using 214 of Goddard's patents to built liquid fueled rockets. Which he himself admitted he was using to construt the V-2 during the war, they won the suit BTW.

Goddard didn't just "experimentet" (sic) with rocketry, he pioneered, perfected, and set the standards all others followed. The Germans included, they used his high speed turbine fuel pumps, fuel cooled nozzles, gimbaled nozzles, gyroscoptic guidance systems, liquid fuel ratios and ingredients.

 

But was Eisenhower actually 'ordered' not to capture Berlin by his superiors?

To Churchills urging that the Western armies should press on to Berlin & Prague....

Eisenhower replied to Churchill's telegram assuring him that... "the only difference between your suggestions and my plan is one of timing" and that "if at any moment collapse should suddenly come about everywhere along the front we would rush forward, and LUbeck and Berlin would be included in our important targets."

And Eisenhower to Montgomery....

''As regards Berlin I am quite ready to admit that it has political and psychological significance, but of far greater importance will be the location of the remaining German forces in relation to Berlin. It is on them that I am going to concentrate my attention. Naturally, ''if I can get a chance to take Berlin cheaply, I shall take it.''

Which seems to convey that Eisenhower wasn't 'ordered' not to take Berlin 'if' military circumstances dictated it, it was up to him to decide.

Or that's the impression I get from Eisenhower in the above discussions [& plenty more along the same lines on the net] such as....

Should the U.S. Have Taken Berlin?: Second Guessing FDR and Ike

Says in part.... critics cite FDR's wartime agreements with Stalin and Churchill as having allowed the Red Army to proceed to Berlin as part of his supposed appeasement of the Russians.

Subsequent scholarship has indicated that, despite the location of the future occupation zone borders, decisions on how far our troops could advance were left to Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower.

Anyway if you have a source or link that sheds more light on it one way or the other, I'd be interested to see it.

On the deal between Stalin and Roosevelt, my views on it above.

Simpson's spearheads were within 50 miles of Berlin & he & Patton are on record saying that the drive on to Berlin could certainly be done in forty-eight hours by Ninth Army.

Not too sure about Stalin being in no hurry of getting Berlin before the Allies.

Carlo De'Este in his book says Stalin was obsessed with the possibility that the Allies might somehow beat the Russians to Berlin, and Antony Beevor in his book 'Berlin The Downfall 1945.'says Stalin wanted to surround the city so that US and British armies could not reach the capital.

Stalin had been at serious loggerheads with Churchill over the Lublin Poles, plus another serious row blew up when secret surrender negotiations between representatives of the Germans and Western Allies had taken place in Switzerland [Operation Crossword] in March but had resulted only in protests from the Russians [when they had discovered the existence of the talks through spies] that the Western Allies were attempting to negotiate a separate peace, it was one of Stalin's major fears through out the war that the Allies might come to some agreement with Germany in the West & let Germany continue the war in the East.

Perhaps you mean Rokossovski.
Beevor speculated that he was not allowed to capture Berlin because he was Polish.

In the Great Purge Rokkosovski's interrogations included torture resulting in nine missing teeth, three cracked ribs, the removal of his fingernails, and three mock shooting ceremonies, but at least he survived, I wonder how many like him didn't.

And It's ironic that of both of the dictators in the conflict, Stalin, wasn't a Russian & Hitler, wasn't a German.

 

As you say brndirt1 in terms of leadership, equipment, and manpower, the Kwantung Army of 1945 certainly was not the same army as it was in 1941.


The Japanese Imperial High Command had transferred most veteran Japanese divisions from Manchuria before the summer of 1945. Hence, most remaining divisions were newly formed from reservists or from cannibalized smaller units. Only six Infantry Divisions had existed before January 1945. Training was limited in all units, and equipment and materiel shortages plagued the Kwantung Army at every level. The Japanese considered none of the Army divisions combat ready and some divisions only 15 percent ready.

The Kwantung Army also suffered from a deficiency of weaponry, particularly armor. Tanks carried only 57-mm guns and machine guns.


A few figures on some Division/Brigade Strength Relative to a fully outfitted 12th Infantry Division of 1937.

On the Kwantung Army Units Deployed Against Trans-Baikal Front

119th Division 70%
107th Division 60%
148th Division 15% 148th Division had almost no small arms for its regiments.
125th Division 20%
39th Division 80% lacked artillery weapons.
136th Division 15%
138th Division 15% was in the midst of mobilization and did not exceed 2,000 effectives.


Kwantung Army Units Deployed Against 2d Far Eastern Front

123d Division 15%
149th Division 15% had no artillery.

Kwantung Army Units Deployed Against 1st Far Eastern Front

15th Border Guards Unit [Regt] was authorized twelve infantry companies and three artillery batteries, but its actual strength was four infantry companies and one battery.

128th Division authorized 23,000 men, only 14,000 were available, and they lacked training.
Etc, etc.

The infantry divisions were armed with rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery pieces, but had no submachine guns, antitank rifles, or rocket artillery. Antitank capability was provided by a battalion of sixteen 37-mm antitank guns, weapons ineffective against modern World War II medium and heavy tanks.

Aircraft were mostly trainers and obsolete types.

Unquestionably, the cease-fire rumors and the ultimate surrender decision disrupted Japanese operations and forestalled possibly greater Japanese resistance in southern Manchuria. [luckily for the Red Army]

In Manchuria proper, the ratio was 2.2 :1.In manpower, In tanks and artillery, the ratio was 4.8 :1; and in aviation assets, about 2 :1.

But it was certainly the biggest battle against the Japanese by far in scope if not in casualties & Tukhachevsky's instructions on Deep Battle was evident in all it's aspects, pity he wasn't around to see it.

Figures from a Glantz's Leavenworth papers site, very large, covers just about everything but takes a while to download but it's worth it......

Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria)

 

If by taking Berlin you mean pushing 12th Army Group into Berlin, I think you are correct to say that was within Eisenhower's power. However, I suspect letting men die to wrest a piece of German real property to give to the Russians was not Eisenhower's idea of fun. That the Russians would keep East Germany was set in stone: a treaty signed by C-in-C is not a matter open to interpretation.

 

The Battle of Berlin was not the most interesting battle of the war-far from it! By early 1945, it was a forgone conclusion that the war in Europe was lost and that the Germans had no chance of saving Berlin or win the war! The most interesting battle was the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. It was the last major offensive operation conducted by the Germans on the Eastern Front. Both sides were evenly divided in both manpower and tanks! Unfortunately for the Germans, the Soviets knew well in advance,
where the Germans were going to attack and at what strength. It was still a mammoth battle the likes no one to this day has ever seen before!
Being German, despite my hatred of the Third Reich, still saddens me as to the great loss of life suffered by our soldiers and panzer units.

 

Yep, that's what most historians say, that it was up to Eisenhower, & he did have an opportunity to move on Berlin [& Prague] but what was the use if every thing had to be handed back in the long run.

I'm on Eisenhower's side on this one, despite Churchill, Patton & others saying he missed a great opportunity.

 

There is a big difference between reaching Berlin and being ready for the final assault. The point I was trying to make is just that the Russians too had reached Berlin but were making preparations for the final battle.

As for Patton, as I have said before: he had many gifts but his tongue was not one of them...

 

Patton certainly had a big mouth on many different issues, & it got him into a lot of trouble, but if he [& a good commander in Simpson] said it could be done, I wouldn't bet against them.

But who knows?