The Battle of France

Was the 88mm Gun readily used during the battle of France?

 

I think we had a thread on the US of the 88 as artillery (as oppose to it's use as AAA or AT). Maybe the artillery section of the weapons forum. Can't find it now though so maybe it's on Axis History or Feldgrau. as I recall it went into the early use of it as such both in Poland and France as well as North Africa.

 

No :France had only 80 divisions and these were insufficient if the front was no longer limited to the German border but extended to the Belgian frontier (Luxemburg-Dunkirk =some 400 km).The French were condemned to go north to shorten the front (the Dyle line was shorter) and to have the support of the 22 Belgian divisions (The French had no illusions that the Dutch could resist more than a few days)

 

It is questionable that the Germans were inferior in the number of artillery pieces.

Frieser (in the Blitzkrieg Legend) gives the following figures for artillery:

Belgium :1338

Holland :656

Britain :1280

France :10700

Germany :7378

But,these figures are useless:how many of these pieces were immobile,fixed in the Maginot Line?How many were locared in the interior of France ?

 

About the 88 mm Flak (there was no 88 mm PAK in 1940) :its numbers in the campaign in the West were almost meaningless,and it was almost exclusively used as anti aircraft weapon :

88mm production : september-december 1939 :207/january-may 1940 : 379.

The decisive role of the 88 mm Flak in the battle of Arras has been proved to be a myth (see : The Miniature Pages site)

 

The fact remains that the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery than the allies and were essentially equal in men and divisions only in the air did they have a numerical advantage and given the fortifications that they needed to breach numbers alone surely don't indicate a German victory. If the French didn't have the troops to defend then the Germans didn't have the troops to attack.

Or not. The French problems weren't so much numbers as flexability and in failure to anticipate what the Germans could and would do. Even so there were some points where the battle might have turned.

And how many of the German pieces were facing the French along the Maginot line or back in Germany or after the first rapid advances left behind? It would also be interesting to know what the calibers and roles were. How many of the guns included were primarily AA?

 

I didnt say Rommel crossed at Sedan, I said the French had reserves scheduled for Sedan, but they were thrown into battle piecemeal. I also said Rommel's crossing of the weir was the perfect example of the difference between French and German command.

 

Rommel did not belong to the PzGruppe Kleist,and, I have not much faith in the stories that he was the best German panzer commander

 

About the tanks :

The claim that the French had more tanks than the Germans is not convincing,because this is founded on the comparison of all French tanks to the German tanks available for Fall Gelb.

The role of the tanks in may 1940 is also much exaggerated : AGB (with 3 PzD) did as good as AG A (with 7 PzD):it advanced in 18 days some 470 km against an Allied numerical superiority(30 German divisions against 50 Allied divisions) while AG A advanced some 410 km .

 

I didn't mean to say that all of the German tanks were obsolete. I just meant to say that in some parts they used obsolete tanks such as the PzKpfw I's and II's.
I don't remember the number of tanks comparison off the top of my head. What was the comparison like again?

 

Following the French site "L'armée de terre française en mai 1940 ", the French forces of the north east theater of operations (from Dunkirk to the Swiss border) had a total of 2244 tanks:908 in 4 divisions and 1336 in batallions depending on the 7 armies.

 

If the French had not split up their tanks into battalions and spread them out, they may have made a difference

 

I would not call either the Pzkw I or II obsolete as such. In reliability, mobility and equipped with radio, rather modern by comparison to many Allied variants.

The issue comes as using them as medium tanks in lieu of enough Pzkw III's, IV's and 38(t)'s. Operating as Reccon vehicles they were as good as any fielded by either side in 1940. Late war Germany would reintroduce a improved Mark II just to fill that role as the older models were less available.

And before anyone jumps me, I am aware the Mark IV was not originally intended as a medium tank, but as a 'heavy' tank to fill the same role the Stug III did for the Infantry.

 

I was more referring to the way that the PzKpfw I's and II's were sort of obsolete based in their weaponry and armor. They had their strengths such as being light tanks they were helpful in reconnaissance and speed, on top of the technology such as the radio and mobility. But the PzKpfw had only two 7.92 machine guns in the turret and had 2-3 inches of armor. He PzKpfw had 20 mm KwK cannon and one 7.92 machine gun, with some slightly improved armor thickness.
The way in which they were deployed was superior compared to the way the French deployed their tanks. But compared to tanks such as the French Char B, which despite it setbacks and constant maintenance, was heavily armored, the Panzer I & II's were somewhat obsolete. Unfortunately for the French they didn't exactly have that much of an idea of how to use them properly in tactics like the Germans did. Though de Gaulles armored Division did have some success as the Germans were advancing the cut off the allied troops at Dunkirk and the British launched a counter attack with armor that slowed the Germans in the first stages of the invasion, these successes were limited.

 

As in all cases you go to war with the army you have rather than the one you wished you had, trying to make all the parts fit the job you need.

One could make the argument that the M-1 Abrams, Bradley and Hummwv were all 'obsolete' for Iraq and Afghanistan if one judged solely by the in theater upgrades, improvements and replacement with Striker's and MRAP's that were introduced.

 

One can argue that this was defensible,because

a)was it not better to spread the tanks along the whole front ,than to concentrate them on 1 point ? Was it not better for 1st Army to have 180 tanks in its vicinity than to have to wait,when there was a German breakthrough on the arrival of the strategic reserve ?


b)an other reason is that the Frenh had enough tanks but insufficient tank divisions:4 divisions and 2244 tanks :there were enough tanks for 10 divisions,but not enough motorized infantry,artillery and engineers,not enough supply trucks,drivers,etc.The problem was that the independent tank batallions only had tanks and lacked infantry,artillery,etc,and were thus very vulnerable .

 

I agree, the French tank may have had better protection , they were nont he less vulnerable. Many were in fact taken out via air attacks and worse, when they had gained land (for instance Abeville, they would have had to slowdown or regained their earlier lines, for fear of running out of petrol. After a couple of dozens kms they needed a refill and when that happened during a battle , or if the fuel tanks did not get through it meant abandonning the vehicle , even though they were controlling the area .......
The German pak may have been uneffective and gave the French a false sens of unvernability for a while (Gembloux , Stonne) the lack of petrol supplies was a nightmare.... and the Stukas finished the job.

 

As the devil's advocate..:the French had sacrified speed to armament and protection :a tank needed and speed and armament and protection,something which in WWII was difficult to find :he needed also the protection of infantry and artillery(as the Germans discovered at Dunkirk and during Barbarossa),but,as in WWII (till 1944) infantry and artillery were seldom motorized,the result was that the tanks advanced at the speed of the infantry (2 km per hour).
Thus,saying ,as a lot of people are doing,that the French doctrine was obsolete,is very questionable: in 1940,the infantry divisions and the mobile divisions (which were not much more mobile than the infantry) advanced at the same speed :the infantry divisions of AG B were at the same time in the vicinity of Dunkirk as the mobile divisions of AG A,and this,while the former were faced by a numerically stronger enemy and had to cover a bigger distance (distance Groningen-Dunkirk:470 km/distance Trier/Dunkirk :410 km)

 

Not really. As usual you are only looking or brining to attention the part of the issue that supports your opinion. The problem with French doctrine was more how they were organized and how comunication flowed. The speed of French tanks was a relativly minor issue. Indeed the lack of radios was far more critical. Of course not having tanks capable of exploiting a breakthrough was significant.

 

1)The lack of radios was not very critical: the tanks would advance slowly and see each other

2)The organization of the French tanks was also not so bad as has been claimed :France needed no tanks capable of exploiting a breakthrough,because France was following a defensive strategy.

From "Blindés allemands contre blindés français/ 1940:La guerre des occasions perdues" 'German tanks against french tanks/ 1940:the War of lost opportunities"


"Comme les états-majors français n'envisagaient qu'une guerre de positions,les chars étaient fortement blindés,lourds et lents.La vitesse et le rayon d'action importaient peu puisque les chars progressaient à l'allure génerale de l'infanterie.Les longs arrets de cette progression permettaient le ravitaillement en carburants.L'équipement radio était sans importance puisque on ne se perdait pas de vue ."


Translation :

As the French general staf considered only a war of position,the french tanks were heavy armoured,heavy and slow.Speed and radius of action had not much importance as the tanks advanced at the general speed of the infantry .The long stops of the advance permitted the supply in fuel.Radio was not important,as there always was eye contact .

Comparing the French tanks ,organization and doctrine with the German tanks,organization and doctrine is meaningless and to draw consequences of this comparison is not correct .

French was a democracy,and democracies are not invading other countries,thus there was no need for an offensive strategy and offensive weapons .Besides,France had not the means to build an offensive army .

Germany,OTOH,could not afford a war of position,its safety was (as in WWI) depending on an offensive strategy and offensive weapons .