The German view of US small arms in WW2.

I had always heard it was the only gun used by all sides of the war, I think even read somewhere in this thread, so I guess I just assumed that included the U.S. But it makes more sense that both Axis and Allied forces used/issued it, rather than "all sides".

 

Ammunition was not the "big" issue, as I have heard of the occasional GI picking up an MP40.

The "big" issue was that the MP40 had a rather distinctive sound when fired...and that distinctive sound tended to draw fire from any nearby American soldiers. So any American using an MP40 will be shot on by his buddies. This tended to discourage the practice of American soldiers use of the MP40.

 

The Hi-Power was never an issue sidearm of the US military. I posted the original message in this thread about that and said "both sides" (meaning Allies and Axis).

Very true, but the noise issue would be the same for all captured weapons. The M1 Carbine makes a distinctive sound in comparison to the K98, G43 or even StG44, yet that didn't stop its use by the Wehrmacht. The same goes for the SVT40 -- the noise is unmistakable, yet it was a very popular captured weapon. Yes, these are not as distinct as the "burp" of the MP40 but the fact remains.

By "big issue" I was referring to the fact that if the soldier held onto the MP40 for a longer duration the supply of ammunition would likely dry up and render the gun useless. The only source would be captured ammo, or if serving in close proximity to a British unit, ammo could theoretically be acquired from here. Both of these cannot be relied upon. I've heard of US soliders picking up an MP40 in the heat of battle (this is documented to have occurred at Point du Hoc) but I've heard of exactly 0 US soldiers that picked up a MP40 in "x" battle, held onto it for "y" months and used it as their standard weapon in lieu of a Thompson or M3. The latter, in a "Call of Duty"-esque fashion, is what the original poster seemed to be implying.

 

Since thread has been resurrected, I will add some info about my M1A1 carbine that I found out. I took it to the December gun show in New Orleans (billed as "The Big One") to have it appraised, Best offer made for it was $7,000.00, but I was cautioned by one dealer to never sell it to someone who gives you an offer here. He indicated that it was worth much more to the right buyer, possibly bringing up to $10,000.00 for it since it was in great condition. I'll never sell it, I just wanted to know what it was worth. The guy who told me not to sell it to anyone here said the best thing for me to do was to hold onto it and pass it down to family. Either that or have it ready for the zombie apocalypse. You never know.

 

I hate to pile on... No, that's not true, I love to pile on! Anyway, the .30 Carbine is a very fine round, and the carbine rifle a very fine package for it.

If the various "intermediate" cartridges found in modern assault rifles are a good compromise between heavy battle rifles and the pistol cartridges found in sub-guns (and I think they are), then the .30 Carbine is a damned fine beginning to that trend. It's a little short of the velocities of cartridges like the 7.62x39 (AK round) or the 7.92x33 (sturmgewehr), but not by much. We're talking about a velocity difference of about 300 fps.

The explanation for the inability to penetrate winter clothing is known as "missing the target." If somebody gets hit with a 110 grain round at 2000 fps, they are going to be in big trouble. It will go right through winter clothing and make holes in various important organs that people normally would prefer to keep intact. The only real drawback to the .30 carbine round is the round nosed profile which loses velocity fairly quickly. So, you're talking about an effective range of 200 or 250 yards rather than 300 or 350. But keep in mind that the carbine was a alternate for the 1911 pistol, not the Garand. In that role, anybody with a brain would choose the carbine.

 

I as going to say that the Germans view of US small arms was the pointy end

 

An astute observation there.

 

School holidays?

 

Found this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SVgX2zLO_Jk

 

The whole "controversy" about the carbine goes back to General Gavin, 82nd Airborne. He, stupidly, decided that his airborne troops should be heavily equipped with the carbine for the Sicily operation. Well, the carbine is a fine weapon within its designated role as an alternate for a pistol or sub-gun, but it is simply doesn't have the range for a main battle rifle. The 82nd performed poorly in Sicily and Gavin blamed the carbine, among other things. Gavin had a habit of blaming outside influences for his failings.

 

I have Gavin's book and some others about Sicly (Carlo d'Este, Martin Blumenson), and I don't think the 82nd performed poorly at all. I do agree that the carbine was not a substitute for a full-sized rifle, and should never be considered as such. In the role for which it was designed it was OK.

 

Gavin was great at self-promotion, but not so great as a tactician or strategist. You can blame poor drops for the general chaos of the D-Day operation, but when you get to Market-Garden and then the Ardennes, you can only blame Gavin for the poor tactics and strategy.

 

Many sincere people are missing the point. In a pitched battle at extended or intermediate range the M1 Carbine was a crappy substitute for the M1 Rifle. But, if your assigned primary weapon was a typewriter or steering wheel, the carbine was a terrific alternative to any extant pistol, and in terms of range and accuracy far superior to SMG's. Emptying 15 to 30 round SMG magazines at 350-600 rpm does little good when dumb luck is the only chance of nailing a target beyond 50 yards....

Making a parachute jump at night is not like the movies. We did not make "Hollywood" jumps, where you carry almost no gear and jump into ideal conditions. Most men had battle rifles or LMG's strapped to a leg and a quick release pack of 150+ pounds of ammo and equipment beneath the reserve chute. At an estimated 50-100 feet altitude (assuming we could even see the ground) we jerked the straps and the heavy pack fell to the end of a 40 foot tether, thus touching earth a full two seconds ahead of the paratroop. The relief of weight allowed the parachute to slow down from 35-40 fps to 20-24 fps before landfall, greatly reducing the chance of injury. On night drops 8-10% of the troops were signifigantly injured on landing without ever engaging an enemy.

Before we were issued M16's (which came with their own awful deficiencies), I jumped with an M14 or a nightmare burden of an M60 with two spare barrels. Our older senior NCO's and instructors had jumped with M1 carbines and M3 SMG's in WWII. Heavier arms usually came in by glider. They were openly critical of our later jumploads. They believed that:

1. You landed at an uncertain location, probably in the dark, separated from your comrades, heavy weapons and supplies for three to twelve hours. Until then, you got by with whatever weapon and ammo that landed with you.

2. Chances of injury went up by about the cube factor of additional weight. Double the weight and have eight times the probability of a crippling injury. Landing on a structure or tall tree meant a good chance of being killed outright. Assuming the Air Corps/Force navigation was correct (Paratroop Greeting: "Parlez-vous Deutches, Senor?"), you landed somewhere with enemy troops wanting very much to find and cross-ventilate you. A broken ankle meant you would probably be killed or captured unless very lucky.

3. A battle rifle is much superior at range, and in good light, or against lightly shielded troops. Most paratroop assaults were in precisely the opposite of these conditions. The Garand was almost 12 pounds. A carbine was five and a half pounds. With twenty clips (300 rounds) the burden was roughly the same as a Garand with 14 stripper clips of 8 rounds each, or 112 rounds.

4. Virtually any bullet wound, be it .50 BMG or .30 carbine, means death or immediate evacuation. In forest, jungle, urban or any other heavy cover, if they got close enough to shoot you, you were close enough to shoot them.

Sicily was a war or two ahead of me; I wasn't there, but I knew men who were. Whatever shortcomings the campaign may have displayed, they aren't attributable to the carbine.

 

That's a very educational post, Darkh!

The Carbine was a "love it or hate it" kind of weapon. The point made earlier is that Gavin began the "hate it" side of that debate after Sicily. Sicily was a mess for the 82nd, and very little of that was Gavin's fault - the transports were shot up by our own navy and ground AA, widely scattered and dropped piecemeal all over the place. They fought like lions, but not in organized companies and regiments because of that very drop.
One of the issues they had was Gavin's fault and that was that he had ordered many/most of the Garands replaced with the Carbine, which sounds logical to a paratrooper, but in practice with an MG42 eating up your men from 500 yards you suddenly start missing that Garand. Gaven trashed the Carbine for the rest of the war and then continued in a couple of biographies and related works after the war.

As for Gavin himself, he really screwed the pooch at Market-Garden. His one objective was the bridge at Nijmegen, and it seems to be the only place he didn't attack in the area. His failing wasn't the only reason for the failure of that operation, but it was a big factor.

In the Ardennes, we was tasked with holding the area south of the Ambleve while the 30th infantry division just to the north (with attached battle groups of armor) destroyed the 1st Waffen SS at Stoumont, LaGleize, Stavelot. Gavin ordered one poorly executed attack across open ground south of the river which cost him far more casualties than was necessary. They took the objective, then inexplicably withdrew (without coordinating that with the infantry on his flank) allowing the remnants of the 1st SS to withdraw. THEN, he blamed the infantry and demanded certain infantry officers be relieved of command - the same ones who had just decimated the German spearhead - then tried to take credit for an operation he had played little part in.

Gavin was a piece of work! But the press liked him (they loved the airborne) and he got away with it all.