The myths of WWII (Eastern Europe)

Are any of these works which you speak of written post 1990? Which ones?

The difference between Hitler and Guderian was that one was a soldier and the other was a politician. Both were not very good when they began to meddle in the others expertise. Guderian was excellent in seeing what was in front of him but not much around him on a broader scale. What he did not know was that without Ukraine the entire Eastern front would have collapsed as there would have been nothing to feed the Wehrmacht with. Also had the noose around Ukraine not been tightened than 600k Red army troops would have escaped only to plague the already heavily depleted right flank of Von Bocke. The noose could only be guaranteed with Guderians help.

Now for credible German statements...... IMO the two most important ones come from the two commanders which stood at the gates. Von Bock and the man that guarded his rear Heinrici both stated against Moscow until reinforced. Bock's men were down to half their strength (terrain and logistics had nothing to do with it) and Heinrici listed 8 reasons for Germany's failer in Barbarossa BEFORE the battle of Moscow in which the primary reasons were the underestimation of the Soviet State and structure followed immediately by the Russian soldier; weather,logistics and terrain were last on his list.

Almost forgot, Jodl was IMO one of the worst commanders Germany had. Both him, Keitel and Kleist all thought the war in the East would end in 6 weeks; Hitler extended it to 3 months.

 

im sorry sir but Bock first off was not at teh gates. Guderian was. Bock sat at HQ. Second Bock too was all for pushing towards moscow as stated "
Hoth’s armies advanced so quickly that Bock immediately contacted Walter von Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in favor of attacking toward Vitebsk so that a drive could be made for Moscow. Initially, the change in plan was accepted but it was soon overruled by Hitler, who favored the encirclement and destruction of the large Soviet armies near Minsk. Bock wrote in his diary:
The envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next natural objective, and will concentrate defense forces there.[SUP][24][/SUP] Differences between Bock’s strategic intent and the intent of High Command repeatedly surfaced. Bock continued to favor a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing Soviet armies and leaving them to be destroyed by infantry, which advanced well behind tank columns. Bock argued that if encirclement was truly necessary then instead of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy smaller Soviet armies, a larger encirclement should be made eastward toward the Dvina-Dnieper River basins.[SUP][25][/SUP] Hitler decided against this plan, and insisted that the pockets containing Soviet armies must be destroyed before advancing deeper into Russia.
Bock, enraged by this decision, was quoted as saying:
We are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape us by this restriction placed on our armor![SUP][26][/SUP]

 

and imo kulge was the worst German commander of the lot. He was the one that always supported hitler instead of bock or guderian. And he did poorly once he gained control of AGC from Bock.

 

kluge

 

Further you should note Jodl was not taking part in eastern opertaions. He was simply writing reports to hitler as stated in earlier comments on here.

 

as for carius who said he would rather fight 80 allied soldeirs than 10 russians. That is in reference to the russian soldiers toughness and determination. As i said earlier he and most germans aknowledged that but no german said the russian army was what stopped them. they all attribute it to bad logistics due to the conditions of russia and distance from supply.

 

My reference to Bock simply implied that he would be the one in charge of Typhoon, he was the center peice, not Guderian.

May I ask why the fascination with the drive on to Moscow? Moscow was never Germany's primary objective. In planning Barbarossa, the initial plan was to destroy as many if not all of the Soviet peace time army in the Soviet Union's newly Western frontier.

Directive 21. 18 December

"The mass of the [Red] army stationed in Western Russia is to be destroyed in bold operations involving deep penetrations by armoured spearheads, and the withdrawal of elements capable of combat into the extensive Russian land spaces is to be prevented. By means of rapid pursuit a line is then to be reached from beyond which the Russian air force will no longer be capable of attacking the German home territories". Two weeks before, in one of many planning conferences for Barbarossa, Hitler had noted that, Moscow is of no great importance (Glantz, Before Stalingrad).

In the opening months the Germans seemed unstoppable, however; no matter the victory, the Red Army kept on coming and the Soviet state did not collapse. To make matters worse, the Germans began taking on largest casualties to date. Desperate times called for desperate measures, 3 armies (North, Center and South) would now push on to the hubs Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev simultaneously.


You mentioned military works, which ones were you referring to?

 

A lot of dubious statements:
1)that Bock was for pushing to Moscow,does not mean this was possible .
2)the infantry did NOT,I repeat NOT advance well behind the mobile divisions :the infantry was to slow,or the mobile divisions were to fast,and as the mobile divisions constituted only 20 % of the German army .....they had to wait on the infantry,....as at Dunkirk .
3)the distance Minsk-Moscow is some 750 km,do you think that a(already weakened) AGC could advance to Moscow ?Do you think that in august 1944 the US-UK armies could march from Paris to Berlin (900 km)
,they were much motorized,the German opposition was negligible,and the roads were much better?
4) Minsk was captured on 9 july n 10 july,the Germans already had lodt 78000 men (without the sick)=the manpower of 5 divisions ,=the infantry strength of 13 divisions .
5) How would the advancing mobile divisions of AGC be supplied ? (the Germans had already on 10 july,lost 22000 horses)?
6) How many of AGC 's tanks would arrived at Moscow ,the rule being that advancing Pzdivisions would lose ONE tank per km on mechanical breakdowns(without fighting)? AGC had 9 PD (on 9 july less than 1600 tanks).

 

You kind of make it seem like the winter didn't have much effect. When I reenact in the cold, I'm only lucky enough not to be knee-deep in snow or actually being shot at. But I can tell you when you wear a parka you feel like humpty dumpty and carrying a rifle with wool gloves sucks to. However, I'm not starving and shooting real ammo trying to save not only my life but my comrades lives as well, and when your in weather that's colder than -10 F, both sides are in a world of ****. Trust me, weather affects your fighting capabilities A LOT. Also, as others have stated, some of the things you originally posted are facts rather than myths.

 

Weather was affecting the fighting capabilities of BOTH SIDES ,unless one would argue it only was cold on the German side. IMHO,it would not be wrong to argue that,in the 41-42 winter,the Soviets were as much hindered as the Germans .And,which things I posted,were no myths,but facts ?

 

While the weather is the same for both sides the effects are not necessarily equal. Winter tends to go harder on the side that is on the offensive. Then there's the question of differential effects on equipment.

 

yes,this is my point:in december 1941;the Russians were attacking(and the snow was hindering them),AGC was withdrawing (abandoning some of its material),but it was not destroyed .Thus,the apocalyptic picture of the German army in the winter of 41-42,is,IMHO,a myth .
Some exemples :
losses of PAK :july:991,december :800;Pz +StuG:june +july :590,december :353;PKW :june +july:4772,december :2859
human losses (dead,wounded,missing,sick excluded):july :167018;december :77857
Another myth is that the superior Germans were defeating the inferior Russians in the summer (a piece of a cake),but were defeated by general winter.

 

What I would like to know is where your getting all these numbers from

 

Forgot,they are from "Va Banque (by H.Schustereit),and his sources are the German military archives :BA-MA :Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv.His these is that Hitler's attack on the SU had as aim to force Britain to give up .One can argue about this these,but the figures about loses...are a goldmine .
About the claim of Jaeger that the Russians did not have automatic weapons ,well ,they lost in 1941 23000 MG,the Germans 20000.
And,about the claims that the Russian winter was causing the Germans countless losses (you know the picture of dead Germans lying in the snow),from the Axis History Forum,the German combat losses (KIA,WIA,MIA) and not combat losses (ilness and frostbite),first CL,second NCL
june :41000 /54000
july :165000 /17000
august :190000 /34000
september:132000/57000
october:114000/66000
november:83000/73000
december:77000/91000
january:87000/128000
february :88000/85000
march:105000/62000
About the non combat losses
1)june is special :all these figures are soldiers sent to rear guard hospitals,those remaining at the front,are not included;but in june,everyone was sent to the rearguard,even the light wounded
2) the ncl in the winter are NOT all frost-bite cases,AFAICS,there are no statistics about the % of frost-bite cases;even in the winter there were soldiers with the flue,....
Also from the same post on AHF (by Hero):for 93 % of the ncl,the average time of being unfit for action was one month,5% only were to be used for garrison duties,1 % unfit for any duty,and 0.67% died .
Of course,the effects of frost bite probably were harsher,but we don't know how much .
That's why I advice caution about the claims of the effect of the winter .
If we would take a very high % for the frostbite cases (50%),than,we would have 180000 cases for 120 days =1500 men.
And,if we would take a very high % of the frostbite cases that died,that were totally unfit,that only were to be used for garrison duties (20 %),than we would have 300 men a day,for an army of 3 million men .
Is this negligible,considerable,catastrophic? The opinions will differ.

 

First off directive 21 was an order from Hitler in which he wanted to find the soviet army and destroy it. however a majority of high command including Bock Guderian and others opposed that plan from the beginning and it was during the entire operation that people like Guderian and Bock oppossed him. Second were are talking before operation Typhoon in which the Germans were capable of thrusting for Mosow had Hitler allocated the resources for it. Next operation typhoon "Bock is best known for commanding Operation Typhoon, the ultimately failed attempt to capture Moscow during the winter of 1941. The Wehrmacht offensive was slowed by stiff Soviet resistance around Mozhaisk, and also by the Rasputitsa, the season of rain and mud in Russia. Once the full fury of the Russian winter struck, which was the coldest in over 50 years,[SUP][3][/SUP] the German armies quickly became unable to conduct further combat operations, with more casualties occurring due to the cold weather than from battle.[SUP][4 [/SUP]

 

As for actual military orders. here you fresh from Wright Patterson Air Force Base archives, the third largest militarial research facility in the world.
heer, um 231.1.40 Transkript Barbarossa-Modell a. blitz Straftat zu stören, geteilt, und die Kraft der kommunistischen Armee, sich zu ergeben oder zerstört werden. Primäre Ziele zu erreichen Überraschung beim ersten Vorschuss, verwenden blitz die sowjetische Armee in einzelne Taschen aufgeteilt, zerfallen Taschen mit Rest der Kräfte.
Modell b. blitz Straftat zu den wichtigsten Punkten der kommunistischen Territorium erfassen zu zwingen, die sowjetische Armee ihre eigenen armee in Versuch, ihr eigenes Land, trap sowjetischen Armee und zwingen sie, sich zu ergeben sparen aufgeteilt. Primäre Ziele zu erreichen primären Ziele bei der ersten Vorschuss, verwenden blitz schnell zu primären Ziele, zu verteidigen primären Ziele von der sowjetischen Armee, Grenadier-Divisionen in der Nähe in und Tasche greifen sowjetische Armee aufzulösen restlichen Taschen der sowjetischen Armee durch einen Angriff durch Gewalt, Erniedrigung Moral und belagern .
Länge um-extensive
Rätsel - bis
halten

 

i will translate this for you using google.

 

heer order 231.1.40 transcript barbarossa- model a. blitz offense to disrupt, split, and force communist army to surrender or be destroyed. Primary goals achieve suprise during initial advance, use blitz to split soviet armee into seperate pockets, disintegrate pockets with remainder of forces.
model b. blitz offense to capture key points of communist territory to force the soviet army to split its own armee in attempt to save its own land, trap soviet army and force it to surrender. Primary goals Achieve primary goals during initial advance, use blitz to quickly take primary targets, defend primary targets from soviet army, grenadier divsions close in and pocket attacking soviet army, dissolve remaining pockets of soviet army by attacking through force, lowering morale, and beseiging.
length of order- extensive
enigma - up
hold

 

German High command was very divided about eastern operations. and your myths being refuted are. a) you said hitler was not the reason the german offensive failed but he was one of the biggest factors as he constantly ordered bock, guderian, paulus and others into situations that cost teh germans, resources, men, and time they did not have. B) you said the weather, siberian troops etc. were not the reason the german advance stalled. But the weather was the #2 reason teh German advance stalled behind hitler's orders. The summer weather resulted in thawed conditions that made the terrain soft and slowed down teh advancing panzers and even further slowed the artillery and infantry behind them. The soft ground made building temporary airfields not possible as planes would not be able to effectively take off or land. And when fall and winter came the weather made things like preserving food and water even difficult on top of the Germans that had to endure the conditions. And yes it is different for the russians. The russians first off are adapt to the weather. The fact that German soldiers had to wait a weeek to acclimate themselves to the climate change slowed german re inforcement rates. Also the Germans were trying to advance under field conditions while the russians were merely strategically withdrawing from stable locations. Germans would have to sit in fox holes, trenches, or destroyed buildings while russians were housed by locals in shelters bfore they were destroyed, lived in trenches and fox holes that were dug well in advance with sources of heat and so on. Siberian troop sand zhukov were big factors in stalling the german offensive as they were ready re inforcements while German re inforcements had to wait the acclimation period. And your last truth C) the russians army alone ios responsible for the german failed attack is false. Yes the russian army was a factor as they were adapted to the climate, their equipment functioned under the conditions and they provided the resistance needed to stop teh german army but the soviets would have failed to stop teh Germans from driving every russian into the depths of siberia had it not been for hitler and the climate and the siberian troops. Hitler decided to invade russia when he did because on paper the german army lookde better. Hitler had information on the performance of the russian army in finland. Hitler did not take into account that the equipment needed for the german army to win would be paralyzed by the conditions it was fighting in.

 

next please quit posting casualty numbers as none of those are accurate nor dredible. i can show you so many different sources that state so many different numbers on casulaty rates. fact is no one knows how many died on the eastern front as casualties were enormous on both sides. Not ot mention it was impossible to count all the body parts and id half of the dead there.