The War Journal of Baron Tekisasu Belasar, Prime Minister of Imperial Japan

.....We move back to less controversial subjects as Colonel Bobimoto offers more concrete data on our future aircraft production. Since my elevation to my current duties I have had deep concerns that we are attempting to build too may types of aircraft in a troubling desire to field the perfect aircraft for every mission. Complicating this is that to this point we can effect little co-operation between the Army and the Navy who have felt that they and they alone understand their needs.

With war imminent, against powers who could clearly out build our industry, the need to focus on as few types as possible to ease our logistics is paramount. Fortunately I seem to have support within the council, as both services seem willing to accept common aircraft as much as is possible living with the prospect that they may sacrifice the optimal aircraft for the ease our production limitations.

We start with our bomber fleet.

Our G3M's (Allied Code name "Nell") are reaching the end of their service life. In the short term they will be used as first line units, but should quickly be relegated to second line duties as transports, trainers, and as rear area combat aircraft issued to our Chinese and Korean allied air forces. With luck we can soon end construction of any new elements except for spare parts and engines to keep existing units operational.

Next is our KI-21's (Allied Code name "Sally") is an Army bomber that has not met its expectations as well as we had hoped. Too be honest I had wished to see this aircraft phased out completely, but Colonel Bobimoto has presented an acceptable use for these aircraft. The proposal is to modify part of the fleet into a maritime patrol bomber for our secondary theaters and the remainder being fashioned into a heavily armed and armored ground attack aircraft for the Army. Since we can make great use of these to compensate for out limitations in Armor and Artillery I can happily agree. Production will continue, but in limited numbers thankfully.

The G4M (Allied Code name "Betty") will become a common bomber type for both the Army and Navy. This should ease our production dilemma's. We will continue to develop a successor to the G4M, but when deployed it too will equip both service's needs.....

 

....Next up is our light tactical bombers for close support of the Army. We have two types in service the Ki-30 and the Ki-32, both roughly comparable to Germany's now famous JU-87 Stuka Bomber.

The Ki-32 (Allied Code Name "Mary") is the older of the two, and overall the performance of both are fairly close except that the Ki-30 (Allied Code Name "Ann") is considerably more swift than her sister. Both types can still be of considerable to us in their intended role so long as we can maintain air superiority over our enemy's. The trouble of course that in perhaps as soon as a year after the start of hostilities we could find ourselves losing this advantage.

Since we will need to expand our pilot training program I have pushed to have the Ki-32 transferred to our Training squadrons as they are retired from frontline service squadrons. I would like to see the Ki-30 to be shifted to our Allied Air Forces (China & Korea) as a frontline light bomber to support their operations. As to when this can occur, I can only hope our transition to the Ground Attack version of our Ki-21 proceeds in a timely manner.....

 

....Moving to larger Bomber aircraft, we must consider another two types currently in service.

The Ki-48 (Allied Code Name "Lily") is a twin engined light bomber. Not a bad aircraft over all as it is fairly swift and agile, especially against current enemy fighters, it will serve as a frontline unit for the near future, Its limited defensive armament and fairly light bombload mitagates against long term use by the IJAAF.

I suspect we will keep it in production for a year, perhaps longer, till we can slowly retool their factory's to produce the G4M or its successor, the Ki-67/G5M types. It will be in turn made available to the CAAF and KAAF forces as a frontline combat unit, with production limited to spare parts only and the factory's located in China/Korea.

The Ki-49 (Allied Code Name "Helen") has just begun to enter service. A twin engine aircraft that sadly does not offer much improvement over the Ki-48. As we have not invested to heavily in this fleet of aircraft, I am pushing to have new production stopped on any aircraft not currently under construction. Perhaps we can find some use for our airborne troops or as a VIP transport, but if our numbers of this type are low enough, I will push hard to end even spare parts production.

There is general agreement that an aircraft like the G4M must act as an inter-service bomber for both the IJA and IJN, and this requires the capacity to carry a torpedo, something neither of these can do and it makes little sense to have so many types of twin engine bombers in our inventory as active frontline combat aircraft......

 

Your humble author is pleased to note that this thread has garnered just over a thousand views from you our loyal rogues!

Thank you for your continued interest and I hope you find the next thousand as interesting!

Darrell

 

Just wait until we actually go to war Mr. Prime Minister!

 

.....The harmony of the Council has been disrupted by a final matter concerning our Bomber Fleet.

General Terauchi has expressed a desire for the IJA to adopt a large 4 engine "Heavy" bomber similar to the American B-17 'Flying Fortress'. Somewhat surprizingly, to me at least, Admiral Takao has also expressed interest in the prospect. Ambassador Kourei however is vehamently opposed to such a program.

Complicating the matter, we have no such design in production, or even in advanced development. For us to field such a plane we must in effect begin from scratch. I have no doubt we could cobble something together, but I can not see how we can have them in any great numbers until late 1943 or early 1944. Potentialy it could drag to near 1945 should we have teething probles as we have with some of our aircraft.

I am willing to support some R & D into the matter, for as Colonel Bobimoto state's even development into aircraft that we ultimately choose not to adopt can bring us advances in technology useful to other designs. This could prove a boon to our replacement of the G4M type interservice bomber.

I wish Admiral Karornada and General Nishio would wheigh in on this. Until they do I can do no more than support development of a prototype.....

 

....Part of what troubles me is that we lack any form of doctrine as how we might use a Heavy Bomber. General Terauchi submits we might use them to bomb Australia or India, Admiral Takao says they could be used to strike at enemy Island bases. The traditional target of such aircraft, Industry of the enemy, is not a viable objective for us due to its distance.

Nor does the idea of city Bombing appeal to me as we are trying so hard to counter the impression of the West that we are savages. The good Ambassador Kourei is quite correct there, whatever the enemy may choose to do, we gain nothing of merit by emulating them in Terror Bombing.

If we do go ahead and design and produce a Heavy Bomber, I suspect we will need to adopt Night Bombing as the English do it. Without a suitable Fighter Escort, it would be suicide otherwise and we already have too many hot heads eager to die fighting rather than to live and win.....

 

....With the dilemma of the fate of a Heavy Bomber unresolved, we at least make some progress concerning production of Fighter aircraft.

Our two oldest types still in service, the Navy's A5M4 (Allied Code Name "Claude") and the Army's Ki-27 (Allied Code Name "Nate") will have to soldier on initially until sufficiant numbers of the A6M (Navy) and Ki-43 (Army) can take their place. Both are out of production for new units but spare parts production remain.

In time the A5M4 will make their way to Advanced Training Squadrons for the Navy, while the Army counterpart (Ki-27) will do the same. I also hope to see some of these (Ki-27's) transfered to Chinese/Korean Self Defence Air Forces to act as their primary Fighter aircraft for local defence.

Transfer of the Spare Parts production lines for these aircraft should be one of the first to be relocated to China and Korea....

 

.......The Army's primary front-line fighter, the Ki-43 (Allied Code Name "Oscar"), has just entered service in April of this year and by all accounts is a fine aircraft, save for one flaw. Its narrow wing, excellent for combat maneuvers, is too small to accommodate even light machine guns, thus leaving only two cowl mounted guns as their armament. Enough for engaging the Nationalist Bandit Air Force, but lacking against western aircraft with four or more machine guns, some of them of a heavy type.

At present three variants are being produced, one with light machine guns, one with a mix of light and heavy machine guns and the third with two heavy machine guns. We will cease production of the first variant immediately, and shift this production line to the A6M. Once that revised line is up to speed the second variant will also end production and its line also will switch to theA6M. In time the last variant will be reduced to one or two plants producing a improved variant armed with light cannons in place of the machine guns.

It will be given a steady stream of subtle improvements, better engines, self-sealing fuel tanks and pilot armor to keep it as combat effective as possible for as long as possible. While most of these should pass out of IJAAF front-line service by early to mid 1943, they should remain the mainstay of our Allied Air Forces till the end of this conflict. If this struggle goes poorly for us they too will stand on the front line along side Imperial Forces.....

 

....In our first informal meetings, before all our Council members were selected, I had made a proposal to make our A6M (Allied Code Name "Zero/Zeke") the universal fighter for both services as a cost cutting measure. One type that avoids the need for multiple production lines, the ability to trade aircraft between services as the need dictates, streamlining the training for pilots and the need to send different replacement parts to the same locations. This seems quite practical to me but was roundly rejected by the Council as being too radical.

To be candid I saw this a serious personal setback and began to be concerned if I had any real influence on conduct of the Imperial Council. I would not be the first civillian figurehead to lead a Council and feared that this alone was to be my legasy. I learned from this setback, choosing my causes carefully, allowing as many as possible to commit themselves, thus letting me understand the lay of the land. Though I have had setbacks since and undoubtably more to come, I have gained confidence that indeed I can make my views have impact in changing our military into a more efficient and co-operative force.

Sometimes however, the course of our debate can pleasently surprise me in the most unexpected ways.

We now have little opposition to making the A6M a standard fighter for both services, at least until the Ki-61 has proven in fact its promise as a superior fighter for the Army and the A7M has shown it can replace the A6M for the Navy. Steadily we will change over the Army's Ki-43 production lines to produce the A6M in ever greater numbers. We will first ensure that all Carrier Fighter squadrons have A6M's then the most important Army squadrons, followed by Navy land based squadrons and then the remainder of the Army squadrons in lesser fronts like China and the Home Islands.

Colonel Bobimoto is confident we can make this change fairly quickly, perhaps within a years time from now......

 

....War with America and the west will force us to come to terms with a enemy wedded to the use of large numbers of Medium and Heavy bombers to paralyze our industry, our economy, and of course our military outposts. England will likely keep their 4 engine Heavy Bombers in Europe, at least until they no longer have any meaningful targets. If and when they do show up in our area of operations, they seem to prefer night operations, so we must field a Nightfighter to counter this threat.

Fortunately, we have time to provide ourselves one.

The American's pose a different hazard. Everthing indicates they plan to use Daylight "Precision" bombing tactics to cripple their enemy's. The small number of B-17 "Flying Fortesses" in the Phillipines and Hawaii, are as yet, no real threat to us in any meaningful way. Their numbers are growing however and it is quite possible they may offer them to the English to use against us. A new type, a B-24 "Liberator" is in final testing according to our intellegence, and if reports are to be believed, it might prove even more dangerous to us than the B-17.

There is also rumor's of a "Super" Bomber able to cross the Atlantic and bomb Europe. Herr Hitler claims his Luftwaffe is working on such a type to fly the reverse route, so it must be possible I think. Such a type, if feasable, could become the only threat that could imperil the Home Islands from the air.

Our A6M can deal with them, so long as they operate low enough, but at high altitude we need an Inteceptor. The Ki-44 (Allied Code Name "Tojo") has just begun to enter service as prototypes. Pilots complain it is not as nimble as the Ki-43, but it has better climb and diving aspects and carry's a far more leathal weapons package than the Ki-43.

With a year perhaps before we are at war with the US, we have time to build and deploy the Ki-44 where they are needed most and in numbers. The Navy had been developing an Interceptor also, but that program will be halted to concentrate on the Ki-44 and its successor, the Ki-100, a modification of the Ki-61.

But as Admiral Takao points out, we are not sure when (or if) the Ki-61 will be available to us.......

 

This may be a bit prescient. From what I can tell I'm not sure it would be clear in the Fall of 41 that the British prefered night bombing. I thought I had run across a clear date for this switch in the past but can't seem to find it now. Their lack of accuarcy at that point might also impact decisions. The implications of "no longer" having "menainful targets" is also a bit problematic at this point as it rather implies an allied victory in Europe which has some further implications with regards to Japan.

 

British strategic bombing was on a small scale in 1941, but what there was was done at night. They had discovered early on that unescorted bombers suffered unacceptable losses in daylight. Even in WWI, long-range bombers like the German Gothas had operated at night. In the 1930s, Bomber Command, including people like Arthur Harris, practiced night navigation and target location.

If I can be unrealistically prescient, what became clear in late 1941 was that precision attack by night was not feasible; the Butt Report documented how few bombs were landing anywhere near their targets. This led to the switch from precision to area bombing, but it was all at night.

Getting back to 1941, we've already seen both the British and Germans switch to night bombing, and also to bombing cities, despite their pious western pronouncements that they would do no such thing.

 

Again I couldn't find any exact dates but my impression was that in early 41 at least the British were still flying at least some daylight bomber missions. It was also in what August that the Butt report came out wasn't it?
Indeed looking at this source:
http://ww2today.com/12th-august-1941-intense-raf-daylight-bombing-raids-on-germany
we see a large mid August 41 day light raid vs Germany.
And this one:
http://www.rafbombercommand.com/timeline/1941_june_until_june_1942.html
lists the last RAF B-17 day light raid as being 25 September and it looks like the last day light raids of any size were in Novemenber of 41.

Furthermore the Japanese stil being neutral at that point in the war could gather some information from both sides as to the accuracy of bomber raids which was not encouraging to say the least, especially if you were looking at strategic bombers.

 

Perhaps I phrased it too absolutely, didn't mean there were no daylight operations, but that night ops had become the preferred tactic for strategic bombing outside fighter range. They also did a lot of operations like the August 12 one, using as much fighter escort as possible; often they were intended as much to draw German fighters into combat as to actually deliver bombs on targets. The Butt report was also in August as you said, and it was an assessment of night bombing accuracy.

I agree the overall effectiveness of strategic bombing at that point was not encouraging.

 

So the question becomes would it be reasonable for a Japanese Government official to make the following statement in October of 41

speaking about the British?

Apologies Belesar for temporaryliy (I hope) hijacking your thread.

 

No Apologies are necessary.

The mingling of what I know as historical fact and what we choose to do is always a factor that I try to minimize as much as possible. As I wrote at the beginning, any mistakes are mine alone.

I think there is enough evidence showing a slow but steady drift to Night bombing in Europe at this date of the simulation. The second part of Britain keeping their Bombers in Europe can be reasonably inferred by Britain's commitment to defeating Hitler.

For me it is of greater importance that a reader of this "Journal" gains an appreciation of just how hard it can be to operate as a co-operative war council, as it was historically for Japan, then it is to be impeccably accurate.

Soooo, I will fall back upon the old "Artistic License" to explain any inconsistencies.

I hope this will not come between the reader and enjoying the read.

 

When I opened this line of questioning I wasn't sure of the timing. The research I have done makes it look like you are right on the cusp. A very forward thinker with fast access to information on the bombing campaigns might have come to the conclusions you did perhaps a month or 3 earlier a month or three later and it's becoming clear.

the part about them keeping their heavies in Europe I never questioned. That's pretty clear unless there were strong political forces to do otherwise. In this case that pretty much would mean the US pressuring them to do it which implies the US is in or about to enter the war. A situation you are trying to avoid. On further thought this could happen if the US was looking to create an incident. The US has already agreed (but I don't think it's public knowledge at this point) to allow the British and Dutch to use US naval bases what if they extend this to air bases?

 

Doing this simulation of a "War Council" I have repeatedly come across data I did not know about the inner workings of the Japanese military, industry and economy, so I understand your feelings in that re-guard.

While my general understanding was close to the overall truth about the flaws within their framework, I have been pleasantly surprized (as the Honorable Prime Minister) to learn that all is not as bleak as it first appears. There are so many avenues where going left instead of right offer small, but very real improvements in the Japanese War Machine.

The question remains, will these cumulative changes be enough to make a Japanese defeat too costly for an America?

It is curious that we easily question a nation at war correcting a mistake early, yet we never question when a nation gets something right before hand ahead of other nations. Germany's combination of air-ground combined arms that made "Blitzkreig" revolunionary, or Britains Radar picket line.

 

.....like our German counterparts (and others) we have attempted a twin engine "Heavy" fighter to fill a number of roles. As usual the Army and Navy designed one each to fill those roles as they saw fit, and as usual it is a duplication of effort we can no longer afford.

The Navy plane, J1N1 Type 2 (Allied Code Name "Irving") ought to be a excellent plane as it employs two of our fine powerplants that propel our swift A6M fighter, yet somehow it is a less than spectacular aircraft. As we intend to increase production of A6M's for both Army and Navy use, we can not afford to waste production on this type. Fortunately, few have been delivered and we can easily and quietly dispose of this program.

The Army varient, the Ki-45 (Allied Code Name "Nick") seem to offer the twin virtues of slightly better performance without the use of powerplants critical to the production of other aircraft. This one we will keep in production as rear area daylight Bomber interceptor outside the range of enemy Fighters, Ground Attack Fighterbomber aircraft for both the Army and Navy and a Nightfighter. Adaptability to multiple missions, the first two without need of much modifications, gives this craft its final virtue.

I wish all our decisions were so simple......