Top 10 tanks of the war

Ill just pick what i think are the two best tanks, not taking reliability or when and how many saw combat.

1 panther
2 pershing

The panther G has a good combination of mobility, armour, firpower and other features like gunsight, which from my understanding has good field of view, magnification, clarity and range finding.

For mobility, there was actually a side by side test conducted during the war between a panther, sherman and a light tank, the test showed that the panther was faster and more maneuverable than the sherman and either faster or more maneuverable than the US light tank, i cant remember.

 

Very well said T.A.G., that failure to produce the correct vehicle extended into the Luftwaffe as well, they were forced to fight a strategic war with tactical weapons.

 

Hello T.A.

I can definitely agree with you on many of your points, namely the German emphasis on tactical superiority and less concern with the logistical side of things and the nightmare it created for the German logistical planners. I mean look at the multitude of different caliber weapons they deployed, it was a logistical nightmare to keep them all supplied with ammunition and parts. To fight a war of attrition you need major standardization. But then again the Germans hadn’t planned on a long war, they assumed it would be over in less than a year.

Anyway moving on to the mobility of the tanks; You might think I’m looking at this like it was some sort of sport statistic, but I am only listing the test results of the tanks in question. Every nation tested their tanks to determine their tactical limitations, and the results of those tests are what I posted.

From these results we can see that the Tiger Ausf.B was infact a remarkably mobile tank for its’ size, it along with the Panther featuring excellent suspension, the most advanced put on any tank during WWII infact, providing it excellent flotation & stability when driving over rough terrain. A disadvantage was ofcourse the clogging which could occur in freezing inviroments, and not least the price and complexity of the design. Furthermore the tank featured excellent stearing and a good gearing, despite the fact that appropiate care needed to be taken not to damage the transmission in certain situations, but a trained driver was the solution to that. (Unfortunately for the Germans these were in small supply by late 1944 to 45) The Tiger Ausf.B was also capable of climbing embankments steeper than most other tanks could cope with, as-well as clear much taller obstacles than most other tanks could. Its’ combat radius was also very much acceptable for a tank its’ size.

In short, while I agree that the Tiger Ausf.B was a major drain on German resources and not the type of tank which was needed the most in Germany’s situation by late 1944, it was nonetheless an engineering marvel and the most advanced & powerful tank ever fielded during WWII. For this it deserves some credit imo.

Anyway it’s great to have a discussion with someone as knowledgeable as yourself on the matter, I think we can both learn a lot from each other

Cheers!

 

Yes, Jent's Pz IV G-H book. He provides a German chart on the failure range of Pz IV armor. Next to the failure range estmate for turret front Jentz put an austerik; the footnote says that the evaluators mistakenly caculated turret armor to be 80mm thick but in fact it was 50mm thick and fails at 1,500 meters.

 

Sorry, I must answer in haste without reading all the other responses to your post because I am in the middle of work. I apologize before hand for redundant arguments if they had been brought up already.

Combat record of Tiger B was actually poor. Joachim Peiper was not happy with it; his Tiger B Bn could not drive from Pruem to Stavelot without losing half of its machines and to boot they almost always arrived the field after the action had already been concluded. No post-war tank was built like it. M26 Patton led to the M46/47/48 series; IS-3 was predecessor to the T-10 which became the T-55. The Tiger faded away.

I don't particularly care for German kill reports written after 1944. They were as likely to exaggerate their kills as the Russians or the Americans and it is a safe bet that actuall accomplishment was more modest.

I am well aware of the problems on that website. The turret hit penetration was achieved by removing the mantlet. But as Vasiliy Fofanov, one of the most respected Russian tank expert said, with the severe tearing of the seams and heavy spalling, the crew would be killed or incapacitated with or without penetration.

Mobility was what makes a tank different from a bunker. A tank soldier in the middle of a firefight might envy the other guy in the big tank, but when a general is moving armies and corps, which is the level wars are won, mobility was sine qua non. By the way, both Sherman 76 and T-34-85 could kill a Tiber B with flank shots at exceedingly long ranges. The same was true for 3-in. guns and 76 or 90 armed TDs. Essentially the Germans were making huge wastages of resources building monstrosities that was routinely abandoned for malfunctioning or killed by something as pedestrian as artillery fire or standard AT weapon flank shots.

The gun was vastly more devastating in anti-personel role and with the standoff range, it did not need rate of fire. A weapon is a cog that fit in the doctrine, my friend. As for people who have seen the optics, so does Vasiliy Fofanov and the Yugoslav Army evaluators. People who had experience with Russian sniper scopes of the war period said that they were of exceptionally quality both here and in other forums.

The key difference is doctrine. IS-2 was a stand-off tank that breaks the line, pins down the enemy before the T-34 close in for the kill. The enemy can either try engage IS-2 where their gun and armor was inferior, or hold their fire and get swarmed by T-34s. For breaking fortified lines, there was no comparison. The heavy armor and excellent gun of the IS-2 clearly was the superior to the Tiger or Panther in frontal assault against fortified infantry.

German tactical manual says so. Frapdo's THE ARMOR SITE used a chart from Jentz taken from German sources.

Von Manteuffel's experience in commanding Tigers of the GD Division against IS-2s contradicted with your evaluation and he was facing the less advanced M43s. German 88mm L/56 gun was ineffective until 1,100 meters range. The IS-2's 122mm could pick off a Tiger E at 2,000 meters. The later M44's totally eliminated the superstructure and its hull was a monolithic plate of 60 degrees sloped armor, 90-110mm thick depending on the factory. 88 have no chance against this armor.

For cost-effectiveness and offensive power, IS-2 was a superior design. It had to, it was newer.

 

Hi Proliator

On paper it did. The suspension allowed it to "turn on a dime" but was badly overstressed and suffered from premature stripping of the third gear. Also its single teeth spur gears would often strip very readily. The final drive on the Panther D was so bad that it could not even turn the tank while backing up. Also, its 3rd gear, the gear most often used in combat was 10 mph slower than that of the T-34/76.

The transmission system was also poor as 5 percent broke within 100km and almost 90 percent broke down within 1,500km.

Yes, but its design gave it a short window of care free operation between breakdowns. The use of straight cut, single pin steel gears caused a lot of wear and tear on the tracks and resulted in short track life.

 

As a part of doing a Master's I took a course in statistics and operations research. The prof was a Pentagon analyst in the business for decades. I submitted a paper I did for a wargame I was designing on "tactical mobility of AFV from historical data." Anyway, I came up with this neat formulation that was an excellent first approximation of vehicluar mobilty that could then be applied to soil condtions as a nomogram and give the resulting mobility of the vehicle under different conditions. His comment on the paper was he didn't get stuff that good from his people.....
The Tiger II was bad. Pathetically bad. Early Shermans with the 19" track were pretty bad in muddy and soft ground. The Pz IV deteriorated with each successive model. The Panther was middle of the road. Early T-34's were excellent but they too deteriorated with successive models as more armor, bigger guns (T34/85) and such were piled on.
I'll see if I can dig out a copy of the formula to let you play with it.
In fact, I did a whole range of WW 2 and post war vehicles with it. The results jibed very well with ancedotal and subjective accounts given of vehicle's mobility by their crews. The Churchill scored well, even if it was slow. The Cromwell was okay until you dumped like another 8 tons of armor on it to bring it up to 100 mm in front. Then it was a dog on soft ground.
The Jumbo Sherman likewise fell in performance by a large margin.
One interesting thing that I found as a trend was that most designs start off with decent mobility then deteriorate with succeeding models (the Centurian, M48-60, and T 44 to 62 all did this among others tested) until a point is reached where mobility is unacceptable. Then there is a sudden jump in mobility as the manufacturer adds a new more powerful engine, adds better tracks and sometimes suspension, and makes the tank perform well again.
As for the Germans, the Tiger I is not bad. The Tiger II and Jadgtiger are just pathetic. They are roadblocks. The Maus is horrible. It is a barely mobile bunker. It may surprise you but the Panther and Shermans with HVSS and 23" tracks score out almost in a dead heat. Yes, the Panther is a bit faster but its "mobility" is no better.

 

Hello T.A.


Do not blame their complicated tanks, even if they just build Shermans they would not win the war
the Germany lost the war in 1941 when the blitzkrige failed to take Moscow, the Germany wanted a quick victory before the USSR wakes up and fights back , (the plan succeeded with France)
so when germans failed to take Moscow they knew they can not take it forever and when they lost their veteran soldiers in Stalingrad they knew they can not win the war whatever they do

At this point they had to face the tow greatest powers in the world and the british empire and from 1942 they could not win any local or Major battle ( they already lose the larger battle at this point
not because their strategy tactics or their tanks are so bad all the war)
though the first three years of ww2(half of the war) the Germany use a light and medium tank. They were cheap ,optimized for use in breakthroughs and have good reliability but they were shocked by
better armor and armament from superb T34

So they wanted to do the same thing and reduce human losses on their tank crews and make more damage on their enemy forces therefor they simply chose to build Panther and Tiger which destroyed more than 60000 tanks despite of all their problems and later the allies do the the same thing (M26,Comet,IS2)

let' s say that they have the industrial capacity of America and face just America and they can bomb all the American citys and factorys and reduce the number of Shermans so the Shermans will now face 15000 Panthers , 6000 Tigers , 20000 PzIV and 25000 Stug , the result will be balanced (in my opinion the germans will win) so the german engineering and soldier do the best thing they can do. like the American and Russian

The germans knew they can not win the war by this small numbers of the Tigers so I think the goal of production of the Tiger is for propaganda purpose

1- to inspire the nation by many heroes (like Michael Wittmann) and feel that they have the upper hand

2- to frighten the enemy tank crews all the time from facing the Tiger although they might not face the Tiger at all (soldiers of allies screamed when saw Pz IV from long distance "bastard tiger")

3- breakthrough of the enemy lines.(Tiger I in kursk, Tiger II in Ardennes)

And do not forget that the Panther and Tiger were a jump to the future like many other weapons (V 1,2 . Mp44,Me 262,submarines----etc) and I think if there were no Panther and Tiger we will still use Sherman even in the Iraq (the evolution theory)

and tell me Why should the western allies focus on tank warfare ? if the airforce could destroy the half of the Panthers in Normandy

In the end the Sherman is not so bad and I think it is the second best tank in ww2 (having good armor ,mobility ,reliability ,long service , its chassis was the basis of successful vehicles variant with many armys ) such as M50 super Sherman from israel ,The tank was armed with a high-velocity 75 mm gun CN 75-50, a development of the German 7.5 cm KwK 42 L/70 ( the germans are very good in building the tank guns while the American the rest of the tank ,and M1A2 is my proof)
here is pictures of shermans in Iraq

 

Which seems to imply that the older models that made up the bulk of WW2 usage were not as good?

What you say more or less matches what I know, My only pick is with the PvIV "deteriorating with each successive model" as IMO it's an oversemplification, while it didn't get a better engine it did get wider tracks, the 50mm G was possibly the limit where a bigger design would have made sense, the 80mm plates of later models were a bit too much but were needed against the Soviet 76 and assorted allied 75 that was what they were mostly facing.
As the J was a "simplified" H it should not be worse mobility wise.

IMO mobility is mostly power to weight and ground pressure with the second being mostly significant for off road movement, you can get a decent model with just those two. Reliability is also a factor but it's very difficult to determine how much of it is the vehicle design itself and how much quality control, crew and mecanics skills and operational consideratons, if your'e advancing a broken down tank will entually be repaired, if you're retreating it will get lost.

 

moutan1 nice post and I agree with the general idea but IMO some details are wrong.

True

Not true, tank losses directly attributable to airforce are minimal. The western allies needed a good reliable tank in large numbers to win and the Sherman was it. Waiting for something better like the M26 would have neant a delay, but AFAIK the main reason they did not hurry with upgunning was they believed the Panther was a heavy tank not meant for the panzer divisions but for a few heavy batallions. That the first panthers they met in Italy were from detached batallions not organic to panzer units may have something to do with that.

You make the German production choices much more rational than they were, if you read Guderian's memoirs, and he was inspector general of the armoured forces, you can find no trace these motivations.

 

1. T34 (Numbers & Performance!)
2. M4 Sherman (Numbers Only)
3. M4 Firefly (Performance only)
4.Comet =
5. Pz V Panther =
6. Pz VI Tiger =
7. Pz IV (Performance&Some Numbers!)
8. IS II (Strong Even vs Konig Tiger Pz VII)
9. M26 Pershing (Performance only)
10 Churchil (Performane Low+Slow)

 

I think the sherman and the churcill tanks are one of the best one...

 

I'm basing my top 10 off nothing more than them being my favs, with no concern to reliability and in no particular order or timeline.

1: Jagdtiger
2: Jagdpanzer IV/70
3: M10 Wolverine
4: MKIV Cromwell
5: Sherman Firefly
6: Tiger II
7: Tiger I
8: M5A1 Stuart
9: Panther
10: T-35

I like many more as well obviously, but I'd need to go allot higher

 

Hello JagdTigerI

?? The suspension is not what allowed the Tiger Ausf.B to turn on a dime, that would be the transmission & final drive. The suspension provided unequalled flotation & stability, making the tank a very smooth and stable platform in rough terrain, and it was by no means overstressed.

Hehe, the Panther could quite easily turn whilst backing up. Also it should be noted that there is no point in always referring to issues which only plagued the Panther Ausf.D series, the first version of the Panther, early on.

By 1944 the Panther was a reliable tank.

There is no such thing as a most used gear. The Panther simply benefitted from better gearing than most other tanks, allowing it to tow heavier loads faster if the need should've risen.

Do you have a source for this?

Here's a Panther from underneath:

 

That is not true. You should read Jentz's book on the tank.

The tank suffered from some serious reliability issues in the beginning of its service life, but these were later corrected, and by October 44 the tank ran sufficiently reliably according to original reports. (I already showed that)

It is nowhere as simple as that. The Tiger also didn't fade away, take a look at tanks today, they are very heavy beasts with tons of armour and very powerful guns, and once more their main job is the same as was the Tiger's: Taking out other tanks.

Furthermore one needs to remember that whichever vehicle or design that continues development has a lot to due with the state of the country & company which manufactures it. The Allies won the war, so naturally their designs were developed further while German designs mostly were halted.

Do you acually have proof of this?

In is not just in respect to the tests, is the many misquotings and alteration of original picture descriptions which is the problem.

As for the test, again it is of a typical Russian fashion, i.e. not very thurough or thoughtout. The Tank was pumbled by shell upon shell, each one weakening the armour for the next. We're talking about hitting it with 152mm shells before even moving on to the 76, 85 & 122mm gun.

The problem with that argument is that Russian sniper scopes are a completely different deal than their tank optics. Furthermore Russian sniper scopes aren't of that good quality, they are usually relatively low powered & offer a narrow field of view, and they are far from always very clear. Russian tank optics are however much much worse, pathetic really would be a proper word for them.

There's a reason buying countries quickly substituted the optics with other ones as soon as they got the tank.

You make it sound much simpler than it in reality is. The IS-2 wasn't invulnerable, not even to the lightest of the German guns. It was infact highly vulnerable even to guns which couldn't penetrate its' armour, the IS-2 suffering from very brittle armour which suffered badly from internal spalling once hit.

Again the gun was too slow, the optics were shoddy and the tank was for from invulnerable to frontal fire, even the 7.5cm KwK40 L/48 being capable of taking it out past 1000 meters.

No it doesn't says that. If you read the book it you will note that it assumes that the tank in question is standing at a 30 degree angle to the incoming shot. Straight on the IS-2 is vulnerable to the PzIV beyonf 1200 meters.

Against the glacis yes, against the hull or turret no. You need to read his original report.

Only problem is the IS-2 could hardly hit anything past 800 meters because of the poor optics it featured.

The glacis was 120mm thick sloped 60 degree's on the later versions, while it was 120mm thick and sloped just 30 degrees on the early versions. But strengthening the upper glacis was a mood thing to do without also increasing the strength of the lower front hull & turret as-well, something which wasn't done until the JS-III arrived. This meant that the late model IS-2, while possessing a glacis plate which was invulnerable to most guns, was still very vulnerable every other place but that to most AT guns possessed by the Germans at that point in time.

That is not true, both tanks were built for different purposes and under different standards, and newer doesn't equal better.(The IS-2 wasn't newer than the Tiger II btw) Furthermore the Tiger I-II & Panther all possessed a higher offensive power against other tanks than the IS-2 ever did, whilst against personnel the IS-2 was better suited.

 

Proliator,

I'm not talking about the Tiger B, I'm talking about the Panther.

The Tiger B's engine was certainly underpowered and overstressed, you have never addressed that issue.

The final drive on the Panther Ausf. D was so weak that the tank could not even turn while it was backing up, which occurred frequently in the retreat to the Dnepr River. Its two fuel pumps were probably the biggest mobility weakness in the Panther Ausf. D because they were prone to leaks and caused serious engine fires. Panther vs T-34 Robert Forczyk

That is quite a common misconception, the Panther G was plagued with most of the same issues as the Panther D and A. This quote is only talking about the Panther G:

The Panther's AK 7-200 transmission was an elegant design offering multigeared steering that permitted the Panther to pivot turn by running the tracks on one side in one direction and the other in the opposite direction, making it possible to tspin the tank in place. While superficially attractive, the transmission was badly overstressed and suffered from premature stripping of the third gear. A more serious problem was the final drive, which had a nominal life expectancy of 1,500km, but which in practive was sometimes as low as 150km. The design was not adequate for a tank of this weight, and its single-teeth pur gears tended to strip more readily than the more robust double herringbone design used in the Sherman. To make matters worse, the pivot turn feature accelerated the final drive failure in the hands of an inexperienced driver. These problems grew worse by the time of the Battle of the Bulge due to the growing alloy shortage that led to more brittle gears, declining quality control at factories, and the decline in spare parts production. While this situation was bad enough, the Panther's transmission was fully enclosed by the front armor, meaning that to replace the final drive, the entire driver's compartment and transmission had to be disassembled to gain access to the faulty assembly.

The combination of premature transmission failure, time-consuming repair, and shortage of spare parts meant that Panther units in December 1944 were often understrength due to the significant number of sidelined tanks. On average, Panther units in 1944 had 35 to 40 percent of their tanks unavailable. At the outset of the Ardennes campaign, 29 percent of the Panthers were not operational, even though nearly all were new vehicles manufactured in September-November 1944. The Panther had a mechanical life expectancy of 1,500km (935 miles), although in practice this was rarely achieved either due to combat loss or mechanical problems. Panthers that suffered mechanical breakdowns in the field often were too difficult to repair in field conditions and so had to be abandoned. Of 47 Panther tanks in the Ardennes inspected by Allied intelligence after the fighting, 20 (42 percent) had been abandoned or destroyed by their crew. Although detailed statistics are lacking, a number of German prisoners of war indicated that Panther tank losses had been lighter do to mechanical breakdown rather than enemy action. The durability of the Panther was so poor that long road marches were discouraged, and Panther units were generally moved by train if any significant distances were involved. Panther vs Sherman Steven J. Zaloga

I misspoke slightly, I meant to say tactical driving which is the third gear, the gear probably used in combat.

In terms of statistical comparison, the Panther Ausf. D did appear to have equal or better mobility to the T-34, having low ground pressure and better road speed. However, in reality, the Panther could only move faster than the T-34 once it reached seventh gear, which is unlikely to occur under combat conditions. In tactical driving, using third gear, the Panther was considerably slower than the T-34, being able to achieve only 13kph (8mph) versus 29kph (18mph). Certainly one of the biggest problems with the Panther Ausf. D and A models [and G] was the fuel-guzzling character of its Maybach HL 230 engine, which required almost double the amount of fuel to go 1km as a Pz IV and nearly four times as much as a T-34. As the Wehrmacht began to run seriously short of fuel in late 1943, the Panther's poor fuel efficiency would further degrade its operational and tactical mobility. Panther vs T-34 Robert Forczyk

These issues are true, please do not deny them, address them

 

Why do you keep talking about the first examples of the first version of the Panther, the Ausf.D ? That's hardly being very objective JagdTigerI. It is very well known that the Ausf.D suffered from a lot of problems which were the result of a premature entrance into service. But it is also well known that the majority of these problems would later be solved, a lot of them even during the production run of the D series.

Fact is that the Panther had a lot of its problems solved as the war went on, and the Ausf.G was considered a reliable tank, read Jentz's book. The Russians who captured Panthers actually became so fond of the vehicle that they would ditch their tank for one if they got the chance, and that is despite the Soviet regulations stating that captured Tigers and Panthers should not be repaired but abandoned and destroyed after mechanical failure. Instead they kept them in service as long as possible, and later even the Pantherfibel service manual was translated into Russian and provided to crews of captured Panthers. That says quite abit imo.

Also that the Panther couldn't turn whilst backing up is complete falacy btw, and I don't know where Robert got that from. He's a great source on Soviet armour, but on German armour I prefer Thomas L. Jentz. Plus I've actually seen a fully restored Panther back up into a hangar and turn at the same time in Germany a few years back, drivetrain over 60 years old, and no problems were encountered at all. I even know one of the mechanics, and he's never expressed any concern about turning whilst backing up, and he knows that the drivetrain is far from the strongest part on the tank. (Seen the Saumur Tiger Ausf.B in france do that same btw, again no issues)

Here's one backing up whilst turning on video, no issues:
YouTube - Restored Sd Kfz 171 Panther Aus. A

Here's one where they're pretty much toying with the drivetrain on the Panther at Saumur, violently throttling up and down, yet again no issues:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pbdv1Ru0YaU

A good video on the Saumur Tiger (I was there when this video was shot in Normandy summer 2005):
YouTube - King Tiger Growls


In short, the reliability issues of these two tanks (Panther & Tiger) are extremely overblown. You should talk to the guys who run a few restored ones today.

As for the Tiger Ausf.B, it was indeed underpowered but the the engine could cope with it, it was the final drive which was overstressed in some situations, esp. when an untrained driver was behind the wheel.

 

Proeliator,

Please read this, it is talking about the PANTHER G

The Panther's AK 7-200 transmission was an elegant design offering multigeared steering that permitted the Panther to pivot turn by running the tracks on one side in one direction and the other in the opposite direction, making it possible to tspin the tank in place. While superficially attractive, the transmission was badly overstressed and suffered from premature stripping of the third gear. A more serious problem was the final drive, which had a nominal life expectancy of 1,500km, but which in practive was sometimes as low as 150km. The design was not adequate for a tank of this weight, and its single-teeth pur gears tended to strip more readily than the more robust double herringbone design used in the Sherman. To make matters worse, the pivot turn feature accelerated the final drive failure in the hands of an inexperienced driver. These problems grew worse by the time of the Battle of the Bulge due to the growing alloy shortage that led to more brittle gears, declining quality control at factories, and the decline in spare parts production. While this situation was bad enough, the Panther's transmission was fully enclosed by the front armor, meaning that to replace the final drive, the entire driver's compartment and transmission had to be disassembled to gain access to the faulty assembly.

The combination of premature transmission failure, time-consuming repair, and shortage of spare parts meant that Panther units in December 1944 were often understrength due to the significant number of sidelined tanks. On average, Panther units in 1944 had 35 to 40 percent of their tanks unavailable. At the outset of the Ardennes campaign, 29 percent of the Panthers were not operational, even though nearly all were new vehicles manufactured in September-November 1944. The Panther had a mechanical life expectancy of 1,500km (935 miles), although in practice this was rarely achieved either due to combat loss or mechanical problems. Panthers that suffered mechanical breakdowns in the field often were too difficult to repair in field conditions and so had to be abandoned. Of 47 Panther tanks in the Ardennes inspected by Allied intelligence after the fighting, 20 (42 percent) had been abandoned or destroyed by their crew. Although detailed statistics are lacking, a number of German prisoners of war indicated that Panther tank losses had been lighter do to mechanical breakdown rather than enemy action. The durability of the Panther was so poor that long road marches were discouraged, and Panther units were generally moved by train if any significant distances were involved. Panther vs Sherman Steven J. Zaloga

Give me a quote...

Show me truth the Panther D could turn while backing up.

First of all, source?

Second of all, yes of course the Soviets would probably want to use captured Panthers and Tigers. They didn't know of its mechanical problems, all they knew was that it had a good gun and heavy armor.

40% of the tanks being sidelined in the Battle of the Bulge doesn't seem overblown at all, especially when compared to 5% of Shermans being sidelined.

It could cope with it? What does that mean? It led to engine failures and poor acceleration.

 

Proeliator,

First of all, I want to remind everyone that a good post is meant to provice critique and debate to any given opinion, not the person who posted them.

The Tiger B was a miserable failure of a weapon. It has been proven time after time on the battlefield that a Heavy Panzer Battalion with its typical number of running machines and complement of grenadiers was no match for an American infantry RCT or armored CC. The Tiger B's dependability and operational mobility was so poor, they could not fight as an organization and went to battle too little too late almost every time.

As for the kill numbers claimed by some SS units late in the war, they are so absurd that refuting them is almost a waste of breath. For example, the 2d SS Pz Div claimed 300 tank kills during the Battle of the Ardennes in its actions around Manhay-Grendmenil. If true, Das Reich would have to single-handedly wipe out sixty percent of the total tank losses of the US First Army in two days of fighting, enganging armored units no more than two understrengthed combat commands. SS Heavy Panzer Battalions' extravagant claims on the East fare no better under scrutiney; they routinely claimed more Russian tanks killed than the Red Army deployed against them and M Kenny of our forum has one such example in another thread.

I find the math and logic of your claim of the IS-2's vulnerability to German guns difficult to grasp. In the report quoted by Jentz, the IS-2 was in fact inpenetrable to 88mm gunfire until 100-300 meters but you refuse to admit its validity. You argue that the rounds were fired 30 degrees off target; therefore at a 'fair' angle 88mm L/56 and even the 75mm L/48 could kill the IS-2 at 1000+ meters. Mathematically, a plate inclined at 30 degrees from verticle is only 15% more effective than a plate with no incline. So an armor plate that can withstand the impact of 88s from 30 degrees at 300 meters will not yield to a lesser weapon at 1,200 meters from 0 degrees no matter how you caculate it. It's a fact.

The effectiveness of IS-2's armor and gun is attested by numerous German after action reports, memoirs, and field manuals, quoted all around the net from sources that can be verified.

 

Again not true. In reality the Tiger Ausf.B was far from a failure, it was in many cases an astounding success, and it proved that time and again. The failure of certain German operations in the west can in the majority of cases be attributed mainly to one thing: Lack of fuel. The Ardenne offensive ground to halt for this reason, the Panzers simply ran dry. That the Germans lacked trained personnel and spare parts didn't help matters either. Considering the extremely problematic situation Germany was in by 44 the Tiger units did extremely well, above all expectation.

And again reliability was under the circumstances in which German tanks had to oeprate pretty good for the Tiger Ausf.B, as proven in the March 45 status report listing the operational status of all German tanks all the way back to may 44.

Triple C,

Try actually reading Jentz's book before denying what is actually written in it. I own the book and I am telling you that the table is from the WaPrüf 1 tests conducted in the 5th of October 1944, and they are assuming that the tank in question is standing at a 30 degree angle to the incoming shot., and that's a fact! Are you gonna deny this?

Furthermore I am not making any claims regarding what the 7.5cm Kwk40 L/48 is capable of, I am stating what it is in fact capable of, nothing more nothing less.

Armour penetration of the 7.5cm Kwk40 L/48 as tested at the Aberdeen proving grounds USA against vertical 240 BHN Rolled Homogeneous Armour with the Std. 6.8 kg PzGr.39 APCBC-HE round (Distance measured in meters):

100m = 135mm
250m = 130mm
500m = 123mm
750m = 116mm
1000m = 109mm
1250m = 103mm
1500m = 97mm
2000m = 86mm
2500m = 76mm
3000m = 68mm

And with APCR shot it was even more deadly with a penetration power of 121mm of armour at 1500 meters.

And bare in mind that 240 BHN RHA armour is a lot less brittle than the armour of the IS-2, and thus a lot more resistant to penetration.

So like I said, in a full frontal engagment the 7.5cm Kwk40 L/48 gun will have no problem at all penetrating the IS-2's front turret at 1,250 meters. And that's a fact.

Here's the 8.8cm Kwk36 L/56 for comparison sake, again with Std. PzGr.39-1 APCBC-HE projectile:

100m = 162mm
250m = 158mm
500m = 151mm
750m = 144mm
1000m = 138mm
1250m = 132mm
1500m = 126mm
2000m = 116mm
2500m = 106mm
3000m = 97mm

These IS-2's were knocked out at a distance of over 1,500 meters in a head on engagement with Tiger Ausf.E's on the Eastern front in late August 1944 (Note the glacis is penetrated right above drivers visor):


Also:

The September 1944 issue of the Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen included a report from a Tiger-Kompanie that had knocked out numerous Josef Stalin tanks in a short period:

The Tiger Kompanie was ordered to throw out the enemy who penetrated into a wood, and then continue to advance. About 12:15 hours, together with an Infanterie-Batallion the Tiger Kompanie started to attack. The thick forest caused extremely poor visibility (50 meters), and a narrow trail forced the Tiger-Kompanie to advance in a single row. The Russian infantry fled their positions as soon as the Tigers appeared. The anti-tank guns, which were pulled forward into position by the enemy within three-quarters of an hour after entering the woods, were quickly destroyed in spite of the difficulty of seeing the targets. Some of the anti-tank guns were destroyed by hits and some were rolled over. Numerous undamaged anti-tank guns fell into our hands.

After the lead Zug of the Tiger Kompanie advanced 2 kilometers through the forest, the Zug leader suddenly noticed knocked-down trees and saw a large muzzle-break (Josef Stalin) directly in front of him. He immediately gave the fire command: " Panzergranate! Cupola sight! Fire!" At the same time he was hit twice by 4.5 cm anti-tank gun shells that robbed him of his sight. In the interim, a second Tiger of the Zug driving through the woods pulled up on line with the Zug leader's Tiger. In spite of poor visibility, the Zug leader started the firefight at a range of 35 meters. In response, the Josef Stalin tank pulled back behind a small hill. In the meantime, the second Tiger had taken the lead and fired three shot at the enemy tank. When the round was fired, the Tiger itself was hit by a 12.2 cm shell on the front below the radio operator's section. Apparently this armor-piercing shell didn't penetrate through because the Tiger was standing at an angle from the target. The enemy tank was knocked out of action by a shot which penetrated the gun. A second Josef Stalin tank attempted to cover the first as it pulled back. During a short firefight, one of these two Tigers hit the second tank under the gun. This round penetrated, immediately setting the enemy tank on fire. The rate of fire of the Josef Stalin tanks was comparatively slow.

Pictures taken emmidiately after the action, these two of the IS-2 which round failed to penetrate the Tiger Ausf.E's front armour at 35m and in return was knocked out by a single shot to the front turret by the same Tiger:

Show me some please. I've got the lot, and I know all of the ones which have been quoted out of context as-well, and that includes the one by Von Manteuffel.

The IS-2's armour was far from always very effective, it was infact often quite the opposite, often failing to protect the crew against shots which theoretically shouldn't have been capable of penetrating the armour as-well as those which didn't even fully penetrate the armour. Brittle armour & internal spalling was a serious problem for the IS-2 throughout its' service life, and thats a fact. The Panther was to suffer the same problem in its later versions.