Discussion in 'Non-World War 2 History' started by bronk7, Dec 28, 2019.
That was "shadow work", for work done in the public eye they needed legal workers.
Some wars are indeed necessary (WW2, Korean War, War against ISIS) if you want to keep your nation's liberty, but that doesn't make them any less atrocious.
A question OP: Are the atrocities you fought to end, ended?
On the main point:
A lot of Germans started having misgivings when they first went to war in 1939. After the first year of the war with the USSR and all the casualties that resulted, AND Hitler declaring war on the USA, even more started to have "defeatist" thoughts; but the GESTAPO had many ears and one didn't voice these thoughts publicly. When Goebbles finally announced "Are you ready for total war?, the German civilians responded with, "It's damn well about time!".
When there are humans in the loop inhumanities will be right there beside them.
That is true. There was a tremendous use for foreign labor, either conscripted or not. A large part of German women were working in agriculture after men were either in the armed forces or transferred to munitions factories. Early in the war about 6 million women already worked in the agricultural industry. As Richard Evan's argues "even with the most vigorous efforts to mobilize women for war production, it would not be possible to recruit more than 1.4 million extra pairs of hands in this way. This was a mere fraction of the numbers needed." There wasn't enough women to go around. 42% of native women were already in the work force in some capacity and still needing to bring in foreign workers. In addition, as OP explained, Hitler had no interest in doing so until it was too late. Even when conscription into war industry was allowed, stringent restrictions on work environments were added to make sure women maintained their virtue as mothers and wives.
(Evans, Third Reich at War)
Hitler's refusal to activate total war is on a par with his failure to prepare his forces for a Russian winter.
o--ok..I thought they didn't have enough manufacturing plants for that many people--so since the men were fighting, that opened up the jobs...?
.....didn't they have enough trouble getting beans/bullets/bandages [ and POL ] up to the front?? could they have prepared significantly ''better'' for winter?
Let me give you an example or two. There was a call to the German people to donate warm coats for the troops in Russia. Flippin' COATS were in short supply. The German had not developed protocols for operating machinery in a Russian winter. (The Sovs mixed diesel fuel with their lube oil so it would stay soft and allow the vehicle to start in the mornings.) The Germans hadn't given enough thought to the different railroad gauges in Russia. Every box car from Germany had to be unloaded and reloaded into a car with a wide-gauge carriage. The list goes on.
The lack of female workforce is just another catalyst in a long list of them that brought down the Germans. National Socialist ideology was its own undoing when it came to total war. The whole idea of lebensraum, for example, opened a string of events that led to their demise. It was a futile attempt to incorporate large tracks of land within the greater Reich and expect to be able to keep up with the demands of such a push.
IIRC, right after the Battle of France, a whole bunch of German servicemen were demobilized in order for them to go back into industry. I assume this was because production was hurting. When Hitler then decided to go east, they were recalled, leaving a big hole in the production of war and other materials. This, and what OP mentioned was mostly due to "victory disease".
..o, yes--I did read something about the railroads/POL/etc on the Ostfront [ years ago ] ....the Germans did not live in that cold of weather, so no need to think of cold weather problems...?
informative--ty ..that does sound like it might cause problems .......but that had to be less than a years' time?? 1940 to 1941--and they had to be recalled before June 1941
Hitler had said they "only needed to kick in the door and the whole rotten edifice would fall". Therefore preparations for a long war in the East was officially "defeatist". When politics overrule reality the troops get the short end.
by Greater Reich, you mean outside of Germany?
Remember that people from the occupied lands, and POWs, were also being used in the grey labor market.
.....sounds like hitler was not thinking ''total war''--but that's what he got and more .....like I said before, no one wants total war--or even to ''prepare'' for it
That's what I meant about "victory disease". Hitler thought that the Wehrmacht couldn't be beaten, so no need for cold-weather gear. It wouldn't be needed. Even Goring had misgivings re. invading Russia! So did many generals. Their warnings were brushed aside, or in Goring's case, bought off.
It would be, except neither is actually true.
It is an interesting, but badly misunderstood subject. Some 19 or 20 divisions are usually said to have been “disbanded after the end of the French Campaign. Of those, four were Landwehr divisions (209., 228., 331., and 358. Infanterie-Division). In common with the other Landwehr divisions (205., 206., 208., 211., 212., 213., 214., 215., 216., 217., 218., 221., 223., 225., 227., and 228. were not demobilized) they were mainly composed of older and often married men, some of the more senior of them Great War veterans. Their mobilization probably had had an adverse effect upon the Reichs economy as a whole. The equipment of the divisions was often obsolescent.
Six other divisions, most of them Landwehr, were converted to field commands occupying conquered territories. These included:
365. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 365.
372. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 372.
379. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 379.
393. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 393.
395. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 395.
399. Infanterie-Division, reorganized as Oberfeldkommandantur 399.
Finally, 15 Infanterie-Divisionen (271., 272., 273., 276., 277, 307., 310., 311., 317., 341., 351, 380., 555., 556., and 557.) were all supposedly formed shortly before, and disbanded shortly after, the French Campaign. Some of these (555., 556., and 557.) were created in February 1940 by the renaming of Fortress divisions (Stellungs-Divisionen) as Infantry divisions, which did little to increase either their mobility or their combat readiness (556. Infanterie-Division was formed on 11 February 1940 from Divisions-Kommando z.b.V. 426 and Landsesschuetzen Batallion II/XVII). However, many left little or nothing in the way of records behind and it is unclear how far along their organization was before they were disbanded. It is also unclear if the personnel that had been mustered for these divisions were in fact discharged or were incorporated into the other divisions whose formation was completed. It is curious that all three of the former Stellungs-Divisionen were disbanded as of 1 October 1940, just as the first of the 11. Welle divisions began activating.
Thus, the Heer created approximately 69 new divisions in the Feld-Heer by the end of 1940. In the same period 19 divisions were disbanded, for a net increase of 50 divisions.
The so-called "Industrial Demobilization" or "refusal to prepare for total war" is actually easier to address than the military demobilization. Quite simply the story does not appear to have much substance.
Looking first at a simple metric, AFV production, we find the following:
From February 1934 when the first Pz-I Ausf A (ohne Aufbau) was produced, to 1 January 1938, a total of 1,879 Panzer and 190 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for an average of 517.25 per year.
In 1938, 804 Panzer and 26 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for an increase over the previous yearly average of 162.4 percent.
In 1939, 743 Panzer (including 150 Czech 38) and 44 Panzerbefehlwagen were built for a decrease over the previous year of 5.5 percent. And, lest we assume that Hitler was demobilizing, let us remember that this change was due to the reduction in Pz-II and increase in Pz-III and Pz-IV production.
Now the critical years of comparison. In 1940, 1,515 Panzer, 34 Panzerbefehlwagen, 44 Flammpanzer, and 184 Sturmgeschuetz were built. That was an increase of 225.8 percent.
Then, in 1941, 3,114 Panzer, 132 Panzerbefehlwagen, 39 Flammpanzer, and 548 Sturmgeschuetz were produced for an increase of 215.7 percent.
So production doubled two years in a row, despite the industrial “demobilization” and "refusal to go to total war"?
Then in 1942 the expansion began to taper off. A total of 4,276 Panzer, 131 Panzerbefehlwagen, 29 Flammpanzer, and 823 Sturmgeschuetz (and Sturmartillerie) were produced for an increase of ‘only’ 137.2 percent. Was there another industrial “demobilization” ordered in 1942?
In 1943 the slower pace of production increases continued. “Only” 5,663 Panzer, 14 Panzerbefehlwagen, 100 Flammpanzer, and 3,312 Sturmgeschuetz were built for an increase of 172.8 percent. That was an improvement over the previous years increase, but still not on a par with 1940 and 1941.
Finally, in the last full year of production, 1944, 7,975 Panzer, 41 Panzerbefehlwagen, 20 Flammpanzer, and 6,208 Sturmgeschuetz were built for an increase of 156.7 percent.
Similar production statistics can be shown for other major items, such as ammunition, aircraft, artillery pieces, and so forth. None show significant drops in production during the timeframe of the “demobilization.”
Other economic studies confirm that the German military industrial expansion was fairly steady from 1938 onwards. The net utilization of resources supplied to the war effort as a share of the net national product in Germany was:
1938 17 percent
1939 25 percent, an increase of 8 percent
1940 44 percent, an increase of 19 percent
1941 56 percent, an increase of 12 percent
1942 69 percent, an increase of 13 percent
1943 76 percent, an increase of 13 percent
Note that the greatest increase was in 1940, which is to be expected since that was the first full year of “wartime” military spending. After that the increase remained fairly constant. Part of the problem was that Germany over-expanded its allocation to war industry 1933-1937, which resulted in an economic contraction in 1938.
Ah, a concise rebuttal.