U.S. Civil War History bits

Aside from the turning point in Union cohesion and morale, one also has to remember that a Lee victory at Gettysburg might have ended the war right then. That is a "what if" scenario, but given the poor support Lincoln had in congress at the time, a defeat followed by an ultimatum (with a victorious Army of Northern Virginia poised just north of Washington) would very likely have ended the war. We'd be two nations.

 

I disagree. Longstreet used a column of brigades at Chickamauga, three divisions, comprised of eight brigades in five lines deep, because the weight of the attack at the crucial point was more critical in Civil War era combat than it is in more modern combat.

But that was the end result. Had the Longstreet exercised some sort of control and had he pushed the flank commanders to actually press their assaults the way they were intended, Pettigrew would have suffered less, as would Pickett on the other flank, and there would have been greater weight at the point of contact. Btw, Pettigrew and Trimbles men actually advanced further than Pickett's men because of angles in the stone wall, but did not penetrate the union lines. Had they arrived in greater strength they would have been on Hall and Harrow's flank and could have disrupted those units facing Armistead, or at the very least would have forced them to divert strength to protect that flank. As it was, because the confederate left flank was compromised almost from the first, they suffered greater casualties and disorganization than they should have.

 

Excellent! Perhaps so, and if so, would you then lay the blame at the feet of Longstreet rather than the overall strategy of Lee?

I tend to be a Longstreet advocate, but perhaps I'm unduly influenced by The Killer Angels because it's such a great book - and happens to take the Longstreet side of the debate.

 

I think that the blame could be spread around to both Generals. Here's my take on the subject.

The Gettysburg Campaign was a bit more complicated than just taking the war to the North. A successful campaign was needed to possibly force a negotiated peace with Lincoln. Intervention by France and especially Britain was out by this time in the war due to the Emancipation Proclamation issued by Honest Abe on January 1, 1863. That point changed the moral direction of the war from the US government's viewpoint. Of course taking the war to the North was desirable in order to give the farmers a break from continual combat and "appropriations" by both armies for over two years at the beginning of the campaign. Food shortages was taking a toll on the army and civilians alike by now. Also as pointed out by USMCPrice, a victory was needed on Northern soil to gain recognition, and then a brokered peace by the European powers would be favorable. The original plan was for the Army of Northern Virginia was to fight a defensive battle (where it's strengths lay) on favorable ground, but as in war plans do not always go according to plan. The two armies collided at Gettysburg not by design. There were Confederate units far to the north of Gettysburg that were called back to where the ANV was massing, north of town. Some units were as far north as Harrisburg, Pa, the state capital. Once the ANV had collected itself, Lee pressed the attacks due to early successes of July 1 against the Army of the Potomac, against the original campaign plans. Later during the battle as mentioned earlier, for whatever reason Longstreet did not apply himself to the modified game plan leading up to what is known now as Pickett's Charge. He was very much against the charge, and of fighting an offensive battle as well.

After the debacle on July 3, the ANV did not leave the battlefield until the night of July 4-5. There was some skirmishing and maneuvering going on by both armies, but nothing major. Once Lee had successfully disengaged his army, he made his way back to Virginia and crossed the Potomac fighting rear guard actions to protect his retreat. It has been written (and claimed by Lincoln) that Meade did not press Lee very much after the battle. Both armies suffered severely in the battle, so I can see why no direct action was taken to force another pitched battle right away.

 

I place the blame on both. Lee for ordering the attack, it was too desperate a gamble. And Longstreet for half-heartedly carrying out his orders once they were given. Longstreet was a very good general, but IMHO not on par with Lee, Jackson and a number of others. Lee and Jackson were an excellent collaboration, and their combination led to a series of victories against large odds. Longstreet had an important role to play in their success, but was not the architect of the victories. With Jackson's death Longstreet felt he would assume Jackson's mantle, and felt he should be consulted on strategy. Longstreet began to put forth and advocte his ideas as to what the confederacies grand strategy should be. When his ideas were rejected in favor of Lee's and when Lee didn't modify his plans to placate Longstreet, he sulked. Lee and Jackson were both very aggressive and would gamble big, and won big. They had similar strategic/operational visions. E.P. Alexander wrote in his book that when Lee first assumed command of the Virginia, one of President Davis' staff told him, "if there is one man in either army, Confederate or Federal, head and shoulders above every other in audacity, it is General Lee! His name might be Audacity. He will take more desperate chances, and take them quicker than any other general in this country, North or South; and you will live to see it, too." A.P. Hill had a similar temperment, but was too impetuous. Lee and Jackson both took great care in doing their homework and the chances they took were calculated and based on solid intelligence and a detailed knowledge of and use of the terrain. Lee due to his engineering background and Jackson's heavy reliance on personnal reconaissance and his mapmaker, Jedediah Hotchkiss. Lee allowed great leeway in the execution of his orders, and permitted independant action when dealing with Jackson, Early and to a lesser degree A.P. Hill. He habitially traveled with Longstreet and in addition to their having a good personal relationship, I think it was partly due to Lee wanting to be able to prod him, as he was at times slow and deliberate to act. Jackson was a true military genius and Longstreet, though a good solid commander was not.

A few of his failings:
1.) He was slow to execute his orders on the second day at Gettysburg and missed a great opportunity.
2.) He failed to exercise proper leadership in the conduct of the assault on the third day.
3.) His exercise in independant command during the Knoxville campaign was an abject failure.
4.) His quarreling with Bragg and behind the scenes political intrigue during the same period led to the Army of Cumberland being able to lift the seige at Chattanooga.
5.) While his assault at Chickamauga was well conceived and executed, and a portion of the Union line shattered. this was partly due to a union error, where they created a gap in their lines just as his assault went forward. I do think his assault would have still been successful even without this fortuitous incident. Where I think he screwed the pooch was in the followup. Over half the union army was shattered and fleeing pell mell from the field. Hood was coordinating the pursuit and it is likely that he would have destroyed what was left of it before they could reform a defensive line, but he went down wounded. Longstreet, the wing commander was unaware of it because he had gone off on a picnic. (no joke) The confederates could have carried the field, but without an overall commander they attacked piecemeal and were each barely repulsed in turn. By the time Longstreet returned and re-exerted command, the situation had changed and Thomas had a formidable defensive position and had assembled bits and pieces of commands into a sizeable force. A great lost opportunity.

Longstreet's attitude had greatly changed by the time he returned to the ANV from his foray at independant command. I think he served Lee very well and was at his best, during these latter campaigns. During the post war fighting between he and Early, I think his reputation was overly tarnished. He was a better general that Early gave him credit for and not as good as he himself and his advocates proclaimed him to be.

 

I haven't read about any units wearing kilts or tartan trewsers before, although I'm sure some did. The "uniforms" of Civil War armies were all but uniform early on. Many units in the ACW wore uniforms inspired by French Zouaves early in the war. As the war drug on, most of these units were issued standard uniforms as their zouave uniforms wore out. Of course I am partial to the zouave unit raised in Louisiana. Here's a picture of a famous Louisiana Zouave unit, The Tiger Rifles. It was part of the 1st Louisiana Special Battalion assigned to the Army of Northern Virginia. This unit was recruited from the New Orleans area, and were extremely rugged individuals, feared by friend and foe alike from what I've read about them. They stole everything that they needed that wasn't nailed down, and sometimes even if it was nailed down. Some of the boys were caught tearing planks off of a farmers house once. The story they gave to the Provost Marshal was that they needed wood to construct winter quarters. I think that the British term for people like that is a "nasty lot". They were ruthless in battle, and felt no shame in robbing the bodies of dead soldiers on the field after the battle. I read once of an incident after a successful battle. A group of Confederates were standing over a mortally wounded Yankee. The poor Yankee was gut shot and obviously in great pain, was asking to be put out of his misery. A Louisiana Tiger ambled up to the group to see what was going on and overheard the wounded man asking for the coup de grace. The Tiger responded "certainly" and caved his head in with the butt of his rifle, then bent down to relieve the newly dead soldier of his personal effects. The other boys standing there were horrified. Ewwwww.




The Yankees had a lot of zouave units too. Come to think of it, the Yankees had a lot of everything. I think it had something to do with the outcome of the war if I'm not mistaken.

 

For those who are interested in Robert E. Lee, or else, are really bored, Douglas Southall Freeman's 4 volume epic biography can be found on the 'net here:
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/e/gazetteer/people/robert_e_lee/frerel/home.html

 

Thank you for the link. I have Freeman's set in hardback and think they are invaluable for anyone wanting to understand what transpired in the war in the east. I particularly like Freeman's technique of giving the reader only that information that was known at the time. It makes many decisions clearer and events more understandable than viewing them with the advantage of hindsight. I feel the reader gains a better and fuller understanding of the events.

I also highly recommend Freeman's, "Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command". I also enjoy throwing in trivia that ties the Civil War in with WWII. Here's one from Wikipedia:

For those interested in a good, enjoyable, very readable, general history of the war in the east from the Union perspective I highly recommend Bruce Catton's Army of the Potomac Trilogy (Mr. Lincoln's Army, Glory Road and A Stillness at Appomattox) and for a general history his Centinial Trilogy (The Coming Fury, Terrible Swift Sword, and Never Call Retreat). The latter trilogy gives a very good view of the political, social and economic issues as well. For those that are familiar with Cornelius Ryan's WWII histories, I find Catton's books similar. They are both good story tellers and they manage to keep the readers attention and make the reading very enjoyable.

 

If we're going to talk books, Michael Shaara's The Killer Angels is breathtaking.

 

There's plenty of blame to go around. Many also blame Stuart for not providing accurate intelligence of the AoP's movements which caused the fight to happen on this less than favorable ground.

 

Or Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill and/or Cemetery Hill on the first day of Gettysburg. Although there seems to be a never ending battle over whether this was practicable for Ewell's forces.

 

I agree it is very well written, a very enjoyable read, I have it in my library along with the companion pieces written by his son. However, it is a historical novel and as such takes many liberties with the actual history. It was not meant as a "history" and like many novels, while it manages to portray many larger truths, it is not an accurate accounting of the known facts. This has been pointed out by numerous historians, it is not a history and was not intended to be.

 

I'm glad you included the last line in your statement. Ewell was one of Jackson's favorite subordinates due to his aggressiveness and tactical acumen. Here is a portion of a HistoryNet article that gives a more accurate accounting of why Ewell acted as he did. Contrary to Shaara's depiction in "Killer Angels", based upon Issac Trimble's post war recollections, his actions were militarily sound. Post war Federal accounts, by Union participants, support the view that by the time Ewell's forces would have assailed the heights, the Federal position was too well defended, in too great of strength for Ewell to have succeeded.

Stonewall Jackson looms over July 1 at Gettysburg because his career as Ewell’s predecessor shapes the way people have looked at the latter general’s performance. Jackson earned a reputation for aggressiveness and independence; if ordered to do something, Jackson did it. It’s a small leap, then, to assume that he’d have found it practicable to take Cemetery Hill. “Oh, for the presence and inspiration of Old Jack for just one hour!” lamented Jackson’s former chief of staff, Major Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton, who went on to serve under Ewell.
There are two major flaws behind that assumption, however. “It is a fact not generally known…that in all his famous flank movements Gen. Jackson was careful to examine the ground to learn the exact position of the enemy,” wrote Southern war correspondent Peter Wellington Alexander for the Charleston Mercury, “and hence his blows were always well aimed and terrible in effect.”
Jackson had learned a hard lesson at Kernstown in March 1862, when faulty intelligence about the enemy’s position led to his only battlefield defeat. Thereafter he made an effort to discern his opponent’s dispositions. In fact, it was in the midst of one such attempt at gathering information that Jackson was accidentally shot by his own men at Chancellorsville. To assume he would have stormed Cemetery Hill without any idea of what lay beyond it places too much emphasis on Jackson’s aggressiveness at the expense of his good sense as a tactician.
The second problem that underpins assumptions about Jackson lies in the wording of Lee’s orders. Over the years, much attention has been given to Lee’s particular wording: “General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable….” Ewell, however, had plenty of legitimate reasons to think an assault on Cemetery Hill wasn’t practicable.
It’s important to note that those words—“if practicable”—never appeared in print until Lee filed his revised report of the battle in January 1864, more than six months after the fight. In fact, Ewell biographer Donald Pfanz carefully avoids offering any direct quotes from Lee concerning his specific orders because no written record seems to exist.
Certainly, though, the intent behind Lee’s orders on the afternoon of July 1, 1863, seems unmistakable. He urged Ewell to attack if his corps commander thought it advantageous to do so. But Lee also placed a very important qualification on his order—best understood by looking at the complete passage from Lee’s 1864 report: “Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were to hasten forward.” Unfortunately, in the years since the battle, much emphasis has been placed on the phrase “if practicable”—words that Lee may have never uttered—and the warning about avoiding a general engagement has been ignored.
Major General Isaac Trimble, attached on special duty to Ewell’s command during the battle, was among those who tried to dismiss Lee’s warning. Writing for the Southern Historical Society (SHS) years after both Lee and Ewell had died, Trimble recalled his attempt to persuade Ewell to attack. As Trimble recalled, Ewell called attention to Lee’s order not to bring on a general engagement. “[T]hat hardly applies to things,” Trimble responded, “as we have fought a hard battle already, and should secure the advantage gained.”
In Trimble’s version, he urged Ewell to take not Cemetery Hill, where the Union army was trying to re-form, but Culp’s Hill. “General, there is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied, as it ought to be by us or the enemy soon. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here,” Trimble said, ad­ding, “it ought to be held by us at once.” Ewell replied, “When I need advice from a junior officer, I generally ask it.”
Trimble never forgot the insult. Recounting his experience in the SHS papers, Trimble made an effort to paint Ewell as being “far from composure” and “under much embarrassment” and said Ewell “moved about uneasily, a good deal excited” and “undecided what to do next.”
“[F]ailure to follow up vigorously on our success…was the first fatal error committed,” Trimble wrote. “It seemed to me that General Ewell was in a position to do so. But he evidently did not feel that he should take so responsible a step without orders from General Lee….”
Nowhere in Michael Shaara’s novel The Killer Angels (or the related film Gettysburg), which covers Trimble’s encounter with Ewell, does Ewell get to tell his side of the story, so modern audiences typically accept Trimble’s version as truth. What really happened on the northern end of the battlefield late on the afternoon of July 1?
Ewell’s Second Corps arrived just north of Gettysburg by three different routes, allowing them to avoid the bottlenecks that tied up the Third and First corps, coming into town from the west along the Chambersburg Pike. As a result, his divisions entered the fray in a sequence that put increasing pressure on the beleaguered XI Corps, trying to hold the Union right.
Major General Robert Rodes’ five brigades had arrived first, around noon. At 2:30, just as it seemed Rodes’ men had taken all the abuse they could, Early’s Division appeared about three-quarters of a mile to their left, moving south down the Harrisburg Road. Early led his attack with Gordon’s Brigade, followed by the brigades of Brig. Gen. Harry Hays and Colonel Isaac Avery. Early’s fourth brigade, led by Brig. Gen. William “Extra Billy” Smith, deployed to the east to cover the division’s flank—which also served as the army’s left flank. In particular, Early ordered Smith to keep an eye on the York Road, in case any Union cavalry appeared there.
By 3:30 the Federal position crumbled. “Away went guns and knapsack, and they fled for dear life,” observed one Union surgeon. The retreat of the XI Corps might have been Chancellorsville all over again—a comparison that has served Ewell’s critics well because it underscores Jackson’s success and, by comparison, Ewell’s shortcomings.
How easy it might have been, critics argue, for Ewell to sweep up the Federals in their confusion. Indeed, Gordon’s Brigade captured 1,800 prisoners—impressive considering Gordon went into battle with only 1,813 men of his own. “The whole of that portion of the Union army in my front was in inextricable confusion and in flight,” Gordon later wrote.
As disorganized as the retreating XI Corps might have been, Ewell’s men were every bit as disorganized. Rodes had lost some 2,500 men since first appearing on the field that morning. Early’s Division, in better shape, had sustained fewer than 500 casualties, but Old Jube’s men still remained scattered throughout town.
Ewell’s third division, that of Maj. Gen. Edward “Allegheny” Johnson, still had an hour’s march ahead before it could even reach the battlefield. Johnson, approaching the battlefield via a route farther west than the rest of the Second Corps in order to protect the corps’ wagon train, found himself snarled in the same traffic jam along the Chambersburg Pike that had tied up the First and Third corps.
The Federals weren’t as disorganized as latter-day critics would have people believe, either. Only four brigades from the XI Corps had engaged in the fighting thus far; some 1,600 of them had remained behind on Cemetery Hill to fortify the position as a fallback line for the army. They would eventually have 43 cannons to support them.
“A position more favorable to [General Meade] and more unfavorable to Gen. Lee (should the latter make the assault,) could hardly have been selected,” wrote Peter Alexander in a dispatch on July 4. “The strength of this position cannot hardly be exaggerated,” he added in a July 7 dispatch.
As the Federals fell back to that strong position, they had strong leadership. “Directing the placing of troops where we turned up was Hancock, whose imperious and defiant bearing heartened us all,” said an officer from the 16th Maine. The remnants of the I and XI corps also had plenty of fresh reinforcements: the 1,600 fresh troops of Colonel Orland Smith’s brigade, plus elements of the XII Corps—some 9,000 men and four batteries strong. Just to the southwest, Maj. Gen. Dan Sickles was bringing the lead elements of his III Corps onto the battlefield, too.
Ewell didn’t know the particulars, but he certainly didn’t like what he could see. “It was now within an hour & a half of dark,” wrote Ewell’s chief-of-staff, his stepson, Campbell Brown. “[T]he enemy’s force on the hill already showed a larger front than the combined lines of our two Divisions—they were a mile & a quarter away.”
Around 5 p.m., Ewell had ridden into the center of Gettysburg, accompanied by his staff. On the way in, he had run into Gordon, who urged Ewell to press the attack forward to Cemetery Hill. In town he received similar advice from Hays. He also received orders from Lee, courtesy of Captain James Power Smith and then, moments later, from Major Walter Taylor.
After the war, in a letter to Brown, Smith said Lee’s orders had been for Ewell to attack if he “could do so to advantage.” Taylor’s postwar writings say that “from the position which he occupied, [Lee] could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization and in great confusion, that it was only necessary to press ‘those people’ in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if possible, [Lee] wished [Ewell] to do this.” Ewell left Taylor with “the impression upon my mind that it would be executed,” and did not express any objections. Ewell sent for Early and Rodes and began to size up the situation.
“It was a moment of most critical importance, more critical to us now, than it would seem to any one then,” Smith later wrote. “Our corps commander, General Ewell, as true a Confederate soldier as ever went into battle, was simply waiting for orders, when every moment of the time could not be balanced with gold.”
Ewell determined he could make the attack, but he wanted support from Hill’s Third Corps. He sent Smith back to Lee with his request, then he ordered Early and Rodes to get into position.
It did not take long for Smith to return with word from Lee that Hill had no men to lend in support of the attack. Hill’s Third Corps had suffered heavy casualties in its victory over the Federal I Corps. He chose to rest his weary men rather than continue to press them—and he left his third division, under Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson, out of the fight entirely. Ewell was to carry Cemetery Hill alone, if possible—but Lee also reiterated his earlier admonition not to bring on a general engagement if at all possible.
Ewell, it seems, was stuck.
Then came another wrinkle. “p came ‘Freddy’ Smith, son of ‘Extra Billy,’ to say that a heavy force was reported moving up in their rear,” Campbell Brown recalled. “Extra Billy” was governor-elect of Virginia, and even the irascible Early showed him deference.
According to Brown, “Early said to Gen’l Ewell: ‘Gen’l, I don’t much believe in this, but prefer to suspend my move­ments until I can send & inquire into it.’ ‘Well,’ said Genl Ewell, ‘Do so. Meantime I shall get Rodes into position & communicate with Hill.’” Early responded by sending Gordon’s Brigade to join Smith’s along the York Road.
Ewell and his officers rode to the top of Benner’s Hill to look for themselves. They saw a line of skirmishers they first mistook for Federals who, as it turned out, were men sent out earlier by Smith. The coast was clear, it seemed. Early said Smith had filed “an unfounded report.”
Unknown to them, though, Brig. Gen. Alpheus Wil­liams of the Federal XII Corps saw the mounted Confederate officers on the hilltop, “evidently reconnoitering.” Seeing no signs of artillery or a large force, Williams reported, “I accordingly directed General Ruger to deploy his brigade, under cover of the woods, and charge the hill, supported by the 1st Brigade under Col. McDougall. I had with me two batteries of artillery, which were put in the road, and directed to follow the assault, come into battery on the rest of the hill, and open on the enemy’s masses.”
The Federals followed a Revolutionary War–era trail through the woods to the pike. “[T]he corps was moved to the right across country east of Rock Creek, until it faced a slope toward Benner’s Hill, where the line was halted and deployed with skirmishers in front,” wrote the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry’s colonel. “The country here was open, and mounted officers of the enemy could be seen on the high ground apparently examining the position.”
Ruger’s brigade was actually ascending the slope of the hill, Williams said, when he received orders to withdraw the division toward the Baltimore Pike and take position for the night. This, he said, was between 5:30 and 6 p.m.
Early always insisted that Smith had been seeing things along the York Pike—although with no Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter for them, no one knew for sure. To be safe,
Early kept Gordon and Smith along the York Pike all night, tying up valuable men from making any assault on Cemetery Hill. But it seems likely that Smith did see something—elements of the XII Corps coming onto the field at precisely the right moment to serve as a much-needed distraction. “The appearance of the division in this position at the time it occurred,” Ruger said in his official report, “was apparently a timely diversion in favor of our forces, as the farther advance of the enemy ceased.”
During his reconnaissance, Ewell discovered that Culp’s Hill sat unoccupied a quarter of a mile to the southeast of Cemetery Hill. If his men could occupy Culp’s Hill, the Union position on Cemetery Hill would be untenable.
Ewell suggested to Early that his men occupy Culp’s Hill. Early balked, telling Ewell that Johnson’s men should occupy it instead once they arrived. Johnson, who had arrived on the scene ahead of his men, traded sharp words with Early, but Ewell took Early’s side.
By the time Johnson’s men arrived, Federals had already occupied the hill. A 30-man squad from the 42nd Virgin­ia, sent by Johnson to reconnoiter, wound up as Union prisoners. The chance to take the ground without a fight slipped away. Over the next two days, assaults on Culp’s Hill would lead to some 2,500 Confederate casualties during the longest-sustained combat on the battlefield.
Obviously, Early had a vested interest in blaming Ewell for the lack of action on the afternoon and evening of July 1. Ewell had supported Early’s decision not to move to Culp’s Hill, and that decision had catastrophic consequences for the Army of Northern Virginia.
After the war, Early contended that he had vigorously supported an assault on Cemetery Hill, yet on the evening of the battle he claimed his men were too tired and disorganized to occupy unoccupied Culp’s Hill. If his men were in no condition to move unopposed to an empty hilltop, how could they have led an attack against a heavily fortified enemy position? “The discovery that this lost us the battle,” Campbell Brown said, “is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten—at least I heard nothing of it for months & months, & it was several years before any claim was put in by Early or his friends that his advice had been in favor of an attack & had been neglected.”

Longstreet, who had always played second fiddle in the southern press and in the minds of the southern people to Lee and Jackson, made comments to a Scottish author, William Swinton, researching the war for a book on the Army of the Potomac, that the defeat at Gettysburg was Lee's fault for not adopting Longstreet's overall strategy, which did not include an invasion of the north, and once the a different strategy was adopted for ignoring Longstreet's counsel once combat was joined. This started the whole post war controversy. The vast majority of the surviving commanders from Lee's Army responded by attacking Longstreet in speeches and in print for his false and self-serving statements. Most of the officers let the matter drop once they had responded to set the record straight. However, the most vocal and aggressive of those that responded was Jubal Early and he refused to let the issue drop. He pretty much made it his personal mission in life to destroy Longstreet's reputation in retaliation. Several of Longstreet's close associates attempted to come to his defense and Ewell's actions on the first day came into question, basically in an attempt to shift the blame from Longstreet. Early, who actually, probably had a better record as a general during the war than Longstreet, had made some questionable decisions at Gettysburg on the first day and was just as happy to allow the suggestion that Ewell had failed Lee at Gettysburg to go unanswered. Longstreet made attempts to salvage his reputation by making even more claims in written responses published in northern papers and publications. Even Longstreets's closest friends were embarrassed by some of the claims he made in response and Jubal Early seized upon them and savaged Longstreet. The whole affair was unseemly and Longstreet's truly valuable contributions to the southern cause were lost in process. He was not as good a general as he tried to portray himself as being, but he was a good, solid commander and a valuable subordinate to Lee during most of his battles.

 

Longstreet also felt that he deserved the job as commanding general over the Army of Tennessee instead of John Bell Hood. When Longstreet's corps was attached to the AoT, he was embroiled with the other corps commanders as they lobbied to have Braxton Bragg removed. As mentioned earlier, Longstreet's experience in independent command was not extremely successful, as exemplified in the Knoxville Campaign. I believe that he could've done a better job than Hood did. Hood wrecked the Army of Tennessee in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign. He was not given another assignment and retired in January 1865.

 

Despite all the post-war arguing and blame shifting, the failure to occupy Culp's Hill is monumental. Look at the map. Taking that hill would have unhinged the entire union position.

 

3 year old story I know.
http://london.usembassy.gov/gb125.html
But I didnt know this.

more pics here.
http://london.usembassy.gov/galleries/gallery5.html

 

Still a good story, especially since it is probably unknown to most readers over here.

 

Just seen this posted by Clive on ww2t.


The women who fought as men: Rare American Civil War pictures show how females disguised themselves so they could go into battle


http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2285841/The-women-fought-men-Rare-Civil-War-pictures-female-soldiers-dressed-males-fight.html

 

I've read these reports before in the past, but thanks for posting them here so others can read up on the subject.