ULTRA and the myth of the German "National Redoubt."

ULTRA and the myth of the German "National Redoubt."

This study investigates the creation of a mythical fortifications system called the German "National Redoubt" and the use of ULTRA to confirm its existence. The work includes a brief background of the Redoubt and examines how the state of intelligence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force helped turn enemy propaganda into "reality." The study addresses the influence of ULTRA intelligence at Supreme Headquarters during the final phase of the war in Europe. This study investigates whether SHAEF used ULTRA to confirm or deny intelligence gathered through conventional means. This thesis concludes that General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters selectively used ULTRA during March and April 1945 to support strong preconceptions that an Alpine stronghold existed. SHAEF's failure to integrate ULTRA with other forms of intelligence was instrumental in building the myth of the Redoubt, rather than to show that no such defensive fortifications system existed. With a better understanding of how Supreme Headquarters built this myth, perhaps future commanders will understand the importance of integrating intelligence obtained from all sources.

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Eisenhowers staff got burned more than once thru overdependance on ULTRA. The Axis offensive that led to the Kasserine Pass battle was a suprise as most of the German orders preparing for the attack were delivered by courier rather than radio. The head of Ikes intel. staff was not paying much attention to air or ground reconissance.

The suprise of the Ardennes offensive was also due much to the similar use of courier delivered orders vs radio messages.