US torpedo failures and Japanese ASW policy

From what I remember, the Japanese could use the unrefined crude as bunker fuel, but the high sulpher content had a very detrimental effect on the ships' boiler tubes. They would need a thorough cleaning or possible replacement after only a few hours of heavy steaming.

 

It also produced more smoke from what I've read allowing sightings at longer ranges. There was also some loss of efficiency in the engines I think. Not sure whether that was due to energy content or the fouling mentioned above or both.

 

One curious thing about the Matsus, although they incorporated a dual-purpose main armament, they omitted the Type 94 gunfire control system which had been used in the previous several classes. They had a simpler Type 3 system, probably a production decision, but it compromised the chance to produce a really good AA ship.

<note, Type #s denote years in the Japanese calender like 2594 (our 1934) or 2603 (1943)>

The Matsu's speed and gun and torpedo were well in excess of the needs of an ASW escort.

One more reason for the relatively low impact of US submarines in 1942 was our methods of employment. According to Clay Blair, only about 54 of 350 patrols went to Far Eastern waters to prosecute the war against Japanese shipping (they accounted for almost half the year's sinkings). We too used subs in support of fleet operations - we had more of them at Midway than the IJN for example - to try to oppose the Japanese onslaught in the first months of the war, and for a wide variety of special missions. Even Ultra was something of a mixed blessing; our boats spent a lot of time shuffling around at headquarters' direction, usually trying to intercept high-speed, well-escorted capital ships.

 

The Matsu class was never meant to be "really good" in anything, they were meant to be "good enough" in everything - including the ability to be produced quickly and in quantity.

 

Mhhhh... of course this thought has some merrit..

1. There were generally not much allied subs (and of those older types) before the building program started in earnest. The failure of torps made this problem worse...
2. The Japanese expected like the Germans a quick victory after the masses of succes they had (warners were ignored) and maybe they seemed to think that ASW isn´t that important because of this...
3. The IJN hardly had any building capacity left to build masses of escorts. Well if they had not build the 2 Jamatos then they could have build more usefull vessels (same with the Bismarks)

 

The older subs didn't have the torpedo problem from what I recall reading. They like some of the older DD's used the previous generation of torpedoes that actually worked.

Switching over production form the Yamatos to escorts wouldn't have helped much in 42. Yamato was already in service and working up and Musahi wasn't far behind. Shinano on the other hand was still under constrution but that was halted in early June of 42 in any case so I'm not sure how much halting said construction a month or two earlier would help.

 

LWD right, the older torps were I believe MK10 ? I forgot my WITP-AE sessions where this was portrayed accuratly. Means the "newer" torps (MK14?) would fail often while the older ones worked. This is also a good case to use the Britiish and Dutch subs to maximum effect in 41. As they did not have the torp problem too. Most of these subs were quite slow however, but against merchant shipping still effective.

 

The US had some 112 submarines in commission with many more building. The building program you speak of had already begun building in earnest. That being said, 26 of these submarines(the older O-Class, R-Class, and the S-1(SS-77)) had been brought out of retirement in 1940-41, to begin training new crews that were to man the new construction submarines, and to also act as additional patrol boats in the Atlantic where the war was heating up. These submarines never left the Atlantic, and would continue to train new crews throughout the war.

I would also add that the older S-Boats did not use the new Mark 14 torpedo, but used the older Mark 10 torpedo that did not have all the problems associated with the Mark 14.

The Japanese expected a quick victory "before" the mass of success they had. Their entire war plan was based on this quick success, and although they did hit the occasional speed bump, it mostly went as planned...Except, of course, that the US & UK never did sue for peace as the Japanese had intended.

ASW was a defensive tactic, which did not appeal to the offensive-minded Japanese military. Thus, it was not looked upon favorably when new ship construction orders went out - which greatly favored the ships of a more offensive nature. Further solidifying this aspect, is that, prior to the war, Japanese submarine maneuvers showed that their merchant fleet was very vulnerable to submarine attack. Except that the Japanese did not take this "lesson" to heart. Instead, they saw their submarine as being quite good at offensive operations and ordered more submarines.

4 Yamatos...Shinano was well under construction, and construction of the unnamed Hull No. 111 had just begun.

Still, the Japanese had plenty of building capacity left, as is evidenced by the Japanese pre-war ship construction plans. However, since the Japanese saw little need for escorts, they built very few of them. So, It has nothing to do with shipbuilding capacity, but with the perceived, or lack thereof, concerning ASW escorts.

The Yamatos could have been useful had the Japanese fought the war as originally intended for the past several decades. But, Yamamoto mucked it up by attacking Pearl Harbor and decimating the American battleline.

Now, the Bismarcks were a total waste for Germany, as they were built only for their prestige value. With little or no thought given to how they would function operationally in a war.

 

Well if somehow the Germans had managed to get into a war with the French and the British remained neutral they might have been quite useful. Not sure that had much to do with why they were built though. The whole H plan(s) did seem to be based around havign a fleet the could at least challenge the RN. Of course they didn't build in much based on a UK reaction to their construction ...