USA major Battle losses to the Wehrmacht after Kasserine-

oH

MM YES -WELL...

Hmm

I would say Market Garden was a failure...The original troops were withdrawn. The battlefield was abandoned.

I would say that would be a 'standard'- was the battlefield abandoned and left to an intact opposing army.

That was a standard applied to Antietam and Gettysburg for instance in the US Civil War.

The seige's of Petersburg & Richmond, by Grant, right before Lee's surrender, lasted months. The union got more than one bloody nose before the final push into the confederate capital. Grant never disengaged. The earthworks, bunkers and trenches set the pattern for WWI. Similar to the Hurtgen some of the battle ground is heavily forrested.

I consider Grant a success and later he was elected Prisident, so I would consider that an endorsement of my opinion that his actions be considered a victory. .

 

But Market-Garden did eventually gain the Allies a large stretch of Dutch territory, mostly from the operations organized to widen the corridor after the failure. No bridges actually captured were given up. The only failure of Market-Garden was therefore the battle for Arnhem bridge. Still the entire operation was a failure - which proves my point, that just any gain made doesn't mean a succesful operation.

I consider a siege a single operation which either fails or succeeds completely.

 

Based on my previous excellent analogy of Petersburg, I consider the Hurtgen battle a complete success for the US Army. I cannot say the operational execution was perfect however, but Eisenhowers 'broad front' strategy was maintained.

The similairity and comparability to the battle in the Argonne forrest during WWI is another example of this time consuming and costly entrenched forrest warfare.

 

If one adopts that kind of absolutist..black or white view then the Normandy landings were a failure since they did not achieve the objectives that they set until days, weeks or months later.
The inevitability Roel refers to in regard to the Allies is more true than he realizes I suspect. In a war of attrition the side that cannot replace it's losses always loses, if the other side is resolute and doesn't falter.

Hurtgen forest was a battle that didn't have to be fought..a battle that a wiser commander would have avoided, it is true. It was not a defeat when one uses a battle like the Kasserine Pass as a standard for defining defeat.
Units overrun..thousands of prisoners, entire units falling back in disarray..now that is a defeat (on the scale of Dieppe)
Even taking into account Patton's counterattack (after he assumed command) and the lessons learned and the fact that such a debacle wasn't repeated, the battle was a disaster any way you look at it.
Of course there were other factors that were never present again. the American units that landed in N. Africa had been hastily thrown together since the US was so unprepared for war. Some units were nearly 75% civilians or at least they could only be called civilians since they had been inducted with no basic training, handed a rifle and a uniform and had to learn to fight on the job, as it were.
Once the US geared up and began turning out properly trained men the situation was different.

 

I'm completely aware of the fact that as soon as the Normandy landing areas were secure the Germans could no longer win the war in NW Europe, and the fact that the landing areas were secured are proof of the fact that Germany could no longer win the war in general. However, if we take this basic fact to apply everywhere then there is no way to judge the Allied armies involved by any objective standards since we're forced to consider everything they do as a success "in the long run". This I seek to avoid and therefore I am adopting what you call a "black and white" view though it is really only a way to set a standard of what is a defeat, and what is a victory.

How can you ever judge an army properly by the individual actions in which it fought, if all you look for is a way to call their operation a success? This is the point I'm really trying to make. Because the terrain was impossible and because the Germans had fortifications and the weather on their side, the battle for the Hürtgenwald was a tactical mistake, and the Americans consequently failed to take their objectives in the battle itself - only after this operation had been concluded and actions elsewhere had provided the leverage, could the forest be taken. The toll in men was enormous, the gains in terms of ground was negligible. It is like calling the Somme offensive of 1916 a success.

 

In my opinion the Germans had better equipment and tactics but they were always outnumbered and they had a chronic supply problem and the Fuhrer and his chronies didn't help either.

 

No, more like calling the Argonne in 1918 a success, or Grants seige of Petersburg a success. Both were the final press on the enemies fortifications before thier final caving in and capitulation.

Except the sige of Petersburg lasted fron June until April and the Hurtgen was accomplished in a much, much shorter time frame.

Other actions elsewhere in the threater took place during this period also. Sheridan and Custer came up from the Shenandoah to assist in the spring offensive after the final Valley Campaign.

Actually, The battle lasted 1/2 the time that the Petersburg campaign did, but twice as long as the Argonne forrest battle.


So in war, one side wins and one side losses..


Please be so kind to explain to me how the Germans won this battle

I am anxious to hear your answer, so that I can foward it to the 82nd Airborn Divisions historian.

http://www.bragg.army.mil/www-82DV/History.htm

I am sure the boys would be interested in hearing how they lost that one and maybe we can get a few of the vets to come here and listen to some more fairy tales.

http://fayettevilleonline.com/airborne82dassn/









http://members.aol.com/siege1864/

 

General Gavins (82nd) summary of the Battle..

http://home.scarlet.be/~cv920172/indexenglish.htm

StoriesII/Gavin

 

If we are talking about battles of attrition, the battle over Italy from October 1943-45 is a good one. It may not have been a major defeat for the Allies, but they did not achieve their main goal of clearing every German outo f Italy. I do not like the "black and white" perspective on war, but for the number of men lost in this long and grueling campaign, it is worth listing.

I am not so familiar with the Battle for Hurtgenwald, so can anyone explain to me what objectives the US was trying to accomplish here?

 

Roel wrote:

A necessary condition for any meaningful debate. One must first define the terms used.

This still gets down to semantics really. I'm not saying that the battle was a success I'm merely saying that it wasn't a defeat. It was a stalemate if anything. The lines remained where they were for months and it wasn't until Feb. '45 until the main objective was taken and held.
I say held because the town and Hill 400 were taken by US forces..they were retaken by the Germans..then ultimately taken and held by US forces.

One way of defining terms is to use examples. I pointed out Kassarine Pass and Dieppe as examples of defeats..then contrasted Hurtgen Forest as an example that did not meet that high a standard.
To say that a battle was a mistake or a tactical error or even a stalemate does not mean that the battle was a defeat. A defeat requires that there also be a victorious side. Would you call the Hurtgen Forest battle a victory for the Germans? They took about 28,000 casualties (to 24,00 US casualties) that they could not afford to replace. They compounded the US errror which was to make a major effort to take a basically useless objective by making an all out , costly effort to hold on to a basically useless objective...and again..they could not afford the losses..so where is the victory?

 

There was no German Victory, the 82nd rolled on through to the Rhine. After that the Germans surrendered, like Grant took Richmond...

Except this was accomplished in the Hurtgenwald in about half the time it took Grant to break though. Hurtgen was completed in a much shorter time frame.

Petersburg, Va. is much warmer than western Germany, so Grant was able to start his spring offensive sooner in the new year, he built up his supplies at City Point for a few months, like the US Army did after September 44, and then made his final push with his best divisions.

Stalin also waited until after the beginning of 1945 to begin his final offensive also. The 82nd advanced as Stalin made his move. Genral Winter has slowed many an advance until spring.

Maybe he can explain the German 'victory', I just don't get it, how long did it take for Troy to fall?

 

This has been really interesting to follow. Several times at the start I wanted to chime in that the Hurtgen was indeed a defeat, but I'm now in the "unecessary and possible stalemate, but not a defeat" camp.

 

operation Schmitd

The failure of Operation Schmidt can be attributed to a combination of many things. Among them were:
1. Our failure to isolate, the battlefield by air and artillery.
2. The adverse weather conditions.
3. The difficult, inadequate, and unprotected main supply route.
4. Our failure to get sufficient armored support across the Kall River.
5. The circumstances which placed elements of the German 89th Division near Harscheidt at the time the 112th Infantry took Schmidt.
6. Our failure to include plans for taking the Brandenberg-Bergstein Ridge. This would have necessitate the use of another division.
7. The importance the Germans attached to the Roer River dam area and which caused their violent reaction when the area was threatened.
There were other reasons, no doubt, but these were considered the most important.



A number of reasons have been pointed out to show why Operation Schmidt was a failure. The analysis of the operation against the nine United States Army Principles of War shows that only two of the principles were properly and fully applied. The fundamental military principle of the objective was violated and with that as a starting point, the troubles of the division multiplied. The selection and assignment of the proper objective is the first and most vital step in the application of the principles of war. Improper objectives assigned to the division led to the dissipation of the ability of the division to achieve maximum practicable military superiority at the decisive place and time. It was this lack of superiority or mass which was the overriding consideration in the failure of the 28th Division's attack.

In analyzing this operation, it is admitted that hindsight is better than foresight. Following the Normandy landings, there had been many successful operations which bad begun as gambles. Schmidt was a gamble that failed, and it provides the reader of military history with an excellent example of the need for applying all of the principles of war all of the time to the maximum practicable extent. Failure to use them decisively and correctly can be fatal to success.



This operation failed, the town was taken 2 months later...

http://home.scarlet.be/~cv920172/indexenglish.htm

Overview- history

 

And again we moved on, this time to Nideggen, and took up positions there. The river Rur (not to be mistaken for the Ruhr) flows through the ranges in a south/north direction. The west side of the river was occupied by the Americans, and the east by us. Sometimes we could see the Americans tobogganing down the hills, we were that close!


The Roer river and Castle Nideggen
Toward January 1945 the fighting intensified dramatically but the overpowering might of the U.S. Army proved extremely difficult to combat. Ammunition became rather scarce, and food wasn't too plentiful either. The morale of the German army sank at an alarming rate and yet the fighting continued unabated.

By mid-February we were digging once more. We had established a bridgehead and prepared our future positions. This involved moving across the river by night over the bridge at Zerkall. We worked overnight and returned to our position before daylight. Once, on returning, we suddenly came under mortar fire. We ran for cover toward a house, but before we reached it a mortar grenade hit the corner of the house at the spouting, sending shrapnel flying about. Of a group of seven or eight, one soldier received a wound to his thigh, another a rather large wound to buttocks and yet another shrapnel into the back and probably into the lung. K., who I mentioned before, was behind me and got killed. As for myself, I did not receive even a scratch! Because the ground was frozen rock hard, we could not bury K., so snow was piled up to cover him, and a rough wooden cross erected.

On February 28 the Americans were about to break through at Abenden, a short distance from Nideggen, and part of it, so the bridge across the river was blown up to make it more difficult for them to advance. During an artillery barrage we all went for cover in the nearby houses. One of the comrades and I sheltered in the basement of a house and found ourselves trapped as the entrance to the basement was blocked with rubble. After some hours we heard voices and these sounded quite unfamiliar. They were in fact Americans. After making a lot of noise they got us out, and we found ourselves in front of a dozen or more rifles pointed at us. Soon we were separated, no doubt because they feared that we would try to escape. To be frank, no such idea had struck me, rather I was glad that the war, for me, had come to an end.

Soon they took me behind the front lines to their kitchen, some fifteen to twenty kilometers away. I was rather scared when I was told to move downstairs into the basement, but was tossed a blanket and motioned to sleep. Sleep of course didn't come, and early next morning I was told to come up into the kitchen where I was given breakfast, the first decent meal for many weeks. I can only remember that amongst the other food there was a sort of hot porridge and real brewed coffee, probably the first real cuppa for years! Then there was chocolate and cigarettes. Conversation took place by means of sign language, but it worked.

On we went to the command post where I was motioned towards a pot belly stove to warm myself. One of the G.I.s tossed me an orange and I imagined that all my Christmases had come at once!


Stories/Horst

 

http://vl.herr.home.att.net/GerdHorner.htm

We had planned to defend our location until all of our wounded were transported back to our main lines. When I went carefully from the house to the shed and to the stable, I suddenly saw that an American soldier was standing right in front of me, pointing his rifle at me from the hip. -- I had my pistol in my left hand. -- There was less than a yard distance between us. .....

We didn't shoot ; ..... I don't know why; -- We both saluted. The distance between us was probably too close, ... or maybe it had something to do with humanity ? We both turned around and walked back.

I warned NCO Malkowski; "Maco, the Americans are inside the building !!!" I then jumped out of the window, onto the road and then dove into the cellar on the opposite side. Because of the cupboard in the middle of the room, the Americans never saw me. At the entrance of this cellar I saw our Company-Troop-leader Göbbels. -- He jumped out of the main entrance and was immediately hit by rounds from an American machine-pistol that was firing from the window. The machine gunner had probably been waiting for me.

Then I went back to our quarters where Lt. Helmers gave me the order, "Hörner, you cover the retreat of your comrades." I was lying on the ground with my MG-42 at the entrance of the house and feeling quite uncomfortable because now I really was the last man there and now there was no one between me and the enemy. Suddenly I saw our wounded comrades walking with raised hands behind the hedge on the opposite side of the tree-garden. I realized that they were being taken prisoner as they were preceding in a southerly direction toward the Tiefencreek-Valley. I yelled, "Willi, take care of yourself !!!" He was holding his hands on the bandages around his head and waved at me. Then I heard a voice behind me, "Hörner, now you come over here as well."

I wanted to jump up and grab my MG, but there was NCO Malkowski standing right beside me and he carried the MG for me. ... A truly great guy !!!!! We retreated to the last houses of Kesternich, in front of the big minefield. We left our foxholes in the early morning of February 4th, it was thawing and we could recognize the mines in the snow. We crossed the dam at Rurberg and took position on the slope of the hill.

Then it finally happened. It was there where I was hit by two pieces of shrapnel from the US 78th ID's Artillery; -- it was 13.00 hour, February 5th 1945. The war wasn't completely over for me yet; -- there still was POW-camp until July 1945.





As it was -- Gerd Horner

 

Hans Falkenstein

Each time when the German shells started falling, the Americans went into full cover and their firing stopped for a moment. The medic took advantage of one of these intervals and tried to make it over the wall. He was hit by a shell-splinter however, but managed to make it. A little later the German fire ceased. Obviously they had given us up for dead since we were long overdue. Then the Americans stopped firing as well. The Americans were now calling out to us in German urging us to surrender since they thought we didn't have a chance to make it out of there. They repeated the call many times but none of us considered giving up. When a mixture of rain and snow started to fall, we figured as soon as it got dark we could make it out of there. We still had a way out to the south. We would have to run through a small orchard and then downhill through a meadow to reach our foxholes, some half a mile away.


After the Americans waited for some minutes for our surrender and when none came, they reopened with their heavy fire. This produced a response from the German artillery as well. The Americans were now using mortars and the hits were coming closer and closer. Horst get fed up and shouted at our sergeant, "I don't want to die here." In spite of all of his experience on the front line, the sergeant didn’t know what to do. He finally agreed that Horst and I should try to run back to our front line and ask for relief.

We planned to cross the meadow by running for short distances during the few seconds when German shells were hitting and the GI's went for cover. We took off our overcoats and put everything aside that could possible slow us down with the exception of our steel helmets. We started crawling out from behind the wall and used what remained of the apple trees in the orchard for cover. After some 20 yards, Horst looked back and noticed about twenty GI's with their rifles in firing position moving in toward the hiding place of our comrades. Horst yelled, "Sergeant Shoot!" But it was too late and useless. With Horst's shouting, the Americans now knew where we were as well and within seconds we were looking into their rifle barrels. We got up with arms raised.


Maybe it was more from embarrassment or humiliation that, in looking up at a grim-faced GI, I exclaimed, "The war is over!!" For that remark, he gave me a slap in the face and tore off the anti-aircraft medal that I had on my jacket. But with German shells still coming in around us, the GI's were in a hurry and made us run as we headed toward the nearby church. As we ran, we passed three of our comrades lying dead on the road. When we saw that there were some 40 to 50 GI's in the damaged buildings alongside the road, we realized that we never had a chance but we couldn't complain about our luck. Arriving at the church we were led into the vestry, which showed little damage. We were checked for weapons and any sharp objects and then questioned. "Where is your unit positioned, where are your tanks and artillery?" Our answers were correct but had little significance, "We came from the edge of the forest (which was all around) and we have no knowledge as to where our artillery is positioned." Our wounded medic was allowed to treat his wounds. He had been hit by nine small shell splinters but was still able to walk.



http://vl.herr.home.att.net/HansStory.htm

 

Stonewall, I'm not really sure how the chunks above are relevant to the discussion?

But anyway...

Nobody claims the Germans won, however they managed to shatter several enemy divisions as they tried to headbutt their way through possibly the most defensible terrain they could find.

German losses were of 'fortification troops' - old or disabled (from wounds) who were of limited value outside of the West Wall.
American losses were of front-line formations.

 

I thought a few stories of the German collapse, retreat and defeat would underline my point..


The US Army figures over 50% of German casualties overall in WWII were from U.S. "arty". I am talking about those Germans opposed by US forces. I heard this from two senior former Pentagon staffers who were also WWII artillery officers. (no link)

The 116th Panzer drove the US out of Schmidt.

http://members.aol.com/soldaten/history.html

I wonder if the German 88' s in the Hurtgen were 'the old & injured garrison' 88's?

 

Ricky wrote:

Exactly my point. No winner = stalemate...not defeat

I don't think that is a true statement. In addition to the Volksgrenadier division there were regular Army divisions such as the 89th, 275th, 344th, 353rd infantry divisions..there was the 116th Panzer division and the 3rd Fallshirmjager division as well.

 

Stonewall, two things in your argumentation don't seem to make sense. One, your comparison of the Hürtgenwald operations to certain campaigns of the ACW; as you point out yourself, conditions were very different, and back then warfare still hugely favoured the defender. And two, your points about the 82nd Airborne division, since this division did not take part in the battle for the Hürtgenwald in the autumn of 1944. Instead it took part in operation Market-Garden, which as I pointed out was a victory for everyone except the British 1st Airborne but was therefore a defeat overall. After that the division was on leave and was only sent back into action at the start of the Ardennes offensive. In which it shone possibly even brighter than the 101st except that everyone ignores it.

I think stalemate is indeed the right term to put on the Hürtgenwald operations. The only points I could make in favour of my "defeat" position is that a stalemate is a defeat for the attacking party, and that the forces used could have had more effect if used elsewhere; these do not change the fact that neither side accomplished anything in the battle. In that I can agree with you, Grieg.

I'm not sure about the deployment of 3rd FJ div in the Hürtgenwald, as far as I know it was in strategic reserve for the Ardennes offensive since late september but I could be wrong. Then again 116th Pz div also participated in the Ardennes offensive yet this division was still active in late October. And 89th Division - wasn't that one Volksgrenadier already?