USA won World War Two and saved England ?

The aim of Cerberus was to take capital vessels from Western France harbours to North Cape where they could be used against Allied Arctic convoys. Not at Atlantic (otherwise they would be left in French habours) And Cerberus was only a propaganda coup because German capital ships hurriedly passed Channel which has not been done since 17th Century by French (Royal Navy superiorty was that strong since then ) BUT Germans did not get end Cerberus unscratched. Only undamaged capital vessel reached North Sea was heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were so badly damaged they hurriedly seeked refugee in Dutch/German coast where they were excellent targets for RAF. A few weeks later Cerberus Gneisensau was bombed by RAF and damaged so severely it became impossible to repair it and considered out of service for rest of war in Wilhelmshaven. Scharnhorsts repairs took drydock time until 1942 summer. And even Prinz Eugen was torpedoed and suffered heavy damage by British submarines off Norway in February 1942.

 

I think we have a bit of a rivalry between LJ and lwd. :eatpopcorn:

 

I don't know who was the wise guy who told this,but the facts were debunking him : at the end of 1941,and also later,Germany was simultaneously waging war with the 3 branches of the WM : they were fighting with the Army,with the LW, with the KM.

 

:lol:

 

The quote function is not that friendly for tired eyes.

 

No it debunks your claim that Oil was not a limiter to operations. Pilots received less training, and non-essential activities were curtailed, KM's ships were contained to port for lengthy periods, this affected combat readiness.

 

No :the pilot story is a classic one : after the war,the losers were blaming each other: everyone was blaming the LW,the front line units were blaming the training schools,saying they delivered less traind pilots,the training schools replying this was caused by fuel shortages (implying : this was the fault of the front line units who could not prevent the destuction of the synthetic plants by the Allies) : very classic .

The truth is : it was the "fault " of the allies who were killing more pilots than the training schools could deliver,result being that pilots were sent to the front before they were sufficiently trained. It was a question of quantity or quality,and the choice was : quantity .

In march 1944 ,the 1 Jagdkorps was losing 205 pilots,these could only be replaced if 13 months before,205 pilots had started their training: and,not enough pilots had started their training a year before,thus,the decision was to sent men to the front who were not ready .

Source : Hooton :Eagle in flames : P 269

 

U Boats were not contained to port for lengthy periods,and,why would it be bad that in wartime non-essential activities were curtailed .? And,why would it be bad that the combat readiness of the surface ships would be affected ? Were the surface ships still essential ?

 

If it takes 250 - 300 hours to train a pilot fully, and oil is no issue, you could compress the time in flight school by flying more frequently, and giving more practical experience. It is perfectly feasible to achieve 300 hours flight time in less than 6 months.

This never happened.

Why?

 

Training activities maintain readiness.

If you never train, your readiness declines.

Experimentation is curtailed.

Unable to experiment to the degree you would prefer, new methodologies and tools are less ready, and are used prematurely. Either spoiling the effect of surprise (allowing countermeasures to be developed & deployed), or failing.

Just to state the obvious.

 

The following is from the AHF:KM oil shortages


Fuel and diesel oil reserves of the KM (in 1000 of cubic metres)


october 1939:437/747

october 1940:321/328

october 1941:396/124

october 1942:174/62

october 1943:139/91

october 1944:359/57

before someone will talk of own-goal:

1)the 1944 reserves were higher than the 1942 reserves


2)raw figures do not indicate a shortage,because needs are depending on the missions:it is perfectly possible that the fuel situation of the KM was better in 1942 than in 1941,because there were less missions,less ships,less consumption in 1942.

One exemple : did the surface ships leave the atlantic ports for an operational mission after Rheinübung,and,if not,why ? Was it because there was not enough fuel? Or was it because there was no need for a sortie which would be suicidal?

 

Those 200-300 hours include basic training....

The shorter training, proves it was a matter of not just pilot attrition rates, but also a lack of fuel. Which you keep denying, in spite of evidence to the contrary.

 

The problems of pilote shortages started already before the fuel shortages,which started in 1944,and the shortages of trained pilots were caused by increasing losses and increasing needs .

Production of Avgas by the synthetic plants in tons (from Treibstoffversorgung der KM 1935 bis 1945,with as source : Germany and WWII Tome V/II P 439)

1939::218.800

1940:591.200

1941:970.000

1942:1.365.200

1943:1.867.600

1944:965.700


There was no shortage of fuel in 1943: the LW was capable to organize air-lifts to Stalingrad and to Tunis,but there was already a shortage of trained personnel .

 

From "Pilot training of the LW before 1942"

1) The training started at a recruit training depot (Fliegerersatzabteilung) : 6 months

2)This was followed by 2 months at a Fluganwarterkompanie

3)The A/B Schule (elementary flying school):START of flying aircraft,after the completion of the B2 training,the candidate had between 100/150 flying hours

4)C flying schools : 6 months :50/100 flying hours

5)Specialist schools

6) Operational training units

In the first year of the war in the east(june41:june 42)without fuel shortages,,the offensive casualties in aircrew on all theatres,were some 4400 men;these losses could not be met by the flying training organizations.

My conclusion : the pilote/aircrew shortages started already before the fuel shortages,and were thus not caused by the fuel shortages ,the fuel shortages only increased the problems,but ,this at a period when the dies were already were cast. It is also not so that with more fuel,the traning organizatins could deliver more traind pilots.aircrew.

 

Somehow, I don't think the airlifts to Stalingrad and Tunis count as "non-essential". They were probably about as far from non-Essential missions as the Luftwaffe got. In other words fuel would be found for those activities regardless.

It's not a matter of either/or.

There were a multitude of inefficiencies and shortages. There was a recognised shortage of fuel in Europe as a whole. Already in '39. Thereof the construction of synthetic plants. But it meant that fuel was always a limiting factor; it had to be husbanded, controlled, portioned out, and delivered correctly. It was always a concern.

Pilot attrition rates soared when Barbarossa occurred, I believe some 4,400 aircrew were KIA or MIA in the first 12 months.

If fuel was not a concern, the pilot training would not have increased the time spent glider flying, while reducing the overall time spent in the air, and in type.

Considering that the lessons from the Battle of Britain should've been learnt, that it was known in July '40 that planning for the invasion of Russia was afoot, and the prevailing theories in the west of "the bomber always gets through" that the demands upon the Luftwaffe would increase, it is amazing the amount of disharmony, disorganisation, lack of planning (or foresight), inability to listen to intelligent underlings, and sheer lunacy that Göring and the rest of the NSDAP inflicted upon the Air Arm.

Even assuming that the war with the Soviets would be over quickly, you still need to ramp up defences against what you know is coming (Western Airpower). Therefore, the blatant hand waving and wishful thinking created the problem, which need not have been so: a shortage of pilots. Post '41, crisis after crisis saw instructors and trainees both thrown into the frontline as "temporary" solutions, that were never temporary. This is exactly the opposite to what was needed to be done to rectify the situation. A leader with more strength of character than Mr Göring, would've seen to it, that the Aces rotated out, that the trainees get the time needed. Especially important once the new types of aircraft started appearing, that the effort to develop and produce them, not be wasted.

And why, o why would you put your best pilots in tactical bombers? In order for them to operate efficiently, you need air superiority, i.e. Fighter cover. Not even this basic fundamental fact did Göring, himself an ace from WWI, grasp. So once you only have air parity, the quality of your pilots is going South, and your losses increase.

No, I have a better idea. Let's take skilled, educated ground crew from the Luftwaffe, and put them in Infantry divisions, without sufficient Infantry training, give them leaders with little or no ground combat experience, and throw them into battle.

 

There's no shortage of potential pilots.

In order to transform 5000 people into moderately competent pilots, each requiring 250-300 hours flying time (grabbing a number mid war), that's 1,250,000 - 1,500,000 hours flying time. If we assume a two hour flight consumes ca 100 gallons of aviation fuel (we're being very generous), and we, to make things easy, allow 400 gallons per metric tonne (again, erring on the side of generosity), we're talking about somewhere between 125,000 to almost 200,000 tonnes of aviation fuel. Fully 1 third of all the aviation fuel produced in 1940 (so, no, not going to happen then...) Or fully 10% of all the aviation fuel produced at its very peak of production, according to your figures!!! This is with a very conservative calculation.

IMO, The scarcity of fuel entered into the calculations and decision making, leading to the way in which crises were responded to, which in turn exacerbated the problems.

 

I'm not so sure the Steelers knew how to skate well enough or had the stick play to even score a goal! But I would love to see that game.

 

Perhaps it should read: "How Canada, New Zealand and Australia sacrificed to save the UK?"

Just a few alternate ideas to add to the mix.

As a Canadian, let me refer you to this link about Great Britain and its Dominions and Commonwealth partners as ratified in 1926 and 1931.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Nations#Dominions

I also wish to point out that in the myriad discussions in this thread there are few if any references to the Canadian equivalent to Lend-lease.

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Canadian aid to the allied effort[SIZE=small][[/SIZE]edit]
Main article: Billion Dollar Gift and Mutual Aid
Britain's lend-lease arrangements with its dominions and colonies is one of the lesser known parts of World War II history.
Canada did not use a term like "lend lease" but it did give Britain gifts totaling $3.5 billion during the war, plus a zero-interest loan of $1 billion; Britain used the money to buy Canadian food and war supplies. Canada also loaned $1.2 billion on a long-term basis to Britain immediately after the war; these loans were fully repaid in late 2006.
The Gander Air Base (RCAF Station Gander) located at Gander International Airport built in 1936 in Newfoundland was leased by Britain to Canada for 99 years because of its urgent need for the movement of fighter and bomber aircraft to Britain. The lease became redundant when Newfoundland became Canada's tenth province in 1949.
Most American Lend-Lease aid comprised supplies purchased in the U.S., but Roosevelt allowed Lend-Lease to purchase supplies from Canada, for shipment to Britain, China and Russia.

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for full article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend-Lease#Canadian_aid_to_the_allied_effort

In all the scenarios I have read in this thread, the aid provided by the UK's allies is often glossed over as negligeable or at the peak of their resources, as though the US was the only alternative to the UK going it alone. I am not suggesting that Canada is the manufacturing juggernaut that the US is or that we have anywhere near the consumer base that they have south of the border. However, with a population of 11,654,000 in 1942 and a determination and commitment to the war effort, I find it almost offensive that Canada is often overlooked and underestimated.

I wonder if much of the lend-Lease aid provided to UK could not have been provided by Canada? Not all of it, of course, but... ?

With the eventual (and possibly inevitable) implementation of conscription in Canada (a measure that Priminister King avoided until well into 1942) Canada had just begun to dig into its manpower reserves, fielding an army that was a fraction of what it could have been. By 1944, could Canada have taken on a greater part of the burden of the war?

Has it occured to anyone that Lend-Lease was just a ploy used by Churchill and Roosevelt to draw America into WWII? Both wanted that as a political outcome. Not so much for the resources that the US could bring to the table, but also for the long term alliance it would provide. The alternative for the us was an alliance of sorts with one or more fascist countries (a morally repugnant choice for one of the world's demoocracies) or neutrality that would lead to further isolation.

I am reading Whitaker's "Dieppe" and he describes the uneasy alliance between the two powers. While on the surface, they shared a mutual ideology there were some fundamental differences. At one point Whitaker describes the American political higher ups wanting nothing more than to see the British empire crumble before the end o the war. Churchill, on the other hand was very much a British iimperialist. He had no intention of letting Great Britain's colonial holdings escape the Lion's grasp. In light of this attitude, it would have been inconceivable for him to stop the war without saving North Africa and the Med as well as regaining holdings in Asia.

 

Don't forget INDIA too, largest volunteer army in the world.
Couldnt have fought the Burma campaign without Indians (and Africans)
Italian campaign would have been even harder without the 3 Indian Divisions .