USS Missouri vs Yamato

Longest range hit was scored on HMS Glorious by KM Scharnhorst (on a moving target) 26,465 yds or so...

The difference between Yamato and Iowa max range was more than 3 km (42,030 m vs 38,720 m) and shell weight was 200kg more for Yamato (altough Iowa had a much better shell) but it would make a difference

 

me262:
You argue that the Japanese scuttled the Kirishima--which is correct--after the USS Washington turned it into a blazing wreck from stem to stern.
Fact is the Kirishima was destroyed, and it's sinking was a fore-gone conclusion.

Tim

 

[quote="Ome_Joop]Longest range hit was scored on HMS Glorious by KM Scharnhorst (on a moving target) 26,465 yds or so...

The difference between Yamato and Iowa max range was more than 3 km (42,030 m vs 38,720 m) and shell weight was 200kg more for Yamato (altough Iowa had a much better shell) but it would make a difference[/quote]

Thanks for the info on Scharnhorst, but a hit beyond 25,000 yards is still very unklikely and Yamato and Iowa were pretty evenly matched in gun power versus armor at those ranges or less. I still don't think the Yamato's extra range would matter in a real fight.

26465 yards or so? Are you sure it wasn't 26450 yards or so?
Pretty good record keeping in the middle of a fight, but that's the Germans for you, precise!

 

The extra range would mean they could start shooting earlier on...getting a good solution before the Iowa could (important when you are on visual) and even then : a lucky hit is a hit (look at Hood...although that was at much shorter rangear)

26450 yards could be true as well you can't measeure that preciscly (i only now the Scharnhorst and the Warspite have the best scores on long range with the KM ship a little bit further...it really doesn't matter they hit it )

 

Some interesting info I found related to the gunfight between the USS Washington and the Kirishima from the USS Washington website:

WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT
SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENT
On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to south-east shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16'' and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500-degree turn. From 0100 to 0107, fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at three enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA.

By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased, one of our destroyers was sunk, one was hopelessly afire (she exploded and sank a few minutes later) and the other two were put out of action (they retired southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course.

From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were:

(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:

1 large cruiser or BB (WASHINGTON only.)
2 large cruisers (WASH 5".)
1 destroyer (our DD's plus WASH 5".)
(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:


1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only.)
1 DD burning (WASH. 5".)
5-9 light craft silenced (our DD's plus WASH. 5" plus S.D.)
There was no melee. This ship was undamaged.


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COMMENT
The following comments are submitted:



Our radar is effective for accurate gunfire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.
Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them and ourselves and closely backing them up.
Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.
Our fire control and the effectiveness of our projectiles meet or exceed our expectations.

Accordingly,


We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF GUNNERY
This ship was fired on only sporadically. She was not illuminated. No hits were sustained and the nearest miss noted was the splash, apparently of a major-caliber shell about 200 yards on the port quarter. Observers who witnessed other ships of our force under concentrated fire reported the Japanese gunnery to be accurate. Enemy ships close to Savo fired automatic weapons accurately at our destroyers. The Japanese ships were, apparently, not equipped with radar. Their searchlights provided excellent illumination of SOUTH DAKOTA, but attracted our fire and provided a point of aim.


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MAIN BATTERY
This ship's gunnery appeared highly effective. Fire was opened with a gun range of 18,500 yards initially by this vessel using radar ranges and optical train and hits were definitely obtained by the third salvo. It is believed target was stopped and sinking after third salvo rounds were fired.

In the second phase target had been tracked by radar ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably obtained on first Salvo and certainly on the second. Fire was rapid, on one turret ready light, for about 2 minutes 39 seconds, firing about 39 rounds. It was interrupted for 1 1/2 minutes due to an erroneous report that target was sunk, and resumed for 2 minutes and 45 seconds, during which time 36 rounds were fired. A total of 75 rounds was fired on this target which was believed to be the KIRISHIMA. Star shell illumination was used on this phase after about the second salvo, 62 rounds being fired.

According to the best data available, overall SPGPM was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline was excellent.
The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely:

Collective fire, Director I (Forward main-battery director) controlling in train.
Group I controlling in Plot.

Director IV (Stable Vertical I located in plotting room) controlling in continuous level and cross level.

Director IV controlling firing circuit (Plot.)

Radar ranges by indicating and voice.

Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual target. During the time when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated by using previously observed relative motion of firing ship and target, a turret spread in deflection was fired.

The selected train firing key was used in plot to insure that the firing pointer could see the light that indicates when the director train is on target. It has been standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target.

Against the first main battery target, 18,500 yards, radar range was used in conjunction with visual train. The target became obscured after the second salvo. The target was lost by all radar's after this salvo. As a result the last salvos went out in what amounted to generated. That is, the present range was let ride and the director being in automatic remained on the generated train. On the second main battery target the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least five minutes. When the target finally came into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on. In this connection it is noted that a considerable period of time is taken to adapt the trainer's eyes to the telescope at either night or day after looking at the radar scope (train indicator.) The reverse is also true. As a result of this difficulty, main battery Director II found it desirable to let the trainer keep track by radar and the pointer observe by telescope. Such a system is made possible by the fact that the director is trained automatically by generated bearing. Therefore small corrections only are necessary and such corrections can be made by coaching from a pointer's station.

Radar spots were used against the first target while the target echo was present. It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target.

The fire control switchboards on this ship provide for a secondary battery director to furnish target bearing to a main battery range keeper. Thus it can also be used to designate to a main battery director. At the time of first contact both main battery directors lost the target and the shift was made for designation, but the secondary battery director had not yet settled down and its designation was not used. In the meantime main-battery Director I had again picked up the target and target bearing was shifted back to it.


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SECONDARY BATTERY
Secondary battery fire control used radar ranges throughout. During Phase 1 radar train was used. In Phases 1A and 2 optical train was used. Level for the basis of gun elevation order was obtained from the Stable Element with dip-range being set on the synchronized elevation knob in accordance with advance range. Firing circuits were controlled by director pointers. Group 1 used rapid continuous fire. On the other hand, Group III soon shifted to Salvo fire, 4 second interval, to facilitate spotting.

In the first phase effectiveness of the Secondary Battery was undetermined. Group I and Group III each controlled two mounts in firing at surface targets at ranges between 13,000 and 15,000 yards. The control of the groups was by radar, range and training. Group III used 400-yard rocking ladder in 200-yard steps. No radar spots were obtained and there was no observation of the fall of shot.

Phase 1A consisted of shooting at what at first appeared to be shore batteries on Savo Island but later identified as surface craft. Initially both groups opened fire on these targets. In view of the fact that Group I appeared to be shooting "over," Mounts 1 and 3 were switched over to Director III which continued the fire. Group III opened fire initially at the target near the right tangent of the island, aiming at the gun flashes, using a 200-yard rocking ladder based on the closest radar range with target speed set on zero. The first target was set on fire, many observers reporting that a stream of 5" tracers poured into the target which immediately burst into flames. A range of 10,200 yards on the burning ship from the main battery coincidence range finder was within 100 yards of the range set on the computer. Fire was shifted successively to the left using gunfire flashes as points of aim, and was continued against gunfire flashes until each gun ceased firing. Apparently another target on bearing near the center of Savo Island was set on fire. These targets may have been destroyers or large MTB's.

In Phase 2 (the third secondary battery phase) the secondary battery again opened with divided fire. Group I fired on main battery target and Group III on target whose searchlights were illuminating SOUTH DAKOTA. Twice during the firing Group I was hitting, apparently starting fires in the upper works. When searchlights on another ship were seen to be turned on, secondary battery Director III used them as a point of aim. On this target, which was apparently a heavy cruiser, also engaged by the SOUTH DAKOTA's 5", Group III fired with a 200-yard rocking ladder. The first salvo landed short and was spotted "up 400." Fires were started. At about the 4th Salvo the searchlights went out. Director III continued with about eight or ten more Salvos, at which time another group of searchlights was seen to come on. The point of aim was shifted to these searchlights and fire continued until they went out. Another set of searchlights came on and fire was again shifted to them. The last searchlights were turned off about the time of cease firing. No hits were definitely observed on the last two targets.

The tactical situation was greatly affected by the presence of islands and the necessity of fighting in comparatively restricted waters. As noted previously the radar screens had many land echoes. For a surface engagement under reduced visibility, and especially in restricted waters, a navigational plot should be maintained in radar plot for fully effective use of the radar. If this vessel were to keep such a plot more space would be required. An expansion of radar plot appears justified.

The picture presented by the SG radar is not a true plan view. Radar operators must be given concentrated training in areas surrounded by land in distinguishing between land and ships. During a previous sweep by this vessel around Russell Island at night, numerous false reports of surface targets were received from the fire control radar's that turned out to be land more than 100,000 yards away. During the night of the engagement only one such report was received.


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LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Radar has forced the Captain or OTIC to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told, rather than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" ST S bulkheads. The enemy may be counted upon to hit foremast superstructure.

The captain and navigator should be in Conn. An experienced officer, other than the navigator, should be FOOD and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the conning station over the various telephone circuits.


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ComBatIve 6 ACTION REPORT
This action demonstrated the tremendous value of radar in a night action. Battleships obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spots, combined with optical instruments.

Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quick and accurate solution and spots.

First phase opening ranges 16,000 - 18,000 yards, illumination by setting moon. Hit with second Salvo. Second phase opening range 6,000 - 9,000 yards; illumination by star shells, did not add to accuracy of fire.


No indication that enemy used radar. Enemy apparently ranged on gun flashes, but inaccurately. SOUTH DAKOTA hit after enemy searchlight illuminated her.

Own gunfire superior to Japs, particularly as range increased.

SG radar invaluable in locating surface targets and coaching fire control radar's on.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Samuel Eliot Morison,

HISTORY OF UNITED STATES
NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II, Volume V


The battleship action of November 14-15 was vastly better fought by the United States Navy than the unorganized brawl of two nights earlier. Admiral Lee had a positive doctrine that he maintained, despite the absence of his entire destroyer screen. An able and original scientist as well as a flag officer, he appreciated the value of radar, used it to keep himself informed of enemy movements and tactics, and made quick, accurate analyses from the information on the screens. Yet some mistakes of earlier night battles were repeated. Lee's task force was a scratch team, destroyer and battleships captains alike being unfamiliar with each other and with their commander. Apparently the recurring urgencies in the South Pacific imposed a haphazard composition for every task force thrown together to meet the enemy. Again, and not for the last time, the Japanese taught the American a lesson in the use of torpedoes. SOUTH DAKOTA was lucky to escape alive. WASHINGTON, conned by Captain Glenn Davis and directed by Admiral Lee with a skill and imperturbability worthy of her eponym, saved the day for the United States.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Tim

 

How much, of even an Iowa sized target, could you see at 45,000 yards? How likely is is that visibility will allow 45,000 yard spotting of a top mast (even with superb Japanese optics)? I believe realistic range to be able to spot a target (and splashes) was 25,000 - 30,000 yards in good conditions, which may account for the longest hits being in the 25,000 yard range area. Late war US radar could pick up 14" - 16" splashes at 35,000 - 42,000 yards (max range for the Iowa's 16" guns). So it is possible that Iowa would have been firing for 12,000 yards before Yamato got off a slavo. Don't bring up embarressing things like spotter planes.
I think it more likely that Iowa would be tracking Yamato and getting off first shots by radar. At Surigao Strait, rebuilt West Virginia with a modern radar set up picked up the Japanese on search radar at 44,000 yards, gunnery radar picked them up six minutes later at 41,000 yards, reported a radar firing solution at 30,000 yards, and was able to straddle and hit with the first salvo at 22,400 yards. Every one of the 13 salvoes fired were reported to be straddles and all were radar directed.

26,000 or 26,450 yards, it's a long way to hit a ship at sea.
What're a few yards among friends?

 

Well, the Germans would have recorded the distance in metres - and 26,465 yards is 24,200m.

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion forum

 

Damn i was just abought to bring those up :lol:

Why were they embarressing....they were obviously needed as the Iowa (even with radar they still had them) and Yamato could shoot out of visualrange....
But obviuosly (that is a fact) US FC was much better!

 

The spotter planes are embarressing becuase they ruin my whole argument about Yamato not being able to spot an Iowa at 45,000 yards.
Okay, try this: IJN spotter planes are useless because of US (radar controlled) 5"/38 DP AA guns firing (radar) proximity fuzed ammo knock them out of the sky.
And US Spotter planes are meaner.
And it's at night.
With swarms of P-61's and F4U-4N's.
Maybe even raining.
No psotter planes in the air. Not a one. None at all.

Iowa's did not need a spotter palne to fire at max/beyond visual range. The FC radar was capable of "spotting" 16" spalshes at the guns max range, with enough accuracy to direct fire. Yamato had no such luxury.

 

My money would be on IOWA in such a fight, provided she was properly handled. She was faster than YAMATO, and was more maneuverable.

 

Iowa were faster but Yamato was more maneuvrable and a better shooting platform!

 

OJ: what do you have to back this up. I've heard the contrary, but with no rationale on either side.

 

I've read it somewhere but i'll try to find some source for it!
One of the reasons i think it was that the Iowa class were to narrow for their length wich had to do with going trough the panama channel...

BTW this is interesting stuff about the Iowa vs Yamato topic:
http://members.aol.com/ghe101/ijn_yamat ... s_iowa.htm

 

OJ: I had read before that an Iowa class (or really 16" US battleships) would have done better at long range versus Yamato, but not the details why, thanks. I think he's off on the US FC, the use of the Mk 8 radar FC at Surigao Strait showed it to be very good, but the author admits to not being an FC expert (like I am - not). The differences in the testing of Yamato's armor are interesting, but htere's no way to know who's results are the right ones (or even if they tested the right armor, all the Yamatos being on the sea bottom).
It's hard to see how Iowa class "wasn't meant to be a brawler". They certainley weren't meant to be a shore bombardment, or AA ships or just around in case surface ships went after carriers, although they performed all these roles well. Washington and South Dakota both "brawled" with IJN battleships given the chance, as did the battle line of Pearl Harbor ghosts at Surigao Strait. There were plans to meet Yamato with a battle line at Okinawa, but the carriers made that unnecessary.
It's also interesting what an effect flawed intelligence could have had on a battle. I wonder what the Japanese tactics would have been? I can easily imagine a case where they would try to stay at long distance while the Americans tried to close.

 

They only way tho know outcome is to get those 2 on a one on one engagement and even then their would still be a lucky winner i guess!
Both have their cons and pro's...maybe Iowa vs Yamato is a draw?

 

We'll never know. Each of us has his own idea of how such a battle would end, so we should let it go at that.

 

OJ: Agreed, the ships are so equal on a one to one basis that it would basically come down to who got in the first critical hit.

 

Either ship looses primary fire control early on their stuffed.

 

Or suffers a major engineering casualty. The list goes on and on...