Was Hawaii ever truly in danger?

I never watched Madmen, so your simile means nothing to me. However, Washing Machine Charlie, didn't stop the marines on Guadalcanal, and he's not going to stop the Americans at Pearl Harbor.

If Pearl and Honolulu were ridiculously easy to find, yet when the Japanese tried it, they bombed a hillside and the Americans never knew they were attacked.

So, yeah, you do have to hit something, other than a hillside, to have any effect on the situation.

 

They had a pretty rough time taking Wake in Dec of 41, given how much closer Midway is to PH and the fact that they haven't taken Wake yet I would think Midway would be stretching it. I seem to recall reading that it would have been harder to get over the reef at Midway as well.

 

yes....true...I guess, for damaged/malfunctioning planes, better save value for the home team......they can land at home.....I'm guessing a lot more rescues for the home team pilots, with the coastwatchers also helping out in that aspect, at least I've read that....

 

yes, chances are you will hit water, and water only....or a latrine [ head in USMC jargon there Juggy!!!! ] I always remember the movie Biloxi Blues, Walken always pronounces it LLLAAA-TReene ] very difficult to bomb in daytime, much less night....especially glide/horizontal....

 

good one..you got my meaning

 

You guys are missing the political point, which will supercede the military point. Under my scenario, the Pearl Harbor raid has just occurred. The Japanese are attacking everywhere. The Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, and now bombs are falling on an under defended Midway from single engine aircraft that could only be from Japanese carriers. Hindsight tells us that these planes were from the retiring Pearl Harbor attack force but what is 1941 intelligence telling the military brass. There are Japanese carriers everywhere and this is at a time when there were only 2 carriers and not much else available in the Pacific. Those carriers stay close to Pearl.

Before you say that those carrier planes would not have been available, remember that the Soryu and the Hiryu were detached from the retiring Pearl Harbor Attack Force to help in the second series and ultimately the successful attacks that did take Wake Island. By bypassing Wake Island, which is also under bomber attack fro the Marshall Islands, the Japanese troops that did take Wake could have sailed another 1200 miles and attacked Midway just as easily as it did Wake.

Once Midway had fallen, the planned immigration of Mavis and other long range bombers could begin. This early in the war, logistical supplies should not have been a problem and the U S navy was not capable of interdicting those supplies either by submarine or surface forces. In fact, the only surface forces in the area would have been the IJN and, again, hindsight tells us that the Soryu and the Hiryu stayed in the area until at least December 23rd.

Once those planes reach Midway, the night nuisance raids would begin. The effect may not be militarily strategic but the political fallout of Japanese bombs unabatedly falling on Pearl and the Port would have been huge. By now the Saratoga has arrived, which brings the Pac Fleet back to 3 carrier groups.

Something has to be done about Midway. The only thing is to send the carriers but now they have to plow through hundreds of miles of enemy reconned country. Who knows who wins this Battle of Midway.

 

Forget the occupation of Hawaii. Let the American authorities tie up naval resources to escort shipping into Hawaii. The nuisance bombing of Hawaii would just be the burr under the saddle, requiring the Pac Fleet to stay close and not meddle in areas like the Coral Sea or Guadalcanal. How many loads to sustain a garrison of just several thousand ?

Also, I believe that there were American submarines tasked and on station with protecting Wake against the IJN. How well did that work out?

 

they would've been stretching their logistics if using Midway....remember, the farther you are away from your logistics base, the greater strain on them, and the logistics stream, troops/ships are more vulnerable

 

Missing the point?

That somehow Bed Check Charlie nuisance raids are going to have more of a "political" effect on the United States than the continual string of defeats coming from the ongoing invasion of the Philippines...

The first Wake Island invasion had their butts handed to them despite the aerial bombardment from the G3M Nells, and the 2nd invasion despite the attacks from Soryu and Hiryu was a near run thing. The Japanese troops that did take Wake would not appear until December 23rd. Now, traveling to Midway, will increase this journey another 4-5 days.

The US could not interdict supplies coming to a Japanese occupied Midway?

The Japanese carriers can only stay on station for a limited time and will eventually have to leave Midway unprotected. Wide open to attacks by American surface and subsurface forces.

The Sara would arrive before the Japanese invade Midway, unless the Japanese invasion fleet leaves several days earlier than it historically did. Further, invading Midway greatly increases the risk of early detection. Your forgetting that Midway had PBYs for long-range reconnaissance, which Wake Island did not have. And depending on your timing, the Midway Invasion fleet would be would be within Midway's PBY detection range before the carriers strike Pearl.

I also think you are greatly overestimating the "political" fallout from Bed Check Charlie.

Simple, the Americans win the Battle of Midway.

The US PacFleet comes up with their own version of Bed Check Charlie, US submarines surface at night shell the islands and come back, and this is done night after night, giving the Japanese pilot no rest. The Japanese carriers are eventually forced to depart for want of fuel, then the Americans invade before the Japanese can truly fortify the island.

 

. Taking Midway will not have any effect on the US ability to wage war and it will be difficult for Japan to keep Midway supplied and reinforced The reason the carriers did not stay around is they needed rearming and refueling. Japan never developed a means of supplying their carriers at sea as the US did. Unless you know how the carriers would operate with out bombs torpedos and fuel, plus most of the torpedos had been used. Plus the only reason the Japanese naval command agreed to Pearl is the carriers would be available for operations to take the DEI.

 

losing the Philippines bad news is one thing,but that is foreign soil. Hawaii may not have become a state until 1959 but I would imagine most Americans would have considered it American soil in the lead up to the war. that's the political difference between losing the Philippines and having American soil continually soaked in blood from Japanese attacks, which the U S Navy can't stop.

The Japanese made a mistake with the first invasion force, they didn't with the second. You say it was a near thing, yet it took the second invasion force how many days to overrun Wake? The answer, less than a day. So much for a near thing.

No, During the early weeks of the war the Pac Fleet showed no capability towards stopping the Japanese anywhere.

On the afternoon of December 7th, It didn't make any difference whether Midway had PBY's or not. There is nothing that the Pac Fleet could do or was willing to do to stop a Japanese invasion of Midway. The retiring IJN could have launched attacks against Midway as soon as the tenth and stayed on site until the 23rd, which is what the Soryu and the Hiryu did do. The Sara didn't even make Pearl until the 15th. The invasion force could have been in position about the same time as Sara made Pearl. The question is does Kimmel pull the trigger and send his carriers to Midway? I don't think so. The Wake Island relief force had 2 of the 3 carrier groups engaged and yet when word came that carrier planes were bombing Wake, the navy brass ordered the mission cancelled rather then risk a carrier vs carrier battle.

more later,time for pizza.

 

At Pearl Harbor and Midway, the Japanese were basically over stretching themselves much like Germany did in Russia. Their supply lines became over stretched making it difficult to results themselves.

 

American territory is American territory, be it the Philippines, Hawaii, or Alaska.

The Americans were far more upset due to the fact that the attack was a "sneak" attack, while the Japanese were negotiating for peace.

American soil continually soaked in blood? Are you talking about Bed Check Charlie or the Philippines? Because it really sound like you are talking about the Philippines, because you can't be talking about Bed Check Charlie...

The Japanese made several mistakes with the first invasion of Wake.

Yes, I say it was a near run thing. Look at the casualties: 49 Marines and 3 Navy officers killed(along with 70 civilian construction workers) to a minimum of 381 Japanese KIA, when Devereux and Cunningham surrendered. There were still almost 400 Marines fit to fight, had the commanders decided to keep up the struggle.

Given the distances involved, and the lack of large warships...what about this surprises you? The only real action going on is in the Philippines, Malaya, and the DEI. Further, given the destruction, just days into the invasion of the Philippines, of Cavite, where are the Americans going to rearm their carriers and submarines?

If the first Midway invasion misfires as it did at Wake, the Hiryu and Soryu will not be able to hang around due to their fuel situation.

Seems to me that you are completely misreading the carrier situation for Wake. Intel given to Pye incorrectly place four Japanese carriers in the vicinity of Wake, not just Hiryu and Soryu. Further, Lexington and Saratoga, although now on the same mission, were not together. Lexington was some 300 miles away from Saratoga, and was in no position to support Saratoga when word came that carrier planes were bombing Wake. Please note that Kimmel's original plan called for Lexington to mount a diversionary raid on Jaluit, which Pye cancelled and then order her to head to Wake to support Saratoga. Thus, Lexington was far out in left field and struggling to play catch up with Saratoga. So, Pye is looking at 4 to 1 odds stacked against Saratoga when he canceled the Wake Island relief. Finally, with Midway being much closer than Wake, and on the 15th the Enterprise is still at sea, who is to say the Kimmel does not add Enterprise to the mix, giving the Americans three carriers.

Pye got cold feet, and was more interested in preserving his command until Nimitz arrive to relieve him of temporary command. Kimmel, already facing the likely axe, might behave more aggressively in hopes of achieving a victory with which to save his stripes.

 

I disagree. All territory is not equal. Bombing Clark Field is not the same as bombing Battleship Row. Google ww2 propaganda posters and you're not going to find one that says "remember the Philippines" but you're going to find many that say, in one way, shape, fashion, or form, "Remember Pearl Harbor." Continued unabated bombing attacks, regardless of how small or militarily insignificant they may be, against Pearl would cause the public to demand action to stop them. The only way to stop them is to retake Midway, at the cost of other projects like saving Port Moresby or stopping Japanese airfield building, in the Solomons.

The Pac Fleet was unable to stop the Japanese from invading or resupplying offensive operations. The submarines on patrol off of Wake, zilch for their effort with the first invasion force and zilch for their effort with the second invasion force. The Asiatic sub fleet of 27 boats went to unrestricted warfare just hours after Pearl harbor and over the next four months sunk only 12 ships while losing 4 of their own, before being moved out of the area to Fremantle Australia. The first successful stop of the IJN was the Battle of the Coral Sea. However, I would suggest that the Lexington and the Yorktown would not have been available if the Pac Fleet had been tasked with the retaking or the destruction of IJN offensive forces on Midway, which could only be accomplished by carrier aircraft.

You are right. If the IJN does not capture Midway quickly, then the Soryu and the Hiryu can't hang around past the historical date of the 23rd or could they have? Did they retire from the Wake area because of logistics or that the Wake Island campaign was over? Hmm.

One of us is misreading the Pac Fleet carrier situation during the aborted Wake Island Relief and it ain't me. You failed to mention the role of the Enterprise. The Sara was to lead the relief effort, with the Enterprise providing distant cover, whatever the hell that means, and the Lex striking South to pull attention from Wake. Every Pac Fleet carrier group was involved, but once IJN carrier planes were reported at Wake, Admiral Pye called off the effort.

The earliest that a Midway Relief Force could stand out of Pearl would have been the 15th when the Sara put to sea. With a sailing time of 7days,that would put the relief force around Midway on the 22nd. From there it's any war gamers board. Any scenario is possible.

But, if Midway was insignificant to the war effort as steverodgers801 would suggest, than why bother retaking it or putting limited offensive assets in harms way to protect it. Do you think that Midway was worth protecting or retaking.

 

If Midway wasn't important, then why did Yamamoto bring an occupation force to the battle? Why not sail to the area and afterwards leave?

 

Everybody remembers the Presidents, no one remembers the Vice President.
Everyone remembers who won the gold medal, no one remembers who won the silver or bronze.
Basically, everyone will remember what happened first - Pearl Harbor, what came second, is going to matter far less. Still, there were more than a few propaganda posters made concerning Bataan & Corregidor. Thus, if the Philippines had been attacked first and Pearl second, would we still "Remember Pearl Harbor."(still, quite possible given the large immediate loss of life)

Given that there were no US submarines near Wake at the time of the second invasion, there was no "effort" made. By the same token, you could make other fallacious claims, that US submarines did not stop the invasion of Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, etc.

The Asiatic sub force lost a good deal of their torpedo supply and much of their repair facilities when the Japanese bombed Cavite. The loss of the bulk of their torpedo supply forced the submarine skippers to be very parsimonious with the torpedoes they had. Thus, attacks were made only if the chances were very good to secure hits. So, their perceived lack of success is hardly surprising giving the restrictions they were under.

The Asiatic submarine force was moved "out of the are" on January 1, 1942, to Soerabaja(Surabaya), Java, and Darwin was also looked into as a submarine base, but was found to be very unsuitable, so those submarines also went to Soerabaja. All of this before the move to Fremantle in March '42.

Very odd suggestion...Very odd.

On the one hand, you claim, that distressed Americans all over the country will be clamoring for immediate action because of Bed Check Charlie. Yet, now you are claiming that it will prevent Lexington and Yorktown from fighting Coral Sea in May, 1942...5-6 months later?

You really, really need to get your ducks in a row here.

Both. Nagumo gave allowances for the carriers to have would good crack at Wake, before they would be short on fuel and have to move on to refuel at Truk, Yamaguchi was willing to keep attacking Wake until his tanks ran dry. Yamamoto wound up siding with Yamaguchi, to keep attacking until his targets were destroyed.

Actually, if you did read my post, you will find that I did mention Enterprise...She was still at sea on the 15th, before being recalled to port for rest, refueling, and resupply. Further, she is acting as backup, and is in no position to take direct action in the relief of Wake...She is essentially out of the picture, unless something goes catastrophically wrong. Thus, her actions are not worth mentioning, as they have not direct effect on the outcome of the battle. We may as well be discussing the USS Yorktown and her effect on the outcome of the Wake Island relief.

"Distant cover" means that she was acting as a backstop in case the Japanese could not be handled by Saratoga. But, basically, she was out around Midway, and was even further removed from the action than Lexington was.

Still, none of this changes anything. The three American carriers are strung out over hundreds of miles of the Pacific Ocean, and none are in any position to provide mutual support with one another. Thus, Pye still only has one carrier facing a possible four Japanese carriers, and Nimitz is not to arrive for another 8 days.

Well, it would be a shade under 4 days, given the Neches's top speed of 12.75 knots. So, likely, about 5 days given Fletcher's refueling orders. So, it would be the 20th, provided the Americans are dumb enough to attack while the Japanese carriers are still in the area.

Midway is insignificant to the Japanese war effort, so defending it or retaking it is not, shall we say, "time critical."

Midway, is slightly more significant to the Americans, if only as a "pit stop" for Pacific Fleet submarines heading to & from Japanese waters, and also as a PBY base. Was it worth protecting...probably not. Was it worth retaking...Not in the immediate future(December '41).

Yamamoto also brought an occupation force to the Aleutians, does that mean that the Aleutians are just as important as Midway?

Midway, could serve as a seaplane base, just as it did for the Americans. This would make it easier to keep tabs on the goings on at Pearl Harbor, especially with the closing of the French Frigate Shoals in or around April-May '42. They could also turn it into an advance submarine base, as the Americans did.

However, pertaining to our discussion of December '41, the French Frigate Shoals are still open as a refueling point to the Japanese flying boats. So, the taking of Midway in December '41, is insignificant to the overall Japanese war effort.

 

What makes you think it would be uncontested?

Almost asuredly water with a decent chance of hitting the shore somewhere. Much less chance of hitting anything significant.

I.e. the result is a bloody failure. Note that unless they swing wide around Wake the latter is likely to spot them on the way to Midway which will kind of give away the plan. The IJN also doesn't really have time to establish sub cordon like the later Midway plan so their intel is going to be even worse.

They were actually in the process of loosing the second invasion as well. The Marines had pretty well defeated the Japanese on one of the islands that compose Midway but were loosing on the other where the command staff was. Had they been in contact with each other they would not have surrendered when they did and there's a good chance the result would have been a second defeat for Japan. One of the serious problems Japan had with invasions such as this is that their prewar doctrine was to land where there were no defences and then after consoldiating a beachhead move on to engage the enemy. Works fine if you can do it but it wasn't going to work at Wake, Midway, or for that matter Oahu.

Because it was the invasion that was suppose to draw out the American carriers. Given the plans or lack of them for the actual invasion that's pretty clear.