Was Hitler right to attack the USSR in 1941?

Oh, I don't accuse you personally of denigerating the L/L, I am only pointing out that 10% (even if a middle of the road figure) is highly suspect to me since it represents only a portion of the subject.

That is only applicible to the "war materials" as such, and doesn't address the bulk of the L/L aid which WASN'T in war making vehicles, or weapons, but in food, fuel, explosives, fabric, sheet steel, copper, finished aluminium, and goods which allowed the USSR to concentrate on her own war production.

No hard feelings, Zhukov himself predicted that without American L/L they wouldn't have survived as they did. He didin't say they would have fallen, but the struggle would have been more difficult, bloodier, and longer lasting.

 

Well no, I think we're on the same page there. My opinion diverges from yours in the area of how much improvement one could expect from the Red Army in a 12 month period in the absence of combat.

Agreed...

Agreed.

Regardless of how much the Red Army trained its junior/company/field grade officers over that 12 month period, they were still in a strict, rigid centrally guided doctrine that was doomed to fail until it had the necessary requisites met (combat experience, mass, communications and logistical support). A well trained Soviet Officer in the absence of orders (ie. communications) isn't any better than an untrained Officer, its the "nature of the beast" of Soviet doctrine.

The indications are there if you look deeply enough into the SNAFU's behind the Army Groups with regard to their logistical support from the border. Such as;
-Supplies stockpiled at the border were not rationalized to speed loading (prioritizing load plans by commodity, by unit, etc.).
-The DR was not part of the planning for the campaign which led to bureaucratic loss of efficiency. Specifically, each Army Group attempted to maintain control of rail assets behind its front which led to gross inefficiency. I am assuming that this issue gets worked out by 1942.
If these two issues are worked out the efficiency of the rail system feeding AGC would be far more effective (greatly increased circulation of rail assets and more tonnage delivered).
-Due to the minimal time between the end of the campaign in the West and raising of new units for Barbarossa not enough time was available to divisional motor pools to assimilate French/Belgian/British trucks/vehicles and build spare parts stockages and mechanical skills to maintain.

The sum result of more time for the Wehrmacht to plan means greatly enhanced logistics and Luftwaffe support (more time to recover from French campaign and BoB). AGC failed to take Moscow because it stalled at Smolensk due to logistical exhaustion. My hypothetical changes many assumptions in that regard, but please don't confuse what I am suggesting as any kind of a sure bet. I just think chances were better in 1942.

 

The only real difference is I do not believe the relative balance of power would shift in Wehrmacht's favor, for the reasons already stated.

Interesting thread.

 

This is my opinion as well.

 

The balance of combat power may or may not shift one way or the other initially, what I am suggesting is the Wehrmacht ability to project sustained combat power has a better chance to shift the balance later in the campaign than it did historically in 1941(when it failed). I also believe that Western Allied aid may or may not be forthcoming once Barbarossa kicks of (1942) in light of the fact that the Soviets would have been directly supplying the German war effort against the West for an additional 12 months (sour grapes).

 

That opens up another odd "un-intended consequence" sort of thing with these alternative ideas. If the Soviets had continued to supply the Nazis with petroleum for those extra months it isn't outside the possibility that the plans to bomb the Baku I fields would have come about.

That was in the mix until the Nazis attacked the Soviets, to "cut-down" the millions of tons of crude heading into the Nazi war machine. Just a thought.

 

Some historians such as Van Creveld, cite the late Spring rains as the main problem, & others like Shirer argues that the fatal decision of the operation was the postponement from the original date of 15 May because Hitler wanted to intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greek advances against Italy's occupation of Albania.

And Thomas Buell in his book 'The Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean' has a dip at both scenarios, mentioning the weather problem and also says the Germans were executing a complicated movements plan which left little transport available to move the Marita forces.

The last obstacle to Barbarossa according to Buell, was the op against Crete. This required the entire VIII Air Corps [fighters & dive bombers] which the Luftwaffe needed to support the invasion of Russia, & 210 transports were destroyed or badly damaged & the disadvantages from the Balkan campaign were the wear and tear on the tanks, resulting in high rate of mechanical failure in Operation Barbarossa.

He says available records also suggest that OKH accepted the delay of Barbarossa for two reasons unrelated to German movements. Once they learned of German intentions, Romania & Finland needed additional time to prepare to participate in the in invasion.

He goes on to say although no single segment of the Balkan campaign forced the Germans to delay Barbarossa, obviously the entire campaign did promt them to wait. On the other hand the Germans could have begun earlier if they thought it important. In the last analysis, anticipation of a quick blitzkrieg success in Russia influenced German thinking, Hitler thought it would take ten weeks.

Even if those extra weeks enabled the Germans to take Moscow that doesn't necessarily mean that the Soviets lose the war, Glantz said that the Soviets would raise armies in Siberia & take it back again.

And that may be correct, but if Moscow falls, Leningrad goes, meaning it's going to make things much harder for the Red Army, & things were very bad as it was in'41.

 

IMHO only Hitler Was so stupid to attack the USSR , Churchil might thought about to go on with the idea, but finally the GB staff would have rejected the idea, after one or two exahusting meetings. If not, FDR would have forbidden it.

Oil, Oil, Oil, after reading the previous posts, I'm not sure the idea of start Barbarossa in Juny 1941 were better than in May 1942. Does any one think Stalin would have attack in winter 1942? I don´t think so...

 

There's some on here who don't discount the possibility that Stalin would have attacked on July 5th 1941.

 

Those are the folks I generally just move past their posts without reading. There is no merit to that argument and its been quite a while since it was exposed as an untenable thesis.

I can't even grasp how much that would complicate the situation. On one hand it gives Hitler an active partner to fight the Western Allies. On the other hand it puts the Soviets into an active fight before Barbarossa and they may begin mobilizing more assets that could negatively impact German plans. Possibilities are endless I guess....

 

From what I have read Stalin wanted his forces prepared for an attack by Summer 1942.
The Soviet Armed Forces said it would be 1943 before they were ready.

 

Definitely not any Red Amy offensive in 1941. They were in the middle of building an army to match the Germans.

 

Right is pointless. Hitler was inspired by the American conquest of the Indians. Hitler was never going to live with the Soviet system, he wanted the land and resources and and resources.

 

My feeling has always been that if Hitler wanted the USSR, he needed to keep right on rolling after Poland in 1939 when he had no Western Front to worry about. The Soviet army had just suffered a major purge, and in confusion, there could have been profit. Technically, the Germans were far better equipped, and wouldn't have met the T-34 or KV-1 yet. The Soviet Air Force was still very heavy with I-15's, fodder for any model of the Bf-109.

 

How far would he go with 60 divisions,of which 10 Pz/Light with 2687 (mostly primitive) tanks on 1 september,and only 2268 remaining after the fighting in Poland ?

 

Dunno. I would think that if Hitler wanted to keep going, he would have prepared accordingly. Either way you slice it, it's still bologna. Win or lose, it was his best chance.

 

The Poles were still fighting, when the Russians entered Eastern Poland. Germany was quite relieved, as this killed off Polish resistance quite handily. The invasion of Western Poland revealed some problems with the German war machine, that would've been nasty had Germany tried to continue Eastwards immediately at such an early stage of the war. Remember the planning for Barbarossa started already 1 year prior. It's not a matter of winging a game of Chinese checkers. Logistics and stockpiles are crucial, and it is unlikely Germany would've achieved anything like what she did historically, especially without stealing what she did from France.

 

How important the stockpiles taken in France and the low countries were is an interesting topic, IIRC at the end of the Polish campaign artillery ammunition stockpiles were pretty low.
But attacking the USSR without a realistic political plan was a fatal mistake, The Germans may have succeeded if he had targeted the communist regime and backed that up with the creation of puppet states, their military success were a lot more impressive and apparently one sided than the ones that caused the collapse of the Czars, but the racist policies Hitler historically adopted played into Stalin's hands and he never had the military strength to win the kind of "to the last man" war that eventually proved necessary against Germany itself.

 

Hitler had no choice. Stalin was preparing for war with the Axis so he had to strike first before the Soviets were ready.

 

No.