Were the germans wrong?operation sealion

Herr macker has no idea of the difference between an anti-ship attack by dive bombers such as the Stuka, and torpedo bombers such as the Swordfish, ESPECIALLY against a rapidly manouvering warship.

He has no idea of English Channel weather or tides!

He has no idea of the logistics of re-supply, especially with TOWED barges.

He has no idea of the effect of bow-waves on a 4' freeboard vessel.

He has no idea of how long it takes a vessel to travel 50 miles at 5 knots.

He has NO idea........



John.

 

Originally Posted by macker33
(Not only did the germans land on british soil but they even parachuted guys in)

Hey that is true,

I recall watching this BBC? historic documentation report called "The Eagle has Landed" and the other one was "The Needle"?

Regards
Kruska

 

The members on this forum impress me with their deep knowledge of everything WW2 and quite a lot more besides. I have found them to be genuinely helpful when people ,like myself with only a general understanding of the subject, ask questions and subsequent clarification.

Its always a good idea to do a little reading on the subject before trying to cross swords with any academic . I would say maccer33 understanding of the subject is of the same level as mine. The question and reasoning behind it I can see. The continuing defence of such an unresearched position is pointless. The members,I think ,have shown great forbearance in explaining Operation Sealion.( At least you have educated me on the matter for which I thank you All)

 

Actually, our friend is right.
Well over a 1,000 German paratroops did land in England in 1940.

These were men captured by the Dutch in the attack on the Netherlands in May 1940, and handed over to the British who took them back to England as POWs

They were part of a failed attack on the Hague, where the Dutch took nearly 1600 of them prisoner, of these 1240 were sent to England just before the Netherlands was completely overrun.

ps; This would have caused problems in any attack on England in 1940 as the Germans were short of experienced paratroopers due to this fact.

 

Excellent ! The British were kind enought to give them a ride back to England, several of their Ju-52s being burnt down by the Dutch as well. As a matter of courtesy they swapped their weapons for a cup of tea and a all inclusive pow hotel booking

 

Well, 200 mines per ship may be an average, but if that includes the twenty-five or so torpedo boats equipped to lay mines (with 30-40 mines each), then there were some mighty large mine layers in German service. Also, it didn't normally take long to lay mines; I have seen accounts of fields comprised of several hundred mines being laid in as little as 2-3 hours.

As for the reference to carrying "over 1,000 mines"; it doesn't make sense to carry that many mines unless one has the capability to lay them in a single operation. Mines were notoriously dangerous to carry on shipboard, especially if a ship might have to engage in a ship-to-ship action, so no one wanted to carry mines that weren't going to be laid in the next operation.

Well, that sounds like the rumors of "numerous burnt bodies in German uniforms washing ashore" on British Channel beaches during the summer of 1940. As Peter Fleming points out, everyone swore it happened, but the stories were always from a friend or a relative or a "friend of a friend". No one ever actually saw the bodies personally. I notice in the story you found, the "witness" never actually saw any bodies or POW's; they were supposedly seen by someone he had talked to. Likewise, he never actually saw any German attackers, just flashes over the horizon and noises of explosions; all the earmarks of an urban myth.

I would still like to see the authority that says the Germans "landed many times" on the south coast of Britain. I don't think any such thing happened and I think macker33 is just blowing smoke when he claims it did.

 

I don't intend to keep pointing out the flaws in your reasoning (or lack thereof) since you simply keep bringing up irrelevant cases.

You are wrong about British naval doctrine; it was quite sound for the time and place. And it certainly was far superior to German naval doctrine, which history, not just a single, atypical, battle, has proven. Could the RN have operated successfully in the Channel in 1940? The answer is yes, without a doubt, as the air-sea battles of Crete and Dunkirk demonstrate. The RN would have taken losses certainly, but under the circumstances, quite acceptable losses and they would have been successful in their mission.

Your "firepower" argument still makes no sense to me; what are you talking about, sea battles, land battles, air battles? They are all different and victory or defeat turns on many issues and details, not just one iron-bound rule for all types of battle.

Every military and naval professional who has examined the plans for Operation Sealion has pointed out numerous flaws, bad assumptions, and questionable judgments; nearly every military historian agrees that it was a deeply, and fundamentally, flawed plan which held little, if any, chance of success. Now you proclaim that the reason the plan was not put into action wasn't because of any basic "weakness", but because of "opportunity" in the East.

There seems to be a disconnect in your reasoning; Operation Sealion wasn't shelved because a window of opportunity suddenly opened in the East in September, 1940. It was canceled because it wasn't working. It was intended to intimidate the British into accepting German "peace terms", so that Hitler would have a free hand against the Soviet Union which he already had determined to invade. Even in 1940, the British AND the Germans could see the multiple deficiencies in Operation Sealion which rendered it an object of contempt by the British, and a matter of severe anxiety by the Germans.

As for Operation Sealion achieving tactical surprise, it's just marginally within the realm of possibility, but given the magnitude of the project, highly unlikely. The British did error on the side of caution and in their defense plans, assuming the Germans would be able to launch the operation with a minimum of alert to the defenders. But given that the best the Germans could do was complete the landing of the first wave of the assault in no less than nine days, it hardly mattered that the first landing barges might show up unannounced off the beaches.

The preponderance of opinion seems to be against your rather superficial analysis of the issues, and since you refuse to accept any evidence or reasoning which contradicts your preconceived notions, there isn't any point in continuing to argue. I do hope you will continue to study the matter with an open mind, and will eventually come to understand why Operation Sealion stands out among the ranks of the the most poorly conceived military plans in history.

 

Oh my god,

those British Bas.... forced these German POW's to drink tea!!!!
That is inhumane - what does the Geneva Convention have to say about that??

Regards
Kruska

 

I just wish someone would put this particular thread to bed. No amount of reasoned counter-argument is going to stop Macker33 believing what he wants to believe so why waste any further breath & time.

 

How so. Hood and POW even though both weren't neccesserily ready for sea stood a very good chance of defeating Bismark and it was after all a bit of an emergency. Furthermore the pair mission killed Bismarck. Still don't see how this proves their doctrine was out of date.

The Swordfish got two hits. One was a lucky hit. However lets take a closer look at this using Bismarck - The History - The Fatal Torpedo Hit as a referance.

First sortie of 15 Swordfish get no hits which is good because it turned out the target was a British cruiser. Second sortie of 15 do get two hits but remember Bismarck is moveing at 20 knots and a relatively big target. Look at the number of sorties flown at Crete and the number of hits prior to the British AA ammo running low or out. Sure 12 Stukas have a chance of damaging or sinking a DD but it's not a great chance especially if the DD is at speed and has a decent amount of AA ammo.

I suggest you take a look at the results of German attacks on British DDs at Norway, Dunkirk, and Crete and reevalutate your position. While they did sink or damage several at Dunkirk for instance most were docked, moving at slow speed in a confined space, and or crowded with passengers so thier evasive abilities were restricted. Then consider that the DDs wouldn't have to operate in range of the LW during daylight hours or only for limited times during daylight.

The KM and Heer both were quite adement about air supremecy being a requirement for a successul op. It was clear that that was not in the cards so the op was postponed then cancelled. I guess you could even say that this was a strength in the plan in that no attempt was made to implement it when the required preconditions were not met. But even if that condition had the plan was fatally flawed.

There is a big difference between doing something unexpected with a hand full of fast warships and doing something that's being closely watched with a couple thousand ships most of which are very slow and whose preps for the op can be spotted (it takes time and is pretty obvious when you start loading troops on ships and barges.

Hardly. The British would likely not have lost any major fleet units. They likely would have lost quite a few smaller units including some DDs and a fair amount more would have been damaged. On the other hand the KM would cease to exist for all intents and pruposes and the LW would likely have been crippled for several months. The Heer would like have lost the divisions committed as well. Relativly speaking Britian would be in much stronger shape. Of course after such a defeat the Germans might not attack the Soviets or might try for a peace treaty.

 

It should be noted that in the whole two months of the Norwegian campaign, in attacks on RN vessels, the
Luftwaffe only managed to sink two destroyers and a sloop, with 3 cruisers damaged.

 

Also worth considering just how much of the UK is within 30 miles of coast, or deep river estuary.

 

Someone needs to look at a map. Thirty miles inland from the proposed landing beaches would have put the Germans in the outskirts of London. Now, one has to wonder how three badly disorganized German infantry divisions with little artillery and armor support, short on ammunition and, having a deficit of motor transport.... Not to mention each one starting from a seperate beachhead and unsupported by the other two are going to march thirty miles inland in a matter of a day or two against the 26 1/2 divisions the British possess.

The Allies in Normandy couldn't manage this feat. They couldn't manage it at Sicily or Salerno, or North Africa, or the Philippines, or Okinawa, or anywhere else. But the oh-so-clever and magnificant Wehrmacht landing from improvised barges and motorboats backed up by a cockelshell fleet of tiny naval craft can.....

 

Yes, against an attacking force that would have had enough problems reinforcing and keeping the momentum of the attack going even if the RN magically ceased to exist. The attrition rate on the attackers side would have taken the teeth out of the offensive before it got very far in land. And Britain is a sizeable island to capture.

Are you just arguing this for the sake of it? You seem to be quite into the idea of the mighty German armed forces sweeping all before them, even in the face of informed logic.

 

I remember running across a release a few years ago: "How Hitler could have won WW2". It didn't seem very convincing. There is also "Hitler's Panzers East" which is another book of that type.

Amazon.com: How Hitler Could Have Won World War II: The Fatal Errors That Led to Nazi Defeat: Bevin Alexander: Books

 

What macker33 seems to of forgotten is that a pre-requisite for an invasion is air superiority over the landing ground, something the Germans were attempting to do during the Battle Of Britain - they failed and so wouldn't have had the amount of aircraft, and quite possibly the will, available to support an invasion in hostile airspace, protect Stukas, protect themselves, cut off the beachheads, conduct ground attack sorties - and the BoB had already proved that the Stuka was a lame duck against modern fighters and the RAF had already shot down enough of them for the Germans to withdraw them from the battle, so where does macker33 think their sudden ability to operate in large numbers, unhindered, come from? For 'your plan' you seem to think the BoB had never taken place. It did, and it would have done before any invasion attempt.

And lets not forget that while Fighter Command were taking on the LW by day, Bomber Command were bombing the invasion barges by night while they sat at their moorings so the numbers available would of diminished night after night thus placing a big strain on trying to get the troops across the Channel.

 

There have been a number of similarly ill informed and illogically defended threads on other war related forums the last few days. I am wondering if its just a big wind up.

Example; Would it have been possible for the RN to have boarded and towed the Prinz Eugen or "shepherded "it back to Scapa Flow ?

If that poster has any magic dust to spare I'll take some.

I really do symathise with the members who try relate facts to these sort of dream merchants. Its got to be a wind up!