What if... Italy had found the Oil under Libya?

I afraid that Germany would need more than a few tankers and Italy (if neutral) would be aware of the risks had she decided to supply Germany with the much needed oil....

The British controlled the Mediterranean. Nothing could be done there on such a scale without their knowledge. This is simply a no starter.

 

Ah i see, that's why the Royal Navy had so much problems supplying Malta and defending Crete...
They controlled some parts from time to time and most from 1943 onwards but early in the war the Italian Navy seemed stronger and far more modern than the small forces of the Royal Navy. After December 1941 the italian Navy was clearly superior but was affected by shortage of oil.

Italy had tankers, maybe not as many as needed but none is not true. Germany could have had tankers as much as they want, they couldn't reach the Mediterranean.
Genoa was a large port already and wasn't supplied with oil by rowing boats. If there would have been oil fields in Libya, they would have started to build tankers too.

 

As stated before; Italy did not have the technology for drilling were the Oil was in Libya, never mind building the infrastructure to get it out of the country.

It's a pipe dream.

Furthermore, the difficulties in supplying Malta were because of Land-based Airpower. The RN had no difficulties supplying Crete, until after the Invasion, and the loss of the airfields. Furthermore, the difficulties encountered thereafter were mainly due to the use of.... land-based airpower, and very little to do with any Italian boats.

The Axis attempt to land troops by ship on the night of the 21st - 22nd May and the following night of 22nd-23rd May was foiled, not because of Axis superiority at sea, I dare say.

 

It is true, during the battle of Crete the heavy losses of the Royal Navy were caused by bombers but that's not important. They didn't "control" the sea, in reality they were withdrawing from the waters around Greece. That's the opposite of naval supremacy.

Nor the italian neither the Royal Navy "controlled" the Mediterranean until 1943.

 

No, it isn't.

They weren't withdrawing from the waters; they were evacuating land forces, who lost the battle, by not controlling their airfields adequately, from the dudes arriving from the sky, not because of the actions of the Axis navies and their near-futile attempts at getting people across by boat.

IOW, had the Allied army defended the airfields adequately, the whole debacle of Crete would've been avoided, and the efforts of the Axis Navies would've been absolutely, entirely irrelevant (which they pretty much were anyway)....

As it was, the entire transport arm of the LW was in tatters, and no large scale airborne landings was ever attempted again by the Nazis.

The RN was never threatened by the Italian Navy. The RN was not restricted in its action in anyway by the Italian fleet. It was pure land-based airpower that hindered the RN. To suggest that some kind of equality existed between the fleets is ignoring the fact that the RN was in the position to reinforce its Mediterranean Fleet when and if it so decided, something the Italians were in no position to do. Any gain on their part would've been challenged and met again. That the RN fleet in the MEd was adequate to the task, is proven by the historical record. Politically, the Italian leadership knew and understood this, that they had no hope to replace any significant ship losses, regardless of the oil situation.

 

Germany could not build tankers and all other military equipment. It had to choose. It's also not a simple matter of shipping oil. Infrastructure and logistics have to be built and protected. This takes time. Time was not on Germany's side neither were the resources which would need to be allocated for such an endeavor.

 

The Regia Marina could choose to attack when the German or Japanese Navy kept the Royal Navy busy. Or the other way round. But they stayed in the ports most of the time.

As long as surface raiders were active, the RN even needed their slow battleships in the Atlantic. The problem with the Regia Marina was that they weren't able and willing to achieve naval victories against an enemy by accepting risks. On paper, they had the ships to dominate the central Mediterranean, but leadership and motivation was poor. As soon as the RN discovered their weaknesses, they attacked with comparably small forces whenever there was a good opportunity.

It was an essential error by the Axis not to eliminate Britain in Europe before declaring war against the Soviets and the US. A stricken enemy can and will recover and finally, it was the end first of Mussolini and later of Japan and Nazi-Germany.

 

Could've, should've, would've.... Didn't.

In other words, as I've stated; the Italians didn't dare, because they knew they couldn't recover their eventual losses, ever. Ship building in the Commonwealth far exceeded that of Italy. Each RM victory was only fleeting, not even temporary. Italy's one hope, was the land campaign in North Africa. Throwing away the RM for the benefit of Germany is not something Italy was willing to do, and rightly so.

RM lacked modern radar, sonar, and so was inadequate for the task of fighting at night, or bad weather. They had to visually range in targets. When they did fight, they acquitted themselves well, but each time, the RN in the Med bounced back, something the Italians just couldn't do. Each Italian loss, was irreplaceable.

The Axis powers had no hope of "eliminating" Britain.

Japan attacked at Pearl Harbour, because they had to; there was no reasonable alternative that would let them continue their aggression in China, and each passing month saw the US grow in power. Had they not, they would been totally eclipsed in the Pacific, and in a far worse position already in '44, than they were historically. Think they could've left the threat posed by the Philippines unanswered?

Hitler declared war because he knew the US would join Britain's side regardless: IOW the Axis powers were well-doomed, once they opted for force, rather than diplomatic pressure.

 

Ever heard of the biggest movement of wealth in history?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Fish
I'm sure, you will invent a simple excuse for it.

After the Fall of France, the Royal Navy planned to withdraw from the Mediterranean, but Churchill refused to give orders.

 

And I have a plan in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. Does that make it real?

Preparing for the worst, is a proven, successful strategy for coping for disasters. Having a plan for the event of Nazi take over of Great Britain, does not imply that Germany actually ever had the capability to do so. The Axis powers had no hope of eliminating Britain.

Or you might be like "think"; You know what think did, don't you? Think pissed his pants, and only thought he did.

Plans are what military organisations do, while they are waiting for reality to catch up. You might call it "a simple excuse", if that is all your brain can comprehend. Maybe we should list all the "plans" and half-baked ideas Germans brought up as "proof" of their inferiority in a wide variety of fields; except, as I explained, a plan, or an idea, is no proof of an actual intent, want or need.

Churchill rightly did not withdraw from the Med. Why on Earth would they have done that? If you can find some credible source stating the majority of the RN leadership demanded to withdraw, but was confunded by the obtuseness of Churchill (as you imply), you are more than welcome to present it. Otherwise, don't bring wishful thinking into your arguement.

 

You're kidding, green slime, did you really think i am here to entertain you by telling fairy tales?
Source is Admiral Friedich Ruge in his book "Der Seekrieg 1939-45".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Ruge

You really think you know more about naval history than the founder of the german after war Marine and highly respected historian?


And i will repeat it: It was a mistake of the Axis not to eliminate Britain in Europe or stop the war, maybe it was possible but did they try it?
Let's be honest: Hitler and Mussolini thought the war in western Europe was already won and Britain will surrender one day to save the empire and the colonies.
Did Japan attack Singapur in 1940 or Italy Malta? Did they try to capture Gibraltar at all cost? We don't know what would have been. But it was completely clear that even a stricken GB will fight back and cause a lot of trouble.

 

Oil has to be found, then drilled, then delivered by pipeline or trucks of some sort to a port which has to be built. Them this oil must be transported to Europe by tankers which also have to be built (lots of them). Port(s) must then be built to welcome such vessels along with additional infrastructure and logistics to transport it further, continuously and protected....

How long might such an endeavor take to complete all this in 1939(?)

 

German memoires.... Ah the glory of the war lost, if not for those bumbling "others" putting hindrances in the way. How many German memoires have we seen, all pining away for the Fjords like a Norwegian Blue?

When I asked for references to the RN wanting to flee the Med, but hindered from doing so an obdurate Churchill (which you implied was the case), I meant actual real evidence of such.

There was no way for the Axis Powers to "elimate Great Britain from Europe" as you put it. Invading Gibraltar was a pipe dream, without the co-operation of Franco. Franco, was a realist: Hitler had no hope of giving Franco what Franco needed in order to be comfortable with joining the Axis powers. Same as Turkey. Further, Spanish and Italian desires in North Africa would've been needed to be co-aligned, and amicably settled; not really happening, no. Or do you imagine declaring war on Spain to be in Germany's best interest?

The invasion of Malta too, is another case in point. It is only important for the Axis now in hindsight. At the time of 1940, neither dictator considered it worthy of attention. If something was not considered strategic at the time, you can't whine about the non-Invasion of it. Whether or not the forces existed to actually invade, successfully or not. It became strategic, because the British saw the opportunity to be a needle in the eye of Mussolini, which the Axis leaders had failed to duly recognise. When it became such a needle, the Axis powers were hard pressed to come up with even a viable plan, considering all their other pressing engagements and needs.

This then, is the whole crux of the problem; the Axis North African / Med campaign was never considered important enough to commit sufficient forces to defeat the Allies. There was always something else needing more resources, and geater commitment. The Western Axis could never adequately deal with the RN in the Med.

The UK did not need to dominate the Mediterranean. They needed to win the Battle of the Atlantic first. The British selected where they would place their forces strategically. They could still spare enough ships to cause the Italians enough worry, the Italians feared losing more than they could afford to; the UK, not so. The UK did not need a greater presence in the Pacific; the US was there. The Japanese couldn't attack Singapore in 1940; they too, were limited in scope. Had they done so, they would've risked the US getting involved earlier; their only chance was to first strike the US hard, when they did. Or are you proposing the Japanese bomb Pearl Harbour in 1940?

You cannot look back in hindsight, claiming a Japanese attacking Singapore in 1940. In September '40, they were busy invading, and then consolidating their gains in French Indochina. Which they only did when the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact were all but done. The Tripartite Pact was only signed in late September 1940. The whole purpose of the Pact was some kind of guarantee against fighting the US singlehandedly. Had they invaded Singapore, GB would not have closed the Burmese road into China (or would've reopened faster than you can say "Burma". The US would've in all likelihood shut of Japan's supply of Oil immediately. Already in 1940, rather than in July '41. In 1940, the war in China was going nowhere real fast. Japan needed the Tripartite Pact, and they had a much more realistic view of US capabilities than the Germans.

When exactly are you proposing the Japanese invade Singapore? With which forces? What dispositions will they be giving up on? How do they plan to cope with potential US reactions? The loss of Singapore is not a deathblow to the UK in Europe; historically, they lost Singapore, and they still fought on. Further, how would this cripple the RN in the Med?

All you've provided for is random handwaving (could've, would've, should've). If there really were large numbers of high-ranking RN officers wanting to withdraw from the Mediterranean already in 1940, or '41 it should be easy enough to produce names, dates, and correspondence.

 

I can only repeat what Ruge has written, he was a member of the Naval Historian Team which worked for the US Navy. Read his book, i highly recommend it.

Or "Fateful Choices" by Ian Kershaw. The title alone is a hint, that there were alternatives.

To me, there is no reason to doubt Ruges reputation. I don't know his sources.

I am referring mostly to his conclusions, as Hitler choose to attack the SU instead of the Mediterranean strategy, we will never know if the Axis could defeat Britain this way. I doubt it too.

 

Then please quote the passage from Ruge's book where he says this.

Because, from my readings, a RN withdrawal from the Med was discussed - not planned - and Churchill was one of several against the idea - not that he refused to issue orders for the abandonment.

 

I found it, it is in german of course:
"Die britische Admiralität dachte im Juni 1940 daran, das östliche Mittelmeer zu räumen und die Seestreitkräfte in Gibraltar zusammenzuziehen. Churchill widersprach sofort, weil er überzeugt war, dass die italienische Flotte und Luftwaffe in Wirklichkeit nicht so stark waren wie auf dem Papier und >>weil es das Ende Maltas bedeutet hätte<<." (Page 109)

"Die (englische) Admiralität wollte auch ohne Japan als Gegner im Sommer 1940 das östliche Mittelmeer aufgeben." (Page 114)

"Wie Hitler so glaubte auch Mussolini den Krieg im Juni 1940 schon gewonnen, er wollte nur noch ernten, aber selbst für diese Erntehilfe sich selbst so wenig wie möglich anstrengen." (Page 105)

"Im Juni (1940) hatte Spanien zugesagt, auf der Seite der Achse in den Krieg einzutreten, falls Waffen und Verpflegung sichergestellt seien." (Page 113)

"Eine große Möglichkeit, die der Sommer für entscheidende Aktionen gegen England hätte bieten können, wurde von Hitler fast nebenher ausgelassen. Das war, als er auf einen Fühler der japanischen Militärpartei negativ reagierte." (Page 113)

Friedrich Ruge, Der Seekrieg 1939-1945, K.F.Köhler Verlag, 3.Auflage 1962
Here for download (i didn't try it)
https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/6hvynpc1hm1z8n4/DER_SEEKRIEG_THE_GERMAN_NAVY_S_STORY_1939_1945.pdf

About Friedrich Ruge:
http://www.hartshorn.us/Navy/VADM%20Friedrich%20Ruge.htm
a lot of sources:
http://www3.citadel.edu/museum/ruge.pdf

Please help me, why can anybody ridicule about the statements of a highly respected naval historian? Friedrich Ruge was a famous admiral during and after the war, why all the bashing?

Strength in numbers: Carriers/Battleships/Battlecruisers/CA/CL/DD/Submarines
Regia Marina: 0/6/0/7/15/133/102
Mediterranean RN (according to Ruge) 1/4/0/7CA and CL/22/12
Force H in Gibraltar 1/2/1/0/0/11/0

 

Google Translate give this

No mention of the RN ordering the evacuation of the Med or Churchill's refusing to issue those orders.

A thought is not an order.

Because your statement that

is rather sensationalized from what others have read.

Ruge is most famous for his post-war career, outside of Germany, I believe that his WW2 career is relatively unknown.

 

Because German memoires are notorious for misremembering important details:

" In June (1940 ) Spain had promised to stand on the side of the axis in the war if weapons and meals are ensured . "

Innocent enough statement. Except Spain hadn't yet committed.

In actuality; on 23rd October 1940, at the meeting at Hendayne, the Spanish demands were:

Gibraltar
French Morocco
Parts of French Algeria
French Cameroon
Food
Petrol
Weapons (including tanks)

And this while
Germany needed diplomatically to sustain the illusion of an amicable relationship with Vichy France.
Germany was barely avoiding starvation, by plundering food from occupied France & above all occupied Poland.
Italy pounced with all the agility of a dead manhole cover, and the speed of a reversing slug 60 miles into Egypt.
Then Italy started a losing war with Greece (Oct ´40).
Italy didn't have enough Petrol Oil & Lubricants (POL).
Germany was short on POL.
By this time, Hitler was already planning Eastwards, and knew he needed more German tanks in German tank divisions in Poland, not German tanks in Spanish tank divisions in Gibraltar.

In other words; Hitler knew he could not meet the demands of Franco.

It is all very well to complain about what he "knew sh-/c-/would've been done". Hitler knew that too. The difference being, Hitler had the figures that proved he couldn't and he didn't get to write a book after May 1945.

All the other statements are just sweeping opinions, and in order to be credible, need names, dates, and correspondence to credit them with any trustworthiness.

" The ( English ) Admiralty wanted to give up even without Japan as an opponent in the summer of 1940, the Eastern Mediterranean . "
Exactly who? Exactly when? On what does Ruge base this? It is hard to imagine even Churchill standing against a united Admiralty. The book needs to reference original sources, or it is mere speculation.

"A great opportunity that could have given the summer for decisive action against England , was left out of Hitler as an aside . That was when he reacted negatively to a probe of the Japanese military party."
What probe? Exactly when? What was proposed, exactly? When was it received? Who delivered it? Was it even credible?

"As Hitler was believed Mussolini war already won in June 1940 , he just wanted to harvest , but even for that harvest aid effort themselves as little as possible."
And why do you think that was? They understood they needed to harbour their strength. They were still trying to win diplomatic points against the British with US neutrality as a prize.


And in fact, you'll find in Historical research, any person actually living through the events is treated as dubious source, unless their recollections are backed up by several, usually independent sources confirming the same.

 

During the course of the war, the RN lost more destroyers globally than the RM possessed at any time. It had still more destroyers at the end of the war. It lost 5 fleet carriers, and 3 escort carriers. That's still more aircraft carriers than the Western Axis powers ever dreamed of having, combined. During the war, the Italians managed to build an amazing 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, and less than 20 submarines.

Had the need in the Med been really dire, the forces would've been found in theatres less threatened. That was the beauty of possessing Gibraltar and Suez.

 

???
Ruge named all his sources. As a professor at the renowned University of Tübingen he knew his stuff.

It's hopeless.