What if Japan Joined in operation Barbarossa

Given Stalin's purges on officers and intellectuals, Japanese spies however could clandestinely convince some to come to Japan for development. Economies of Hokkaido and Southern Sakhalin were still predominantly agricultural and based on timber. These knowledgeable technicians and intellectuals would be useful. Please note that Japan did not discover oil in Manchuria despite its presence and the synthetic oil attempt was highly unsuccessful. With this new influx of knowledge from the SU, German, Romanian and probably Finnish help on synthetic oil and timber industries, the synthetic oil industries from coal and used timber resources from paper making could flourish.

If oil was discovered in Manchuria or even synthetic rubber was made in Germany, not only in the US, Japan still needs foodstuff, iron and minerals. Only tin can be provided from Outer Manchuria. Manchuria itself was a producer of agricultural products and a major one of soybean, so securing Manchuria was a prize for Japan.

Frankly, if Japan can sustain its needs with resources around the Sea of Japan, it would not be a major importer nowadays. Thinking backwards in time, Japan's reversal of fortune was almost impossible.

 

Finding oil in Manchukuo/Manchuria is not going to happen no matter how many "knowledgeable technicians and intellectuals" are brought in from the Soviet Union, Germany, Romania, or Finland. You see...They would be knowledgeable in what is currently known and understood at the time. Hence, they would look at the same spots the Japanese and American companies had already investigated, and like the Japanese and Americans, they too would find no oil. The problem was that the Manchukuo/Manchurian oil fields lay where geologists did not expect to find them. Only with new developments in the field of geology as to where oil could be located allowed the Chinese to find oil in Manchuria...Which did not happen until 1959.

 

With regards to Japanese synthetic oil production in Manchukuo...

Soviet "knowledgeable technicians and intellectuals" would have been just as good as, and bad as their Japanese counterparts. The Soviet Union was still in the experimental stage of synthetic oil production...As they had prodigious supplies of crude oil to meet their needs. The Soviet's synthetic oil development did not really come into force until they removed several synthetic oil production plants from occupied German territory back to the SU after the war was over.

Germany needed her own "knowledgeable technicians and intellectuals" to continue working on her own growing synthetic oil industry. So, they could not be spared until after Germany had secured her own source of crude oil - which could only occur after, and not before, the Soviet Union had collapsed or Germany had conquered the Caucasus. Conversely, if either of these two events had occurred, Japanese participation in the German invasion would have been, or probably would be, a moot point.

The Japanese synthetic oil "failure" came from their too rapid growth - moving from experimentation right to full production, without going through the necessary, and vital, pilot programs.

 

The Japanese had operation to North and south. As they realized Germany was not winning in Aug 1941 and Russia was not collapsing they chose the "operation south". Due to oil restrictions they only had some 6 months for their fleet to operate and in a way forced them either to act or surrender. In that sense the US state of fighting at any moment should have been at the highest. Was there a FDR or Fleet commander message/order to units that they could be at war at any moment or not? Just making people think Japanese had small brains and such eyes that they could not shoot straight is not the solution here, as we can say from hindsight.

 

Let us look at the ideas this way:

1) going south or north
IMHO, the critical point was 1937 when Japan and China was locked in in mortal combat of full scale war. Given T. A. Gardner's numbers, in 1941 the dye of going south was already long cast so the critical points of Soviet defeat on Japanese in Nomohan was not as seemingly critical on either two directions. However, Japan could still "[find] themselves in very dire straights within a month or two of opening hostilities." Beyond 1937, going south is cast

2) taking Outer Manchuria and Sakhalin or not
IMHO, Wikipedia's Battles of Khalkhin Gol (07:10, 28 January 2016‎) states, "After the occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Japan turned its military interests to Soviet territories that bordered those areas. The first major Soviet-Japanese border incident, the Battle of Lake Khasan, occurred in 1938 in Primorye. Clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces frequently occurred along the border of Manchuria."
Soviet victory in Nomohan squashed Japan wishes.
------
a)

Your understanding is comprehensible; may you tell us your sources ?

B)

Similarly, may I know your sources ? Also,lLiteracy in Europe was still ahead of much of Asia; so in numbers of technicians who could help development, how would education in Japan produced too rapidly her own technicians to be assigned elsewhere, if the developments on synthetic oil were already considered too rapid ? Education of population did not work like development of experiments -- children would need to mature to mid-20s when they could be hoped to help. If much more Japanese technicians were to be trained ahead of time, their training would need to go back in 20+ years in time -- around the victory of Russo-Japanese war and ww1.

Therefore boosting their numbers considerably was a way to help industrialization.

 

This is not correct : the outcome of Barbarossa had no influence on the Japanese decision to start a war with the US .A German victory would not change Japan's situation .

 

You can start with:
"Oil from the Wells of China", by Laurence J. C. Ma, Geographical Review, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 99-101
"Physics of Sedimentology: Textbook and Reference" By Kenneth J. Hsü - beginning on pg 205.

"The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940, Volume 8", edited by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter
https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/japt/70/3/70_3_250/_pdf

Google/Bing/DuckDuckGo will provide several more

Never looked through the Fisher-Tropsch online archive of the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan? It is a virtual treasure trove.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm
Scroll down to [SIZE=9pt]SERIES X: MISCELLANEOUS TARGETS[/SIZE] as there are several useful reports in the JM-200-L & JM-200-M series.

Again, "The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940, Volume 8", edited by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter

"Japanese-German Business Relations: Co-operation and Rivalry in the Interwar Period" by Akira Kudo.

As always, there is plenty more to be found on Google/Bing/DuckDuckGo.

You do realize that this would require a complete restructuring of Japanese society as a whole...Which is beyond the scope of this What If. Higher education was limited to the Japanese privileged few, and would remain so until sometime after the end of World War II.

Further, since the Japanese began experimenting with the production of synthetic fuels in the mid-1920's, this "Great Leap" in Japanese education is going to have to take place earlier than 1905-1918. Probably, some years after the Meiji Restoration.

 

For sources, I shall leave them as they are

If complete re-construction is not remotely probable and influx of skilled workers were needed, one way to utilize the chaotic years after ww1 to ww2 would be "luring" Euroepan --- especially East European -- to turn Japanese farmers into workers of agriculture and light industries. According to Wikipedia, a Finnish paper company announced plan to use F-T process in conversion of waster biomass from paper making.

In other words, Japan joining the OB is not a beneficial what-if to Japan; Japan would benefit if she stayed put after taking Manchuria. During 1920s onwards, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus experienced turmoil which partly lingered from the Russian Civil War. For Japan which saw the SU as a competitor of influence, some involvements would make sense on theory. Recalling that the SU and Germany participated mutual development of the tank and its tactics, Japan's participation in 1920s Eastern Europe would open eyes for better infantry quality.

Japanese infantry would never outnumber the Soviet and Siberians. In neighboring and limited region of combat around the Sea of Japan, combined arms of navy, army (and their aerial attachments) may give Japan a chance to win influence -- the victory of the Russo-Japanese War was such an example. After that war, Japan still held about 10 something years before the Russian Civil War, another 10 something years before taking Manchuria. Maybe ``obsession`` with going to East China -- direct challenge to China -- instead of gradual escalation in Northeast Asia was an Achilles` Heel to Japan`s strategical goals. A middle way was a halt after taking Manchuria in 1930, from which I understand that I shall try to leave this what-if topic as is.

 

Ok, you've lost me on this...How does Finnish technology in 2006-2015 equate to Japanese technology in 1920-1940?

Now, I ask you two questions.
- How many synthetic crude oil production facilities were the Finns operating in 1920, 1930, and 1940?
- What was their production output?

 

There's also the problem the synthetic oil is very energy inefficient. German synthetic oil cost them quite a bit more than oil on the spot market in the run up to WWII and they had lots of domestic coal production.

 

Why not? If the USSR would crumble it would be easy to conquer the area they wanted instead of facing troops fighting under Stalin´s orders.

IF Hitler had died July 1944 the German frontline had crumbled for sure.

 

As he often does he has taken a position with a core of truth and carried it well past the point of validity. Japan needed a lot of oil and at the time there looked to be little additional available in Siberia. So Japan is still pushed toward the South even if the USSR collapses prior to PH. If the collapse was soon enough and the possibility of receiving oil shipments from Germany (courtesy of the captured Soviet oil fields) was well in hand prior to PH then perhaps it could have some impact. It would also free up some IJA troops that were defending against possible Soviet actions in Manchuria.

 

Japan needed oil;there was no oil (exploitable) in Siberia;thus there was no reason to attack the SU .

And if the USSR crumbled,this would not make the conquest of the DEI easier .The Kwantung Army would remain where it was =tied in China, even if the USSR crumbled;besides : the Kwangtun army was not needed to conquer the DEI. The DEI were conquered without the use of the Kwantung Army .

 

yes and no

 

That's an odd statement to make, considering that the Japanese were still debating going North or South as of June 30, 1941.

The Kwantung was in Manchukuo, not China. Nor, did the Kwantung Army remain tied to Manchukuo - Throughout the Pacific War, it's units were siphoned off to bolster those Japanese forces fighting in the Pacific.

Some units from the Kwantung Army were transferred South to participate in the attack, other Kwantung Army units were transferred to China to take the place of those units transferred South.

So, yes, the DEI was conquered with the use of the Kwantung Army.

 

As you have already noted, Finnish technology in 2006-2015 may not equate Japanese in 1920-1940. However, according to English Wikipedia`s East Karelian Uprising of 1921-1922 article, Jagers acquired Japanese weaponry so there was contact -- clandestine or not -- between Japanese and Finns on military matters. Similarly, would mentioning the Finnish technology produce some ideas ? Anyway, I understand that I shall try to leave this what-if topic as is.

 

This is not correct and it is missing the point .

 

Unfortunately for you, it is correct and whatever point you were trying to make is in error.

 

Haha : initially only ONE division (2nd) was used for the invasion of the DEI,and this division did not belong to the Kwangtung Army .

Thus : unfortunately for you ,you were wrong .

Haha .

 

Yes, unfortunately you are wrong...No surprise there.

Of course, that does not include, as I stated earlier, units sent to China to replace those lost for the Southern Invasion.

Further, Kwantung air units sent South were:
5th Air Group
10th Air Brigade
12th Air Brigade
24th Air Regiment (fighters)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/pdfs/JM-77_Preparations4Manchuria%3C1943/JM-77.htm
Note - Appendix 2 is missing.



LJAd, as you are so fond of saying...

Haha.