What if Japan Joined in operation Barbarossa

Haha : it is not mentionned that these units were used for the invasion of the DEI .You claimed that units of the Kwantung Army were used to invade the DEI,and you are unable to produce proofs for your claim .

That units were sent to Formosa and the northern part of Indochina does not indicate that they were used for the invasion of the DEI .

 

Haha.

The 4th Tank regiment was part of the Kwantung Army, and participated in the invasion of the DEI, as were the 44th, 45th, and 48th AAA Battalions.
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/pdfs/JM-66/JM-66.pdf

Cheers!

 

Haha. Sorry, didn't want to be the only one not saying "haha".







PS,

I'm still waiting on for someone to convince me as to why Japana would want to break the non aggression pact with the SU and fight alongside Hitler...

Haha.

 

You aren't the only one nor is this the first time the question has arisen on this forum.

 

Japan was part of the steel pact and if the USSR had crumbled I personally could not see any reason why not come to take a part of the cake in that case for Japan.

 

As the cake was worthless,why would Japan want a part of it and wast its decreasing resources to obtain the cake ?

The Steel Pact was only a worthless piece of paper : in august 1939 Germany was stabbing Japan in the back, and in april 1941 Japan was stabbing Germany in the back by signing a treaty with the USSR .

 

Build-up pf the Kwantung Army :

end 1937 : 6 divisions

1938 : 8

1939 : 9

1940 : 12

1941 : 13

1942 : 14


1943 :15

1944 : 10


1945 : 24


Distribution of the Japanese forces

Summmer of 1941 :

Japan,Korea,Formosa : 11 divisions

Manchuria : 13

China : 27

november 1941 :
Japan, Korea, Formosa : 6

Manchuria : 13

China : 21

South : 10 (of which 2 still had to arrive from China and 1 from Japan ) .


Conclusion : For the invasions in the south (DEA,etc) Japan used forces from China and Japan . NOT from Manchuria .

Hi,hi .

 

Build-up of the Kwantung Army????

The number of divisions roughly doubled from 1941 to 1945...
However, The number of troops of the 13 divisions in 1941, is roughly equal to the number of troops in the 24 divisions of 1945.

Apparently LJAd does not realize how far below strength those Japanese 1945 divisions were...
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/M/a/Manchuria.htm


Then we have MAGIC intercept #869

So...The number of divisions goes up, but the number of troops goes down.

Where did they go?


Conclusion: LJAd's fixation on the number of divisions that constitute the Kwantung Army has led him make an erroneous conclusion. No surprise there.


PS Ho Ho

 

Why was it useless. The oil from Baku and wheat from Ukraine could have been sent to Japan?!!

 

The quality of the information is on the level of the present US media : nil

A certain source ho ho

It seems ho ho

The Kwantung Army ready to attack the SU (in december) ho ho

 

There is no proof that the Kwantung Army divisions were under strength,besides this is irrelevant:Takao is falling in the trap of the Equation with 4 unknows,which can not be solved .

Before PH Kwantung Army was 2 times defeated by the Soviets . A was defeated by B

In 1945 Kwantung Army was again defeated by the Soviets . C was defeated by D

The Kwantung Army was not the same , the Soviets were not the same .

Saying that C was defeated by D because C was weaker than A is wrong and unprovable .A and C (the 2 Kwantung Armies ) were fighting against a different opponent:it is very possible that if C was stronger than A,it also would have been defeated by D or by B .

It is the same as saying that the Ostheer was more weaken in 1944 than in 1941,because it had more divisions with less manpower . nwhich is wrong .

There is no reason why 24 divisions from a manpower of 750000 would be less stronger than 12 divisions from a manpower of 750000 ,especially as the 24 divisions were not faced by the same opponent of the 12 divisions .

 

Wrong : the pool from which were raised the 13 divisions in 1941 is equal to the pool from where were raised the 24 divisions of 1945,and this is without considering that between 1941 and 1945 non combat units from the Kwantung Army were replaced by combat units from Japan,which made it possible to raise new divisions, and the possibility that the new divisions were raised in Japan and that non combat units left Manchuria for Japan .

That the number of soldiers was the same does not mean that the content of the pool was the same .

 

Of course : not :the distance was to great and Germany needed the oil and the wheat .

 

The quality of your opinion is nil.

Shame you don't present any sources to back up your opinion. But, then again, you don't believe in source material. Uninformed speculation is the only way to support your opinions.

 

And now we see that LJAd 'admits' that he has lost his argument.

He resorts to his standard tactic of obfuscating the issue at hand and going off on a tangent.

Regretfully, you are the only one mentioning this. Thus, your post is irrelevant to the matter at hand.

No one is comparing A to C to B to D to F to G to E to H...Except for you.

 

Yes, you are wrong. No surprise there.

The 1945 pool is not equal. It is far worse. If the troop pool was equal, then why did the Japanese themselves consider none of the Kwantung Army's 1945 divisions combat ready?

 

There is no such thing as "combat ready" ,unless it is specified against which enemy : a Japanese division could be combat ready against the Soviets of 1945 and not combat ready against the US of 1945, but also combat ready against the Chinese of 1945 .

The combat readiness of a division depends on the combat readiness of the opponent and also on the mission which is given to the unit .

The combat readiness does also not depend on the available manpower : what was the manpower of the 13 divisions in 1941 ? 200000? If so ,this means that 500000 men remained for other missions.If the manpower of the 24 divisions of 1945 was 350000 men ,this means that 350000 men remained for other missions, but this does not affect the combat readiness of the divisions . A division of 10000 men can be as, less,or more combat ready than a division of 15000 men .

 

Sorry, but you are avoiding the issue...

Let's look at the Japanese 148th Division in August, 1945.
25% of it's authorized strength in horses.
30% in vehicles
30% in rifles
10% in light machine guns
10% in heavy machine guns
5% in infantry battalion guns
20% in artillery
0.1% in communications equipment
2% in engineer equipment
30% of clothing
10% in other supplies

These units were not ready to fight the Chinese, Soviets, or the United States in 1945.

Further, the Japanese themselves go on many times about the poor quality of their officers, NCOs, and enlisted troops/draftees in the 1945 Kwantung Army. Lack of training, lack of experience, use of previously exempted civilians to fill draft quotas. The Japanese are scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel to create these new 1945 divisions.

So your claiming that

is simply not true. It is just another figment of your rather vivid imagination.

 

1)That these units were not ready to fight the Chinese, Soviets,or the US in 1945 does not prove that the situation of the Kwantung Army was worse in 1945 than in 1941, unless you can prove that these units would have been ready to fight the Chinese, Soviets, US in 1945 .That the Kwantung Army was defeated in 1945 by the Soviets does not prove that it was weaker than the Kwantung Army of 1941,which also has been defeated by the Soviets .

2)Your claiming that the Japanese were scraping the bottom of the manpower to create these new divisions in 1945,is an other figment of your inability to understand simple things as : that in 1945 the Japanese manpower barrel was much bigger than in 1941,because between 1941 and 1945 Japan had mobilized several millions of men,the majority of whom were still available .In 1945 Japan was not at the end of its manpower,its manpower was bigger than in 1941.

 

From someone that refuses repeatedly to provide references?

Your comments are worthless.


In existence since 1919, the Kwangtung Army was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25] Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere. By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess found its strength reduced half again from its number in December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft, engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34's.

The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer to the Japanese homeland. Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the homeland and included two divisions on the border. This also removed the Kwantung Army's 1st Tank Division, the last armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) The result left the Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self (its most seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of 1944).[9-63]



In order to prevent the Russians from discovering their alarming weakness in Manchuria, the Kwangtung Army mobilized reservists and new recruits to form new divisions and brigades to maintain the appearance of a formidable fighting force. In early July 1945, the Kwangtung Army was expanded from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions. Unfortunately for the Kwangtung Army, more than one-fourth of its entire combat force was mobilized only ten days prior to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9 brigades). [4-63]


Ammunition and weapons were in such short supply the Japanese resorted to arming soldiers with bamboo spears. [18-154] Of the 24 divisions in the Kwangtung Army, the Japanese themselves rated only seven or eight to be combat effective. [9-63]


By August 1945, the Kwantury Army had pieced together a combat force of 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft, most obsolete.


http://http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm

With references to Glantz, and friends...

Now, where are your references?