What if Japan Joined in operation Barbarossa

Thus showing that you can't follow a logical argument. Typical.

 

Your continued inability to understand or at least admit to understanding a logical and well reasoned argument continues to astound me. Your continued attempts to distort both the English language, the data, and logic to support your essentially unsupportable opinions would be humorous if it was much less frequent as it is it's simply tiring.

 

Wrong :

1)A japanese unit could be combat ready against the Soviet Far Eastern force of 1941,but not to the Soviet Far Eastern Force of 1945, it could be combat ready against a US 1941 unit and not against a US 1945 unit .

2)NO : manpower and combat readiness are different things : a unit of 800 men can be more combat ready than a unit of 1000 men .

3) A certain level : this is never the same for all units ,it is not uniform . It depends on the situation , the mission , the opponent .The level of manning,training, equipment readiness that is required is varying for all units .

The level of manning, training,equipment readiness required for the 1941 kwantung Army was not the same as for the 1945 Kwantung Army,as for the Japanese units invading the DEI,or the Japanese units defending Iwo Jima,or the Japanese units who would be committed if operation Olympus was started .

In 1879 a British unit was defeated in SA

In 1898 a British unit was victorious at Omdurman

In 1899 a British unit was in trouble at Mafeking and Ladysmith

In all cases the combat readiness was different ,because in all cases it was a different army fighting against a different opponent . Thus a comparison is impossible .

It was the same for the Kwantung Army : its available manpower was the same for 1941 and 1945 : between 700000 and 1.1 million,but the army of 1941 was different from the army of 1945,and so were the Soviets . In both cases the Japanese were defeated because the Soviets were stronger, not because the Kwantung Army of 1945 was weaker than in 1941.

 

Of course the Japanese were defeated because the Soviets were "stronger". They were definitely not defeated because the Soviets were weaker!

Regardless, that says nothing about the shambolic state of the Kwantung Army in August '45. All observers, all writers of authority, are clear on the sorry state of the Kwantung army in '45.

Furthermore, you are still acting as if you were some kind of authority on the English language, when it is clear that the rest of the world does not share your definitions.

Comparison's are always possible. Always. This also enables us to analyze what a particular army had/has for short comings. Placing it in context, helps to understand why things were organised and happened as they did. But just as we can compare a medieval knight to soldier of the 1st world war (examining training, combat load, etc), we can nevertheless also compare one army, with another; it's organisation, it's OoB, it's level of experience, the degree of competence in its officers, etc. Especially when looking at the effects of the wider conflict in China, Burma, and the Pacific, on one defined army over a time period of 4 years.



Combat readiness is a condition of the armed forces and their constituent units and formations, warships, aircraft, weapon systems or other military technology and equipment to perform during combat military operations, or functions consistent with the purpose for which they are organized or designed, or the managing of resources and personnel training in preparation for combat.
Most armed forces maintain varying levels of readiness by the troops to engage in combat due to economic considerations which vary from minutes to months. In modern armed forces troops designated special forces are usually those kept at the highest state of readiness for combat, and are often alerted only a few hours before being committed to combat. Where time is of the essence in military action being initiated, the troops, such as pilots of interceptor aircraft, may be kept in constant state of combat readiness.

Note the lack of a designated opponent in the above definition. Even so; comparisons are always possible.

This article http://www.stripes.com/news/us/army-budget-chooses-combat-readiness-over-modernization-1.393232 is talking about the Army budget, and effects on "Combat Readiness", without defining any particular enemy. Thus, there is a concept of "Combat Readiness" irrespective of opponent. It consists amongst other things, of ensuring that the troops have the equipment, knowledge, and skills to perform their respective roles to expectations. We can most assuredly compare the state of readiness between different organisations, or even the same organisation, over time....

 

1)The sorry state of the Kwantung is not comparable to the sorry state of the Kwantung Army of 1941 . If the 1945 KA was given a -5 and the 1941 KA was given a minus 2 ,in both cases compared to the opponent, that will give us no indication about the corelation between both KA's .

A minus 5 army can be "stronger" than a minus 2 army ,because the question is never if one of both armies is stronger than the other ,but if they were stronger than their opponent .

2 ) It is impossible to compare a medieval knight to a WWI soldier . One could even say that the medieval knight was stronger than the WWI soldier ,which has as much validity as the opposite .


3)Combat readiness irrespective of opponent is meaningless,because the roles depend on and differ following the opponents .

During the Cold War the CR of SAC was different from that of Nato ground forces,and that of NATO ground forces was different from that of ground forces in the US .

Even today the CR of fifferent types of forces is different .

That the army budget could affect CR in general (it is not necessary) does not mean that CR exists irrespective of opponents . It is perfectly possible to have the same CR with less money .

 

1) It is possible, to compare anything to anything else; even itself, at a different stage in time, or development. Even armies, with or without an opponent.

It is indeed interesting to study the development of a single army, across peace time, or conflict (i.e. compare Army A at time Y to Army A at time Z), as it reveals many things about the state of the nation in general, and how developments in the field, technological advancements, financial constraints, political pressures, geopolitical events, etc have effected how the capabilities of that army have developed or atrofied. So indeed, the question may very well be, if the passage of time has seen it grow in strength / capabilities or not; regardless of the changes in strength of any potential opponent near or far. Just as the state of the Kwantung Army in '45, when compared to '41 shows what a sorry state the Japanese were in.

2) Of course you can. You can compare all sorts of details betweeen the two. It is even possible to come up with an opinion. Now, that opinion will probably be a value-based judgement according to how the viewer values certain qualities / aspects. That does not invalidate the comparison per se.

3) No, combat readiness is essentially independant of any opponent, as there are fundamental tasks that need to be carried out regardless. If your soldiers are incapable of carrying out even fundamental tasks say from proficiently firing a weapon (due to lack of ammunition, lack of training, or some other inability), to exercising effective command and control or having a fully functional motor park (again, lack of knowledge, lack of skills, lack of spares, or just plain lacking) then it is hardly meaningless. Quite the opposite.. Indeed, it is this that helps define "Combat Readiness". These basic tasks and abilities need to be mastered, if not excelled at.

Now you are just waffling as you back yourself into a corner, unable to explain your thoughts coherently. You continue to pick at imaginary nits in order to make some kind of point, instead of just accepting the fact; The Kwantung army of '45, was a sorry shadow of itself. Poorly led, few if any junior officers with experience, little training, and shambolically equipped, in the midst of a desperate mobilisation, while simultaneously trying to develop lines of defense along the Korean-Manchurian border.

 

Are you intentionally misunderstanding or are you really that dense?

1. Wrong as pointed out. Combat Ready is not in general a comparison against other forces. It simply means that the unit is capable of performing the tasks it is assigned at a reasonable level.

2. What an absurd interpretation of what was being said and discussed. If the infantry battalions in a countries armed forces are suppose to contain 1000 men then a battalion that contains 900 may well be combat ready but one that contains 100 is surely not. On the other hand if companies are suppose to contain 100 and one does it can indeed be combat ready so yes a company with 100 men can be combat ready when a battalion with the same number isn't but that wasn't what we were discussing now was it?

3. It may not be the same for all units but the term is usually applied uniformly across units of the same force and of similar nature. Again it has nothing to do with a specific mission although it role does have an impact and it certainly has nothing to do with the opposing force.

Before you try and lecture someone in the meaning of words you should really try to make sure you understand them yourself. You have made it very clear in this case that you have absolutely no idea what you are talking about and no desire to learn.

 

Avoiding to repeat myself in occasion, I say: If Japan joined OB

1) would have been cutting the Pacific route of the Lend Lense at Vladivostok, capturing the city with a population about 1 million
2) land forces would push up to Khabarovsk, winning a victory. Airforce would help defeating the Red Army.
3) Vladivostok would then become a navy base of submarines and anti submarine forces, if Japan turns from making more Aircraft Carrier to submarine. These new submarines and related forces
3a) would help protect Japan merchant voyages from US raids.
3b) would be communicating with Germany thru Finland by traveling under the sea to Liinakhamari and Petsamo, a Vladvivostok-Liinakhamari voyage. This new submarine voyage would not help the war effort apparently but intangibly like exchanges and transfers of technology, intelligence, personnel etc.
4) The Red Army would be hard pressed to commit some Siberian officers and soldiers who were capable to fight in harsh and cold climate. Their reassignment against Japan would take them away or thin their presence in a similar fighting ground -- Karelia. Thus Finland, instead of Germany, would benefit in tangible terms. Note that only a railway -- Murman Railway in Karelia and Trans-Siberian in Russian Far East -- would be capable to transfer huge human and material resources in 1 run of cargoes.
5) In wartime needs, Primorsky Krai would hold large amount of coal and timber, tin, tungsten, silver, zinc and gold but it lack iron, rubber and agricultural products. So Japan's taking the Krai would not solve all Japan's resource problems, let alone the Krai satisfying the needs in resources that it had.

That is all.

In the long run, Soviet given its huge human and industrial might -- Urals locating out of reach from Germany and Japan -- would defeat both Germany and Japan if Soviet would decide to fight it out. Would the Soviet government settle for at least a ceasefire with Germany at a result of Japan attacking as aforementioned ?

For Japan, taking the west coast of the Sea of Japan would not help much of her dire resource and diplomatic situation. However, if Japan would commit to attack the coast, she would not be capable simultaneously to attack the US in Pear Harbor; would Japan still be getting petroleum and iron products -- scrap iron for example -- from the US ? The Us would at least continue to influence the battlefield with diplomacy and resources -- a reminiscence of American role in Russo Japanese War of 1904 and Siberian Intervention in late 1910s to early 1920s.

To break this reminiscence, Japan going south against the Dutch and French colonies in Southeast Asia would be an idea which was in big picture Japan did.

 

The iron and scrap steel embargo went into effect on October 16, 1940, well in advance of Operation Barbarossa. The petroleum embargo would be questionable, if the Japanese moved against the Soviet Union, there exists the possibility that the embargo might be enacted slightly earlier than historically.

 

It should be noted that avgas was embargoed earlier as well I believe.

 

An update.

Given this piece of info, Japan might still be going south because the West Coast of the Sea of Japan was well underdeveloped except in Inner Manchuria and coastal cities in Vladivostok. Development takes time and thus was not favored if Japan continued or started a world war scale of conflict. Southern Sakhalin became an integral part of Japan only in 1943, just less than 40 years after that piece of land had been recognized and controlled firmly by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War.

Would Japan be more favorable to keep the land conquest after ww1 if Japan did not join Germany ? Instead on one side, it could supply arms to Finland, exchange intangible assets with Germany and other nations, while Japan armies pushed slowly up north. On the other side, it shall concentrate in developing the lands it had -- Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, islands in the Pacific, the island of Taiwan etc.

 

As mentioned earlier by some very respected rogues. Japan has nothing to gain in Siberia nor were they in any condition to fight in such an environment.

Japan was a naval power which desperately needed oil. Siberia had nothing to offer in that respect and would lose their naval support.

 

Who's idea was that?

 

I see the Sovs trading ground for time. The Germans were the main threat, and far closer to major Soviet cities and industry. What, realistically could the Japanese do except threaten Vladisvostok? They'd likely let the Japanese get lost, and freeze in Siberia, then when forces could be had, hit the Japanese with the kind of armored warfare which the IJA really didn't have a defense against. It would also be the first time the Japanese encountered an enemy as fanatical as they were.

 

OpanaPointer's was my untyped idea. If Japan did attack the port city Vladivostok and nearby area, her effort would be more symbolic than realistic goals of handling some Soviet military pressure on Germany.

If Japanese Navy took Vladivostok and ferried armies, artillery, TDs, light tanks, aircraft across the sea, what could the Japanese achieve with attacking the Soviet ? IJ army could take the Amur estuary and the surrounding mountain ranges but as Gromit801 mentioned, Siberia yield nothing to remedy Japan lack of resources. Bear in mind exploitation of resources take years if not decades to be fruitful.

Southern part of Sakhalin only became a part of Mainland Japan in 1943, 36 years after the land had been ceded as a result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. So about 40 years of development would be needed if a newly acquired land could become a integral part of the conquering nation. I do not see how taking Amur estuary, Vladivostok and other cities mean much to Japan in terms of getting resources.

Probably Japan should have not pushed southwards after 1937 beyond Beijing and nearby areas: why triggered a Communist and Nationalist China coalition when taking control of mainland China was not possible. Then could an attack to USSR secure a front hinging on mountain ranges beyond the Amur estuary ? The only sizable transport for very large volume of cargoes is the Trans-Siberian railway that would be under Japanese influence. How USA would react to the Japan expedition: cutting the scrap iron and petroleum product exports ?

Having typed that, how about a Mare Nostrum plan for Japan: the sea would be of course the Sea of Japan. Attacking Russian Far East and Northern half of Sakhalin would accomplish that. West Coast of the sea where Vladivostok is located, the whole Sakhalin island, Korean peninsular, Manchuria and Japanese Archipelago would all be under Japanese control. The transport would be voyage which Japan was ranked among the bests of the world.

Then how could Japan defend against the eventual Soviet counterattack ? If the Battle of Taranto had helped Japan planning of attacking Pearl Harbor, would Japan participation for Franco in the Spanish Civil War expose its military against her Soviet Union. The civil war took place around when the battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol happened in the East. Would Italian development of submarines and Japanese military exposure to global affairs help push for an effective emphasis on development of armor and submarine -- hence anti-submarine -- military presence ?

So the Soviet-Japanese border conflict would not be considered a part of ww2 but a large scale operation itself that would be related to ww2 events: like the Winter War and Continuation War to ww2. How possible Finland survive a probable full-scale Soviet assault when Japan had to yield all her gains since the Russo-Japanese War ? If the Great Britain and the US had not been involved, would Japan achieved her Mare Nostrum plan ?

Two probably outcomes would result:
1) A stronger submarine warfare presence than a single emphasis on surface vessel would help communication between Germany, Italy and its co-belligerent by submarine voyage. A Vladivostok-Narvik or Liinakhamari voyage allow a window of direct communication until the battle for the Atlantic spilled over to the Arctic.
2) We know Germany and Czech supplied few tanks including the t-34 for Italy to improve its armor with acquired knowledge from these tanks. Early models of the BT series were present in the Spanish Civil War, KV1 were used in the Winter War, T34s were captured in late 1941. Japan would have numerous chances to improve its armor after exposure in the Civil War? Even Italy could develop a Semovente 75/18 which was capable of defeating Sherman, why could Japan not develop a hetzer which was capable to destroy IS2 ?

Every bits help, I guess but the eventful USA participation shall be accounted for for any nation on the other side of USA.

 

Ah ha, do to the Japanese what the Russians did to Napoleon.... Me like, me like

 

The Economics of World War II: six great power in international comparison, edited by Mark Harrison; it is categories itself as studies in macroeconomic history. ISBN 0 521 78503 0 paperback

To paraphrase at large with some self input,

As the Pacific War started,

So recoverable metals and other resources were mostly from lands around the Sea of Japan including Taiwan -- the lands under control just after the Manchurian incident in 1931. As typed, the 1937 invasion beyond Beijing was a time marker for reversal of economic fortunes. Occupying Vladivostok and west coast of the sea would open a new voyage from Manchuria to Vladivostok, or downstream on the Amur to mainland Japan. Japan needed not expand into Siberia; Amur estuary along cities of Khabarovsk and others would be the limit as developing those lands shall be preoccupying enough.

If this would be the aim of Japan participation of the OB -- whenever it would take place in June 1941, before or beyond, how useful would this expedition be for Germany ? As I mentioned before, submarine voyage would become possible from the Sea as the water essentially would become an inland sea. If voyage via Finland or Norway-- Narvik for example -- was successful, a positive feedback for more submarine and antisubmarine production would help communications among Italy and Japan -- both countries had had some substantial naval capabilities. Would weakened American submarine sabotage of Japanese merchant vessel would be a side-effect ?
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East of the Sun: the epic conquest and tragic history of Siberia, by Benson Bobrick; it is categories itself as Siberia (history). ISBN 0 671 66755 6

Bloodlands: Europe between Hilter and Stalin, by Timothy Snyder. ISBN 0 671 66755 6

So, in Soviet leadership, Soviet intended to defend against Japan. The failed German attack on Moscow would actually fail to help Japan instead of Japan helping Germany in joining the OB.

As mentioned, the escalated effort in Japanese submarine industry would allow communication with Italian probably at least around the horns of Africa, then proceeding to Libya by land or air. Coupling with the new voyage lines in the Sea of Japan with all coastal land under control and only advancing on Dutch (NOT British) possession in the Pacific ,or helping Thailand getting on with the French to recapture lands in modern day Cambodia and Laos. However such military move even in 1937-- essentially a partially attempted Pacific War without Pearl Harbor --- could not evade with difficulty American intervention in embargoing and beyond.

However, communication among Germany, Italy, Japan and other co-belligerents would probably help Japan a firm establishment in land warfare. German anti-tank weapons and Japanese would-be copies would be capable to destroy BT series tanks in expected Soviet-Japanese conflict. In Nomohan, BT series tanks were the main armor. As Japan would not intend and be capable to advance beyond Outer Manchuria against the SU, tank-destroyers would be better in mountainous and uninhabited or underdeveloped lands. The Germany and co-belligerent military could provide the means to beat those tanks. The uninhabited and cold climate on Manchurian terrain beyond the occupied Manchuria would allow Finland who fought unconventionally again the Red Army help Japan in combat experience. Given the quotes, knocking out the Soviet political will to carry on the hostility and pushing further for more lands in terms of getting resources and expanding influences would be beneficial to Japan than Germany. On the other hand, Germany needed also economic and military war aims in OB, which Japan would be incapable to help, and failed to break the Soviet political will.

Thus joining the OB precisely in June 1941 would be more symbolic than realistic in which the military expedition would already be going on for years or a decade. In the end economies for Japan and Germany did not allow war to drag on. Could Japan manage a limited conflict with the Red Army in Manchuria ? Then probably Zhukov would be stationed in the Far East, preventing him and his staff to defend Leningrad and Moscow.

In short, many what-if scenarios need to happen for Japan to pull off "unscathed", which any dragging military conflict mostly mean American participation and thus beginning of the endgame.

 

This post is off topc: my what-if would be if Japan could keep the Whole Sakhalin island until today, does its coal, undersea gas, oil resources remedy Japan's needs ? Not to mention the southern tip of the island could be developed as a populated area.

This video is for who is interested.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AisLuZ9vfcE

Mr. Ian Craig in the video located himself at Aniva Bay.
Now, ExxonMobil and Shell Oil Company have obviously participated in undersea gas exploitation. Would Japan prioritize Japanese company first if the island would have been still Japanese since ww2? If Japan would attack the SU and penetrate deep into Siberia, she would have lost all land possession once the Red Army counterattack. Manchuria (Inner and Outer, to be specific) would probably be the limit of expansion.

 

Why did Japan not want to join the battle against Russia with its ally Germany? Germany joined the fight against America, yet Japan still didn't join the fight against Russia. Did that cause any friction with Hitler and Japan?