What if...the Japanese had landed troops in Hawai'i immediately after bombing Pearl?

I pulled my copy of Jentschura and it does reference that the converted Momi class "patrol boats' did carry just one daihatsu, but other sources I have seen, including the Combined Fleet web page, claim that two could be carried and launched. It's a small matter, as I concur with your other remarks regarding the limitations of these fast troop transports. Certainly they were NOT capable of fulfilling Dabrob's claims of being able to carry ten daihatsus and and around 700 troops. I also agree that their engines would be worn out and probably not capable of anything like a sustained 18 knots.

Instead of landing 4,200 troops, Dabrob's patrol boats would land, at best, around 240 troops armed with nothing more than their rifles and MG's and the ammo they could carry in their pockets. Instead of being a serious threat, the US defenders would hardly break a sweat eliminating these hapless invaders. But then, that is typical of his "research".

 

I can only speak for myself, but I would consider this "plan" nothing more than a comic-book fantasy. It certainly would never pass muster with any real planning staff, and, as I have frequently pointed out, would have been laughed out of even the Japanese IGHQ, never an agency known for their appreciation of reality, as completely unworkable and, indeed, insane.

 

After reading Gordon Prange's book, "At Dawin We Slept" one quickly learns that the Japanese originally intended to invade Oahu as part of a two pronged aerial and overall millitary assault aimed at temporarily driving the US Navy out of the Pacific, by seizing its primary base of operations in the Hawaiian Islands, while destroying the US Pacific Fleet itself. The IJN immediately realized that they did not have the necessary wherewithal to successfuly pull off such a massive, military enterprise. The IJN was not a true "bluewater navy", in the same sense that the USN would not become until after 1943. The Japanese could not support and maintain a fleet borne military invasion, in enemy waters, so far from friendly bases of supply and repair, as the crucial support ships of a then modern day fleet train did not exist. Replenishment of ships while underway was still very much a new and largely unproven concept for most navies and I don't believe the IJN even had the numbers of fleet oilers necessary to keep so large a fleet fully fueled and on station. In short, they were not a "fleet that came to stay."

The disparity in numbers between the two forces were a major stumbling block for me, as the US had two triangular army infantry divisions, the 24th and 25th and the elements of three US Marine Defense Battalions on Oahu. These units had their allotted TOE, although elements of the Marine Defense Battalions were currently on deployment at Midway, Wake and Johnston Island. This however, doesn't take into account the tens of thousands of USN Bluejackets that would be available to put in some triggertime, should they be needed, or the thousands of Army Air Corps men who would be without aircraft and also available for use as ad-hoc infantry, as they both were in the Philippines.

The Japanese Army would be landing IIRC two light infantry divisions, plus Special Naval Landing troops (Japanese Marines) and other supporting units on Oahu. The major problem with the Special Naval Landing Forces was that historically speaking, they weren't very well trained or effective troops. Nearly every invasion they took part of, ended badly for them. In Malaya, they took heavy casualties and were nearly driven off their invasion beaches by half trained Indian troops. At Wake Island they took horrendous casualties and were very nearly driven back into the sea. At Guadalcanal, they were completely destroyed as a unit, following a disasterous night assault on US Marine positions. At Milne Bay, in a battle lasting 3 days, they were forced to re-embark and flee after encountering fierce Australian opposition. I fail to see how these troops could be considered to be an elite spearhead of trail blazers, especially on such an important and major operation as the invasion of Oahu.

The Japanese Army was largely still mainly dependant upon horses as the primary movers for their artillery and heavy support units. I don't care if they spend one week aboard ship or several, it is a simple fact that those horses are going to need a number of days to recover both their health and their land legs, otherwise, they are going to die while in the harness traces, leaving those Japanese units without transport and easy picking for US counterbattery gunfire and air attacks.

Did we ever decide as to where the primary invasion beaches would be? I know that the north shore of Oahu was impossible for the Japanese to utiliize in December, unless they were using surf boards rather than diahatsu landing craft to come ashore. Likewise, many of the western beaches abutt against some tremendously high mountain ranges, making it terribly difficult to establish an effective beach head, not to mention simply getting one's troops deployed inshore.

That's just off the top of my head. Does anyone have anything to add?

 

Uh...no John I think that is a very inclusive sumation of the arguments against a successful invasion, and beings both "LiebstandarteSS" and "dabrob" have abandoned the thread, I think it is safe to assume we have put it to bed.

Brad

 

Yes, just file this one with the Operation Sealion threads....In SECTION 8....

 

Catching back up after a weekend away.

dabrod, you have chosen to ignore my question as to the authenticity of your tonnage allocations and have ignored the requests of the Admin to provide this information. Since you seem to think it better to ignore such mistakes it leaves me with no option but to assume that you are intentionally attempting to manipulate the information and deceive us with completely false information. Such a intentional deception and misrepresentation of the facts is in my opinion a despicable act deserving of nothing more than contempt. You have not made a single post within the forum on any topic which did historically occur, leaving us with no impression on the level of knowledge of time period that you may have. This thread has run its course and is about time it gets closed.

 

I agree

 

Moderator Note. This post appeared as a new What If needing moderation. I chose to merge it into this thread and reopen the thread, in light of recent changes in member posting permissions.



The Hawaiian Islands ‘what if’ thread, hijacked for his surprise invasion scheme by Robdab as all Oahu threads on the internet are eventually discovered and hijacked by Robdab, ended thusly,

"dabrod, you have chosen to ignore my question as to the authenticity of your tonnage allocations and have ignored the requests of the Admin to provide this information. Since you seem to think it better to ignore such mistakes it leaves me with no option but to assume that you are intentionally attempting to manipulate the information and deceive us with completely false information."

Since the thread was locked at the point of Robdab’s spectacular crash into the granite face of Murphy’s Law, it has become impossible on the proper thread to answer the question about shipping tonnage that prompted his demise. Robdab (not Dabrob, BTW) lifted the shipping figures for various Japanese invasion units from a Hawaiian thread I did several years back. I think he ignored the request for verification of the shipping figures given for the Japanese on 7 December 1941 because (1) he had no idea how the numbers were actually compiled or the information available to explain them (2) I wouldn’t have helped him had he asked me and (3), he had failed to pass on this explicit warning about the figures when passing them off to this forum as golden,

"It has not proven possible to ascertain exactly the composition of these mobilizations, but the following give a rough idea. Caution: these totals are only roughly accurate in many cases."

Tthe figures Rob posted for the historical Japanese deployment were:

Operation................... Historical
China/Korea.................707,658
Thailand..........................6,650
Kra (Malaya)..................46,453
Singora (Mal).................84,877
Patani (Mal)..................47,781
Kota Bharu(Mal)............26,751
Mal (2nd Wave)...........485,000
Aparri (Phi)...................37,694
Vigan (Phi)...................28,049
Legaspi........................38,623
Borneo..........................47,345
Davao...........................80,899
Lingayen(Phi)..............379,457
Lamon (Phi)................111,972
Gilbert Isl......................31,029
Wake Isl.......................17,034
Guam...........................36,969
IJN Aux Cruisers............72,414
Hospital Ships...............33,491
Sub Tenders.................75,510
Gunboats....................167,866
IJN, all others.............1,498,176
Economy, Cargo........1,714,543
Economy, Pass............840,000
Total............................6,616,241

6,616,241 comes from the US Strategic Bombing Survey, Vol 9 PP32, and this includes about 1.2 million tons of very small ships:

Cargo ships.
20-100 tons - 742,935 tons
100-500 tons - 442,163 tons
500-1000 tons - Number: 264 - GRT: 198,036
1000-3000 tons - Number: 527 - GRT: 1,055,224
3000-6000 tons - Number: 486 - GRT: 2,330,577
6,000-10,000 tons - Number: 219 - GRT: 1,603,219
10,000+ tons - Number: 19 - GRT: 234,087
Total: 1,515 ships of over 500 tons.

The interest on the locked thread appeared to have focused mainly the historical invasions and tonnage allocated to each. Ignoring China and the IJN, the invasion figures were compiled starting with the website here,
http://niehorster.orbat.com/014_japan/_ops.html

Niehorster’s ORBAT gives the names, and in many cases, the tonnage of all the AP transports used in each operation. After that, the GRT for each transport had to be tracked down, first using the 1939 merchant fleets guide and after that, ship by ship searches on the internet. This gives the following list:

Ship Name…Invasion…GRT…Branch of Service

Akiura …Aparri (PI)…6803…Army
Arizona…Aparri (PI)…9663…Army
Kazauura…Aparri (PI)…6804…Army
Kurama…Aparri (PI)…6789…Army
Matsukawa…Aparri (PI)…3826…Army
Yuzan…Aparri (PI)…3809…Army
Hiyoshi…Borneo…4943…Army
Myoho…Borneo…4122…Army
Kenkon…Borneo…4575…Army
Nichiran…Borneo…6503…Army
?…Borneo…?…Army
?…Borneo…?…Army
Hokkai…Borneo…8416…Navy
Katori…Borneo…1920…Navy
Tonan…Borneo…9839…Navy
Hankow…Davao…4105…Army
Havana…Davao…5622…Army
Kanko…Davao…2929…Army
Hiteru…Davao…5857…Army
Kuretake…Davao…5175…Army
Liverpool…Davao…5866…Army
Teiryu…Davao…6550…Army
Amagisan…Davao…7620…Navy
Eiko…Davao…3011…Navy
Kinugasa…Davao…8407…Navy
Kirishima…Davao…5840…Navy
Koshin…Davao…6530…Navy
Taito…Davao…4467…Navy
Tatsugami…Davao…7070…Navy
Tenryu…Davao…4861…Navy
Tonan…Davao…19209…Navy
Chaina…Guam…?…Navy
Cirebon…Guam…?…Navy
Daifuku…Guam…3194…Navy
Kuraido…Guam…?…Navy
Matsue…Guam…7061…Navy
Moji…Guam…385…Navy
Nichimi…Guam…?…Navy
Venice…Guam…6571…Navy
Yokohama…Guam…6143…Navy
Teiun…Indochina…5355…Navy
Awajisan…Kota Bharu…9784…Army
Ayatosan…Kota Bharu…9800…Army
Sakura…Kota Bharu…7167…Army
Fushimi…Kra…4936…Army
Ryoyo…Kra…5974…Army
Yamaura…Kra…6789…Army
Miike…Kra…11738…Army
Toho…Kra…4092…Army
Zenyo…Kra…6742…Army
Johoru…Kra…6182…Army
??…Kuching …?…Army
Bengara…Lamon…?…Army
Dai-go…Lamon…5244…Army
Dahban…Lamon…?…Army
Dainichi…Lamon…5813…Army
Kaimei…Lamon…5253…Army
Kayo…Lamon…4369…Army
Kitano…Lamon…7952…Army
Kofuku…Lamon…1919…Army
Lisbon…Lamon…7152…Army
Nagato…Lamon…5901…Army
Nichiren…Lamon…5460…Army
Ryoga…Lamon…5307…Army
Ryoyo…Lamon…5273…Army
Shinsei…Lamon…4734…Army
Shinshu…Lamon…8160…Army
Taiab…Lamon…?…Army
Tatsuno…Lamon…6960…Army
Tofuku…Lamon…5858…Army
Toyama…Lamon…7089…Army
Toyohashi…Lamon…7031…Army
Haruna…Legaspi…10421…Army
Myoko…Legaspi…4103…Army
Shinaogawa…Legaspi…7503…Army
Yasukawa…Legaspi…6710…Army
…Legaspi…4900…Navy
Name…Legaspi…4986…Navy
Barajiru…Lingayen…?…Army
Buyo…Lingayen…5300…Army
Chiyen…Lingayen…?…Army
Eri-I…Lingayen…?…Army
Genkai…Lingayen…?…Army
Havre…Lingayen…5652…Army
Hegu…Lingayen…?…Army
Hokumei…Lingayen…5600…Army
Kizan…Lingayen…5007…Army
Konsan…Lingayen…2733…Army
Maebashi…Lingayen…7005…Army
Nichimei…Lingayen…4769…Army
Ohyoh…Lingayen…?…Army
Pasifkku…Lingayen…?…Army
Shunko…Lingayen…6780…Army
Sidoni…Lingayen…?…Army
Ryunan…Lingayen…5106…Army
Tajima…Lingayen…6995…Army
Tempei…Lingayen…6097…Army
Tokiwa…Lingayen…6971…Army
Tsuyama…Lingayen…6962…Army
Tamakiku…Lingayen…?…Army
Anyo…Lingayen…9257…Army
Arasuka…Lingayen…?…Army
Arizona…Lingayen…9500…Army
Aruzentina…Lingayen…?…Army
Asaka…Lingayen…7399…Army
Atorasu…Lingayen…?…Army
Atsuta …Lingayen…7983…Army
Ginyo…Lingayen…8613…Army
Hamburugu…Lingayen…?…Army
Meian…Lingayen…8617…Army
Hoei…Lingayen…?…Army
Hoeisan…Lingayen…6032…Army
Hotsukawa…Lingayen…?…Army
Kenzan…Lingayen…4704…Army
Koronbia…Lingayen…?…Army
Koyo…Lingayen…3010…Army
Kyokko …Lingayen…7032…Army
Mansei…Lingayen…7770…Army
Miyadono…Lingayen…5196…Army
Mizuho…Lingayen…8506…Army
Nichiwa…Lingayen…4955…Army
Oyama…Lingayen…3809…Army
Reiyo…Lingayen…5445…Army
Rima…Lingayen…7250…Army
Satsuma…Lingayen…3091…Army
Somedono…Lingayen…5148…Army
Teikai…Lingayen…9492…Army
Zenoa…Lingayen…?…Army
Arugun…Lingayen…?…Army
Biyo…Lingayen…5425…Army
Hakushika…Lingayen…8152…Army
Hay…Lingayen…5446…Army
Himaraya…Lingayen…?…Army
Hinan…Lingayen…?…Army
Hokushin…Lingayen…5819…Army
Jinsan…Lingayen…5215…Army
Kashu…Lingayen…5460…Army
Konan…Lingayen…5226…Army
Kusuyama…Lingayen…5306…Army
Mintyuo…Lingayen…?…Army
Momoyama…Lingayen…3103…Army
Montorioru…Lingayen…?…Army
Rakuyo…Lingayen…9500…Army
Tamijima…Lingayen…?…Army
Uchide…Lingayen…5275…Army
Uerusu…Lingayen…?…Army
Yae…Lingayen…6780…Army
Yoneyama…Lingayen…5274…Army
Hakusan…Luzon…10380…Navy
Kimijima…Luzon…?…Navy
Myoko…Luzon…?…Navy
Senko…Luzon…?…Navy
Hirokawa…Patani…6872…Army
Sagami…Patani…7189…Army
Kinka…Patani…9305…Army
Tozan…Patani…8666…Army
Asosan…Patani…6937…Army
Kinugawa…Patani…8812…Army
Shinshu…Singora…8160…Army
Aobasan…Singora…8812…Army
Asaka…Singora…7398…Army
Atsutasan…Singora…8663…Army
Kansai…Singora…8614…Army
Kashii…Singora…8408…Army
Kyushu…Singora…8666…Army
Naminoue…Singora…4731…Army
Nako…Singora…7145…Army
Sado…Singora…7180…Army
Sasago…Singora…7100…Army
Hakabusan…Thailand…6650…Army
Brisbane …Vigan (PI)…5425…Army
Hawaii…Vigan (PI)…6781…Army
Shunko…Vigan (PI)…6100…Army
Oigawa…Vigan (PI)…4282…Army
Takao…Vigan (PI)…5461…Army
Kinryu…Wake…9310…Navy
Kongo…Wake…7043…Navy

Summary:
Invasion…Tons…Unknown
Aparri…....37694…....0
Borneo…..40318....…2
Davao…..103119....…0
Guam…....23354....…4
Kota B…...26751…....0
Kra…........46453....…0
Lamon…..114941…...3
Legaspi….38623…....0
Lingayen..283767…..24
Patani…....47781…....0
Singora….84877….....0
Thailand….6650…......0
Vigan…....28049….....0
Wake…....16353….....0
Gilberts….....0…........4

Total tonnage of known ships – 904,000
Average of known ships: about 6,600 tons.

So, for example, for the Lingayen invasion, 283,767 tons of shipping was identifed and for the other 24 ships, their GRT remained unknown. The Lingayen invasion force was credited at 379,457 in total. But this was done using a very conservative figure for the unknown ships (3,000 tons, IIRC). If the unknown ships were actually about the average of the known invasion transports (6,600 tons), then the Lingayen invasion would have been about 442,000 tons in size, not the 379,000 credited. Ironically, Robdab might have been too conservative in the amount of shipping that could be obtained by not invading the Philippines.

As I was lightly skimming the thread, I noticed that someone had speculated as to the duplication of transports between Malaya and the Philippines. For the most part, since the names of the ships are known, it can be said with certainty that transports were not double-assigned on the early missions. Duplicate ships (same name, with 2 different missions) in the above list comprise 7 ships for 59,743 tons

The biggest mystery is the column, "Malaya, 2nd Wave". Not a single ship is known of this group, and where and when they were used is unknown. The figure was guesstimated from deducting the total Malaya first wave ships from the total shipping devoted to the Malay campaign. The actual Malaya 2nd wave convoys were dispatched so long after the 1st waves that they may have also been composed of 1st wave ships. If so, what the 485,000 tons was used for is unknown. It was not supply; an 80,000 man army consuming 25 lbs per man per day (a generous estimate for the IJA) will cost 30,000 tons per month. At 2.2 measurement tons each, and with the assumption that the ratio for Japanese ships was 1.25 measurement tons per ton, that translates to about 55,000 tons of shipping required, not 485,000. At this time, I suspect that the extra transport might be related to the rush in getting these units to South East Asia before the war.

 

Glenn,
But even if shipping is availiable it still begs the question...isn't projecting power from Japan proper to Oahu far different then simply from Japan to Luzon especially when the Japanese already had bases closeby in Formosa,Chinses mainland and Indochina? Now they did have the Marshalls but they weren't developed anywhere near enough for this type of operation.

 

IMHO the main problem with these scenarios is that hindsight is used too much. Some questions the Japanese have to ask before they even plan to start planning this operation is "Is this a guaranteed operation? If we send the entire Combined Fleet to capture Oahu are we still assured of success?" . IMO the Japanese had to just worry about keeping the Pacific Fleet from interferring with their Southern Operations whench the historical hit & run raid ,they had to strike south in order to get the oil and by striking there( to the South) they were throwing strength against weakness thereby almost being assured of success or at least reasonably so.


In going after Oahu they would be throwing strength against strength and in their minds they know they can't be guaranteed of success in attacking/siezing Oahu and if they don't succeed what then? They would have expended alot of their fleet air arm and battleline ships for nothing and still don't have the oil fields of NEI. We can look back and say maybe heck yes they destroyed our airforces & fleet they should have just went on and landed BUT even they didn't know they would achieve both the surprise & success they did on 12/7/1941 . In fact US incompetence played a large part in their success at Pearl Harbor? Does anybody here care to plan an operation counting on the other side's incompetence? It's very easy to look back but the Japanese at the time had to plan as otherwise ,in fact they figured they could very well loose two of their CV's anyways in planning the operation.

 

Incompetence?.......professional sailors and soldiers are often incompetent, thats why they are given command. *
You referring to the leadership at Pearl Harbor, in the months leading up to the attack of 7 December 1941, as incompetent is no different than me referring to you as a knucklehead.

It's easy to look at things after 68 years and wonder: "What on earth were they thinking?" Especially when their actions are associated with a disaster.

Look at Capt. Charles McVay or the 9/11 Attacks. I was in the Military on Sept. 11, 2001...........does that make me incompetent or were the sailors on the Indianappolis incompetent?

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were acting appropriately for the threat "they" perceived at the time. Let's not forget it was a Sneek attack. The very definition of sneeky means to be conducted without notice.

Incompetent is a strong word and I disagree with your usage of it.

* Italics used to infer sarcasm

 

The idea of the original poster of an immediate attack against Oahu is unsustainable for doctrinal and operational reasons. Doctrinally, it was against everything the Imperial army had learned to throw a major invasion against the enemy’s primary defenses prior to establishing control of the sea and air. It simply would not have been done. Operationally, some in the thread pooh-poohed the difficulties inherent to undertaking so many crucial missions at once, but the Japanese did not. (These difficulties were pointed out numerous times by many posters, to no avail).

At Midway, both 1st Air Fleet and Combined Fleet were deeply concerned that Kido Butai had two potential simultaneous missions (suppression of Midway and destruction of enemy carriers). Here, it was coldly proposed that the carriers could take on as many as 6 different missions at once. (Destruction of enemy surface fleet, destruction of enemy carrier task forces, elimination of enemy land based air. Support of invading army units. Interdiction of coastal artillery fortifications. Protection of friendly convoy and surface combat units.) Any plan that simply piles such difficulties one on top of the other willy-nilly isn't worth a moment's consideration.

In terms of distance of projection to the combat theatre, the issue wasn’t shipping so much as it was oil. At 6 million tons, the Japanese merchant fleet would require about 1 million tons of oil to move 6,000 NM. The Japanese started with 6 million tons in their reserve. Assuming unlimited oil available, a ship might be able to move 36,000 miles in a year. But with only 6 million tons in stock, 18,000 miles per ship is a more reasonable guess. If you are fighting 750 miles from your base, your shipping is about 4.4 times more efficient in terms of tons of "stuff" it can deliver per ton of oil it burns (in comparison to an operation at 3,300 miles from your base).

 

You know something???/ Your right,very very right and I apologise if I offended you or anybody else that certainly wasn't my intention. I certainly used the wrong word . I Should have said the Japanese couldn't count on the US making all the mistake it did on 12/7/1941 or at the very least everything going right as it did for them on that fateful morning.

 

I would almost word it the way it has been hisorically:
"The Japanese did not know how successful their attack would be".

All the alledged incompetence and mistakes were the result of the ensuing investigations. The defenders of Oahu and Pearl Harbor were doing nothing inapropriate for the time and context of Hawaii in December 1941. I am sure if Adm Kimmel and Gen. Short were provided the same information the the congressional panels and Naval boards, who investigated the events of 7, December 1941, had they would have been much more proactive than they were. Again this is an example of Hindsight being 20/20.

Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were given a 10,000 piece jigsaw puzzle with no box or picture for reference and were expected to do their best with the information they were provided. The Congressional Investigative panels and Naval Boards had the box with a picture and easily assembled the pieces.

It is very easy to nit pick and criticize someone when you know what the results are.

Is it a puzzle of a tiger or a box of Frosted Flakes?........you don't know until you open the box.

 

Keep in mind too that things were done on the international stage much differently in 1941 than they are done today. Sneak attacks were considered bad form and not at all cricket. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were awaiting an official Japanese Declaration of War that they felt sure was coming in the next few days because of threatening Japanese convoy and troop movements towards Malaya and Hong Kong. This was where they felt that the war would begin, because that is what their intelligence operatives in both Washington and the Pacific were informing them.

The closest information that either Short or Kimmel received indicating Japanese intentions was a final war warning issued from Washington early on 7 December that was sent via Western Union Telegram, rather than by normal US Military communications, because atmospheric conditions had knocked out the undersea cable with Hawaii. The vital Western Union Telegram was not marked "most urgent" and as a result, was handled like any other everyday mail, until it was found after the attack in an "In-Box"at Kimmel and Short's headquarters.

 

The gist of the case against Kimmel and Short is that their duty to safeguard Oahu was severe, not diminished by a lack of specific intelligence as to Japanese intentions. While it is true that practically the entire defense establishment assumed the main blow would fall in South East Asia, at each individual outpost in the Eastern Pacific it was the responsibility of that command to think that they would be the target. That is to say, if the Panama Canal had been attacked in some fantastical scheme on the 7th, it would be no defense for the local commander to complain that he didn't bother with patrol because he assumed his territory immune from the attentions of the enemy.

 

Here is an interesting "abridged" six page report on the Pearl Harbor Hearings from the Time magazine of 1945.

Pearl Harbor Report, 1945

See:

Pearl Harbor Report: Who Was to Blame? - TIME

In those six pages the "blame" gets spread around pretty well, from the men in DC (including politicians), to the men on station at Oahu.

 

The Japanese planes managed to duck under the radar of the North Shore, but a landing force, not that well. The radar operators on the North Shore thought the incoming Japanese planes were US planes coming from the mainland. If radar or sonar detected a Japanese landing force, then US troops on the ground would have time to prepare for the attack and fight them off. If the Japanese wanted to take out Honolulu, they would either have to:

a.land at the North Shore and walk over or around the Ko'olau mountains
b.land the troops at Waikiki
c.land the troops at Ford Island or
d.air-drop the troops all over military bases to completely eliminate the military presence

Besides, an air attack is simple and sometimes hard to detect. A landing force, however, is easy to find. Adding invasion to the Pearl Harbor attack would be too complicated to handle.

 

Will this thread never die?

 

Harry Turtledove's End of the beginning?

I think the U.S could have responded without have Pearl under control it would have taken longer and some ships from the Atlantic Fleet would need to be transferred over. But i think a counter attack by the U.S. could easily overrun and Japanese troops that landed on the Island's.