What would have happened if Hitler would have decided not to postpone operation Barbarossa

None taken

It has more to do with asnswering A-58's question about his History professor's willingness to change his "B" to an "A".

lwd : They don't

As far as the thread topic:

Less German soldiers would have frozen to death and Germany would have had to retreat in the winter instead of the spring.

 

Some here might find this enlightening...... Russia only had about 3000 miles of paved roads in 1941. Making any kind of Blitzkrieg impossible when the spring showers came down.

 

So, is that good or bad?

 

Check your PMs

 

Sorry to dredge up this old thread...Stolfi's 'Hitler's Panzers East' is an excellent 'what-if' about whether or not the capture of Moscow and speeding up of the attack would have made a difference. Crete, not really. The forces committed were too small. However, by-passing the Kiev salient and relying on the Pripet marshes and mobile forces to protect the flanks while Guderian drove on Moscow...that might have made all the difference. The spearheads HAD to be stopped for a little while, they were badly eroded and needed rest. But 10-14 days would have done it. Stolfi posits that once Moscow were taken it would then have been necessary to take the entire line of the Volga. Interesting theory, more than worth reading.

 

I should not put any faith in Stolpi;I have read some devastating critiques on Stolpi,but I will not repeat them (I am a polite man).
Stolpi is the archetype of the operationalist,with nothing than contempt for logistic problems .

 

Stolfi's book dazzles the layman, but shrinks in the light of real analysis. The manner in which he treats the transportation issue(s) is completely deplorable and enough in and of itself to make his work pure fantasy.

The four weeks that are in question here weren't lost because of the Balkan's campaign, the scale of Barbarossa compared to the Balkan's operation is apples to oranges. The Axis preperations/deployments for Barbarossa were continuing as fast as they possibly could during the Balkan's operation which basically makes the "4 weeks" an overstatement. The Balkan operation was basically done by 30 April leaving only Crete to finish off for the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine while the Army units were all redeployed (only 2 divisions did not make it by 22 June and they were held in reserve). The Balkan operation might have cost 2 weeks for Barbarossa, but the ultimate issue for Barbarossa was logistical failure after Smolensk was reached.

 

Wrong. It's dependent on the geometry you are using.

 

by-passing the Kiev salient and relying on the Pripet marshes and mobile forces to protect the flanks while Guderian drove on Moscow

This is the essential flaw in the whole discussion, that it all revolves around Guderian and his dozen or so divisions. This stems from the prominence of Guderian's memoir in histories of the campaign and the dramatic scene with Hitler debating "Moscow or Kiev?" as if the entirety of German power in the east could only be directed one or the other. In fact, the Germans conducted two simultaneous army group level offensives. While Guderian and von Kleist were destroying the Russian concentration around Kiev, an army group spearheaded by Panzer Groups 3 and 4 advanced a distance comparable to encircling Moscow from a start line around Smolensk. Unfortunately it was directed on Leningrad and Tikhvin, but it covered the distance, over tougher terrain with poorer transportation - roads and railroads on the way to Moscow were as good as they got in Russia.

protect the flanks reflects another misconception, which appeared in the pre-Barbarossa war games (conducted, ironically, by von Paulus). These predicted a pause around Smolensk, mainly for logistic reasons, and a demand by both Army Groups North and South for a "loan" of panzers from AG Center. The implication was that the situations on both flanks were analogous and that the same response should be made to both. In fact they were vastly different. The axis of advance was not directly east but ENE, Warsaw-Moscow. Viewed this was there essentially was no left flank; the front extended continuously to the Baltic coast. There were fewer Russian forces in the north to threaten an advance on Moscow, and that advance itself would largely cut them off since most transportation arteries flowed through Moscow - a curious situation in which the advance actually secures it own flank.

The south was vastly different. AG Center was already some 200 miles beyond the Russian concentration around Kiev, and this flank would get longer as the advance continued. Beyond the Russian armies on the right was most of the rest of Russia's insustry and population, with rail, road, and river transportation to feed in troops and supplies. The greatest danger to the Germans was a strike from the south as they pressed their advance in the center.

The alternate strategy would have been to conduct the Kiev operation as they did, but instead of shifting PzG 3 north, bring PzG 4 south, and make the companion offensive in AG Center. The Kiev operation would support the main offensive, allow PzG 1 to play a useful role, and allow Guderian to make his next move just as he did historically, further supporting the central drive by encircling the Russian armies around Bryansk.

Historically the Germans executed two phases of successful attack, one before and one after the fall rainy season. Each comprised two simultaneous operations: Kiev and Leningrad, Bryansk and Vyazma (the Vyazma "cauldron battle" covered 3/4 of the distance from Smolensk to Moscow). This could just as easily have been Kiev and Vyazma, Bryansk and Moscow.

 

Very interesting.
I have read a counter factual similar to this which ends up with the Germans taking heavy losses in Moscow and withdrawing.
This tied in with no Balkan campaign, an earlier start date to Barbarossa and the use of minor Axis troops namely the Italians as street fighting cannon fodder Moscow may well have been taken.

 

Thanks. People sometimes equate Moscow in 1941 with Stalingrad, but my thought was that Moscow would be another battle of encirclement, whereas Stalingrad remained the front line, with the Russians able to feed in troops and supplies despite the Germans' best efforts to stop them. The best analogy to Moscow '41 would be the other battles that year like Smolensk, Kiev, or Vyazma, all of which ended up with the encircled Soviets capitulating. I also think 1941 was probably the only chance the Germans had to take Moscow. No one was going to ring a bell and declare them the winner, but it was probably the best thing they could do to conclude Barbarossa and prepare for the next year's campaign.

I think they misused Italian and other allied troops, most notably of course in 1942. Second-rate troops (no offense intended) should have been used in secondary sectors to free up German units for the decisive battles.

 

Second-rate troops WERE used in 1942 in secondary sectors to free up German units for the decisive battles:at the battle of Stalingrad,German allies were protecting the flanks.

 

Second-rate troops WERE used in 1942 in secondary sectors to free up German units for the decisive battles:at the battle of Stalingrad,German allies were protecting the flanks.

True, but that's precisely where I think they went wrong. Those sectors, especially along the Don, were right in the path of the obvious, nearly inevitable Soviet counterstroke in the direction of Rostov.

Perhaps I should have been clearer; they should have been nowhere near the main offensive, at least not in such numbers and absolutely not lined up Hungarian, Italian, Romanian. Use them in AG Center or North, maybe down the Caucasus mopping up behind von Kliest's 1 PzArmee. For that matter, if they occupied the Caucasus, Sevastopol would be isolated; they could save building up for a major assault, leave a few Romanian divisions to screen it, and put Manstein's 11 Armee where it could do some good.

 

"Unfortunately" I think there were no secondary fronts. Manstein was supposed to attack and take Leningrad, however the Red Army made a big offensive and Manstein had his hands full stopping that. Also in the AGC sector the Red Army was pushing hard to destroy AGC. Somehow Model was able to counter that. So there was no "easy place" in the Ostfront. The biggest problem I see is that Hitler thought the Red Army was running out of men, and did not take into account Gehlen´s warnings about the soon-to-be attack by the Red Army. The mistake in the first place was to divert troops to Caucasus AND Stalingrad.

 

An important detail not addressed here is that while the Panzer Groups moved to the flanks to help AGN/AGS the rump of AGC stayed static and still could not be properly supplied. While the PZ Groups conducted lengthy movements, they were assisting Army Groups that had enough logistical transit capacity to supply their large Infantry Armies in offensive operations. In order for AGC to move forward as a whole, the base of its front needed to be broadend to facillitate enough logistical support via converted rail to rear area corps depots (support for all of AGC cannot be funneled through a single depot, there must be many along the length of the Army Group). At the time of the Kiev operation there was not enough logistical transit capacity to supply AGC in major offensive operations in the direction of Moscow.

 

Well of course we have to tae the Russian Winter into effect. German units without the proper winter weather gear and the screeching halt of supplies crippled the movement of the German military. IMO if the invasion was started early enough the Germans could have been outside Moscow before the snow fell. With the capture of Moscow I do not think the Soviet regime would have caved in. What would take place would be the largest guerilla war in history. The Germans would not be able to take the whole of Russia anyway due to logistical problems and the mere size of Russia.

 

"German units without the proper winter weather gear ":I do not think the Germans needed winter gear in october and november.
In fact,the importance of the winter (not that severe as generally is assumed )is much overestimated to become something mythological :the Germans at the point of capturing Moscow,and ...suddenly the winter fell in.
The German offensive was already stopped at the end of november(before the winter)by the tough Russian resistance .
But,of course,in the popular imagination,it was caused by the winter,as Napoleon was defeated by the winter (anotner ineradicable myth )

 

They should have used the Romanians in Stalingrad in full where their poor anti-tank equipment wouldn’t matter as much.
If Moscow was surrounded and attacked the Italians, Hungarians and Slovakians should have been used in the street fighting for the same reason.
The German could then hold the flanks.

 

The tough Russian resistance was one part of the failure of Barbarossa, but in the end it all comes back to an inadequate logistical support plan that was based on shallow and incorrect intelligence estimates. The Heer in front of Moscow was at the end of its logistical tether, the Red Army didn't have to do much to stop them in late November. The December counter-attack is what really brought the winter factor into play on the Germans. If the Wehrmacht had been able to just sit tight in winter positions without having to fight major combat they would not have had the monumental issues with the winter weather. The Red Army simply forced them out into the cold and they weren't equipped for it. Winter weather had nothing to do with the failure of Barbarossa, the issue was decided before December.

 

Even with the capture of Moscow, nothing would change. The real ultimate goal of the German army should have been the destruction of Russian forces as territory meant nothing when your enemy can retreat basically indefinitely. So the 4 weeks would have no effect except a few extra hundred miles to retreat on the way back, even less with the rasputista.