Which did more to win the war?

Also note that this post by "mcoffee" was in response to "Carronade", not yourself.

 

I'm aware of that; if someone has something pertinent to say, does that mean it should go unsaid?

 

No, what (it seems to me) should be done is reply to posts directed at yourself if you are going to use the "quote" option, if you are pointing out something you yourself posted, but not in reply to posts directed at others. Simply to maintain continuity in replies and responses.

In this case I think it would be more apropos to simply refer to (not quote) the post by another member instead of using it for your introduction.

This opinion shouldn't be left "unsaid" exactly, but it should be posted in the proper context of the previous posts and threads; that is all I'm pointing out, i.e. Note where I've put the emphasis in your post. "mcoffee" wasn't replying to you is all, so your reply wasn't directed at the proper member.

 

This question comes from a member not well versed in the air war, so please don't laugh too much.

Did Germany's searchlights have any real affect on the RAF missions at night?

After reading Speer's book, I found that very late in the war Hitler had kind of an obsession with flak guns. I was just wondering if search lights were a big priority throughout the war as well to help out those guns.

 

Actually - I was replying to "mcoffee's" statement, which I believe I'm free to do - and I also believe that he should be able to recognise his own words when quoted.

To continue - noone had dedicated longrange bomber escorts when they began their respective wars; the Americans weren't alone in this lack. The Luftwaffe had at least the Bf110....but escort wasn't its main role - or as the BoB proved (and events in Poland and France before that) it's best ALL airforces believed that their heavier bombers could self-defend in box formation....and some, like the Do17, were actually quite good at it in an early war context (see thread on Bomber defensive armament), while some - like the Vickers Wellington proving itself abysmal over the German Bight in late 1939 - just weren't suitable.

Interestingly - the British never actually developed a true longrange fighter escort for their bombers; they did manage to stretch the range of the Spitfire significantly, yes....but not for nighttime use, and certainly not as far as Berlin The Mosquito NF came close - but not quite as an "escort", more as a freehunter accompanying the Bomber Stream to knock down LW nightfighters....just as the LW intended its Bf109s to do over England at first in the BoB

 

To answer an earlier question, I don't believe searchlights had that much of an effect as compared to radar assisted flak and night fighters.

My main point is one I brought up before but don't think anyone commented on. We are all agreed that both the AAF and the RAF caused significant damage to Germany's war effort with their bombing but it was the USAAF that made the main contribution to defeating the Lutwaffe which was a major part of the strategic bombing campaign. In the first five months of 1944 we gained almost total air superiority over Europe by the efforts of AAF fighters and bombers. I think it could even be said that the RAF efforts were close to defeat by March of 1944 (Nuremburg) and that it was only after large numbers of German night fighters were destroyed when the were thrown in against our daylight raids that the threat to Britains night raids decreased.

 

That's a little simplistic, it was more of a joint effort. I can't use 'we' as I wasn't there, but one could equally say that the 8th AF effort was blunted ( I shan't say defeated ) by Schweinfurt II (August 1943) until Big Week (February 44). The Nachtjagd suffered more at the hands of the later Marks of Mosquito than by wholesale daylight losses.

 

It was thanks to the Blitz that Bomber Command realised that bombing the workers houses, and public utilities (gas, water, sanitation) had more longer term distruptive effect on production than bombing the actual factories.

 

The design goal of both the Spitfire and the Bf 109 was as a short ranged interceptor. Both were excellent aircraft for their stated purposes.

The original design goal of the P-40 was as a low altitude ground support and coastal defense fighter. At the time the P-40 was designed, the prospect of high-altitude air attack on the Continental US was not considered a possibility, and the Pacific was considered the Navy's playground. The P-40 was obsolete by European standards by the time the prototype flew, and its combat radius was nothing to brag about. Later versions had increased range, but the P-40 design never caught up with the competition.

 

....and both, despite their range issues, ended up being used extensively as bomber escorts Which was my point, really - noone designed a bomber escort before or in the very early years of the war; they pressed other types into the role that were to a lesser or greater degree unsuited to it. It wasn't an American failing...everybody did it!

 

I'm sorry but I can't agree. Based on claims made by both groups, more nightfighters were destroyed by USAAF in the air and on the ground than by the RAF. US fighters not only shot down large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters in the air but devastated German airfields with low level attacks. I am not trying to say that USAAF was the only reason for the German defeat in the air, but I do believe that the numbers speak for themselves. Because of their great range advantage over RAF fighters, the 8th and 9th AF fighter groups destroyed a great many more aircraft in 1943-45 and contributed to the gaining of air superiority over Europe, perhaps the most important single effect of the allied strategic bombing campaign.

 

Fair enough, but can we have some sources ? I'm unaware of the USAAF's efforts ahainst the Nachtjagd in 1943 and early '44 - which airfields were targeted and when ? I have plenty of information for 100 Group but not for the 8th and 9th AF.....

 

RAF efforts close to defeat?

This sounds like The Army Air Corps blowing their own trumpet.

Until the advent of the Mustang, the Luftwaffe well and truly controlled their own airspace, and inflicted higher losses on the AAF. Raids like Nuremburg or Leipzig were exceptions to the rule.

The Army Air Corps certainly didn't win it alone. It's typical of their own bloated self opinion that they would percieve this as such at the time, and now.

 

I was unaware that the Army Air Corps (or the USAAF for that matter) ever issued a position statement to that effect. And the Air Corps being "old school", wouldn't they have used a bugle instead of a trumpet?

I don't agree with the "..close to defeat" statement and neither did the GAF who viewed 30/31 March as a happy confluence of favorable (for them) conditions.

Ah, the old 'Mustang saved the Daylight Campaign' myth. One of my pet peeves, but getting far from the original topic. Maybe a subject for a new thread.

 

Returning to this thread....I've been re-reading Aders' 'History Of The German Night-Fighter Force' which offers some interesting views, if not exact loss figures.

Aders credits the eventual defeat of the Nachtjagd primarily to two factors ; the overwhelming Allied use of electronic countermeasures ( citing the British lead in this field ) and the successful USAAF attacks on the Romanian oilfields. Discussing the period mid-1944 to Spring 1945, Aders states ; -

'...during this period operational availability reached a level believed impossible only a few months before, because for the first time ground crews had an opportunity to look after their aircraft properly. Even the mounting losses caused by Allied starfing attacks could be quickly made good because until the end of 1944 both the aircraft and component part industries reported ever-increasing production figures...' ( pp.167-168 ).

 

This was certainly a large factor since by 1945, the Germans were having severe pilot shortages. The training time decreased dramatically and there were a lot of half-trained German 17 year olds flying by then, with proportionate losses and effectiveness.
However the major factor was not a shortage of aircraft (Speer was a production genius and somehow kept them cranking out til the end of the war) or even a pilot shortage, but lack of fuel.
The Russians had overrun the Ploesti refinery, in Rumania, by 1944 and while the Germans did have several other synthetic oil plants, Ploesti was the major refinery Hitler depended on for German fuel. Even Hitler knew that with the loss of Ploesti Germany was doomed.

 

Change that to "many"....

As late as April 1945, Heinrich Fey the defector was able to tell the Americans about FIVE more synthetic fuel plants they hadn't heard of before!

AHF member "kurfurst" - now departed - used to run a website devoted to the Me109...sadly that site too is now defunct. On it, in the technical appendices, he had posted up the Allied intelligence reports compiled at the end of the war on german POL production and storage. As of VE Day, the Germans had over a quarter of a million tons of aviaition spirit for their prop fighters bunkered! And similarly large amounts of RP1 and 2 etc...

The problem wasn't by 1945 that they didn't have it - it was that it couldn't be moved around Germany because of Allied interdiction to where it was needed

 

Even if that were true - and I have my doubts - 250,000 tons sounds like a lot until it is examined in context.

Josef Schmid's works on the German Air Force vs. the Western Allies have considerable information about German supplies of aviation gasoline. In his position he obviously had a vested interest in avgas.

As of the beginning of May 1944, the Luftwaffe had total stocks of 540,000 tons of aviation gasoline. Monthly usage for the first 6 months of 1944 averaged 150,000 tons per month.

Aircraft gasoline production peaked in March 1944 with 214,000 tons. By June 1944, production was down to 74,250 tons. As of 1 July 1944, total Luftwaffe stock of avgas was down to 218,000 tons which included the June production. And the Allied oil campaign had not yet hit full stride.

On 17 June 1944, the Commander in Chief, Air Fleet Reich issued the following orders:
“The gasoline situation and the present rate of consumption at the fronts necessitate the imposition of immediate measure to save gasoline. Only by making utmost reductions, above all in general air activity, and also in operations will it be possible to overcome the present situation. Unnecessary use of gasoline is equivalent to sabotaging the war effort. I request all generals commanding corps to exercise strict and absolute supervision of all air traffic within their areas of responsibility.
Travel by air, even flights by top-level personalities, must be restricted to flights that are absolutely essential to the war effort. Even major delays, caused by the use of means of transportation that save gasoline must be taken into account. Other means of transportation, used in good time, will be substituted for air transportation. Gasoline quotas for motor vehicles will be sharply reduced. Motor vehicle gasoline will be used exclusively for carrying out missions essential to the war effort.”

Again, without context this is meaningless. Exactly what was the output of these unknown plants? They were obviously very minor plants when the total production of synthetic fuel is examined.

Synthetic production of avgas peaked at about 180,000 tons in March 1944. Natural production was essentially lost in August 1944 with the fall of Ploesti. Synthetic production dropped to 5,300 tons in September 1944 and never rose above 35,400 tons (November 1944) for the rest of the war.

Schmid put total avgas stocks at 218,000 tons in July 1944. Production stayed far below demand for the rest of the war. Do you wonder why I'm skeptical of the 250,000 ton stock at the end of the war?

 

The context is simple - in the last three months of the war, the LW daily sortie rate was falling away steadily - but production at the synthfuel plants was continuing. What they were producing wasn't getting used at anything like the rate it was in the summer of 1944

Actually, the point wasn't their total output - the point was that the poster I was answering noted that the Germans had only "several" synthfuel plants; in actual fact, they had far more than the Allies knew about until the last weeks of the war.

That's the problem - "demand" was local, on-the-spot....and thus couldn't be filled because of the Allied air interdiction.

 

And, of course, you can provide references showing that supply was greater than demand?