Who saved Moscow in December, 1941?

I do not think we can fault/blame any single person, event, action or condition. It was a combination of things that prevented a capture of Moscow in 1941.

 

A number of sources I checked on line stated 19 miles. A quick google will find this.

From what I've read the weather wasn't all that bad in Novemeber. A and C were IMO clearly factors although there were others. Part of the German problem was that although some units got that close they couldn't get that close in strength to do much more. This was not just do to A and C but to logistics problems and the threat of Soviet forces on the flanks. There may also have been some realization at the local level that they could get a few miles closer but in doing so would leave themselves unable to hold what they had taken.

 

correction:it was mainly C,because,every month,there were less Germans,and ...more Russians.
The Germans started with 3.2 million (OKH reserves included)
june :casualties :94000 replacements :none
july:casualties:182000 replacements :none
august :casualties :234000 replacements :none
september:casualties:189000 replacements 277000
october:casualties:180000 replacements :78000
november:casualties :157000 replacements :55000
december:casualties :168000 replacements :14000
the casualties are KIA,WIA and MIA +sick
the dates of the replacements mean the periods the replacements were send to the front,not the dates they arrived to the front .
if we take june as index,we have
june 100
october 87
january :80
bear in mind that most losses happened in the infantry,the situation of which was disastrous .

 

But that's a rational for it being both A and C.

 

Did the German Generals advise Hitler to put back from Moscow and adopt a more flexable defence till spring 1942, or was that army group south after Staligrad

 

Just in order to realize how important is the above post, take a look to wikipaedia about waffen ss article : <<The war in the Soviet Union proceeded well at first, but the cost to the Waffen-SS was extreme: the Leibstandarte by late October was at half strength due to enemy action and dysentery that swept through the ranks.[36] Das Reich had lost 60% of its strength and was still to take part in the Battle of Moscow, and was decimated in the following Soviet offensive. The Der Führer Regiment was reduced to 35 men out of the 2,000 that had started the campaign in June.>>
Of course we must not forget the post from IRU about the extraordinary Russian defence and counter attack just in front of Moscow. Especially what mentioned about the sailors.

 

about Das Reich,a report from 24 march 1942,is giving the following:
22 june 1941:19026
replacements: 5911
losses: 12898
rest :12039,of whom 4716 sick
for Totenkopf :
22 june :17265
replacements:5029
losses:10976
rest:11318,of whom 1649 sick

 

I recall at least Rundstedt advised that to Hitler in late 1941.

 

The Balkan/Greek delay yes; Hitler's most catastrophic mistake Then there was the cost of occupation-8 divisions in Yugo alone- at the outset and more as the guerrilla wars snowballed. Small countries can have huge consequences. http://www.ww2f.com/eastern-europe/27913-draza-mihailovic-man-who-saved-russia.html
JeffinMNUSA

 

I agree that the Germans had troops tied up in the Balkans, an area that Hitler hoped would come under the Italain control, but having said that, these troops along with the five Divisions stationed in Norway (13 Divisions in all) could ony delay the Soviet advance and would off crumbled.
But would the 6th Army or army group north have done any better with these extra troops I dont know. one questio I would like to pose was why did Hitler waste his army in the struggle for Stalingrad, they should of tried to bypass it like the German army of old, but Hitler wanted a prize, the prize of taking the city what bore the name of Stalin, looking at it now in 2011, the waste of German Divisions by Hitler in 1942 was crazy, not counting the 13 divisions in Balkans and Norway, they could have saved 100,000 men from captivity in Tunisia if Hitler orgered a withdrawel when the game was up there, these troops along with the loss of the 6th army was major blow to the German war machine, they were battle hardend troops which the German army had to make up with raw recruits.

 

Stalingrad had to be taken,because it was a Russian bridge-head.
In june 1942,there were 12 divisions in Norway and 5 in the Balkans.Of course,these divisions could not be withdrawen.
My assumption is that the divisions at Stalingrad could no more be withdrawn after august 1942,because they were committed in heavy street fighting,and,besides,where would be the new frontline ?
I don't see the significence of the German troops in Tunis for Stalingrad .

 

Safe to say that A+B=C? It's not suprising that the smaller countries caused some of the biggest problems for Germany. Earlier I said that in my opinion that another factor in the German defeat was pointless bloodshed that lead to no strategic gain.

 

you got me ! it was both

 

I don't think that the delay (some 3 weeks) caused by the Balkan intervention-the bad weather,whatever,was that important in the failure of Barbarossa .
The Germans planned to start as soon as possible after the spring Rasputitza,to defeat the SU in the summer,and after some replenishment,in the remaining time during which operations were possible,to advance as far as was possible(the ideal situation being at the A-A line)
Phase A would be :1 june start -10 august defeat of the Rusian Army,10 august-1 september :replenishment
Phase B would be :1 september-1 december:the mop up and advancing to the A-A line .
All would depend on phase A,if this failed,there would be no place for B,and a new start of A in september was very unlikely to succeed,because Germany would be to weak and the SU to strong,and,even if A succeeded between september and december,there would be no time for phase B,and,both were indespensable for the success of Barbarossa .
Even if the Germans could start earlier,they only could fight 10 weeks,and ,during the 10 weeks,the Red Army had to be defeated;if it was not defeated,game was over,Barbarossa had failed .

 

I agree for the most part, but I wouldn't call the Soviet defence a "strong defense" to mean that the Red Army was highly effective at any given time. To paraphrase Halder, he said something to the effect of; " If we destroy a dozen enemy divisions, he simply puts up a dozen more. They may not be equipped or led to our standards, but they are there nonetheless". If you look at the German losses of the first 10-12 weeks and balance that with the replacements they recieved over the course of Barbarossa (until Dec. 1941) you can see that the planners in the Intel section set up the planners in the Personnel section to fail. The personnel replacement shortfall (numerically speaking) starts after the seizure of Smolensk and the beginning of the Red Army counterattacks in August in that area (especially Yelnya area).

I would call it:
A -"Persistant" Soviet defense
B -Inadequate preparation leading to critical shortages/prolonged campaign
C -Weather

A+B+C = Wehrmacht too weakend/attrited to seize Moscow in late November

 

Additional to above opinions, the fight in the Eastern Front was bloody from the beginning; or even precisesly, it was splatter from the beginning. However no matter if the Red Army was bleeding 10 times more than Wermacht (calculating the POW's also). Russian could afford it but Wermacht could not.
Americans gave a lot of material to Russians (vehicles, tanks, supplies, armor). I think this was not just for help. This was on purpose. I think that they knew that like during WW1 they would have to fight some day the Germans. Material can kill men. Someone-cannot recall who- said give them what they need. We need 2 days to make a truck, 3 days to make a tank, 4 days to make a ship but they need 20 years to make a good soldier!! No matter the weather, the ammonition, the supplies etc. ....Wermacht needed trained men. Hitler after 3-4 years of war just moved coloured flags on a map. Divisions which were only at name divisions. So recruitment was another reason of German's failure.

 

What did Hitler say, Kick the door in and the whole rotten lot will fall down, what a mistake that was.

 

That makes better sense. But that brings up another question, even if the Germany army was prepared to face a winter, would they have been abale to seize Moscow.

 

I think that they had to take Moscow in 1941 to have any chance of victory in the east, I cannot see many countries able to carry on fighting on such a scale as the Soviets did in 1942 with there capitol and command centre in the enemys hands, but having read the replys so far we can see that was impossible to achive, the Germans had given it there best shot, and thats not taking into account Hitlers intervention at crucial stages moving forces from one area to another.

 

Prior to December of 1941 (and after the initial attacks) form previous discussions I've seen it's not at all clear that Hitler's impact on the war was negative.