Yamamoto, genius?

The tonnage lost during the Gaudalcanal campaign was almost identical. I can't remember the exact numbers but I think the IJN actually lost a bit more although the US lost more ships (the two battleships lost being the difference). I'm not sure I'd call that getting ones "butt kicked". Tactically both sides could claim some losses and some victories but again on the strategic level it was a decisive defeat for Japan.

 

Competent, perhaps, but no Genius.

He is considered so I suspect for his 'Sleeping Giant" comment attributed to him and his early demise from a long range fighter interception/ambush. Looking dispassionately at his record offers a better insight I think.

Pearl Harbor. Certainly bold and risky, but hardly novel. In essence it is a rehash of the Russo-Japanese war opening strike at Port Arthur in 1905. Togo used Torpedo Boat Destroyers (then a new and somewhat untested weapon) to cripple the Russian Pacific fleet. Pearl Harbor could have been a disaster if the Battleships had been out of the harbor or if they got caught by US carriers in a similar situation as Midway. Modern consensus is that Strategically, Pearl Harbor was a failure.

Indian Ocean raid. Very little accomplished for the fuel, wear and tear on the fleet and attrition of flight crews.

Coral Sea. Tactical victory, Strategic loss. Did not have to be. If you suspect the enemy has 2-3 operable carriers, why send 2 and a half to a vital objective?

Midway. Any comment necessary?

Solomon's. Too little too often, fighting the kind of battle they didn't want to fight.

 

good point on the Solomons....they thought they could beat the ''weak'' Americans...could they have brought overwhelming force into action at the Canal?

 

Overall, the U.S. won the day, but the butt kicking I was specific about Savo, and perhaps Tassafaronga.

 

They eventually dispatched about three divisions' worth of troops, and they had the shipping to carry them, if they could just keep those pesky Americans from sinking it For some reason they grossly underestimated the American strength on Guadalcanal, even though they could count the transport ships. Maybe if they'd made a realistic estimate of the problem and a concerted effort to deal with it.

 

Regarding what bronk said in post 20: at the time they were still kind of trying to get their industry in gear for war, so at the time the US industry wasn't quite producing at full capacity, so the USN had to be careful with losses. That is why the loss of the Lexington was a hard hit, because we had a small carrier force and we had to be careful with our carriers. So at that time, it would have taken a bit of time to make up for those losses.

 

Actually I think at that point we were pretty close to full capacity it's just that carriers take a while to build. The first 3 Essex class carriers were ordered in July of 1940 and layed down in 41. Now the capacity was also increasing at this time so it may depend on how you want to define "full" capacity.

Refernces for the above in case anyone wants them:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essex-class_aircraft_carrier
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Essex_(CV-9)

 

Don't forget that, at the time, battleships were considered more important than aircraft carriers, and you had the 4 South Dakotas and 4 Iowas occupying slips that may have gone to carrier construction. 3 of the 4 SoDaks would be launched in 1941(June, November, and September), amd Alabama, Iowa, and New Jersey would all go down the ways in 1942. But, here you see the change in priorities...The Wisconsin would not be launched until December '43, with the Missouri following in January 1944(the first 2 Iowas will spend a little over 2 years before launching, but the last 2 take 3 years to launch).

 

And the Montannas get canceled hard to explain the Alaskas though.

 

was the US on wartime production pre-Pearl H ?, yes/no?

 

at the time of Pearl the Us was starting to gear up for war. They were still in the setting up the things needed to start building all the factories needed. Coral Sea was a disaster for Japan because they could not make good the pilot losses and the fleet left the area around Pearl because there was no way to rearm and most ships needed refueling

 

as someone stated before, he said he could go for 6 months, after that, he didn't know....did he have any plans for post-Midway???

 

Yes, the naval shipyards were operating at or very near full capacity for large warships.

 

Bronk7, as to your question, did Japan have plans for past 6 months? Yes and no

They did, but during the period called 'Victory Disease' by some Japanese, they began increasingly to improvise based on in part opportunities and threats as they perceived them.

Worse it is hard to equate Japanese actions in the Solomon's with their overall strategy. The plan in a nut shell was to seize area's ripe with resources, and those islands necessary for their defense, build them up and wait for the inevitable allied response. Once that response was begun, they were supposed to bring enough force to the point of attack, crush it decisively and wait for the next. Hopefully one or two such debacles would convince America and her allies that a negotiated solution would be acceptable.

Japan never quite brought enough force to do the job at Guadalcanal or New Guinea. To be fair they had lost 2 thirds of their Fleet aviation at Midway and faced not one but two offensive threats, but they still had land based aviation, rough parity in carrier aviation and a advantage in battleships (including at least 1 super dreadnought).

Clearly Guadalcanal and New Guinea were 'offensive responses', but Japan always seemed to hold back from a full commitment of all her assets. Compare these with allies responses to Coral Sea, Midway and Port Moresby and a clear difference seems to present itself. Yamamoto commanded throughout this period, so ultimately he must be held accountable.

 

they didn't have a chance, so whatever Yammy did, wasn't going to stop the US from kicking some a@@

 

Long term yes, but in late 1942 and early 1943 they still had rough parity with the US. Assets, used properly could have turned the tide in New Guinea or the Canal, at least for awhile. The US could still suffer a defeat or two and successfully prosecute the war. Japan need to win a succession of battles to have a chance to force the US to lose interest. The key however was winning that first one.

 

wouldn't they have had to invade the USA? ..they pissed us off...I don't think any President or American would've stopped until Japan was burned to the ground....the Americans would never forget, or lose interest.....they couldn't attack our manufacturing, and with the manpower, that was it....same as in Russia, they weren't going to forget....and why stop, if you got the ability and power?? so what if they won some battles, thousand of miles away from PH, not to mention the mainland? they were going to get kicked, no matter what...much thanks your replies..didn't Halsey say, something like, ''before we're through with them, the only place the Japanese language will be spoken, is hell??".. wasn't that the feeling of America?

 

"same as in Russia" is a good phrase, but it didn't mean the same thing to the Japanese that it might mean to us. They were mindful of their defeat of Russia in 1904-5 - they seized the territory they wanted in Asia, then beat off whatever forces, army and navy, the Russians were able to send thousands of miles to fight on Japan's home ground. They never thought about invading Russia or marching to Moscow - nor did they present any sort of existential threat to Russia. Eventually the tsarist regime found it easiest to acquiesce in the new reality, and they thought we would too. That was their only experience to date of fighting a western power. As has been noted so many times, they didn't really understand America.

 

I guess this is obviously a separate issue from Yamamoto's "genius", but there was little chance of the US "losing interest" I don't believe. Far as I know, there was no particular amount of war weariness in the USA prior to 1945 Iwo/Okinawa, when the USA had been in it almost 4 years and those casualty figures started showing up in the newspapers, with the prospect of an invasion of Japan looming. But in '42 or '43 there was no chance at all of the US shying away from a fight with Japan. The sentiment attributed to Halsey by bronk7 was widespread.

 

sorry Car, I meant, the Russians would never lose interest in pounding Germany to hell....as US would never lose interest in pounding Japan,,,never never......