Yet another "Operation Sealion" what if?

The more interesting scenario would have been the German defeat of the RAF and no immediate invasion.

The Luftwaffe would have been relatively free to pick and chose what targets to hit, and effectively cripple industry. The U Boats choking the Atlantic convoys - potential food riots breaking out, change of government and a negociated settlement with Hitler without German troops setting foot in England.

 

They nearly did until they switched to bombing cities.

 

if they kept it up, they would have succeded...

 

Not really. The fighter bases closest to France, and their squadrons, were taking a hammering at one point but there were many fresh squadrons a bit further away which could have been rotated in if necessary. If all else failed, the RAF could have abandoned the closest bases and carried on fighting from airfields beyond Bf 109 range. But the RAF fighters would still have been within easy reach of London - and the beaches.

The BoB actually hurt the Luftwaffe more than the RAF - they were failing to make up their losses in men and planes, whereas the RAF was more or less as strong at the end of the BoB as it was at the beginning.

And the longer the Germans delayed before the invasion, the more time the British had to strengthen their defences and replace the army equipment lost at Dunkirk.

 

They nearly did until they switched to bombing cities. </font>[/QUOTE]The story that the RAF was saved by Luftwaffe attacking London instead of the airfields is one of the great myths of WW2
On the 6 September 1940 the RAF's Fighter Command had 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots available, an increase of 150 planes and 200 pilots from the beginning of the Battle in July.
The Luftwaffe was not even coming close to winning the war of attrition

On the 5 September Air Vice-Marshal Park commander of 11 Group spoke to his Chief Controller Lord Willoughby de Brooke " I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses" Park said "Well I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going, I'm sure we shall win in the end"

On the 7th September the Luftwaffe blinked, they bombed London

 

Definitely Luftwaffe was getting hammered but considering the effort for the RAF to stay in the battle everything was put in the battle if not 150%.

Actually I´m always a bit sad about "we can afford the losses " part. What does that exactly mean? We can cover the losses (?) by what level? 1:1 ,2:1....?

The pilots taking the position of the lost ones are always fresh and probably get killed more easily than the experienced crews. So losing pilots is always making your fighter force more vulnerable, I think. And estimating that is more like flipping the coin. No matter what air force.

 

Granted, the RAF had been badly hit, especially the aircraft and airfields of 11 Group, but only rendered marginally effective on a temporary basis. It took less than an 8 day respite from Luftwaffe air raids for all of 11 Group's airfields, their compliment of aircraft and pilots to be brought back up to a full, 100% operational capability status.

That doesn't sound to me like a group that was ever in any danger of being wiped out by overwhelming numbers, with all of their pilots dead or in hospital, all of their aircraft destroyed and their airfield runways cratered into a moon scape of non-usability.

 

Actually no.
While the Luftwaffe was fighting the battle with almost all of its air force, Fighter Command only fought the battle with just over 50% of its operational strength in the front line. The unit fighting in south west (11 Group) had 30 Squadrons, while 12 and 13 Groups outside the main battle area had 28 squadrons.
The RAF and Luftwaffe were fighting two different types of battle. The RAF was fighting a war of attrition, the Luftwaffe was attempting to achieve a quick knock-out blow.

Like I've just pointed out, the RAF was taking the long view. Park knew that the losses the RAF were taking in this period, while heavy, would not defeat the RAF, before either the winter came, or the Luftwaffe was forced to call it off, due to its own losses.

People always look at the losses of Fighter Command and they fail to notice that the Luftwaffe was suffering even more.
The rate of replacement of both pilots and aircraft during the battle for the Luftwaffe was insufficient, leading to the break-up of formations and units, something that didn't happen on the RAF side. In fact during the battle the number of operational RAF fighter squadrons increased.
At the start of the battle the Luftwaffe only had a 5:3 advantage in operational single seat fighters over the RAF, by the end of the battle the Luftwaffe had nearly 150 operational fighters less than the RAF.
This has led one historian to suggest that if Fighter Command pilots are called 'The Few' the Luftwaffe fighter pilots should be called 'The Fewer'.

 

Sorry if I did not make myself clear on the subject. All in all I was meaning the spirit and all the men/women in the RAF when I was talking about the 100-150%. If you have lousy mechanics you can´t win with great pilots etc. Or all the other people involved like women as radar operators etc. These all are important parts of the system and all added to the victory gained in the end. And this is what makes the great victory; the nation united against the enemy. This takes it to the 150%; the spirit within.

Sorry about my sarcasm about the " We can afford the losses". I guess I have heard that one too many times. Usually this means that "I hope we can afford the losses". It´s only afterwards you can be sure the other side could not.

It is a well known fact the Germans lost a whole lot more planes. I don´t think anybody questions this.Big losses however don´t always mean you end up losing the war. Just check the Ost front statistics and Germans would have been clear cut winners by August 1941. No other nation could have stood the losses of that magnitude. ( even Halder wrote in his diary that it seems the USSR has lost at the time ).

ANd when it came to the battle of Britain which was, I believe, the first of its kind of warfare. How can anyone predict how it will end? The famous "bomber always gets through" theory and the first calculations for expected civilian losses in London? They did not happen even though those were the principles when the bombings were about to start. And I´m glad they did not.

 

A significant fact as far as pilot supply was concerned was of course that RAF pilots who were shot down but uninjured were often back with their units, ready to fight again, the same day.

When German planes were shot down over England - or over the sea - the crews didn't get back.

 

In the grand scheme of things it is sea power, not air power, that determines the success or failure of Seelöwe. Winning the air war for Germany does not in any way mean they can successfully invade.

 

Agreed. Enough said.

 

I have read several books on the matter and have seen several more doco's on TV and the conclusion of the capacity of the Royal Navy is this, it is i known fact that capital sips such as Battleships, Battlecruiser, Heavy Cruisers and Aircraft Carriers were not to be deployed against the invasion fleet, they were to be deployed for the express usage in evacuation of the Government and Royal Family plus government and royal assets, such as the crown jewels, gold bullion, government document and the like.

That leaves invasion fleet interdiction by light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Now i am assuming that the Royal Navy at the time could not have had as many as 300 destroyers in home waters at the time due in no small part as the RN was scattered throughout the world, and would take weeks to race back home.

And now onto the Air war, well it is a fact during Operaration Alder, Goring forbade follow-up attacks on airfields two days in a row, Goring ignored the importance of destroying the vital radar installations, and the Luftwaffe failed to attack centres of industry, such as aircraft production and repair facilities, also it failed to destroy the lines of communications such as roads and rail, and they needed only hed to achieve local air superiorority over South-Eastern Britain.

And onto the land war, Britain was in no shape what so ever in the land defense of home soil as the British Army had three fully armed divisions at the time, the rest were lacking in arms and equipment, let us not forget that Britain alone lost over 750,000 tonnes of war materiel in France and Norway that excludes the 70,000 vehicles it left behind, at full production that equates to at least 18 months of war materiel production lost.

But the only thing that would have made the job difficult was the fact that Churchill was fully prepared to use biological and chemical weapons, he indended to use both Mustard gas as previously mention and Anthrax, plus Britain did have one secret weapon the vast oil pipelines that jutted out into the channel, the intention was to flood the channel with oil and set it alight, immolating thousands of Germans troops.

But in conclusion Hitler hesitated and "he Who hesitates is lost". I belive German forces could have taken Britain and yes at a very high cost but taken it nonetheless, had thing been done right.

 

I don't know about the capital ships not smashing the invasion. Can you provide a link to this?

The people who planned sealion thought that "local air superiority" would work. Unfortunately, these are the same people who failed in all of the above.

The Royal Army was in disarray, but was not alone in the defense of the homeland:

Any thoughts?

See below...

I share your interest in this topic! I have come to realize that "Operation Sealion" was never going to work. This doesn't say that Britain was invulnerable, just that no 'ad hoc, spur of the moment' plan would succeed.

I plan to revisit this topic again in the future, but only in support of a thoroughly thought out plan.

 

Yes i will concede that the LDV had recruited at least 1.5 million, but they were to be used to supplement the local law enforcement such as the police to keep law and order, they however were never to engage outright attacks on any invading army as they were not an authorized military organization, they were a militia nothing more and nothing less, and had they engaged the German forces they would have been shot on the spot if captured and they would not have been taken POW, Also the LDV retained their civilian capacity.

And had the Germans launched Operation Seelowe and by any miracle established a beachead, i can honestly say that the USA would have wiped their hands of Britain and stopped any supply convoys thus those millions of guns would have never have been sent, thus depriving the British of weapons.

Plus one thing has bothered me, if the Germans had the capacity to launch a seaborne invasion of Norway, why could it not do the same with Britain, even taking into consideration of the material losses by the German Navy.

 

The LDV / Home Guard might have had numbers in mid to late 1940 but certainly lacked training, orgainzation, and equipment. In the early days most volunteers got just an arm band (uniforms came later). This made them legal combatants in the same way the Germans did this with the Volksturm towards the end of the war.
One also has to note the guns the US sent were the SMLE No 3 Mk I and I* (or P 14) both of which used .30 06 (7.62mm) ammunition not British .303 (7.92mm). To note this many had a white band painted around the stock about half way to the muzzle. You sometimes see this in Home Guard photos.
Certainly, a unit of even fairly well equipped Home Guard with say some Lewis guns, a BAR or three (yes they received some of these too), and a couple of Smith guns was hardly an awesome fighting force.

Now, a more interesting proposition is that the Germans do something totally different.

What if instead of launching an invasion, the Germans use their preparations to assist the U-boat campaign? The British held at a minimum 36 destroyers in the South of England for counter invasion duties. This in turn put a real strain on the Royal Navy's ability to escort convoys properly.
So, now the Luftwaffe turns its attentions to RN destroyers and other naval vessels in port and tries to attack them at sea as well. With the continued build up of shipping and other preparations for a landing the attacks would not look out of place.
At the same time priority is given to U-boat constuction and operations. If the British had a few more thrid to half million ton losses per month as they did in this period historically, it might have really put some economic hurt on England.

 

One main exercise was carried out by the Germans before Sea lion, just off Boulogne. Fifty vessels were used, and to enable the observers to actually observe, the exercise was carried out in broad daylight. [The real thing was due to take place at night/dawn]

The vessels marshalled about a mile out to sea, and cruised parallel to the coast. The armada turned towards the coast [one barge capsizing, and another losing its tow] and approached and landed. The barges opened, and soldiers swarmed ashore.

However, it was noted that the masters of the boats let the intervals between the vessels become wider and wider, because they were scared of collisions. Half the barges failed to get their troops ashore within an hour of the first troops, and over 10% failed to reach the shore at all.

The troops in the barges managed to impede the sailors in a remarkable manner - in one case, a barge overturned because the troops rushed to one side when another barge "came too close".

Several barges grounded broadside on, preventing the ramp from being lowered.

In this exercise, carried out in good visibility, with no enemy, in good weather, after travelling only a short distance, with no navigation hazards or beach defences, less than half the troops were got ashore where they could have done what they were supposed to do.

The exercise was officially judged to have been a "great success".

 

For Germany to make an invasion of England possible, they would have to have:

1) Built the means to transport the troops and supplies to England, with enough extra to allow for the operation to be successfully sustained despite losses. This would take far more time than they had once the war started.

2) Developed, trained, and fielded the forces needed to protect the invasion shipping. I see two main threats to the invasion shipping. Air attack, Naval attack.

3) Trained their forces for the invasion, developed means to carry out the attack in unexpected places/ways, planed for countering British defenses and to cause as much disruption and confusion in the enemy as possible.

The Nazi's did none of these things.

The US weapons arrived by July, sealion [even the pathetically hopeless version the Nazi's contemplated], wasn't going till September, three months to late.

The LDV were going to be manning the defenses [meaning they will have to be defeated while fighting from prepared positions]. If you read the articles linked too in my previous post, it gives some interesting information about the defenses that would need to be overcome.

I don't believe England could be beaten by the historical sealion. By a fully, carefully thought out and prepared for invasion, sure.

[ 31. January 2007, 12:44 AM: Message edited by: Shadow Master ]

 

Mate the rifle the U.S sent was not the SMLE No1 MK3 or 3* and the Pattern 14 (different rifle to the SMLE)and both rifles were in .303 (7.7mm not 7.92), the rifle the U.S sent was the M17 (model of 1917) in 30-06. The only .303 rifle the U.S produced during WW2 was the Savage No4 MK1 and MK1*.
Cheers

 

Sorry that I can't contribute to this discussion, but I just want to say...I love reading this..and you guys bring up some great points!!

Not many forums out there that have this wide of opinions..and still kept civil...almost "profesional"

Good Job