Yet another "Operation Sealion" what if?

John Dudek · Aug 19, 2007

redcoat said:

No.
Anthrax was never considered for use against any invasion force, just Mustard gas.

Again no.
There was no realistic way the Germans could hope to protect the invasion fleet from being sunk by the largest navy in the world at that time, the RN.

Guess what Its another No.
On the date of the switch to bombing London the RAF had more operational single seat fighter pilots than the Luftwaffe. The shortage of pilots Dowding was worried about, were experienced Squadron and flight leaders.

Must admit, I'm getting a little fed up with using this word
No, they weren't forbidden, its just that the RN didn't plan to use them. They considered the 20+ cruisers, the 50+ destroyers, and the hundreds of auxiliary craft were enough to deal with any invasion force

Ho Hum
No, they weren't
Click to expand...

If the Royal Navy didn't intend to use "heavy units" to interdict and destroy the incoming German Invasion ships, then why did they send a large portion of the fleet to more southerly ports like Rosyth, instead of keeping them safe and away from harm at Scapa Flow?

Martin Bull · Aug 19, 2007

John Dudek said:

why did they send a large portion of the fleet to more southerly ports like Rosyth, instead of keeping them safe and away from harm at Scapa Flow?
Click to expand...

Didn't the 'Royal Oak' and Prien have something to do with the decision ?

John Dudek · Aug 19, 2007

Martin Bull said:

Didn't the 'Royal Oak' and Prien have something to do with the decision ?
Click to expand...

The sinking of the Royal Oak was much earlier. By 9/40 the blockships and defenses at Scapa flow had been added-to and markedly increased. Moving the Fleet South was as a result of the Germans preparing to make Sealion a reality.

Kai-Petri · Aug 20, 2007

I guess it was up to the RN then (?)

From " The last ditch" by David Lampe:

"So few military vehicles had been brought home from France that the few mobile defence units that could be raised in the summer of 1940 had to rely on hired civilian motor coaches for their mobility. Eight hours´ notice was needed just to get these units on the road- more time than the first wave of Hitler´s invasion armada would have taken to cross the English Channel and unload its troops. The defence units would then have crept across the country very slowly, impeded by the absence of signposts."

redcoat · Aug 20, 2007

Kai-Petri said:

I guess it was up to the RN then (?)
Click to expand...

By September the date of the planned invasion, the equipment situation for the British army units defending Britain had improved quite considerably, as this post from the American poster RichT090 on the Axis History forum shows

548 Cruiser Tanks had been built by 30 September; 134 had been lost in France and 137 were in Egypt, which still left over 200 in Britain, enough to equip the four Cruiser regiments of 1st Armoured Division that were active. The situation with Infantry Tanks was even brighter, of 524 completed, 120 were lost in France and 52 had been shipped to Egypt on 18 August leaving well over 330 available, enough to equip the five regiments of the GHQ Reserve 1st and 21st Army Tank Brigade to full War Establishment and leave enough left over to allow the continued training and equipping of the six regiments of 23rd and 24th Army Tank Brigades (essentially a full regiments worth per brigade). And there were a plethora of Light Tanks available, of 1,340 built, 321 had been lost in France and 275 were in Egypt, leaving over 700, more than enough in theory to equip the dozen or so regiments formed to War Establishment. Note that by actual count the three ‘light’ regiments of 22nd Armoured Brigade averaged 42.33 tanks, 73 percent of their War Establishment of 58.

Just 139 A11 Infantry Tank ‘Matilda’ Mark I were built, 65 prewar and 74 between 1 September 1939 and 31 March 1940. In contrast just 2 prototype A12 Infantry Tank ‘Matilda’ Mark II had been completed prewar and 34 more up to 31 March 1940. All production Matilda from 1 April 1940 were A11 Mark II, but were supplemented by Valentine production beginning in May. There were a total of 121 Matilda II and Valentine ‘I’ tanks produced in the second quarter, 227 in the third and 354 in the fourth of 1940. Of the 140 Mark I, 97 were lost in France, along with 23 Mark II. In addition, 52 Mark II went to the desert in August 1940 and more later in the fall (November IIRC). So although the bulk on hand with troops as of 1 June were Mark I (60+), by the end of September the majority in England were actually Mark II (300+).

In terms of newly produced artillery, not counting guns evacuated from France (a total of 322 of all types or roughly one-in-eight had been brought back), there were about 140 2-pdr AT guns, 568 40mm Bofors AA guns, 294 25-pdr guns, 728 3.7-inch AA, and 118 other miscellaneous guns added to the Army from 1 April to 30 September. In terms of ‘B’ Echelon vehicles, 63,879 had been lost in France, but 54,057 new ones had been produced.

Also by that time the initial shipments of equipment sold by the US had arrived, including 895 M1917 and M1897 75mm guns, each with 1,200 rounds of ammunition, 300 3-inch mortars, each with 325 rounds of ammunition (enough for 150 battalions under current WE), 1,157 Lewis, 7,071 Vickers, 10,000 M1917 MG, and 25,000 BAR.
Click to expand...

Log in or Sign up

Yet another "Operation Sealion" what if?

John Dudek Member

Martin Bull Acting Wg. Cdr

John Dudek Member

Kai-Petri Kenraali

redcoat Ace

Share This Page

About US

Useful Links